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
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Israel-Hezbollah Escalation Tracker


Lebanon has arrested no more than one percent of Hezbollah's fighters in the year since the November 2024 ceasefire agreement with Israel. These inadequate efforts to disarm Hezbollah, as required by the deal, are jeopardizing the tenuous peace the U.S. negotiated. This is a matter of insufficient Lebanese political will, not simply ability. JINSA data indicates that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are able to operate forcefully against Hezbollah but only do so when confronted with sustained international pressure. For example, after French and American insistence, LAF activity against Hezbollah spiked by as much as 192 percent in October 2025, but then, once again, quickly dropped by 61 percent in November. Indeed, senior Lebanese officials have admitted they would prefer to return to a [policy](#) of "containment," rather than "disarmament," of Hezbollah.

When the LAF steps back, however, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) step forward. For the last 11 months, Israel has conducted an order of magnitude more operations against Hezbollah (1,152 total) than Lebanese forces (132 total). And, when LAF activity dropped in November, Israel responded with a 28 percent increase in strikes, such as the November 23 [operation](#) that killed Hezbollah military commander Ali Tabatabai.

The LAF's continued avoidance of meaningful efforts to disarm Hezbollah jeopardizes the already fragile ceasefire, as Israel may feel compelled to intensify its own operations aimed at neutralizing the terrorist group's capabilities, which could lead to another full-scale war.




- Lebanon has failed to uphold its ceasefire obligation to disarm Hezbollah, instead conducting only limited, largely symbolic, operations and only when under intense international pressure. The IDF has been significantly more active in neutralizing the Hezbollah threat.
 - » Since the ceasefire, the IDF carried out over 1,150 total operations, including over 870 strikes, killing over 370 terrorists, compared to just 132 Lebanese internal security activities and 437 arrests.
 - Even if all LAF activity targeted Hezbollah, which is uncertain, its arrests amount to only roughly one percent of the 40,000 fighters U.S. Special Envoy for Syria and Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack [claimed](#) that Hezbollah still has.
 - » Lebanese internal security activity briefly spiked by 192 percent in October, following weeks of sustained [diplomatic pressure](#), but dropped by 61 percent immediately afterward, demonstrating that Beirut's inadequate enforcement efforts are a result of a lack of political will more so than military capabilities.



- The November 27, 2024 [ceasefire](#) required Lebanon to:
 - » “Starting with the Southern Litani Area, dismantle all existing unauthorized facilities involved in the production of arms and related materiel, and prevent the establishment of such facilities in the future” and “dismantle all infrastructure and military positions, and confiscate all unauthorized arms inconsistent with these commitments;”
 - » Ensure the LAF is the “only armed groups, arms, and related materiel deployed in the southern Litani;” and
 - » “Commit to taking steps towards [UN Security Council Resolution 1701’s] full implementation, without violation,” which required the “disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon.”
- The sharp increase in Lebanese security operations during October demonstrated that Lebanon is capable of taking action against Hezbollah, but only under international pressure. It lacks the political will to sustain these efforts at levels sufficient to achieve long-term disarmament goals.
 - » The disarmament plan the Lebanese Cabinet [approved](#) in early September lacked a timeline for full Hezbollah disarmament, and the Trump administration and bipartisan

members of Congress reportedly have grown increasingly [frustrated](#) with Lebanese progress, potentially leading to an end in U.S. support.













- President Donald Trump reportedly set a [deadline](#) for the end of the year, which, given the current pace of activity, Lebanon is unlikely to meet.
- » Both Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) commander General Rudolph Haykal and Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have expressed their unwillingness to enforce the ceasefire agreement, recently [shifting](#) toward emphasizing “containment” rather than “disarmament” when discussing LAF operations north of the Litani River.
- » Lebanese President Joseph Aoun has typically led efforts within the country to disarm Hezbollah, but he also [undermined](#) those efforts in September by arguing that “resorting to force to implement the Lebanese government’s decision to limit arms to the state is out of the question under any circumstances.”
- » As a sign of increasing dissatisfaction with Lebanon’s progress, the Trump administration [cancelled](#) Haykal’s visit to Washington in mid-November after the LAF commander suggested suspending Lebanon’s plan to disarm Hezbollah.
- » The LAF has even taken measures to block IDF from conducting operations to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure, as it did in June when it [blocked road access](#) to a Hezbollah-affiliated home Israel planned to demolish.
- » Signaling the increased tensions, Israel and Lebanon sent [diplomatic envoys](#) to the ceasefire monitoring committee meeting for the first time on December 3, which had previously only included military officials from both sides.
- Security operations to seize weapons, prevent smuggling, and arrest those involved are especially crucial to disarming Hezbollah, as they directly disrupt the group’s access to arms and hinder its ability to replenish its arsenal. However, even when Lebanon does act, it rarely undertakes these most impactful enforcement missions.
- » Only 35 percent of Lebanese operations have involved seizing weapons. As of late October, the LAF only claimed to have [seized](#) approximately 10,000 rockets and 400 missiles.




- Weapons-related activity fell 62 percent in November, dropping from 13 activities in October to only five last month.
- Although the Lebanese Army has claimed to conduct [thousands of operations](#) to seize Hezbollah weaponry, most of the seizures involve seizing a small number of weapons, rather than large stockpiles, and the lack of action directly against personnel showed a reticence to forcefully move against the group.
- » Lebanon has only arrested roughly 230 individuals for weapons charges and 16 individuals for smuggling.
- » Following the Lebanese Cabinet's [approval](#) of the disarmament plan in early September, weapons-related arrests had surged in September by 2,067 percent, largely due to a major sweep in the Shatila refugee camp that resulted in 55 arrests of Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian individuals on weapons and drug-smuggling charges.
 - However, this increase was short-lived, dropping by 66 percent in October and then falling by another 50 percent in November.
- Furthermore, Lebanese security forces have failed to conduct sufficient operations in the most critical areas—southern Lebanon and the heart of Hezbollah territory in the Bekaa Valley—further undermining efforts to disarm the group and fulfill their ceasefire obligations.


Lebanese Operations Since Ceasefire

Lebanese Operations

-  Weapons Seizure (No Arrest/Kill)
-  Arrest/Kill and Weapons Seizure
-  Arrest/Kill (No Seizure)
-  Drug Seizure (No Arrest/Kill)
-  Arrest/Kill and Drug Seizure
-  Arrest/Kill and Smuggling Thwarted
-  Arrest/Kill and Funds Seizure
-  Firefight
-  Smuggling Thwarted (No Arrest/Kill)
-  Infrastructure
-  Beirut
-  Bekaa Valley




- » Only roughly 40 percent of Lebanese security activity occurred in the areas south of the Litani River and in the Bekaa Valley.
 - Just over half of weapons seizures have been in these key areas, with 10 percent south of the Litani River and 42 percent in the Bekaa Valley.
- As a result of limited Lebanese operations targeting Hezbollah, the terrorist organization's force buildup currently exceeds the rate at which the Lebanese Armed Forces are disarming the group, notwithstanding prior commitments made by the Beirut government.
 - » Even after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Iran has continued to attempt [frequent](#) smuggling through Syria into Lebanon. While Syrian officials have successfully stopped numerous attempts to smuggle weapons to Hezbollah and seized hundreds of weapons, some shipments still manage to get through.
 - » Israeli officials [claim](#) that Hezbollah has become more active since the October ceasefire with Hamas, increasing personnel near the border and rebuilding infrastructure, rocket launchers, and drone production capabilities.
 - » On November 7, U.S. Treasury Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John Hurley stated that Iran sent roughly [\\$1 billion](#) to Hezbollah in 2025, despite sanctions and a devastated Iranian economy.
- In response to Lebanon's insufficient action and Hezbollah's commitment to rebuilding its capabilities, near-daily Israeli operations continued throughout the ceasefire period, with IDF counter-terrorist activity averaging over 770 percent more operations per month than Lebanese security forces.
 - » Since the ceasefire, the IDF carried out over 1,150 total operations, including over 870 strikes, compared to just 132 Lebanese internal- security activities.




- The November 2024 ceasefire created a mechanism through which Israel provides Lebanon with intelligence on Hezbollah violations. Under the agreement, Lebanon must act on these notifications to remove Hezbollah capabilities.
- If Lebanon does not act, under the terms of an agreement with the United States, Israel has maintained the freedom to operate in Lebanon against Hezbollah threats.
- In November, after three consecutive months of decreasing activity in Lebanon, Israel conducted 28 percent more operations than in October.
- » Israel has sought to systematically degrade Hezbollah's physical infrastructure, carrying out 125 infrastructure destruction operations, while Lebanese authorities have almost entirely refrained from targeting the group's entrenched military infrastructure.
- » In contrast to Lebanon's weak direct action against terrorist personnel, since the ceasefire began, the IDF has killed at least 370 terrorists in Lebanon, with over 350 neutralized through airstrikes.

Terrorists Killed in IDF Operations in Lebanon JINSA



- » The IDF even conducted roughly 90 percent more strikes specifically targeting terrorist personnel than all of Lebanon's internal-security operations combined, with over 250 such Israeli strikes.
 - Since March, the IDF has maintained high monthly strike activity, averaging nearly 23 strikes specifically targeting terrorists per month, far outpacing any Lebanese enforcement efforts.
 - While Israel has launched far fewer strikes throughout the ceasefire than during the most intense period of fighting from September to November 2024, the 28 percent of its strikes that specifically targeted terrorist personnel have consistently stayed higher than the seven percent during the three months before the ceasefire began.

IDF Strikes in Lebanon Since October 7, 2023



- This approach, culminating in the targeted [strike](#) on November 23, 2025, that killed Hezbollah’s military commander, Ali Tabatabai, demonstrates Israel’s strategic adaptation since the November 2024 ceasefire.
- While destroying Hezbollah’s infrastructure and weapons, especially deep in Lebanese territory, would require substantial air or ground operations, Israel has instead focused its efforts on targeted strikes against Hezbollah’s command structure and fielded forces.
- » IDF operations in Lebanon have overwhelmingly concentrated on areas on both sides of the Litani River and across the Bekaa Valley, highlighting the terrorist group's deep, persistent military entrenchment.
 - Unlike Lebanese operations, IDF activity was concentrated most heavily south of the Litani River, accounting for about 31 percent of all operations, and four percent of activity occurring just north of the river. Israel also conducted 22 percent of its operations in Bekaa.
 - IDF operations in these areas targeted terrorists and leaders rebuilding infrastructure, such as training camps, smuggling routes, weapons sites, underground facilities, and engineering equipment.

IDF Operations in Lebanon Since Ceasefire

