Simmering frustrations among lawmakers with U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack — who also serves as special envoy to Syria and manages a wide remit in America’s Middle East policy — have recently emerged with force, as multiple lawmakers tell Jewish Insider they have concerns about the U.S. envoy’s expansive role.

Barrack’s critics see the envoy pushing U.S. policy in concerning directions, toward an overly close relationship with Turkey despite the country’s overt anti-Israel posture and regional ambitions and, most recently, as a key enabler of the Turkish-backed Syrian government’s offensive against U.S.’ longtime Kurdish allies in the Syrian Democratic Forces.

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Michael Makovsky, the CEO of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, told JI that, “half the things the guy says I can’t understand, and the other half I don’t agree with.” Makovsky said he’s been particularly troubled by Barrack’s influence on Syria policy, seemingly pushing the U.S. toward support for al-Sharaa.

“I think that’s been a big mistake,” Makovsky said, criticizing the “betrayal of the Syrian Kurds, which I found rather obscene” and emphasizing that the Kurds had been a critical ally of the U.S. in the fight against ISIS. He noted that al-Sharaa remains aligned with jihadists who have carried out massacres of Syrian minority groups.

“We’re all in on [al-]Sharaa, and I think that’s partly because Trump met him and likes him, but even before that, it’s because this is what Barrack wants,” Makovsky continued. “He seems to often reflect exactly the Turkish view, and I don’t think the Turkish view on Syria aligns with our own interests at all.”

He said that he was also troubled by Barrack’s claim that Israel is not a democracy, saying that it was a poor message from a U.S. official and suggested that he does not properly understand the region.

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Read the full article in Jewish Insider. 

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One of the most striking features of post-Assad Syria is the speed with which the interim government has been able to claim international legitimacy. Regional and Western governments that once saw no future for Damascus are now tentatively re-engaging, hopeful that the post-Assad moment can be shaped into something stable and constructive. Trump has focused on promoting normalization and economic integration as the foundations of long-term stability.

A critical step to achieving that vision and meeting Trump’s objectives is reaching an agreement between Syria’s interim government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which defended large portions of northern and eastern Syria throughout the conflict and built one of the most effective governance structures of the post-2011 era: the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). On March 10, 2025 SDF General Mazloum Abdi and Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, agreed on a framework for talks which requires a detailed integration roadmap to be finalized by the end of December.

Among the main points the negotiations have to resolve centers on the future of the SDF. Roughly 100,000 fighters – men and women who have undergone years of US-backed training as part of the coalition’s campaign against the Islamic State – must somehow be integrated into a national army that itself is far from a coherent force. Equally contentious is the debate over Syria’s future political system. Negotiators from the AANES maintain that only a decentralized form of governance can reflect the country’s complex mosaic of ethnic and religious communities. By contrast, Damascus is insisting that this is a discussion that needs to be had further down the road, if at all.

For Syria’s interim president, incorporating the northeast through negotiation is a matter of survival. The institutions Al-Sharaa oversees remain brittle, and the forces under his command are a motley crew–an amalgam of militias whose record toward minority communities is deeply troubling. The state lacks the manpower, financial capacity, and political standing to capture and administer Kurdish-held areas through coercion. While a renewed civil war could theoretically dismantle the Autonomous Administration as a territorial entity, it would come at an enormous cost: investors would retreat; the government’s recently gained international credibility would evaporate; and external actors would find an opportunity to entrench themselves on Syrian soil. The result would be a level of fragmentation far worse than what any negotiated decentralized arrangement would produce.

That is why Ambassador Tom Barrack has positioned the United States as a facilitator between Damascus and the Autonomous Administration and urged the sides to engage in earnest. He is doing his best to convey no bias on the part of the Administration but mixed messages on decentralization in Syria have been confusing. Barrack is right not to seek to dictate the outcome of these negotiations but he should also not limit the scope and the vision of the peoples of Syria. Anything from a monarchy to federalism should be on the table–so long as the peoples of Syria reach their decision through peaceful and political dialogue.

Alas, the pace of the US-facilitated talks aimed at integrating the Kurdish-led administration in northeast Syria with the country’s transitional government has slowed. The last high-level meeting took place in Damascus on Oct. 7, bringing together Mazloum Abdi, Ahmed al-Sharaa, US Syria envoy Tom Barrack, and CENTCOM commander Brad Cooper. The prospects for meeting the end-of-year deadline set for the talks are dim.

The problem is not with the substance of the negotiations. Syria’s interim government is not outright rejecting the idea of integrating the SDF or establishing a decentralized political structure that reflects the realities of the new Syria – an idea that President Trump’s Syria Envoy Tom Barrack has also endorsed. On the contrary, there is strong appetite for a deal that ends territorial fragmentation and brings key armed and administrative actors under a unified national framework.

Instead, the obstacle comes from outside of Syria. The SDF has long warned that Turkey is imposing a veto on any deal that would integrate the northeast into a new Syrian political framework. Indeed, Turkish infiltration of Damascus has shaped decision-making across multiple ministries and agencies. Anyone attempting to steer Syria toward a more inclusive political future finds themselves navigating a labyrinth of Turkish influence.

Ankara’s policies since 2011 have played a decisive and often destructive role in shaping the Syrian conflict. What began as political support for opposition activists to topple Assad quickly morphed into the systematic backing of jihadist armed factions fighting to prevent the emergence of any sort of Kurdish governed area in Syria. These groups (many linked to al-Qaeda or sharing its ideological foundations) benefited from Turkey’s permissive border policy, logistical support networks, and, at times, direct military patronage. The current Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and virtually all government officials in Damascus come from one such group–Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, formerly the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria.

With Assad’s downfall, one might have expected Ankara to support a new political arrangement that empowers the very Syrians who suffered under the old regime and fled the violence Turkey helped fuel. Instead, it is actively blocking the Syrian transitional government from reaching a deal with persecuted communities – particularly Kurds, Yazidis, Christians, and Arabs who live under the Autonomous Administration. Turkey appears unwilling to accept any new order in Damascus that does not adhere to its own narrow parameters, especially one that might embolden the Kurds of Turkey.

In Turkey, the Turkish government has taken a courageous step by engaging with the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan as part of the peace process to resolve their own decades-old conflict, but it is yet to articulate how it intends to address its root cause: the Turkish republic’s constitutional eradication of Kurdish identity. Thus, three million Kurds enjoying broad constitutionally guaranteed rights in Syria just south of the Turkish border – at a time when 20 million Kurds in Turkey still cannot legally use the letter X (a letter absent from Turkish but present in the Kurdish alphabet) – is seen as a dangerous precedent before the anticipated drafting of a new constitution in Turkey.

As part of the process, the PKK announced a ceasefire in March, then dissolved in May, and later declared that it had initiated the withdrawal of its forces from within Turkey’s borders. Not satisfied with these historically significant steps, the Turkish government has moved the goalposts and is now slow-walking its own process with the PKK while preventing Damascus from moving forward with its negotiations with the SDF – essentially trying to turn the entire situation into a cross-border four-way trade. Ankara wants Öcalan to use his influence over the SDF to scale down their autonomy demands and disarm and disband along with the PKK. Ocalan is not relenting to this pressure, leading Ankara to essentially deadlock both processes in Turkey and Syria.

As of now, the front lines between the SDF and forces loyal to Syria’s interim government are still tense and have erupted multiple times over the last few months. The longer this deal takes, the more chances there are that the next flare up could result in Syria descending into civil war again. Recent Turkish military movements along the Turkey-Syria border and public threats made by government mouthpieces cannot be disregarded as mere bargaining tactics.

In my view, Turkey’s threats and obstructionism runs counter to the vision articulated by Trump for a more stable and secure Middle East. The United States should leave no doubt that renewed fighting in Syria is off the table. The bloody massacres in Suwayda and Latakia have already shown us how quickly armed groups loyal to the interim government in Damascus can revert to old habits. As Trump champions peace over new wars, the Turkish government should recognize that any move toward reopening the conflict would invite a strong White House response.

For the first time in years, Syria has a chance to rebuild. Turkey must not hold that hope hostage.

Giran Ozcan is Fellow for Kurdish Affairs at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). He previously served as the Founding Director of the Kurdish Peace Institute.

Originally published in the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune.

The post Will Turkey Allow Syria to Rebuild? appeared first on JINSA.

Blaise Misztal is the Vice President for Policy at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA).

Jonah Brody is a policy analyst at JINSA.

Originally published in the National Interest.

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Read the full article in Jewish Insider.

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Characterizing Turkey as a “potentially threatening regional power” led by a “pro-Hamas” president, a new report from the Jewish Institute for National Security of America released on Wednesday argues that Ankara should not be considered for readmission into the F-35 fighter jet program. But it also sets out a series of increased conditions the Trump administration should impose if it decides to proceed.

Turkey was booted from the advanced fighter jet program after it acquired a Russian S-400 air defense platform, which officials say could have compromised sensitive components of the F-35. The Trump administration, despite widespread skepticism, has reportedly been working on a deal to sell Turkey the jets if it relinquishes the S-400, as is required under law.

The report was authored by JINSA CEO Michael Makovsky, former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Eric Edelman, Center for American Progress senior fellow Alan Makovsky, JINSA scholar Svante Cornell, JINSA Vice President for Policy Blaise Misztal and JINSA Policy Analyst Jonah Brody.

“The United States must carefully consider whether Turkey, a rising, and potentially threatening, regional power led by the authoritarian, pro-Hamas, neo-Ottoman President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, can be trusted with this advanced jet,” the report reads. “We fear that it cannot. Repeatedly, Turkish policy and U.S. interests have diverged. Too often has Ankara threatened to use force against U.S. partners — not to mention, on occasion, U.S. troops.”

The report argues that Turkey should not be welcomed back into the program, noting the country’s decades-long history of working at odds with U.S. interests in a variety of venues. The report suggests that providing the F-35s would further exacerbate Turkish aggression, and warned that key elements of the F-35 could be stolen if sent to Turkey.

But, noting that the administration seems “favorably disposed” to granting the request, the report outlines a series of conditions the administration should place on Ankara if it proceeds.

Those requirements include removing the Russian S-400 system, and also restoring normal relations with Israel, ending all support for Hamas, preventing Hamas from fundraising in Turkey, entering a deconfliction mechanism with Israel regarding Syria and respecting Greek and Cypriot territory.

“If Turkey cannot agree to these terms, it should not be granted access to this advanced American weapon,” the report reads.

The report further proposes that the administration could offer to sell the Patriot air defense system to Turkey if it otherwise refuses to give up the S-400, but under the condition that the system only be deployed in Turkish territory and not inside Syria.

Regardless of whether Turkey is readmitted into the program, the report urges Congress to consider passing legislation requiring that any U.S. military sales to Turkey do not compromise Israel’s qualitative military edge, a requirement already in place for other Middle East partners.

Originally published in Jewish Insider.

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The discussions come as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan escalates his rhetoric against Israel, including expressing support for Hamas and threatening to invade or attack Israel. Turkey has also been increasingly hostile toward the NATO alliance and its efforts to counter Russia.

Ankara has been barred from acquiring the top-of-the-line fighter jet and placed under U.S. sanctions since its 2017 purchase of a Russian S-400 missile system. Experts warn the S-400’s radar systems could compromise sensitive technology and details of the F-35 if operated in the same airspace. Reports indicate that, under the deal in discussion, Turkey would be allowed to buy F-35s if it transfers the Russian hardware to a U.S.-controlled area at an airbase in Turkey.

“It is being talked about. We’re at a point where it’s a consideration, and then we’re going to have to make a decision,” a Senate Intelligence Committee member familiar with the matter told Jewish Insider.

Pressed on whether such a deal would require the U.S., or possibly Ukraine, to be able to inspect the S-400, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul (R-TX) responded, “Well, Turkey has access to one — you’re getting warm.”

The State Department indicated that the administration does still want to see Turkey become part of the program but didn’t confirm the specific details of current talks.

“The requirements for Türkiye to procure the F-35 are well known, and our policy has not changed,” a State Department spokesperson said in a statement to JI. “Türkiye’s continued NATO interoperability remains a critical US priority.”

The spokesperson added, “we look forward to resolving this [sanctions] issue with Türkiye in a productive manner” and remain “committed to robustly implementing … sanctions to deter arms export transactions that bring Russia revenue, access and influence.”

Sen. Joni Ernst (R-IA) told JI any movement on the F-35s should be predicated, at minimum, on Turkey’s greater cooperation with efforts to release the Israeli and American hostages held in Gaza.

“We know that they have influence with Hamas as well, and so until we start to see the return of our American hostages from Israel, I don’t think we should be visiting with Turkey about any of these issues,” Ernst said.

Sen. Tim Kaine (D-VA) said he’s “skeptical” about the prospect of allowing Turkey to buy the advanced jets.

“That doesn’t mean unalterably, unequivocally, ‘no’ under any circumstance,” Kaine said. “But I would start with some real skepticism. I mean — even just the Erdogan comment about Hamas the other day … So I would be skeptical.”

In an interview with NBC News, Erdogan said, “I never called Hamas a terrorist organization. I don’t approach Hamas as a terrorist organization,” instead calling it a “resistance group.”

Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) told JI that the U.S. should “consider very carefully what the downsides are.”

“We want to hold NATO together and strengthen it, but there have been problems with Turkey as an ally and in terms of human rights and democracy, and I think we ought to consider very carefully what the negatives are before we do,” Blumental said.

McCaul said that any deal should be predicated on “what Turkey does in exchange for that — and then I can’t get into what that is.”

McCaul said that his openness to the deal “depends on how well they cooperate with NATO,” noting that the U.S. had effectively conditioned the recent sale of less-advanced F-16 jets to Turkey on Ankara allowing Sweden to join NATO. But he said that the F-35s should not be co-produced in Turkey, as was initially planned before Turkey acquired the S-400.

“So [it] depends on what else they do,” McCaul said. “It’s a good way to motivate, and we don’t want to see them buy it from other countries like Russia.”

Sen. Pete Ricketts (R-NE), who proposed sanctioning Turkey over hostile moves against Israel, suggested that the F-35s could serve as an enticement to Turkey to change its posture toward Israel.

“I believe that we ought to work with our allies to help them support Israel and work [on] ways to” convince allies to be more supportive of Israel, Ricketts said. “I don’t know if this is specifically a way to do it.”

Pressed on Turkey’s open hostility toward the Jewish state, he responded, “that’s where I think we have to work on opportunities to be able to get Turkey back onto supporting Israel.”

Some in Washington are skeptical that a sale would actually go forward.

Bradley Bowman, the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former national security advisor to members of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, said he’s “very, very confident… that you would have a bipartisan majority in at least one chamber, if not both chambers, working to stop this.”

Blaise Misztal, the vice president for policy at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, also noted that legal prohibitions on Turkey obtaining F-35s as long as it maintains possession of the S-400 remain in force. He said that prohibition might not be resolved by the agreement as reported publicly.

Bowman and Misztal both argued that the presence of the S-400 was just one concern about Turkey acquiring the Russian system: “The bigger issue is the S-400 purchase was demonstrative of a Turkish turn away from the West, and willingness and even desire to work with U.S. adversaries,” Misztal said.

That broader pattern, Misztal continued, would remain the same even if the specific issue of the S-400 is resolved. Both Bowman and Misztal pointed to a series of incidents of Turkey deviating from U.S. interests and priorities and aligning with U.S. adversaries, including its increasingly aggressive rhetoric toward Israel.

Misztal and Bowman also said they’re skeptical that Turkey would honor a deal to give up control of the S-400, with Misztal warning that Turkey could breach the agreement and retake control of the Russian system down the road once it has received the F-35s.

“Whoever the staffer is that apparently thought this was a good idea, I think is clearly operating from a different worldview, a worldview that I think is fundamentally inconsistent with American national interests,” Bowman said. “This is an absolute no-brainer that, if this is being put forward by the administration, it will be on a top five, top 10 list of one of their worst decisions.”

Misztal argued that there’s no clear benefit to the U.S. in proceeding with the deal. He said the U.S. should demand a demonstrable step of “more strategic value” from Turkey to “show that it is fully in the NATO camp.”

“They haven’t changed their behavior and they’re not offering to help us with something,” Misztal said.

Bowman emphasized that the F-35 is the crown jewel of the U.S. and its allies’ arsenal, currently being used by Israel. He said it would be a key platform in any war between NATO countries and Russia, in the Taiwan Strait or between the U.S. and Iran, and that there should be a high bar to prove Turkey is worthy of it.

“We have to be very, very careful who we share that technology with,” Bowman said. ”The most advanced fighter aircraft in the world, that is fundamental to American deterrence, fundamental to the deterrence of our adversaries and fundamental to our security of our country’s key allies, like Israel — you don’t just give that to anyone.”

Misztal said a Turkish F-35 fleet would raise concerns for both Israel and for Greece, the airspace of which Turkey has violated repeatedly.

But he also said that U.S.-owned F-35s have different and greater capabilities than versions exported to other countries, and the Israeli versions of the jets have their own unique systems, “so it wouldn’t be a one-to-one comparison, necessarily, but it would certainly raise Turkey’s military power and air power significantly compared to where it is now.”

Originally published by Jewish Insider.

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Turkey has confirmed it will stop all trade with Israel until the country allows humanitarian aid to flow uninterrupted into Gaza.

“Export and import transactions related to Israel have been stopped, covering all products … Turkey will strictly and decisively implement these new measures until the Israeli government allows an uninterrupted and sufficient flow of humanitarian aid to Gaza,” Turkey’s trade ministry said in a statement late on Thursday.

In response, Israel’s Foreign Minister, Israel Katz, has instructed the ministry’s director general to look for trade alternatives and focus on local production.

The National looks at the Israel-Turkey trade stand-off and its wider implications.

Why are Turkish imports important for Israel?

Due to its close geographical proximity, competitive production costs and quality products, Turkey has emerged as a preferred exporter to Israel in the past couple of years.

In addition to basic produce and goods such as eggs, vegetables and textiles, Turkey is a leading exporter of high-value products such as electronics, iron, plastic and steel to Israel.

In 2022, iron and steel topped the list of Turkish exports to Israel, and were together worth $1.19 billion, according to data compiled by Trading Economics. In second place were vehicles ($562.98 million), followed by plastic ($516.24 million) and electronic equipment ($384.59 million).

Why is Turkey a better option than China?

Following the Covid-19 pandemic, Israeli businesses started looking for alternative trade options beyond China, making Turkish facilities increasingly appealing.

Gaash Worldwide, an Israeli logistics and supply chain firm, said in March last year that the main advantage of the Turkish market over China is that products produced in Turkish factories are of “better quality”.

Factories in China can make products at a very high level, but the Turkish factories produce better quality and long-lasting products, it said in its analysis posted on its website.

The proximity also helps traders to reduce transportation costs and shipping times.

Exporters look for alternative routes

Following the suspension of bilateral trade between the countries, Turkish and other foreign exporters with confirmed orders are exploring alternative routes to deliver their goods to Israel.

“We have confirmed orders from Turkey as well as Israel,” Anuj Gulati, general manager of an Amsterdam-based food packaging and spices company, told The National.

“Currently our shipments are at Turkish customs and we are not very clear about the situation … we might have to look for alternative routes through Egypt or Lebanon to supply our products to Israel.”

Mr Gulati said the trade suspension will have serious implications for goods intended for the Palestinian territories.

“The trade suspension will potentially lead to a blockade on goods destined for the Palestinian territories, as they also have to undergo Israeli customs clearance,” said Mr Gulati, who ships his products to Palestine through Turkey-Israel route.

Reuters spoke to the head of a Turkish chocolate and confectionery exporter that produces some products specifically for the Israeli market, with packaging entirely in Hebrew.

“It is a big material loss for us,” he said. “There are companies in Israel from which we have receivables and to whom we owe money. What will happen to these receivables when trade stops?”

What trade value is at stake?

Bilateral trade between Turkey and Israel stood at more than $6.8 billion last year, according to Turkish Statistical Institute data. More than 75 per cent of this was Turkish exports.

While largest export from Turkey to Israel was iron and steel last year, the primary import was refined oil products.

Formed in 1993 to promote trade ties between the two countries, the Turkey-Israel Business Council includes companies selling goods and services ranging from digital payment technologies to metal packaging.

In a statement on X on Friday, the Istanbul-based business council said it supported the Turkish government’s decision to stop exports and imports of all products.

The two nations have had a free-trade agreement in place since 1997.

Despite exchanges of bitter rhetoric since the Gaza war broke out on October 7 and the halting of flights between Istanbul and Tel Aviv, the two nations have remained economic partners.

What prompted the blanket trade ban?

The latest actions came on the close heels of Turkey expressing its intentions to join South Africa’s case against Israel at the UN’s highest court, accusing Israel of genocide in Gaza.

Last month, Turkey announced it was restricting some exports to Israel amid strained relations between the two countries. It said it was imposing restrictions on a list of goods because of Israel’s refusal to allow Turkey to take part in aid drop operations over Gaza.

The list provided by the ministry includes 54 items, among them construction materials such as marble, cement, steel and aluminium products.

Will the move derail co-operative initiatives?

In August 2022, Turkey and Israel announced the restoration of diplomatic ties and the return of ambassadors to each other’s countries after years of tension.

Both countries had also agreed to explore co-operation avenues.

However, last year’s Hamas-led attack on Israel on October 7, which was followed by Israel’s massive offensive against Gaza, has led to the current hostilities.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has also been a vocal critic of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli government’s policies towards Palestinians.

He accused Israel of being a “terrorist state” and voiced his support for Hamas.

In the past few months, Mr Erdogan has come under pressure domestically with protesters calling for him to cut off relations with Israel due to the Gaza war, in which more than 34,500 Palestinians have been killed since October.

Pro-Palestine demonstrations have also grown in Turkey in recent weeks.

Why analysts see it as the Turkish President’s attempt to appease voters?

After local elections in March in which Mr Erdogan lost votes to more conservative Islamist parties, Turkey’s leader has been under increasing pressure from the public to take more forceful action against Israel.

Experts said the trade dispute is “all about Mr Erdogan and his interests”.

“First and foremost, what are his domestic political needs? How does he recover from his stinging defeat in the local elections?

Originally published in The National.

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From now on, the world can be separated between those who condemn this act of true evil, the worst attack against Jews since the Holocaust, and the terrorist sympathizers who cannot do more than equivocate between genocidal savages and the innocent people they killed. And, unfortunately, too many countries in the broader Middle East that the United States calls partners have shown themselves to fall in the latter category.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, throughout his more than 20 years in office, has been a political chameleon, happy to make alliances with whomever he needed to stay in power, be they Islamists, Kurds, or ultra-nationalists. But he always shows his true colors when it comes to Hamas. Erdogan has met multiple times with Hamas leader Khaled Meshal and invited the group’s leadership to reside in Turkey. On Sunday, the day after Hamas launched its terrorist assault on Israel, Erdogan declared, “It’s our responsibility to stand with the oppressed.” Since then, he has gone on to call Israeli self-defense operations “devoid of any ethical foundation” and claimed US troops moving to the region would commit “serious massacres” in Gaza.

The Biden administration should impose clear consequences for such rhetoric by a NATO ally. For example, it should condition the sale of new F-16s to Turkey on it expelling and condemning Hamas. The United States should also continue upgrading the security relationship with Greece. The Greeks, incidentally, responded correctly. As Greek Defense Minister Nikos Dendias said, “Hamas’ barbaric attack directly violates the core principles that NATO must uphold, including human rights, human dignity, and security. Every member-country in the Alliance should express a clear and unwavering stance on this matter.”

Other states sympathetic to Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood have made statements no less grotesque than Turkey’s. Qatar declared that it “holds Israel solely responsible” for Hamas’ savagery. The Biden administration should inform Qatar that the future bilateral relationship will depend on Qatar’s successfully pressing Hamas to release the 200 hostages the terrorists abducted from Israel, and kicking Hamas leaders out of its country.

Disappointingly, even some American partners who oppose Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood have sought to blame Israel for Hamas’ crimes. Saudi Arabia highlighted “its repeated warnings of the dangers of the explosion of the situation as a result of the continuation of the occupation, the deprivation of the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights, and the repetition of systematic provocations against its sanctities.” President Biden should press Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, who seems keen to normalize relations with Israel, to issue a better statement, if for no other reason than to help improve Saudi support in Congress for a US-Saudi mutual defense treaty.

Just as the United Arab Emirates did. The UAE initially called for “utmost restraint and an immediate ceasefire in order to avoid serious repercussions.” But it at least updated it by recognizing that “attacks by Hamas against Israeli towns and villages near the Gaza Strip, including the firing of thousands of rockets at population centers, are a serious and grave escalation.”

How countries respond to the 10/7 barbaric attack against Israelis reveals their true allegiances. President Biden, who has responded very well since the attacks, should follow what US Ambassador Nikki Haley once told the United Nations, “the US will be taking names.”

Michael Makovsky, a former Pentagon official, is president and CEO of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America. Blaise Misztal is JINSA’s vice president for policy.

Originally Published in eKathimerini.

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