



Iran Nuclear Tracker: September 2025 Quarterly Update

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JINSA's [Iran Nuclear Tracker](#) provides updated analysis and data on Iran's nuclear weapons program for each quarterly board meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Given the setbacks of the 12-Day War and the start of a process to "snap back" UN sanctions since the last IAEA meeting in June, Iran reached a tentative, effectively one-way, deal on the sidelines of the agency's current meeting that it expects will neutralize diplomatic and economic pressure while still enabling it to obscure the current and future status of its path to the bomb.

1. Major Developments and Takeaways

- During the first IAEA quarterly meeting since the 12-Day War, Iran [reached](#) a framework deal with the agency that it hopes will stop the [reimposition](#) of tough UN sanctions and secure other diplomatic concessions, in exchange for vague offers to restore inspectors' access to nuclear sites that Tehran unilaterally abrogated in the wake of the June conflict.
 - » Following Iran's July 2 law [suspending](#) inspections, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi warns he cannot [account](#) for Iran's enriched uranium stocks, the status of potential new enrichment sites in Iran, nor the extent of damage to other nuclear-related infrastructure.
 - » Inspectors also still must account for Iran's extensive undeclared activities and infrastructure, including past weaponization work, that prompted the IAEA to declare Iran in breach of its Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards at its previous meeting in June—hours before the start of the 12-Day War—and which led America's European (E3) partners to [initiate](#) the 4-6-week "snapback" process at the end of last month.
- While specifics of the new Iran-IAEA agreement in Cairo remain unclear, overall it aligns with Iran's incentives to run out the clock on snapback and obviate U.S. bargaining power in any resumed nuclear talks, without requiring Tehran to sacrifice diplomatic leverage or military deterrence by divulging its nuclear program's current status and reconstitution capacity.
 - » Iran reportedly has [one month](#) to inventory its highly enriched uranium (HEU) for the IAEA, after which they would move to [further talks](#) about how the IAEA would verify this inventory.
 - Though the IAEA's quarterly monitoring report does not assess the size of Iran's stockpiles, due to war damage and suspended inspections, data collected right before the conflict [indicate](#) Tehran was continuing its [breakneck](#) 60 percent HEU stockpile growth to the extent it had more than 11 bombs' worth of this material by mid-June, all of which it could have converted into 90 percent enriched uranium in less than one month.
 - The Cairo deal's timeframe allows Iran to drag its feet until Russia assumes the UN Security Council's (UNSC) rotating presidency on October 1, after which point Moscow likely will try to [attenuate](#) the snapback process past its October 18 expiration date.

- Reflecting this [urgency](#) for the IAEA, Grossi said at the September meeting that “these practical steps, allow me to state the obvious, need to be implemented now.”
- » Regardless if or when Iran gives an inventory, its conditions for follow-on talks are entirely one-sided and, if fulfilled, offer little chance of providing substantive or timely transparency:
 - In line with the country’s July 2 law, Iranian officials make clear that future IAEA access depends on Tehran first receiving unspecified [guarantees](#) that it will not come under further military or other [attacks](#), explicitly including snapback.
 - Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi [insists](#) “no access is being granted to inspectors at this time. The type and form of any future access will be subject to separate, future negotiations that will take place after Iran submits its reports.”
 - Following years of systematic IAEA safeguards non-compliance that ultimately led to snapback, Iran now insists it would not restore full access but instead demand [limits](#) on “the number of inspectors, their level of oversight, and their nationalities.”
 - Simultaneously, Iranian officials close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have listed these [preconditions](#) for renewed talks with the United States on a new nuclear deal.
- » The Cairo deal follows a pattern of Iran-IAEA agreements where Iran pledges renewed cooperation in order to stave off sanctions and other pressure at impending IAEA board meetings, only to renege on its promises shortly thereafter (SEE TABLE).
- » Iran is also trying to build leverage by [intimidating](#) Grossi directly, implicitly threatening his safety by accusing him of complicity in U.S.-Israeli strikes on its nuclear program, and by [threatening](#) to abandon the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) if snapback succeeds.
- Even with the major setbacks Iran suffered this summer, its full IAEA compliance is more important than ever in light of its sharp imperatives to protect remaining nuclear infrastructure from further military strikes and obscure any efforts to resume its progress toward the bomb.
 - » The Cairo deal focuses on Iran’s HEU stock, much but perhaps not all of which is believed to be buried inside facilities at Fordow, Isfahan, and Natanz that were hit in June.
 - Grossi has said Iran mentioned the need to keep the location of its enriched uranium stocks [secret](#), and he warned recently that the [status](#) of this stockpile still “needs to be verified. Some could have been lost.”
 - » Full accounting of these enriched uranium stockpiles would be necessary, but far from sufficient, to assess and monitor the true extent of Iran’s nuclear program, given the IAEA’s well-established warnings that it cannot rule out undeclared stocks of enriched uranium, centrifuges components, and other [covert infrastructure](#) for producing a nuclear weapon (SEE INFOGRAPHIC).
 - In its June [report](#) on Iran’s NPT violations, the IAEA revealed Iran’s lengthy track record of systematic cover-ups at four weaponization-related sites, much of which Iran successfully hid from inspectors for years and only came to light after Israel’s daring covert operation to extract archives from Tehran in 2018.
 - This report noted the whereabouts of nuclear material and equipment stored at one of these sites, which Iran hastily destroyed in advance of inspections, remain unknown.
 - Tellingly, Iran demands an end to snapback despite still failing to address these concerns that led the IAEA to find it in breach of its NPT obligations in the first place.

2. Charts and Infographics

TABLE: Iran's Empty Promises to the IAEA		
DATE	MEETING COMMITMENTS	SUBSEQUENT EVENTS
August 2020	Iran agrees to let IAEA visit sites at Marivan and Varamin where IAEA suspects Iran conducted undeclared weaponization-related work.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IAEA finds undeclared man-made uranium during visits to the two sites. IAEA finds Iran's explanations for such uranium "not technically credible."
February 2021	Joint Statement reaffirming need for continued cooperation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Iran subsequently ends JCPOA-related transparency measures and reduces IAEA access at known enrichment sites.
September 2021	Joint Statement allowing IAEA to service monitoring equipment in Iranian nuclear facilities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The following month, Grossi says IAEA monitoring in Iran is "no longer intact." Iran subsequently removes IAEA cameras from declared nuclear sites.
March 2022	Iran agrees to respond to inquiries into suspected undeclared sites.	Information provided by Iran fails to address all of the IAEA's inquiries.
March 2023	Joint Statement on restoring transparency at declared sites and addressing concerns at suspected undeclared sites.	In May, Grossi notes "no further progress" from Iran in fulfilling its Joint Statement pledges.
May 2024	Iran agrees to "concrete measures" in order to fulfill March 2023 Joint Statement commitments before June 2024 IAEA board meeting.	Grossi notes Iran's "completely unsatisfactory" non-cooperation , including reducing inspections and discrediting inspectors.
November 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Iran accepts Grossi's request to halt expansion of 60% HEU stock. Iran agrees to continue discussing IAEA concerns about suspected undeclared sites. Iran considers accepting IAEA designation of additional inspectors. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IAEA censures Iran and begins Comprehensive Report detailing its safeguards non-compliance. Iran accelerates 60 percent HEU stockpile growth to its fastest-ever rate. Iran continues stonewalling inquiries into suspected undeclared activities.
April 2025	Iran agrees to discuss resumed IAEA access and monitoring at declared nuclear sites.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In June, Grossi notes "Iran has repeatedly not answered or not provided technically credible answers to" IAEA inquiries. IAEA passes resolution formally declaring Iran in breach of safeguards obligations.

Infographic: Severing Iran's Path to a Nuclear Weapon

