



# Turning Tides: U.S. Blockade Enforcement Exceeds Iranian Evasion





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## I. Executive Summary

Conflicting reports abound about the effectiveness of the U.S. blockade on Iran's ports, which went into effect on April 13. Media outlets and shipping analytics firms suggest that dozens of Iran-linked ships have passed through the blockade line. Meanwhile, the Pentagon maintains that scarcely any ships have evaded the blockade. These two claims seem irreconcilable.

JINSA has monitored shipping, using data from the Kpler advisory firm, in and around the blockade line and found that the truth lies in between, though far closer to the Pentagon's claim: the U.S. blockade enforcement has been largely effective.

We have found that just 17 blockade-eligible ships crossed the blockade line as of April 30—and, of the 17, around a quarter did so on the blockade's first day, suggesting early enforcement issues that have since been resolved.<sup>1</sup> These figures, like all other public estimates, exclude small boats like fishing vessels and fast attack craft. However, a range of factors—including ships turning off their transponders or falsely listing their flagged-nation, port of origin, or intended destination—can complicate vessel tracking even in normal circumstances.


Overall, JINSA's data review suggests the blockade and broader U.S. maritime interdiction strategy have been effective—if often misunderstood. American forces have redirected 44 vessels seeking to breach the blockade since April 13, and seized another one.<sup>2</sup> They also seized at least an additional two non-Iranian vessels transporting Iran's crude oil in Asia. By contrast, just 17 eligible ships, a fraction of that total, breached the blockade line. Notably, none of them were oil or gas tankers; all the ships that escaped the blockade so far were bulk cargo carriers, including some small ones of little obvious utility to the Iranian regime.

Even taking these figures at face value, though, they paint an incomplete picture. The blockade, other U.S. interdiction operations, and the broader economic warfare campaign labeled Operation Economic Fury have a preventative effect that is not reflected in any shipping data. These measures deter an unknown, though nonzero, number of ships from leaving Iranian ports in the first place—depriving the regime of its financial lifeline.

Yet striking at the Iranian regime's main financial artery is just part of the U.S. mission. These operations constrict the regime's ability to import weapons components, assembled weaponry, inputs for missile fuel, cash, and other items from its patrons in Beijing and Moscow. So long as the operations continue, the Islamic Republic of Iran will have few, if any, options for reversing its current economic and military weakness.

## II. Evaluating the U.S. Blockade's Criteria

When first announced, the blockade was defined clearly. United States Central Command (CENTCOM) said on April 12, “the blockade will be enforced impartially against vessels of all nations entering or departing Iranian ports and coastal areas, including all Iranian ports on the Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.”<sup>3</sup> Later, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth clarified, “our [blockade] criteria [are] either Iranian ships or [ships going] to and from Iranian ports.”<sup>4</sup> The Pentagon further specified that “any vessel entering or departing the blockaded area without authorization is subject to interception, diversion, and capture.”<sup>5</sup> It delineated the “blockaded area” as waters west of a set line running north-south from the Iran-Pakistan border to Oman—including the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz.



Some confusion, however, has been generated by press reports conflating two similar, though distinct, lines of effort. One is enforcement of the blockade itself, targeting Iranian-flagged ships and ships entering and exiting the blockaded area en route to, or from, Iran’s ports. Yet, complementarily, American forces are also interdicting vessels connected to Iran’s illicit trade far afield from the blockade line or the Middle East in general, including as far east as Sri Lanka.

The Pentagon has repeatedly made this distinction clear.<sup>6</sup> Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine stated on April 16, “**in addition to this blockade**, the Joint Force ... will actively pursue any Iranian flagged vessel or any vessel attempting to provide material support to Iran.”<sup>7</sup> (emphasis added) Then, on April 16 the Navy reiterated, “**in addition to enforcing the blockade**, all Iranian vessels, vessels with active OFAC [Office of Foreign Assets Control] sanctions, and vessels suspected of carrying contraband, are subject to belligerent right to visit and search.”<sup>8</sup> (emphasis added)

Blockade vs. Economic Fury Criteria		
	Naval Blockade	Broader U.S. Operation Economic Fury Effort
Ship Headed Directly To/From Iranian Port Crossing Blockade Line	Yes	Yes
Iranian-Flagged Vessel Crossing Blockade Line	Yes	Yes
Any U.S.-Sanctioned Vessel Linked to Iran	Not Necessarily	Yes
Any Vessel Suspected of Transporting Contraband On Behalf of Iran	Not Necessarily	Yes
Any Vessel Suspected of Providing Material Support to Iran	Not Necessarily	Yes
Any Vessel Linked to Iran’s Shadow Fleet	Not Necessarily	Yes



### III. Public Reporting on U.S. Blockade Enforcement

Since the U.S. blockade entered into effect on April 13, some reports, citing shipping data, suggest that the blockade’s effectiveness has been undermined by supposedly lax enforcement. The major such reports include the following:

April 27: “Four Million Barrels of Iranian Oil...” A leading outlet reported on April 27 that “two tankers carrying around four million barrels of Iranian oil managed to sail past the blockade on April 24 bound for Asia, data from TankerTrackers.com showed.”<sup>9</sup> The data appeared to come from an April 26 X post from TankerTrackers stating, “Iran loads 4. 6 million barrels at crude oil terminals, additional four million **barrels appear to have** exfiltrated U.S. blockade line.”<sup>10</sup> (emphasis added). Then, in an April 27 update to its original post, TankerTrackers seemingly walked back its claim: “Update: One [tanker] (2 million barrels) did not depart Iran.”<sup>11</sup> In the update, the firm omitted any claim about the other 2 million barrels.

April 22: “At Least 34 Tankers Linked to Iran...” One major publication cited analytics firm Vortexa, on April 22, as having tracked “at least 34 tankers linked to Iran” that passed across the blockade line.<sup>12</sup> This included at least 19 tankers moving east, away from the region, per Vortexa. Yet significantly, while Vortexa alleged that six tankers crossed the blockade line with Iranian crude oil onboard,<sup>13</sup> three of these six tankers were in fact redirected back to port by U.S. forces.<sup>14</sup> Potentially, at least one or more of the other three have since been redirected as well.

April 21: “At Least 26 Iranian Shadow Fleet Vessels...”: An estimate that received significant press attention, particularly after being cited by Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT), was one that shipping data firm Lloyd’s List published on April 21.<sup>15</sup> That update’s title, “At least 26 Iranian shadow fleet vessels bypass U.S. blockade,” was seemingly indicative of widespread blockade breaches.<sup>16</sup> A leading publication reported that day, “more than two dozen Iran-linked ships carrying oil and gas have evaded the U. S. blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, according to Lloyd’s List ... [since] April 13, at least 26 laden ships have sailed in and out of Iranian ports.”<sup>17</sup> The article, though, noted at least 23 of the 26 ships were ultimately redirected by U.S. forces, citing CENTCOM.

April 16: “81 Percent of Ships...”: One media outlet reported on April 16, citing Lloyd’s List, that “81 percent of ships that transited the [Hormuz] strait since April 13 were affiliated with Iran through ownership, flag, port calls in Iran and other links.”<sup>18</sup>

## IV. Accounting for Different Accounts

Yet, these reports of blockade evasion are far less conclusive than they may appear. Nor do they align with the data that JINSA has collected and reviewed, presented below. Most of the above reports use their own unique definitions for what they count as blockade evasion, few of which align with how the United States has defined and is enforcing it. The primary factors helping explain the disparities between the varying estimates of how many ships have crossed the blockade line include:

- ***Confusion Over Vessels’ Blockade Criteria.***

The oft-used term “Iran-linked ship” lacks a clear, universal definition. The phrase can include indications of vessels’ past or present ownership, prior port calls, and previous cargo shipments. Tracking firms may vary, including between the same firm’s subscription options, in how certain metrics are collected, and how many are accessible. More significantly, though, a commercial vessel having some past affiliation with Iran—whatever that may mean—does not inherently mean it is subject to the blockade criteria.

For instance, Lloyd’s List, after claiming on April 21 that “at least 26 Iranian shadow fleet vessels” bypassed the blockade line, issued a less publicized update using the same term—but omitted from it the word Iranian.<sup>19</sup> The update also noted the firm’s criteria for defining a ship as a shadow fleet vessel: ships involved “in a cargo delivery where at some point over the course of the delivery one party in the chain engages in one or more deceptive shipping practices.” This criterion is clearly beyond the remit of the blockade.

Separately, Vortexa was cited as having tracked “at least 34 tankers linked to Iran.”<sup>20</sup> Yet a tanker being abstractly “linked to Iran” is not part of the blockade’s criteria. Similarly, another article claimed, “81 percent of ships that transited the strait since April 13 were affiliated with Iran” without specifying further.<sup>21</sup> In addition, multiple outlets reported the U.S.-sanctioned, Malawi-flagged *Rich Starry* tanker tried to circumvent the blockade line after leaving an Emirati port.<sup>22</sup> However, the blockade’s criteria do not apply to the vessel, since it loaded up at an Emirati port and did not log any recent port calls in Iran.<sup>23</sup>

- ***Geographic Discrepancies.***

Some confusion has been caused by the fact that the blockade line and the Strait of Hormuz are sometimes used interchangeably or not clearly distinguished from one another. In fact, the U.S.

naval blockade line is located at a vastly different location, around 300 miles away, from the Strait of Hormuz itself. The blockade line and the Strait of Hormuz thus include a different set of ships at a given time. However, this distinction is not always clear in estimates about blockade effectiveness. For example, one media outlet reported on April 22, citing Lloyd's List, that "81 percent of ships that transited the [Hormuz] strait since April 13 were affiliated with Iran."<sup>24</sup>

A blockade-eligible ship, however, may indeed cross the Strait of Hormuz but still get turned back at the blockade line. This has likely happened with some number of the unnamed 44 vessels the U.S. military says it has rerouted away from the blockade line.<sup>25</sup> For example, the *LPG Sevan*, a tanker transporting Iranian oil which crossed the Strait of Hormuz without incident, was redirected shortly after crossing the blockade line.<sup>26</sup>



Source: Kpler



Source: Windward Maritime

- **Ambiguity of Ship-to-Ship Transfers.**

Ship-to-ship transfers within the Gulf (between a ship that took on oil at an Iranian port and one that never entered an Iranian port) have likely enabled at least some Iranian oil shipments to cross the blockade. Such transfers complicate enforcement since the oil is carried on ships that, superficially, seem eligible to pass the blockade. However, the shipping analytics firms Lloyd’s List and Windward each identified just one such transfer since the blockade took effect, suggesting shipowners may be leery to engage in this practice with such close U. S. attention currently on the Gulf’s waters.<sup>27</sup> Such transfers, thus, do not seem to account for a large number of otherwise undetected blockade evasions.

- **Obstacles Posed by Ghost Fleet Tracking.**


Yet another explanation for data disparities lies in the well-known efforts by Iran, China, Russia, and other nations to maintain a tanker ghost fleet to evade sanctions. These illicit vessels are periodically re-named or re-flagged, adding to the complexity. In addition, they frequently travel with their transponders switched off, or altered to give false locations, contributing to data disparities. For instance, JINSA’s data almost exclusively includes ships crossing the blockade line with their transponder on. Other shipping traffic datasets, including Vortexa’s, rely on assumptions regarding ships’ locations to backfill data gaps when vessels turn off their transponders.<sup>28</sup>

## V. JINSA-Reviewed Data on U.S. Blockade Enforcement

Though not necessarily an ironclad, comprehensive accounting of all impacted ships that crossed the blockade line since April 13, JINSA, using Kpler data, tracked 17 blockade-eligible ships that passed the blockade line since it entered into effect. In that timeframe, American blockade enforcement prevented 45 vessels from breaching the blockade line—44 were redirected by U.S. forces, and another ship was disabled and seized.<sup>29</sup>



- Blockade-Eligible Ships Confirmed to Sail Through Blockade - Westward
- Blockade-Eligible Ships Confirmed to Sail Through Blockade - Eastward
- Ships Redirected by U.S. Forces



## Blockade-Eligible Ships Which Crossed Blockade Line Without Being Stopped



Ship Name (Flagged Nation)	Type	Date Crossed Blockade Line	Direction	Origin	Destination	Location as of April 30
Safari 25269 (Iran)	Small Cargo Vessel	April 13	East	Al Hamriya, United Arab Emirates	Karachi, Pakistan	Last detected in Karachi, Pakistan on April 22
Azargoun (Iran)	Container Vessel	April 13	East	Unspecified	Colombia, Sri Lanka	Off the coast of Malaysia
Ashkan3 25278 (Iran)	Small Cargo Vessel	April 13	East	Chabahar, Iran	Karachi, Pakistan	Last detected in Karachi, Pakistan on April 17
Shabdis (Iran)	Container Vessel	April 13	East	Chabahar, Iran	Zhuhai, China	Off the coast of China
TLHA 2 90 (Iran)	Unspecified	April 13	West	Unspecified	Unspecified	N/A
11458 (Iran)	Unspecified	April 16	East	Chabahar, Iran	Karachi, Pakistan	Last detected in Karachi, Pakistan on April 18
Ponente (Marshall Islands)	Bulk Carrier	April 18	East	Chabahar, Iran	Santos, Brazil	Last detected off the coast of Mozambique on April 27
Basel (Liberia)	Bulk Carrier	April 19	East	Bandar Imam Khomeini, Iran	Santos, Brazil	Last detected off the coast of Mozambique on April 28
Ceci (Marshall Islands)	Bulk Carrier	April 20	East	Bandar Imam Khomeini, Iran	Rio Grande, Brazil	Off the coast of Mozambique
Fahimi 25134 (Iran)	Small Cargo Vessel	April 22	East	Chabahar, Iran	Unspecified	Last detected in Karachi, Pakistan on April 24
Locarno (Marshall Islands)	Bulk Carrier	April 22	East	Chabahar, Iran	Santos, Brazil	Off the coast of Tanzania
Ascanio (Marshall Islands)	Bulk Carrier	April 26	East	Bandar Imam Khomeini, Iran	Rio Grande, Brazil	Last detected in Arabian Sea on April 25
Alyasin11932 (Iran)	Small Cargo Vessel	April 26	East	Konarak, Iran	Unspecified	In Arabian Sea
LB Energy (Panama)	Bulk Carrier	April 26	East	Bandar Imam Khomeini, Iran	Santos, Brazil	In Arabian Sea
M13526 (Iran)	Small Cargo Vessel	April 28	West	Karachi, Pakistan	Unspecified	Last detected off the coast of Chabahar, Iran on April 28
Lianstar (Gambia)	Cargo Vessel	April 28	East	Bushehr, Iran	Karachi, Pakistan	Directly off the coast of Karachi, Pakistan
Georgia S (Portugal)	Bulk Carrier	April 29	West	Paranagua, Brazil	Chabahar, Iran	Directly off the coast of Chabahar, Iran

Source: JINSA-reviewed data from Kpler. Some details provided by BBC News and VesselFinder.com. Note: List excludes fishing vessels and high-speed craft and may not be comprehensive.

While each ship listed above—some of which are being exclusively reported on by JINSA—fall under the stated U.S. blockade criteria, some are especially suspicious. These include:

- The Iranian-flagged *Azargoun*.
  - » According to the Israel-based Alma Center think tank, the cargo vessel may have been involved in the Iran-Russia drone and missile trade, and in Iran’s supply of weapons to the Assad regime in Syria in recent years.<sup>30</sup>
- The Iranian-flagged *Shabdis*.
  - » The vessel was tracked in March departing Goalon Port, a chemical storage port in China’s city of Zhuhai.<sup>31</sup> This is relevant given China’s longstanding role in supplying Iran with chemical precursors for ballistic missile fuel. The *Shabdis* is directly implicated in these precursor transfers, according to media reports.<sup>32</sup>
  - » As of April 27, the *Shabdis* was again en route to Zhuhai, according to the ship’s Automatic Identification System (AIS) details, and JINSA-reviewed Kpler data showed it was located just off China’s coast.
- The Marshall-Islands flagged *Ceci*.
  - » The vessel was, in 2025, found to be carrying over \$20 million worth of narcotics, and also equipment authorities said was used to transfer illicit materials at sea.<sup>33</sup>

Moreover, several ships that circumvented the blockade line have several connections to one another, potentially indicating links to a broader Iran-tied shadow fleet network.

The *Ceci* is owned by Minoa Maritime Limited, the same Athens, Greece-based firm that owns the *Ascanio*. Both ships are Marshall Islands-flagged bulk carriers which left in recent days from Iran’s Bandar Imam Khomeini port en route to Brazil. Additionally, two other shipping firms are registered at the firm’s Athens address, according to public data.

In what hardly seems a coincidence, two other vessels that crossed the blockade line, the *Locarno* and *Ponente*, shared the same Chabahar, Iran to Santos, Brazil route and are both flagged in the Marshall Islands. The two vessels’ respective owners, Cornelia Shipping Co. and Padova Marine Corp, are registered in Greece, though each without a publicly known address or, seemingly, any other vessels in their fleet—suggesting both are shell companies.<sup>34</sup>

Yet, while the two vessels are ostensibly owned by different firms, both are managed by the Greece-based Grehel Ship Management Co., as is the Panamanian-flagged *LB Energy*. The *LB Energy*, like the other two bulk carriers noted above, crossed the blockade line heading outbound from Iran to Santos, Brazil. Grehel Ship Management is registered at the same address as the ship’s registered owner, Woody Chartering Ltd, in Greece.<sup>35</sup> And Grehel reportedly manages yet another bulk carrier that crossed the blockade line, the *Basel*, which logged its destination as Santos, Brazil.<sup>36</sup>

That nearly a third of all ships that JINSA tracked heading outbound across the U.S. blockade line would record the same destination—Santos, Brazil—deserves scrutiny. Santos is a port of particular concern, given its role in Iran’s overseas criminal and financial networks. According to the International Coalition Against Illicit Economies (ICAIE), a watchdog organization led by former U.S. officials, Iran’s overseas network “has access to, and in some cases control of, key port facilities ... across the [Western Hemisphere] ... [including] the port of Santos.”<sup>37</sup>

JINSA has tracked several blockade-eligible bulk carriers traveling across the blockade line, but we have not detected tankers doing so. In general, bulk carriers are incapable of transporting liquid items, and at most, only in moderate quantities. By contrast, tankers are typically larger vessels, and are specifically

constructed with large tanks in order to carry significant amounts of liquid products—crude oil, refined petroleum, or liquified natural gas.

## VI. U.S. Maritime Enforcement in Economic Fury: A Broader Look

Overall, despite some early implementation hiccups, the blockade seems to have worked well. Since the blockade first entered effect, American forces enforcing the blockade have redirected 44 vessels and seized another. This count excludes the several ships interdicted, as part of the broader U.S. maritime operations, in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal this month.

Assuming this number as the baseline, and discounting any vessels that successfully hid or spoofed their locations, the United States apparently rerouted most of the relevant ships that tried to bypass the blockade. Since the blockade took effect on April 13, just 17 total blockade-eligible vessels, according to JINSA’s review of Kpler data, crossed the blockade line. U.S. forces, therefore, seem to have stopped at least 45 of 62 relevant vessels from successfully breaching the blockade line.

Of the 17 blockade-eligible ships JINSA monitored crossing the blockade line, approximately one-fourth did so on the blockade’s first day and just 12 have since—indicating early enforcement issues that have been ironed out. Secretary Hegseth recently suggested this is the case, stating, “as far as breaching the blockade, it’s been pretty consistent. There were a number of ships at the beginning ... and that stopped.”<sup>38</sup>

Moreover, some vessels that crossed the blockade line seemingly without consequence, are likely under close U.S. surveillance and could be interdicted at a later point. In fact, the United States may be deliberately setting a trap for such vessels. On April 25, *Newsweek* reported that U. S. forces are “letting Iranian-linked ships bypass the blockade in order to catch and isolate them in open waters using faster Navy destroyers,” as the destroyers largely remain outside the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman.<sup>39</sup>

Complementary to blockade enforcement, as noted, U.S. forces are actively working to interdict Iranian-flagged ships and ships aiding the Iranian regime—either through transporting contraband for it, or otherwise seeking to provide it with material support—across the world, as part of the Trump administration’s Operation Economic Fury.<sup>40</sup> In addition to redirecting 44 blockade-eligible ships, U.S. forces have taken multiple vessels transporting the Iranian regime’s energy shipments—including the *Majestic X* and the *Tifani*—out of the equation.<sup>41</sup>

## Ships Subject to U.S. Maritime Operations Since April 13



Ship Name	Type	Date	Approx. Location	Reason	Details
Touska (Iran)	Container Ship	April 19	Arabian Sea	Attempted blockade breach; transporting dual-use military items	U.S. forces disabled, inspected, and seized vessel
Hero II (Iran)	Crude Oil Tanker	Unspecified; Week of April 20	Unspecified	Attempted blockade breach	U.S. forces intercepted + redirected to port
Hedy (Iran)	Crude Oil Tanker	Unspecified; Week of April 20	Unspecified	Attempted blockade breach	U.S. forces intercepted + redirected to port
Dorena (Iran)	Crude Oil Tanker	Unspecified; Week of April 20	Indian Ocean	Attempted blockade breach; transporting 2mn barrels of crude oil	U.S. forces intercepted + redirected to port
Deep Sea* (Iran)	Crude Oil Tanker	Week of April 20	Indian Ocean	N/A	U.S. forces reportedly intercepted vessel
Derya* (Iran)	Crude Oil Tanker	Week of April 20	Indian Ocean	N/A	U.S. forces reportedly intercepted vessel
Tifani (Botswana)	Crude Oil Tanker	April 21	Indian Ocean	Transporting Iranian crude oil	U.S. forces intercepted, inspected, and seized vessel
Majestic X (Guyana)	Crude Oil Tanker	April 22	Indian Ocean	Transporting Iranian crude oil	U.S. forces intercepted, inspected, and seized vessel
LPG Sevan (Panama)	Gas Tanker	April 24	Arabian Sea	Sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury; Transporting Iranian oil and gas	U.S. forces redirected to port
Blue Star III (Comoros)	Container Ship	April 28	Arabian Sea	Suspected blockade breach	U.S. forces intercepted and searched vessel; ship allowed to proceed
<b>At Least 40 Other Unspecified Vessels (Total of 44 Vessels Redirected)</b>	N/A	Since April 13	N/A	Attempted blockade breaches	U.S. forces redirected

\*Not confirmed by U.S. military. [Source:](#) U.S. Central Command; Reuters; The New York Times

## VII. Placing the U.S. Blockade in Strategic Context

Significantly, the number of ships that have broken through the blockade line, or the number of ships that were redirected away from it, do not tell the full story. Not recorded in any of these figures are all the shipowners, in Iran and elsewhere, that were deterred from setting sail in the first place. So it is not too surprising that, according to intelligence estimates, the blockade has cut the Iranian regime's oil exports by an estimated 80 percent.<sup>42</sup>

Assessing the blockade's effectiveness requires distinguishing between the blockade's day-to-day statistics and its broader strategic goals. If the blockade is aimed at limiting Iran's most lucrative or strategically-important inbound or outbound shipments—not all vessels covered by the blockade's criteria—determining operational success requires more than counting vessels that crossed the blockade line.

The Pentagon has indicated this is indeed the case. An unnamed senior U.S. defense official, on April 21, told the Lloyd's List analytics firm the blockade is not meant to be all-encompassing.<sup>43</sup> According to a public memo from Lloyd's List, "the official ... [said] that the U.S. military is assessing the effectiveness of the blockade based on the impact to the Iranian economy, not strictly by the number of Iran-linked vessels transiting past the blockade line."<sup>44</sup>

Further, as discussed, the blockade has likely had a preventative—though unquantifiable—effect on illicit Iranian maritime trade. It is not possible to measure how many shipping firms, shipowners, port and refinery owners, and energy companies were deterred, since April 13, from helping facilitate Iranian shipments in the first place.<sup>45</sup> However, common sense suggests this number is high. Much as the implicit threat of punishment deters some would-be criminals from breaking the law, robust U.S. enforcement is disincentivizing Iran-linked maritime trade.

Moreover, the blockade, and its effectiveness, cannot accurately be viewed as a standalone U.S. policy effort. It is complemented by the broader Operation Economic Fury mission, which, just this week, expanded to include sanctions on Iran's shadow financial network, likely depriving the regime of tens of billions of dollars; a major Chinese refinery involved in the Iranian illicit energy trade; and around 40 shipping companies and tankers that helped move Iranian oil.<sup>46</sup>

The ripple effect from such actions—the latest in a litany of U.S. sanctions imposed on over 1,000 Iran-linked entities since February 2025—is sizable.<sup>47</sup> China had been purchasing around 90 percent of Iran's oil before the war.<sup>48</sup> Now, its oil refinery owners may have to think twice.

Economic Fury is further raising the costs for any entity coming into contact with Iran's illicit networks or considering doing so. This has the practical effect of making more apparent to the world's port, ship, and refinery owners that Tehran has a poison-ivy touch. Interacting with Iran's illicit networks risks inviting sanctions—and being cut off from the U.S. financial system.

As a result, Economic Fury has also helped create a nightmare scenario for the Iranian regime: having lots of oil but being unable to store or offload it. This has reportedly forced Iran to decrease its crude production by 2.5 million barrels a day and put it on the verge of running out of storage in less than a month's time.<sup>49</sup>

The strain on Iranian oil storage capacity is having a serious impact. Iran's regime is desperately trying to ship out, by train, the roughly 50 million barrels of oil that are quickly filling up its refinery tanks, according to media reports.<sup>50</sup> All in all, the blockade is costing the Iranian regime an estimated \$435 million a day, Fox News reported on April 29.<sup>51</sup>

Other positive effects of the blockade are less quantifiable, but just as significant. These include denying Iran the ability to import weaponry, weapons components, and chemical inputs like ammonium perchlorate—a critical missile fuel precursor.<sup>52</sup> On the strategic level, the blockade is placing unprecedented pressure—both economically and militarily—on the Iranian regime.

## Endnotes

- 1 JINSA-reviewed Kpler data.
- 2 "U.S. Marines Aboard...," @CENTCOM, X.com, April 30, 2026, <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2049865465179123953>.
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- 4 Todd Lopez, "Joint Force Enforces Maritime Blockade in Gulf of Oman, Globally," Pentagon, April 24, 2026, <https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4470128/joint-force-enforces-maritime-blockade-in-gulf-of-oman-globally/>.
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