

Monthly Iran Projectile Tracker: November 2024

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The Jewish Institute for National Security of America's (JINSA) <u>Iran Projectile Tracker</u> presents regularly updated charts and graphs on missiles, rockets, drones, and mortars that Iran and its regional proxies have fired at U.S. personnel, partners, and interests in the Middle East, as well as data for other Iran-linked malign activity. Below is an update reflecting the major trends from the last month.

1. Major Trends


- After over a year of fighting and nine weeks of sustained escalated fire, Hezbollah and Israel implemented a ceasefire on November 27 at 4:00 am local time. Before the ceasefire went into effect, Hezbollah fired at least 2,095 rockets, missiles, and UAVs at Israel throughout November, roughly one third as many as the 6,340 projectiles that the terrorist group fired during its unprecedented escalation in October—the highest monthly total during the conflict.
 - » As IDF BG Effie Defrin and JINSA Policy Analyst Yoni Tobin argued in a <u>JINSA report</u> before the ceasefire, ensuring enforcement of the agreement's terms to not allow Hezbollah to reenter southern Lebanon and that Israel maintains freedom of action to prevent it from reconstituting itself will be critical to the deal's long-term viability.
 - » After three consecutive weeks of declining fire against Israel, Hezbollah escalated its daily average fire by roughly 80 percent in the week leading up to the ceasefire deal as a last-minute bid to exert pressure on Israel to agree to a deal and maximize the amount of attacks it could conduct before its implementation.
 - Despite this final surge of attacks, Hezbollah's choice not to send military support to Bashar al-Assad in Syria after Islamist opposition forces launched an offensive that captured Aleppo and other key territories on November 30 is further evidence of their loss of capacity and willingness to fight.
- Iran-backed militias in Iraq launched at least 100 UAVs, missiles, and rockets against Israel, only 10 percent fewer than the 111 projectiles these groups launched during their unprecedented escalation in October. Leveraging its Iraqi proxies to fire at Israel was likely a means for Iran to increase fire against the Jewish state without triggering the retaliation on Iranian territory that its direct attacks have incurred.
 - » Although not a party to the ceasefire, Iran's proxies also decreased their fire after the agreement went into effect.
- Iran-backed militias also conducted five attacks against U.S. troops in Syria during November, a 66 percent decrease from the 15 they launched in October.
 - » U.S. strikes to preemptively target Iranian proxies preparing attacks and U.S. strikes shortly after Iran-linked attacks occurred likely contributed to this decline in attacks on

U.S. troops, as well as provided further evidence that Iran and its proxies back down when faced with stronger and more consistent use of military force against them. The United States had not targeted Iran's proxies in Iraq or Syria since August, despite being subject to a resumption in attacks against U.S. troops in September.

- » There have now been at least 210 Iran-backed attacks targeting U.S. troops in Iraq, Syria, or Jordan since October 2023.
- The six attacks that the Houthis in Yemen conducted against maritime targets in November continued the overall trend since September of decreased attacks and marked the first month without a successful attack against a maritime target since the Iran-backed terrorist group's escalation began in November 2023.


2. Iran-linked Attacks Against Israel

- In November, Hezbollah and other terrorists in Lebanon launched 67 percent fewer rockets, missiles, and drones at Israel than during the unprecedented escalation in October, according to JINSA's data. The terrorist group fired at least 2,095 projectiles from Lebanon during November, an average of 70 projectiles per day, down from 6,340 total projectiles in October (205 per day average), the month with the peak total number of Hezbollah attacks.
 - » Hezbollah also fired roughly 4 percent fewer projectiles during November than in September. However, during the week before the ceasefire went into effect, it was on pace to fire 33 percent more in November than September.
 - During the first three weeks of November, Hezbollah decreased its average daily fire against Israel by 66 percent, 18 percent, and 32 percent, respectively, compared to the preceding week.
 - From November 15-26, in the leadup to the ceasefire, Hezbollah increased its fire by roughly 80 percent compared to the prior week. While this increase reversed the trend of declining attacks, Hezbollah did not increase its fire to levels it reached earlier in the escalation.




» From May to November, Hezbollah increased their average daily fire against Israel by 272 percent compared to the first seven months of the war. Since May, Hezbollah has launched over 14,313 projectiles against Israel from Lebanon, compared to 3,625 between October 2023 and April 2024. Hezbollah has launched roughly 17,940 projectiles at Israel since the war began in October 2023.

» During the escalation from September 20 to November 26, Hezbollah launched an average of 144 rockets, missiles, and UAVs per day. Throughout the escalation, Hezbollah launched roughly 9,800 projectiles.



Hezbollah's Escalated Fire During the 2023-24 War 🛛 🔯 JINSA

- While Hezbollah maintains a large arsenal of rockets, missiles, and UAVs, Israeli operations have killed almost all of Hezbollah's senior leadership, eliminated over 500 of its fighters, destroyed substantial portions of its weapons arsenal, and targeted Iranian efforts to resupply the terrorist group. This weakening of Hezbollah undermines its role as a second-strike deterrent against an Israeli operation to directly target Iran's nuclear program.
- In November, Iran's proxies in Iraq continued the unprecedented escalation of attacks against Israel that they began in October. The 100 projectiles these groups fired during November were only 10 percent fewer than the 111 they launched the month beforehand.




- The 100 projectiles Iran's proxies in Iraq launched during November were 178 percent more than the 36 projectiles they launched during September and 127 percent more than the 44 projectiles during May, which had been the month with the highest monthly total before the recent escalation.
- » Although not a party to the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, Iran's proxies in Iraq also decreased their fires after the ceasefire went into effect on November 27 by launching only two more UAVs for the rest of November.
 - Iran's proxies in Iraq launched an average of 3.3 projectiles per day at Israel during November, down from the average of 3.7 projectiles during October, but up from an average of 2.5 projectiles from September 19-30 and an average of 0.4 attacks from September 1-18.

3. Iran-linked Projectile Attacks Against U.S. Targets


- In November, Iranian proxies decreased their attacks against U.S. personnel by 66 percent compared to October, which had been the highest monthly total since January.
 - » Unlike with previous Iran-linked attacks, U.S. forces preemptively struck Iranian proxies preparing to launch rockets or targeted Iranian proxy sites after each attack, which likely contributed to the decrease in total Iran-linked attacks throughout November.
 - The United States did not conduct any strikes against Iranian proxies in Syria or Iraq during October, despite these groups targeting U.S. forces with seven attacks in September and 15 attacks in October.

Iran-linked Projectile Attacks Against U.S. Personnel Since the Start of the Israel-Hamas War




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• Iran-backed groups in Iraq and Syria have launched at least 210 attacks involving over 360 rockets, missiles, and drones against U.S. personnel since October 17, 2023.




4. Iran-linked Projectile Attacks Against Maritime Targets

- The Houthis' maritime aggression decreased by 66 percent during November to at least six cases, down from 18 incidents in October, and matching the six incidents in September.
 - » The decline in Houthi attacks may be due to Iran and Hezbollah—who have <u>assisted</u> <u>with Houthi operations</u>—focusing their attention on Israel's escalated operations in Lebanon. The Houthis may also face a shortage of weapons that are capable of hitting ships because of its high number of attacks over the past year and limited U.S. strikes to destroy its weapons stockpiles.



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
- » From September to November, Houthi aggression has been roughly 76 percent lower with 0.33 incidents per day compared to the peak activity from May to August of an average of 1.4 incidents per day.
- » Similarly, the number of projectiles that the Houthis launched during November increased by 39 percent.



- The Houthis launched 28 projectiles in October compared to 46 in November.


Iran-linked Projectiles in the Maritime Domain 📴 JINSA

» November was the first month since the Houthi escalation began one year ago that the terrorist group did not conduct a successful attack against a maritime target. Of the six maritime attacks, 50 percent were entirely neutralized by U.S. or partner forces, and the other 50 percent missed their target.




5. Iran-linked Malign Activity Against the United States

 In 2024, Iran and its proxies have already conducted nearly 95 percent as many incidents of malign activity targeting the United States or U.S. personnel (139) as in the entirety of 2023 (146), most of which has consisted of projectile strikes by Iran-backed groups in Iraq and Syria and Houthi strikes endangering U.S. naval vessels in Middle Eastern waters.



» The number of Iran-linked malign activities against the United States during the Biden administration has been unprecedented, and the rate of such activities has skyrocketed by roughly 660 percent since Hamas's October 7, 2023, attack on Israel.



Malign activity includes incidents of projectile strikes, maritime aggression, major cyber intrusions and hacking, kidnappings/wrongful detentions, and terrorist attacks.