



## Iran Nuclear Talks Update 6/9/25

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*While the United States and Iran continue to negotiate a potential nuclear deal, JINSA will resume its weekly release of the Iran Nuclear Talks Update.*

### U.S.-Iran Nuclear Negotiation Status: Ongoing

- With only two days until President Donald Trump's 60-day nuclear deal [deadline](#), which is set to expire on June 11, Trump and officials in his administration have expressed conflicting views on whether the United States would allow Iran to enrich uranium as part of an agreement. As this deadline approaches, a reported U.S. proposal would allow for Iran to continue enriching some uranium until a regional nuclear consortium is established. This proposal raises concerns that the Trump administration may waver on its "no enrichment" redline.
- While the negotiating teams have yet to confirm a sixth round of talks following the proposal's submission, Iran has rejected the U.S. proposal and [announced](#) on June 9 that it would submit an alternative proposal to the United States.
- Meanwhile, on June 9, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Board of Governors is meeting, where the United States and European countries are expected to push for Iran to be censured.

### U.S. Consortium Proposal: Enrichment or No Enrichment?

- Despite Trump declaring any uranium enrichment a redline in the ongoing nuclear talks with Iran, a recent U.S. proposal reportedly would establish a regional nuclear consortium and allow for low levels of Iranian enrichment.
  - » On May 31, U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff [submitted](#) a proposal to Iran which would allow Iran to continue enriching uranium to levels below 3 percent and only at above-ground facilities until a new international consortium is established to produce nuclear fuel for countries in the region.
  - » The deal would also prohibit the regime from constructing new enrichment facilities, force it to "dismantle critical infrastructure" used to handle uranium, discontinue research and development of advanced centrifuges, render underground enrichment sites "non-operational," and cooperate with IAEA inspectors in exchange for certain sanctions relief.
  - » Following the proposal, Trump [posted](#) to Truth Social on June 2, writing, "Under our potential Agreement—WE WILL NOT ALLOW ANY ENRICHMENT OF URANIUM!"
  - » Contradicting his recent proposal, Witkoff had previously rejected the possibility of any potential deal that would permit Iran enriching uranium when he [stated](#) on May 18, "we cannot have [enrichment]. Because enrichment enables weaponization, and we will not allow a bomb—to get here."
- Iran has already ruled out the U.S. proposal but appears to be preparing a counterproposal.

- » On June 3, *Axios* [reported](#) that a senior Iranian official responded to the consortium proposal, claiming, “If the consortium operates within the territory of Iran, it may warrant consideration. However, should it be based outside the borders of the country, it is certainly doomed to fail.”
- » On June 4, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei [rejected](#) the proposal, asserting on X, “To the American side and others we say: Why are you interfering and trying to say whether Iran should have uranium enrichment or not? That’s none of your business.”
- » On June 9, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei [announced](#) that Iran would submit a counterproposal to the United States after Witkoff’s recent nuclear deal offer was rendered “unacceptable” for the regime.

## Israeli Preparations for a Military Strike

- Against the backdrop of talks, reports of Israeli preparations to conduct strikes against Iran’s nuclear program could potentially increase U.S. leverage at the negotiating table, but Trump has publicly called for Israeli restraint during the talks, incentivizing Tehran to drag out negotiations without giving clear or final answers to U.S. proposals.
  - » On May 28, *The New York Times* [reported](#) that Israel continued to prepare for military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, despite the ongoing negotiations.
  - » Later that day, Trump [confirmed](#) that he had advised Israel against striking Iran, telling reporters that “we’re having very good discussions with [Iran], and I said [to Netanyahu], ‘I don’t think that’s appropriate right now.’”
  - » On June 1, *Financial Times* also [outlined](#) how Iran has repositioned its military in preparation for a potential U.S. or Israeli attack, particularly by bolstering its defense capabilities near vulnerable nuclear sites.

## Europe’s Hardening Stance Against Iran

- Recent reports suggest that the E3 nations—the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—might seek to “snap back” United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.
  - » On May 20, Secretary of State Marco Rubio [stated](#) that “There’s a separate set of sanctions ... which are the snapback provisions that the E3 in Europe have. That’s on another clock, completely different from [the United States’]. ... They’re moving forward on their process, independent from ours.”
  - » On May 25, *The Jerusalem Post* [revealed](#) that the E3 powers realized that Iran seeks to drag out nuclear talks with the United States in hopes that stalling will prevent snapback.
  - » The United States is also [expected](#) to support the E3 in censuring Iran for Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) violations at the IAEA’s Board of Governors meeting on June 9, which could then form the basis for the E3 to advance snap back via the UNSC. The decision for censorship would be based entirely on Iran’s non-compliance with IAEA safeguards obligations.
    - With the E3’s looming threats to reinvoke sanctions, Araghchi [warned](#) European nations on June 6 via a post to X, stating “Instead of engaging in good faith, the E3 is opting for malign action against Iran at the IAEA Board of Governors ... Mark my words as Europe ponders another major strategic mistake: Iran will react strongly against any violation of its rights.”

- JINSA Fellow Gabriel Noronha has [argued](#) that April-May was the ideal time to invoke the snapback, arguing, “Snapback should be conducted during a period of two sequential UN Security Council (UNSC) presidencies whose leaders are favorable to snapback.”
  - » Having UNSC presidents who favor snapback sanctions throughout the six-week period required to push it through the UN process would provide the most successful outcome for snapback. Yet, the countries [holding](#) the UNSC presidency in June, July, and August, are either unreliable on supporting the snapback or strictly oppose such measures.