

Scorecard: Iran Nuclear Talks

| <i>Parameter</i> | <i>JCPOA (2015)</i> | <i>President Trump (2017-18)</i> | <i>Recent Trump Administration Statements</i> | <i>Current Trend</i> |
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| Enrichment Level | ≤ 3.67% enriched uranium. | <p>“Worst of all, the deal allows Iran to continue developing certain elements of its nuclear program. And importantly, in just a few years, as key restrictions disappear, Iran can sprint towards a rapid nuclear weapons breakout.” – President Donald Trump, October 13, 2017</p> | <p>“Total dismantlement. That’s all I’d accept.” – Trump, May 4, 2025</p> |  <p>Positive: Stronger U.S. statements despite Iran insisting enrichment is non-negotiable.</p> |
| Stockpile | 300kg of ≤ 3.67% enriched uranium. | | <p>“If Iran wants a civil nuclear program, they can have one just like many other countries can have one, and that is they import enriched material.” – Secretary of State Marco Rubio, April 23, 2025</p> | |
| Enrichment Capacity | 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges in 30 cascades at Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). | <p>“The [JCPOA] allowed Iran to continue enriching uranium and, over time, reach the brink of a nuclear breakout.” – Trump, May 8, 2018</p> | <p>“They do not need to enrich past 3.67%. In some circumstances, they’re at 60%, in other circumstances 20%. That cannot be ... and you do not need to run—as they claim—a civil nuclear program where you’re enriching past 3.67%.” – Witkoff, April 14, 2025</p> | |
| Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) | 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades for R&D and isotope production, but no uranium enrichment. | | | |
| Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missiles | Iran “called upon” not to conduct tests of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles (UNSCR 2231). | <p>“The flaws in the [JCPOA] also include insufficient enforcement and near total silence on Iran’s missile programs.” – Trump, October 13, 2017</p> | <p>Iran must “walk away from building long-range missiles that have no purpose to exist other than having nuclear weapons.” – Rubio, May 2, 2025</p> | |
| | | | <p>Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities “are not up for negotiation.” – Iranian official, April 25, 2025</p> | |

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| <p>Nuclear-Capable Cruise Missiles</p> | <p>Not addressed.</p> | <p>Not addressed.</p> | <p>"The United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations will work with key allies to complete the snapback of international sanctions and restrictions on Iran." – Trump, National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) No. 2, February 4, 2025</p> | <p> Incomplete: No U.S. mention of cruise missiles, but Iran trying to delay or forestall "snapback" of UNSC sanctions on its missile development.</p> |
| <p>Monitoring and Verification</p> | <p>Iran required to ratify the IAEA Additional Protocol, and to implement Modified Code 3.1 permanently (Iran fulfilled neither obligation).</p> | <p>"The deal's inspection provisions lack adequate mechanisms to prevent, detect, and punish cheating, and don't even have the unqualified right to inspect many important locations, including military facilities." – Trump, May 8, 2018</p> | <p>"This is going to be much about verification on the enrichment program, and then ultimately verification on weaponization. That includes missiles, the type of missiles that they have stockpiled there, and it includes the trigger for a bomb." – Witkoff, April 14, 2025</p> <hr/> <p>"I'd much rather see a deal with Iran where we can do a deal – supervise, check it, inspect it and then blow it up or just make sure that there is no more nuclear" facilities. – Trump, February 10, 2025</p> | <p> Negative: Softening U.S. demands, even as Iran continues its non-compliance with IAEA safeguards.</p> |
| <p>Sunsets</p> | <p>8 years (October 2023): End of UNSC restrictions on nuclear-capable ballistic missile tests. 8.5 years (March 2024): End of ban on advanced centrifuge testing and manufacturing. 10 years (October 2025): • End of Natanz enrichment capacity and stockpile caps. • End of UNSC consideration of Iran's nuclear program. 15 years (October 2030): • End of 3.67% enrichment cap. • End of Fordow enrichment ban. • End of ban on heavy water reactors and spent fuel reprocessing. 20 years (October 2035): End of IAEA containment and surveillance of centrifuge components. 25 years (October 2040): End of IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate and conversion plants.</p> | <p>"The deal's sunset provisions are totally unacceptable." – Trump, May 8, 2018</p> <hr/> <p>"Serious flaws include the deal's sunset clauses that, in just a few years, will eliminate key restrictions on Iran's nuclear program." – Trump, October 13, 2017</p> | <p>A deal "has to be something that actually not just prevents Iran from having a nuclear weapon now, but in the future as well, not just for 10 years with some sort of sunset provision or the like." – Rubio, April 18, 2025</p> | <p> Positive: Iran has yet to reject U.S. demands for longer-term restrictions than under the JCPOA.</p> |