

Obstacles Ahead: Assessing the Roadmap for Gaza

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I. Overview

After months of limited progress on reaching a deal to disarm Hamas, the Board of Peace (BoP) [announced](#) last month that Hamas had officially agreed to a plan for “relinquishing all of its weapons.” The prospect of advancing President Donald Trump’s “[Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict](#)” reached in October 2025 (hereafter, the Comprehensive Plan), as further enshrined in [UN Security Council Resolution 2803](#), could be coming within reach—but numerous, significant challenges will need to be resolved before the new agreement can move forward.

On July 30, President Trump [announced](#) that the BoP had reached “a HISTORIC agreement for the COMPLETE DISARMAMENT of Hamas and all other armed groups in Gaza,” which he commended as a “monumental step toward lasting PEACE and SECURITY.” Shortly after, the BoP [confirmed](#) that Hamas had agreed to complete disarmament in a deal. The [new agreement](#), called “A Roadmap for Completing the Implementation of President Trump’s Comprehensive Peace Plan in Gaza” (hereafter, the Roadmap), outlines a framework for the decommissioning of weapons held by Hamas and Palestinian factions and the transfer of governance and security control to Gaza’s interim technocratic government, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG).

Less than two weeks after Hamas agreed to the Roadmap, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly [rejected](#) the document. The Roadmap calls for Israel’s “complete” military withdrawal from Gaza, and its provisions on the sequencing of Israeli withdrawal and Hamas disarmament are, at best, ambiguous. It also does not seem to require Hamas to turn in some light weapons classified as “personal arms.” Prime Minister Netanyahu affirmed that Israeli forces “will not carry out any withdrawal until Hamas is disarmed”—a long-standing Israeli position in months of negotiations—and stated that Hamas’s disarmament must include “heavy weaponry, lighter weaponry, all weaponry.” The issues of Israeli withdrawal and ensuring comprehensive, permanent weapons decommissioning, in addition to maintaining Israeli freedom of action to respond to Hamas threats, are among the most significant, unresolved issues impeding progress on the Roadmap.

This JINSA Analysis analyzes the parameters of the Roadmap, the shortcomings of its approach, and challenges to implementation, drawing on the text of the Roadmap itself and post-hoc modifications and interpretations offered by the BoP and the Board’s High Representative for Gaza, Nickolay Mladenov, who led diplomacy with Hamas on disarmament.

II. Parameters and Shortcomings of the Roadmap for Gaza

Articles 1-3: Key Principles

Article 1: Objectives of the Roadmap

The very first article in the Roadmap begins by affirming that the framework for the document's implementation is grounded in the Comprehensive Plan and [UN Resolution 2803](#) endorsing the Plan. The Comprehensive Plan envisions a secure, peaceful, and prosperous future for Gaza. Phase I of the Plan involved the release of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, a pause in hostilities, increased aid delivery into Gaza, and Israeli withdrawal to a Yellow Line dividing Gaza roughly in two. Phase II of the Comprehensive Plan, which has yet to be implemented, calls for the full demilitarization of the Strip, Israeli withdrawal, an interim Palestinian technocratic government, major reconstruction of the territory, deradicalization, reforming the Palestinian Authority (PA), and further withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to a security perimeter.

Article 1 in the Roadmap outlines aims largely in line with the Comprehensive Plan, including an end to fighting between Israel and Hamas, Palestinian governance, Gaza's redevelopment, ensuring security, and full Israeli withdrawal. However, the Roadmap's language on a credible pathway to a Palestinian state expands on the approach of the Comprehensive Plan. The Roadmap explicitly states that it aims to "facilitate launching a credible political path that achieves self-determination and statehood," which could be interpreted as making Palestinian statehood *the* explicit, although perhaps distant, objective of the Roadmap. In contrast, the penultimate point in the Comprehensive Plan states that with progress on reforming the PA and redevelopment, "the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood"—language that seems far less committal to a two-state solution. The shift appears to be an effort to address Palestinian and Arab demands for a clearer articulation of the final end state of the process—one that the Israeli government (especially during an election campaign), and Israelis more generally, could take issue with.

Articles 2 & 3: Immediate Commitments and Verification

Next, Article 2 discusses the immediate next steps to enable the Roadmap's implementation: Israel must meet all Sharm el-Sheikh commitments (commitments made when the Comprehensive Plan was signed in Egypt in October 2025), "particularly the cessation of military operations as detailed in annex (1)." Hamas and Palestinian factions must also cease "all military operations." The BoP will be [hard pressed](#) to ensure that both Israel and Hamas stand down when so little trust exist between them, and Israel has every reason to believe Hamas is playing for time and has no intention to disarm. Moreover, demanding the end of Israeli military operations could limit the IDF's freedom of action in Gaza, which must retain the ability to take defensive actions and reenter Gaza if needed to take out a resurgent Hamas threat. The continued threat of Israeli military action would also bolster leverage against Hamas in the likely case that it seeks to shirk its commitments, particularly disarmament, under the Roadmap.

Although Annex (1), which presumably provides details on the BoP's demands of Israel with regards to halting its military operations in Gaza, has not been published, Mladenov has provided some clarity on exceptions to the cessation of Israeli military operations. He [told](#) Israeli reporter Amit Segal on August 9 that "None of the plan ... limits Israel's options to react to a threat if it's imminent and if it's really endangering its troops." It is unclear what would constitute an imminent threat under the Roadmap, which actions by the IDF would fall within these parameters, and who can make these determinations. In the event that Hamas attempts to rebuild, including through training and weapons production, Mladenov stated that "the process [of the Roadmap] stops ... we do not progress to the next stage" but did not specify whether Israel could intervene militarily.

Calling for Israel to meet all outstanding commitments from Sharm el-Sheikh could include withdrawal to the original Yellow Line, though this is not specified in the text. The Comprehensive Plan called for Israel to immediately withdraw to an agreed-upon line, referred to as the “Yellow Line,” that divided Gaza roughly in two (Point 3), with Hamas controlling the 47 percent of the Strip along the coast where almost all of Gaza’s population lives and the IDF controlling the remaining 53 percent of the territory. Under the Comprehensive Plan, Israel would gradually withdraw and hand over territory to the multinational International Stabilization Force (ISF) in accordance with progress on demilitarization (Point 16). In practice, however, Israel has expanded its control of Gaza and the Yellow Line was gradually moved, leaving Israel with approximately 64 percent of Gaza under its control.

Despite Prime Minister Netanyahu’s public opposition to the Roadmap, Israeli strikes in Gaza have [decreased](#) significantly, with a halt in airstrikes early last week [ordered](#) by the premier following a meeting with BoP officials. Any strikes in Gaza now [require](#) approval from IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir. Israeli troops have also partially withdrawn to the location of the Yellow Line under the Comprehensive Plan, according to [Mladenov](#) and [Israeli sources](#).

Once all parties approve the document, Article 2 states that the timetable and implementation mechanisms for the Roadmap will be developed in 14 days—an unrealistic timeline for what is likely to be complex, contentious negotiations on key issues that the Roadmap left unclear or unanswered, including the sequencing of Hamas disarmament and IDF withdrawal and the precise process for decommissioning weapons. Further, Article 2 seems to suggest that the implementation of the Roadmap can only begin if and when Israel approves the agreement. As indicated by Netanyahu’s initial rejection of the plan, requiring the Israeli government’s official affirmation of the Roadmap, especially in advance of late October 2026 elections, could result in delaying its implementation, perhaps indefinitely.

After the timetable and implementation mechanisms are established, the NCAG would enter Gaza. The BoP seems to have initially established the NCAG before Hamas was disarmed so it could serve as an integral interlocuter with Hamas to facilitate disarmament. The Roadmap, for its part, sees the NCAG as the body implementing the decommissioning process. This puts pressure on the NCAG to enter Gaza rapidly—out of step with the embryonic status of the institutions supporting the NCAG. For example, the NCAG’s police force has yet to be formed. Several thousand candidates have been vetted, but training has not yet begun.

Articles 2 and 3 together discuss the verification of Israel and Hamas’s commitments under the Roadmap. Commitments in each phase of the Roadmap must be verifiably completed before movement to the next phase. A new International Verification Committee (IVC), composed of representatives from the guarantors (Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and the United States), the BoP, and the U.S.-commanded ISF, will serve as the verification body determining that commitments have been met—an important role that could enable credible progress on the Roadmap and ensure that Hamas’s disarmament is real. However, the inclusion of Qatar and Turkey on the IVC, two countries with a history of providing financial and political support to Hamas, could damage the credibility of the committee and certainly leaves Israel highly skeptical of the IVC’s ability to serve as an effective and impartial verification body.

Articles 4-7 & 14: Transfer of Security and Governance Control to the NCAG

Dislodging Hamas from any role in Gaza’s future will require establishing a transitional governing alternative that, free from Hamas influence, is capable of providing essential services, including law and order, to the Gazan population and can prove itself a better alternative to Hamas. The Comprehensive Plan’s Point 9 establishes that Gaza will be temporarily governed by “a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee” comprised of “qualified Palestinians and international experts” and tasks the body with “the day-to-day running of public services and municipalities.” This committee, called the National Committee for

the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), was [set up](#) in January and includes 13 Palestinian technocrats, but has yet to enter Gaza and assume any real responsibility.

In the months before the Roadmap was reached, as disarmament talks with Hamas stalled, the BoP planned to create [safe zones](#) in Hamas-free areas, beginning near Rafah. Each of the pilot zones would [provide](#) tens of thousands of Gazans with safe, temporary housing and access to medical facilities, schools, and employment opportunities. [Security](#) inside these zones would be provided by the ISF and the NCAG police, with the IDF maintaining a security presence on the perimeter. The safe zones would [decrease](#) Hamas's control over the local population and enable the NCAG, Palestinian police, and the ISF to show progress and momentum in an environment where Hamas and its weapons have already been cleared.

Articles 4, 6 & 14: Authority and Responsibilities of the NCAG

In the Roadmap, Articles 4 and 6 establish the document's foundational principles regarding the transfer of authority and control to the NCAG, significantly expanding on the role for the NCAG envisioned in the Comprehensive Plan and Resolution 2803 as the steward of Gaza's day-to-day management and administration. Article 4 states that Hamas and other Palestinian factions in Gaza will transfer "all civilian governance and security functions" to the NCAG. Article 6 goes on to state that "Gaza shall be governed according to the principle of One Authority, One Law, One Weapon"—a riff on the PA's long-held, but never successfully implemented, policy of "One state, one government, one law, one gun," suggesting that the NCAG will be the sole governing authority in Gaza and only Palestinian entity authorized to hold weapons.

Assigning responsibility for security to the NCAG is not a novel proposal. Speaking at the [Davos Economic Forum](#) in January, U.S. Special Envoy for Peace Missions Jared Kushner suggested that the NCAG's role includes security and law and order. Proposals to advance Hamas's disarmament in the subsequent months of negotiations on disarmament assigned responsibility to the NCAG for Gaza's security, either as a [prerequisite for disarmament](#) or [after weapons are decommissioned](#).

But will "all" security functions truly be relegated to the NCAG? This is disputed within the Roadmap itself. Article 14 restricts the NCAG's security responsibilities, saying that it will be "responsible for handling internal security incidents," implicitly suggesting that "external security incidents" will need to be addressed by another force—possibly Israel, though this is unclear from the document and could contradict the requirement that Israel cease military operations in Gaza.

The line delineating internal and external threats is not clear, nor is there any clarity on who will determine what constitutes an external threat. The lack of details on the conditions under which Israel would be permitted to reenter Gaza and carry out a military operation—as may be needed to eliminate a Hamas resurgence, imminent attack, or terrorist threat—risks limiting Israel's freedom of action and could lead to future tensions between the NCAG, the ISF, and the IDF if Israel feels an operation in Gaza is required for Israeli national security.

In signing the Roadmap, Hamas agreed to relinquish governing control to the NCAG, but whether this will be credibly implemented remains to be seen. Hamas already made [multiple, symbolic](#) announcements to this end over the last several months—while [working to restore its governance capacity](#), administrative authority, and control over the population using intimidation and coercion during the ceasefire.

Even with an apolitical, technocratic body ostensibly at the helm, Hamas will likely try to maintain significant influence inside Gaza's administration. Hamas has already said it [plans to run](#) in elections scheduled for the West Bank later this year and will almost certainly seek to maintain some form of long-term

political influence in Gaza as well. The Roadmap tries to guard against this by stating that the NCAG will be fully independent and Palestinian factions will not interfere in its affairs (Article 4). However, until and unless Hamas is thoroughly disarmed, there is real danger that the dynamics in Gaza could end up mirroring Hezbollah's influence in Lebanon for the past several decades, in which others govern, but the terrorist group can effectively veto government decisions that threaten its power and standing. For the NCAG to be independent and operate effectively, Hamas must be deprived of its primary means of influence and control—its weapons—as rapidly as possible. This must include light weapons, which Hamas uses to intimidate and control Gaza's population.

Articles 5 & 7: Civilian Institutions & Police Force

Articles 5 and 7 concern the fate of government workers and the police force, which currently operate under Hamas's helm. If appropriate vetting and evaluation are in place, [retaining technocrats](#) at lower levels in Gaza's ministries could bolster the NCAG's ability to rapidly provide services and prove itself a viable alternative to Hamas administration. However, Article 5 does not mention a vetting process for civil servants. Instead, it notes that civil servants "shall be treated lawfully, fairly and with dignity with respect to their rights," with civil servants who are terminated or retired also "receiv[ing] their rights." There is no discussion of a vetting process to ensure that civil servants retained in Gaza's ministries have no fidelity to Hamas or its ideology, or details on the conditions that may lead to termination or forced retirement.

On the issue of the NCAG's police force, Article 7 states that "Newly-trained police personnel shall be incorporated into existing police structures," likely referring to incorporation into the currently Hamas-run police force. The article goes on to say that "All police personnel shall undergo a comprehensive vetting," and those who fail to meet standards will either be "offered alternative civilian roles consistent with their earlier experience" or retire—phrasing that suggests even police personnel who fail vetting could receive posts in the new NCAG administration.

Moving former Hamas police officers who do not pass vetting due to their commitment to Hamas or past crimes against Gazan civilians into new posts in Gaza's civil ministries could significantly undermine the NCAG, as Hamas will seek to retain its power and governing influence. Rigorous vetting is required to ensure that police officers that served under Hamas and are retained to work under the NCAG in any capacity harbor no allegiance to Hamas and had worked under the terrorist group simply to earn a paycheck.

Articles 7-11 & 13: NCAG Control of Weapons in Gaza and IDF Withdrawal

Success on disarming Hamas is the prerequisite for a future for Gaza where it is secure, peaceful, and prosperous. As disarmament has stalled since the signing of the Comprehensive Plan ten months ago, other elements of the Plan's Phase II—Hamas-free governance, Israeli withdrawal, and reconstruction and deradicalization—have yet to make progress. In months of negotiations, Israel has maintained that Hamas must be fully disarmed and military infrastructure in Gaza, including tunnels, must be destroyed, while Hamas agreed to partial concessions but resisted full disarmament. The Roadmap marks the first time that Hamas appears to have agreed to allow the NCAG to hold or control all weapons.

Articles 7-10 address the future of Hamas's weapons. The objective, per Article 8, is that by the end of the decommissioning process, "only NCAG shall hold, store or control weapons in Gaza." The articles discuss four categories of weapons: police weapons (Article 7), heavy weapons and military infrastructure (Article 8), personal weapons (Article 9), and weapons held by Israeli-backed militias (Article 10).

Article 7: Police Weapons

Per Article 7, the “responsibility and authority” for all police weapons will be transferred to the NCAG upon its entry into Gaza. In previous negotiations, Hamas [floated](#) that it would transfer weapons held by its police force to the NCAG—though Hamas had also [pushed](#) for its police officers to be integrated into the NCAG’s police force. Should Hamas still retain influence inside the new police apparatus, even with the NCAG ostensibly at the helm, these weapons could in practice remain in Hamas’s hands.

Articles 8 & 13: Heavy Weapons and Military Infrastructure and IDF Withdrawal

Article 8, by far the longest of the articles on weapons decommissioning, discusses the decommissioning process for heavy weapons and military infrastructure. It states that an unspecified decommissioning and storage process for heavy weapons, military production facilities, weapons depots, and tunnels will commence after the outlying Phase I Sharm el-Sheikh commitments, including an end to Israeli operations, are met, the NCAG enters Gaza, and the ISF is deployed.

The lack of details on how weapons will be decommissioned and stored raises concerns that Hamas could regain access to weapons stored by the NCAG. Unlike the Comprehensive Plan, which states that weapons will be placed “permanently beyond use” and military infrastructure “will be destroyed and not rebuilt” (Point 13), the Roadmap makes no such commitments. However, in a post-hoc explanation of the Roadmap’s decommissioning provisions, Mladenov [claimed](#) in his interview with Amit Segal that weapons would not need to be moved outside Gaza because they would be rendered “unusable,” though this statement does not seem to have a basis in the Roadmap itself.

Article 8 further states that the process of decommissioning and storing heavy weapons and military infrastructure “shall be linked to an Israeli withdrawal, in phases, from the areas under its control in Gaza” and the decommissioning of weapons belonging to armed militias. Israeli withdrawal from Gaza is explicitly mentioned in two other places in the Roadmap: Article 1, establishing Israel’s “complete” withdrawal as an aim of the Roadmap, and Article 13, which states that Israel’s phased withdrawal should be completed in accordance with a to-be-determined timetable, the Roadmap’s Article 8, and the Comprehensive Plan.

During months of negotiations led by the BoP on advancing the Comprehensive Plan’s Phase II, Israel has maintained that Hamas’s complete disarmament must preclude any withdrawal, while Hamas stated that it requires Israeli withdrawal prior to disarmament. The language around Israeli withdrawal in the Roadmap’s Article 8 leaves the core dilemma of sequencing Israeli withdrawal and Hamas disarmament unclear. Employing the term “linked” to describe the relationship between the process of decommissioning heavy weapons and infrastructure and phased Israeli withdrawal does not provide much clarity on sequencing. It could mean that Israel’s gradual withdrawal will begin after the process is completed—or that at specific milestones, Israel will withdraw from progressively more territory.

The [“Explanation” document](#) accompanying the Roadmap text, shared by the BoP on August 1, could provide insight on how to interpret Article 8. The third point in the Introduction section says that, per the Comprehensive Plan, Israel’s phased withdrawal is “tie[d]” to “verified progress of the decommissioning process — rather than to predetermined dates.” The connection between Israeli withdrawal and disarmament “progress,” not completion, suggests the IDF could be required to start withdrawing before Hamas is fully disarmed.

The Explanation’s descriptions of Articles 8 and 13 in the Roadmap provide further support for this interpretation. Describing Article 8, the Explanation reads “The clause clearly links the decommissioning process to a phased Israeli withdrawal and decommissioning of armed militias. It establishes that implementation will be verified and **‘step-for-step’** in its process” (emphasis added). The description of Article 13 similarly says that “The withdrawal will be carried out in accordance with clause [Article] 8, ensuring a

step-by-step process linking withdrawal phases to verified decommissioning steps” (emphasis added). Providing the strongest support to the interpretation that Israel is expected to withdraw gradually, as disarmament progresses (vice completed), Mladenov [posted](#) on X on July 31, announcing the Roadmap, that “withdrawal must move in lockstep with decommissioning.”

However, further confusing the situation, after a meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu on August 3 (but before Netanyahu’s August 9 rejection of the Roadmap), the BoP contradicted the principle of “step-for-step” reciprocity between decommissioning and withdrawal featured in its own Explanation document for the deal. The Board [stated on X](#) that “the withdrawal of the IDF beyond the Yellow Line will take place ***only once decommissioning is complete***” (emphasis added) and claimed that Hamas has committed to this sequencing, despite the group’s long-held position that it will only disarm once Israel withdraws. It is unclear whether the BoP was referring here to the original Yellow Line under the Comprehensive Plan or the expanded location of the line. By issuing this statement, the BoP likely tried to make the agreement more palatable to Israel, which remains highly skeptical that Hamas will follow through on its commitments and resistant to withdrawal before Hamas gives up all of its weapons.

Less than one week later—and immediately after Prime Minister Netanyahu rejected the Roadmap—Mladenov clarified that IDF troops are “currently at the Yellow Line” agreed to under the Comprehensive Plan and stated that “What we are asking is that the IDF do not position troops further from the Yellow Line.” Mladenov reiterated earlier statements that Israeli withdrawal would be “step-by-step”: as decommissioning is completed and verified in geographical sectors of Gaza, the IDF would progressively withdraw. The varying interpretations offered by the BoP and Mladenov, its lead negotiator, have only added to the confusion on expectations for Israel’s withdrawal under the Roadmap.

Article 9: Personal Weapons

Article 9 discusses personal arms, which “shall be subject to the regulations of relevant Palestinian laws.” The NCAG is empowered under the Roadmap to register personal arms and manage weapons licenses, presumably in accordance with some unspecified vetting and review process of individual applicants, and enforce the law. However, unlike with heavy weapons and weapons belonging to armed militias, the NCAG is not given the authority to store any personal weapons.

The Palestinian laws referenced in Article 9 and discussed in the Explanation document, which presumably refer to the PA’s laws in the West Bank, establish some restrictions on the weapons Gazan citizens are permitted to hold: small arms must be registered and licensed and assault rifles are banned. Israel has raised concerns that Hamas will keep its light weapons under the Roadmap, including the Kalashnikovs used by Hamas to carry out attacks against Israeli civilians on October 7, 2023, and maintain its control in Gaza. Under the Roadmap, it appears that citizens of Gaza, and in theory potentially even individuals associated with or sympathetic to Hamas, may be allowed to own some small arms, but this category is limited.

Interestingly, but somewhat confusingly, the BoP’s [post on X](#) on August 3, following the meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu, indicates that the decommissioning process includes “light weapons, heavy weapons, and the tunnels alike,” which suggests that light weapons will also be decommissioned, going beyond Article 9’s allowance for some small arms. Mladenov similarly [shared](#) in his interview with Amit Segal that the process outlined in the Roadmap calls for “the full decommissioning of ... all weapons.”

Article 10: Militia Weapons

Article 10 addresses the final category of weapons discussed in the Roadmap: those held by Palestinian [militias](#) financed and supported by Israel, which have clashed with Hamas during the ceasefire and conducted operations in territory under Hamas’s control. Militia weapons will be “decommissioned and stored under NCAG authority,” and militia members are barred from serving in security or police roles—a

unique restriction not imposed on Hamas militants or other Palestinian factions. This process, per Article 8, will be linked to the decommissioning of Hamas's heavy weapons and military infrastructure.

There is reason to be highly doubtful that Hamas will abide by these terms and follow the Roadmap in good faith. Hamas has repeatedly signaled willingness to cooperate when under pressure in an effort to gain time, only to renege on its commitments later on. It almost certainly will seek to do so again, rather than give up its primary means of power and influence and *raison d'être* as the "resistance" to occupation bent on Israel's destruction.

Article 11: Social Peace Agreement

Beyond the decommissioning of weapons, Article 11 seeks to prevent shows of force and retaliation against Hamas once it disarms. The article mandates the creation of a "Social Peace Agreement," which will feature "commitments to immediately end internal violence, avoid reprisals, shows of force, military parades and armed demonstrations." Whether these commitments translate to restraint on the ground will depend on whether the NCAG police can deter and counter efforts among Palestinian factions to exhibit their military might and seek retribution, especially against Hamas for its two-decade long rule of tyranny and misery over the Gazan people, culminating in the suffering and devastation triggered by the group's attack against Israel on October 7.

Article 12: The International Stabilization Force

Alongside the NCAG police, the Roadmap outlines the deployment of the ISF to Gaza, where it will play a peacekeeping role that overlaps with the missions envisioned in the Comprehensive Plan. The Comprehensive Plan proposed that the ISF would train and support Palestinian police, help secure border areas, and serve as a holding force as the IDF withdraws from territory (Points 15-16). The Roadmap slightly modifies the ISF's mission: Article 12 states that the ISF will "monitor compliance by all parties with the ceasefire, train the Palestinian police, secure the protection and delivery of humanitarian assistance and essential supplies ... and support the NCAG" in non-policing missions.

At the time the Comprehensive Plan was reached, many observers assumed the ISF would be heavily involved in the disarmament process, either as an independent monitor or an enforcer of a more confrontational approach, should it be necessary. Resolution 2803 provided support for this understanding of the ISF's role in Gaza. It explicitly includes demilitarization and disarmament as part of the ISF's mission and authorizes the ISF "to use all necessary measures to carry out its mandate"—a common UN euphemism that is widely understood to encompass the use of force. However, countries providing troops to the ISF have resisted a mission extending beyond peacekeeping, and the BoP returned to a more limited conception of the ISF's role in Gaza.

Although many countries have expressed an interest in contributing to the ISF, Morocco is the only country so far to have [formally committed](#) to participate in the force. Three other countries—[Kosovo](#), Albania, and Kazakhstan—are reportedly [on track](#) to formally join the ISF as well. Except for a very small number of troops stationed at the International Gaza Coordination Center, a logistics hub headed by the ISF that is based in Kiryat Gat, it does not appear that any national troops have been deployed to Israel for near-term entry into Gaza or undergone serious training for their mission there.

Deploying a multinational force, especially one composed of troops from Arab and Muslim-majority countries, to Gaza raises a [series of concerns](#). The IDF may need to periodically reenter Gaza to eliminate significant terrorist threats, and ISF forces could be killed in terrorist attacks or by friendly fire from the IDF. Hamas will certainly try to trigger armed clashes between Israelis troops and the ISF, as even inadvertent harm to the ISF could lead to significant diplomatic blowback for Israel. The national contingents of the ISF would be subject to domestic political pressures and could be reluctant to coordinate activities with the IDF, increasing the risk of accidental clashes or tensions. Like in Lebanon, where the UN Interim

Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) too often served as a cover force for Hezbollah's reconstitution, deploying a multinational force to Gaza could strengthen Hamas and ultimately undermine the Roadmap.

The location where the ISF will be deployed intensifies these risks. Per Article 12, the ISF will serve as a buffer force, separating the IDF from areas of Gaza held by the NCAG. Positioning the ISF between the IDF and the Palestinian population—where Hamas may try to rebuild—complicates Israel's decision making, could limit its freedom of action, and increases the odds of tensions or accidental clashes with the ISF when the IDF feels it needs to reenter NCAG-controlled areas.

The hope is that some of these risks will be alleviated by U.S. leadership and support of the ISF, though American troops will not be deployed inside Gaza. Members of the U.S. military at the helm of the ISF could facilitate coordination between the IDF and ISF and assist with deconfliction to minimize the risk of accidental clashes.

Article 15: Reconstruction

The focus of the Roadmap is on overcoming immediate roadblocks to advancing the Comprehensive Plan. It does not discuss the Comprehensive Plan's long-term objectives, such as deradicalization, in detail, nor does it touch on PA reform. However, it does include an article on large-scale reconstruction, in addition to mentioning reconstruction and development in Article 1. The final article of the Roadmap, Article 15, discusses reconstruction, which, it states, will occur based on a "plan and timetable prepared and supervised by the BoP and NCAG."

It is critical that reconstruction does not begin until Hamas is completely disarmed. Allowing reconstruction and redevelopment while Hamas remains dominant, or at least significantly influential, in Gaza will empower Hamas, which will seek to take advantage of the massive quantities of dual-use materials imported for reconstruction and large investments made in Gaza. Until Hamas complies with disarmament and Gaza is demilitarized, investments in Gaza would also carry large financial risk, as fighting between Israel and Hamas could resume and destroy progress with reconstruction.

Overview of the Roadmap for Gaza

Article	Key Elements	Outstanding Questions & Implications
1	- The parties commit to the Comprehensive Plan. - The parties' aims include an end to fighting, Palestinian governance, redevelopment, security, full IDF withdrawal, and facilitating the launch of a pathway to a Palestinian state.	Could be interpreted as making Palestinian statehood the Roadmap's explicit objective.
2	- Israel will complete outstanding commitments under the Sharm Sheikh Protocol. - Hamas and Palestinian factions will cease all military operations. - The timetable and implementation mechanisms will be developed within 14 days from the Roadmap's approval. - Once the timetable and implementation mechanisms are completed, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) will enter Gaza. - The International Verification Committee (IVC) will certify the completion of commitments.	- The parameters of Israel's ability to respond to Hamas threats are unclear. - The NCAG is not yet equipped to rapidly assume responsibility in Gaza.
3	The IVC must verify completion of commitments under a given phase before moving to the next phase.	The inclusion of Qatar and Turkey on the IVC damages its credibility.
4	Hamas and other Palestinian factions will pass "all civilian governance and security functions" to the NCAG and not interfere in its affairs.	Hamas will likely try to maintain significant governing influence.
5	- The NCAG will maintain continuity of public services. - Civil servants will be treated fairly. - The NCAG address legitimate financial obligations.	No mention of a vetting process for civil servants.
6	- Gaza will be governed based on the principle of "One Authority, One Law, One Weapon." - The NCAG will act consistent with Palestinian laws and international standards.	
7	- Police personnel undergoing training will be integrated into existing structures. - All police personnel will be vetted. - The NCAG will assume authority over police weapons.	- Police personnel who fail vetting could receive posts. - Hamas could in practice retain police weapons.
8	- The NCAG will implement a process to decommission and store heavy weapons and military infrastructure. - This process is "linked" to a phased IDF withdrawal. - Weapons will not be transferred outside of Palestinian parties or to Israel. - Upon the completion of Articles 7-10, solely the NCAG will "hold, store, or control weapons."	- The weapons decommissioning process is unclear. - The sequencing of Israeli withdrawal and decommissioning is, at best, ambiguous.

9	• Personal weapons will be subordinated to Palestinian laws. • Only the NCAG can register arms, manage weapons licenses, and enforce the law.	• Gazan citizens may be allowed to own small arms, with some restrictions.
10	• Weapons belonging to armed militias in Gaza will be “decommissioned and stored under NCAG authority.”	
11	• A “Social Peace Agreement” will be created to prevent shows of force, retaliations, and internal violence.	• Effectiveness of the social agreement depends on the NCAG police’s abilities.
12	• The International Stabilization Force (ISF) will ceasefire monitor compliance, train the police, secure humanitarian assistance, and provide non-policing support to the NCAG.	• The deployment of the ISF in a buffer zone could limit IDF freedom of action. • Tensions or accidental clashes could break out between IDF and ISF, with significant diplomatic repercussions.
13	• The IDF’s phased withdrawal will be completed in accordance with a timetable, the Roadmap’s Article 8, and the Comprehensive Plan.	
14	• The NCAG is responsible for “internal security incidents.”	• No details on the delineation of internal and external threats and who defines an external threat
15	• Reconstruction will occur based on a plan and timetable developed and overseen by the Board of Peace (BoP) and NCAG.	• Reconstruction before disarmament could empower Hamas.