Next week, President Obama will make his first visit to Israel as president. The bonds that exist between Jerusalem and Washington are built upon mutual strategic interests and a solid foundation of shared cultural and political values. At the same time, both countries face common threats where cooperation and sharing in defense technologies have clearly been of great benefit to both.

Israel is the only ally in the region whose interests are closely aligned with those of the United States. A strong and secure Israel is an essential element of national security strategy upon which American military planners can rely. Israel is a great resource for the United States in its own right and can help America to better understand regional trends as well as influence outcomes that would support U.S. regional interests.

Given the high levels of instability and uncertainty in the region at this time, we urge President Obama to make it clear to both our allies and adversaries that:

• American policy is to prevent Iran from possessing nuclear weapons capability and not to depend on containing it if it does so. Only with the heaviest possible pressure and with a united American-Israeli front can there be a reasonable chance to slow Iran’s march toward developing a nuclear weapon. All strategies, such as engagement, sanctions, covert operations, regime change, and the credible threat of military attack must be implemented simultaneously. Taking military action off the table undermines all other options short of war.

• If President Obama must encourage resumption of talks between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, the two parties should meet without preconditions. He must reject the notion that the burden for reaching any agreement should fall disproportionately on Israel. As long as Israel’s neighbors continue to believe that the Jewish presence in the Middle East is only temporary and that time is on their side, they will continue to condone violence and terror to achieve their goals.

• Israel is rightly concerned about the possible transfer of advanced or nonconventional weapons to Islamist militant groups in the region. Failure to prevent such weapons transfers today is likely to have serious negative consequences in the future for our own country, for Israel, and for our friends in the Middle East. As a measure supportive of both American and Israeli interests, President Obama must voice support for Israeli preemptive operations that deny our mutual enemies lethal capabilities.

• The United States will continue ensuring that Israel has the defensive and offensive capabilities needed to deter and fight its enemies. Preserving Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME) is of utmost importance to the fulfillment of our shared goals.

• The United States will continue to work with Israel and our regional friends to identify and support new strategic partnerships, while continuing to buttress traditional friends in need of our backing. Jordan remains a key ally for both the United States and Israel. In light of the challenges now facing the monarchy, Jordan’s stability should be a priority objective.

• President Obama should make clear that the United States regards Egyptian fulfillment of the terms of the peace treaty with Israel, preservation of unfettered passage of international shipping through the Suez Canal, prevention of smuggling across Egyptian borders, securement of the Sinai Peninsula, and zero tolerance for the presence of terrorist organizations on Egyptian soil to be necessary and would view violations with grave concern.

American leadership is critical for the stability of the Middle East. Withdrawal from the region will undermine U.S. interests in regional stability, interests that are currently being threatened by the ongoing upheavals in the Middle East and Africa. We urge President Obama to make it clear that the United States will remain firmly connected to the region and its closest ally, Israel.

The post President Obama’s Visit to Israel: U.S. Policy Priorities appeared first on JINSA.

Outgoing Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has called this budget sequestration, a “meat ax” approach to budget cutting that will force the Administration to reexamine its entire national defense strategy, announced only one year ago. Not only would the half a trillion dollars in cuts over the next decade “hollow out the force,” it would reduce the United States to a “second-rate power,” Panetta said.

Sequestration would not only slash U.S. military resources and capacities, but would also directly impact the health of the U.S. economy, which would be felt immediately as 800,000 Department of Defense and Armed Services civilian employees would see their pay reduced 20 percent over the remainder of the fiscal year through furloughs, with the high likelihood that many of those jobs will be phased out over time. Untold thousands of layoffs will occur in the defense and aerospace sector where more than one million Americans work. Government-funded research and development, which has historically propelled the civilian economy, will be curtailed.

Strategically, sequestration would so degrade U.S. military capabilities that it would become highly questionable whether current and projected threats to the country could be met. New global crises might not be responded to and U.S. commitment to existing crises would have to be reduced.

In the Middle East, numerous countries with which the United States enjoys partnerships, including major non-NATO ally Israel and the friendly but fragile monarchy in Jordan, would be impacted by sequestration. Israel, the only democracy in the region, is a trusted friend to the United States in numerous security related areas as well as an important trading partner.

Sequestration would cut foreign aid to Israel by $263.5 million this fiscal year. Since Congressional funding for the Iron Dome missile defense system was not a budgetary line item, if Congress and the White House cannot agree on a budget, $211 million meant to assist Israel in producing more Iron Dome systems, which save lives and were a major factor in allowing Israel to moderate its response to Hamas rocket attacks, will be cut from the FY2013 budget. Similarly, funding for the Arrow High Altitude Missile Defense System and the David’s Sling Medium Altitude Missile Defense System would be reduced by nearly nine percent. U.S. and Israeli firms jointly own both systems and the global market for missile defense is vast. Funding reductions would likely result in the loss of sales opportunities, and hence jobs, in a field where joint U.S.-Israel products dominate.

As of last year, the Department of Defense’s own strategic guidance analysis projected that in the Middle East, the United States must be focused on countering violent extremists and destabilizing threats to allies and partner states, particularly from Iran, as well as preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon capability. To support these objectives, the Pentagon analysis noted, the United States must continue to place a premium on U.S. and allied military presence in – and in support of – partner nations. Current defense cutbacks and the sequester will make the prospects for achieving this goal highly unlikely.

Cutbacks in aircraft carrier operations will have serious repercussions for critical stability operations in the Middle East. For the past several years the United States increased its military presence in the region, maintaining an aircraft carrier strike group in the Persian Gulf and a second carrier strike group in the Arabian Sea. These two deployments have been vital in America’s ability to deter Iran from efforts to intimidate our Arab partners through aggressive behavior and, perhaps, from taking direct action to block the Straits of Hormuz, the vital waterway through which 20 percent of the world’s crude oil flows. Such an act – or even a serious threat of it – would deal a severe blow to the U.S. and world economies. No country would escape the dramatic negative economic effects of this action.

Two weeks ago and on just three days notice, the U.S. Navy was forced to cancel the deployment of the USS Harry S. Truman to the Persian Gulf. This cancellation reduced America’s naval presence in the Gulf by half and comes just as Iran is scheduled to restart negotiations with the P5 +1 on its nuclear weapons intentions. The reduction can only weaken America’s negotiating position, sending the wrong signal to a country that already believes America to lack resolve with potentially chilling consequences.

The choice not to employ air bases for combat flight operations in the Middle East – whether in Afghanistan, Bahrain or in other Gulf states – means that the U.S. Navy has shouldered the lion’s share of strike operations in the region at the high cost of wearing out the naval air fleet far more rapidly than was ever anticipated or budgeted for.

Massive, across the board cuts in the training of U.S. service members and in the maintenance of their equipment have already begun. While units in combat or the very next to go to combat will receive adequate funding for training and equipment, the armed services are being forced to take risk on the training of follow-on forces.

On March 1, the Air Force will ground all of its aircraft not directly associated with near term combat, combat replacement or special missions. The Army, Navy and Air Force have announced cancellation of their scheduled depot maintenance activity for the last six months of the fiscal year. There is also an economic impact to these false maintenance savings: the U.S. Navy estimates that slipping a ship’s necessary maintenance period costs 2.6 times as much to do the same work when the next shipyard slot opens, usually two years later.

The impacts of these training and maintenance cuts are insidious. By this fall, the armed services’ rotational deployment capacity, i.e., the ability to put ships and aircraft on station or into theater and stay there, will be curtailed for years. The ability to exert global persistent presence has been the cornerstone of America’s approach to crises that have no clear conclusion. The armed services will extend currently deployed forces as long as they can but when they return, the forces whose turn it will be to replace them will not be ready to go if they were not trained and equipped this summer. The Service Chiefs have testified that by this fall even if funding were restored, it would take up to nine months to return those forces to deployable readiness.

A permanent reduction to defense spending on the scale of the sequestration will cause a retrenchment in American foreign policy and overseas engagement. The Pentagon’s strategic guidance places a premium on U.S. and allied military presence in the Middle East along with an increased emphasis on the Pacific. As the effects of the sequestration begin to bite, the result will be further reductions in presence. Additionally, U.S. military support for the capacity and capability development of partner nation forces will be significantly diminished.

Crippling the U.S. military’s ability to project power will embolden those countries given to hegemonic behavior and result in an increase in conflicts across the planet and, as a consequence, increase loss of life and intensify disruptions to the global economy. The very high degree to which America’s worldwide presence makes possible the smooth flow of global commerce is rarely appreciated.

Congress and the Obama administration must act responsibly to support a robust American national defense capability. Allowing U.S. military resources and capacity to be curtailed through the ham-handed methodology of sequestration would constitute a dereliction of duty by both.

The post Sequestration’s Devastating Effects Will Be Felt at Home and Abroad appeared first on JINSA.

Last week, the Israeli Air Force reportedly attacked two different targets in Syria. One is said to have been a convoy ferrying advanced anti-aircraft missiles to the Shiite terrorist organization Hezbollah, the other, a large compound reported to contain training camps and research facilities housing Russian technicians as well a number of Iranian special operations troops. Accounts are incomplete and Israel has not officially acknowledged either attack.

Such military strikes would conform to Israel’s policy of pre-emptive covert and overt military action to prevent Hezbollah, an Iranian pawn, from acquiring and/or using both sophisticated (such as the SA-17 surface-to-air missiles that are said to be the convoy’s chief cargo) and unconventional weapons.

The Assad regime has stepped up assistance to Hezbollah, a longtime ally in the fight against Israel and increasingly one of the regime’s chief battlefield allies in the Syrian civil war along with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force. Units from both terrorist groups have been fighting alongside Assad’s forces.

Curiously, just two days before the strikes, the head of Israel’s National Security Council, Yaakov Amidror, a retired IDF general, was in Moscow reportedly on a mission to convince the Russian government to take action to prevent Syria’s unconventional weapons from falling into the hands of terrorist groups.

The longer Assad brutalizes his own citizens and lays waste to population centers where the resistance operates, the more attractive the extremist Islamist militias engaged in the fight against Assad become to Syria’s Sunni majority, a point made in a previous JINSA Report. The larger the Assad regime’s loss of control over Syrian territory, the less control it wields over its vast arsenal of anti-aircraft, anti-tank, and surface-to-surface missiles, and chemical and biological weapons.

This dynamic is likely to motivate Israel to take similar and quite possibly larger unilateral military actions to ensure its security. And while the likelihood of a large-scale Israeli military operation against Assad’s forces is currently remote, the ongoing civil war in Syria increases the risk of Israel coming into conflict with non-state actors emanating from the chaos, a development desired by Tehran.

The overriding American interest in Syria is stability under a post Assad government, preferably one that is not militantly Islamist, hostile to its neighbors, and in possession of Assad’s unconventional weapons arsenal. Israel’s interests are the same, but also include preventing the acquisition of those game-changing weapons by Hezbollah, itself a terrorist organization with American blood on its hands.

Overhead surveillance and intelligence collection is essential to any Israeli preemptive action against this threat. It was not a coincidence that the IDF Intelligence Chief, Major General Aviv Kochavi, was meeting with U.S. officials at the Pentagon the same day that allegedly the Israel Air Force struck the targets. The United States and Israel have mutual interests in stability in Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, and that includes thwarting Iran’s regional ambitions. The current instability, which is strongly impacting Jordan and Turkey, is a matter of the great concern for both countries.

Now, after the election of new administrations in both the United States and Israel, the U.S. government would be prudent to engage in political and diplomatic initiatives to ensure as much as possible that no cracks are visible in American support for a threatened Israel.

Positive steps the Obama administration could take to support Israel if it is again forced to act include:

1. President Obama, acknowledging the deterioration of the Syrian situation and that as a consequence Israel has been drawn into the conflict, issues clear and unequivocal statements that America stands firm with its ally Israel.

2. Initiate a diplomatic campaign aimed both at our global friends and within the halls of the United Nations to blunt undue criticism of Israel for acting in its own defense.

3. Increase the frequency and scope of joint U.S.-Israel military exercises, intelligence sharing, and cooperative counter-terrorism and cyber security activities as a public demonstration of the unshakable bonds between the two countries.

4. Initiate a U.S.-Israel military study and planning group to prepare joint recommendations regarding policies and potential strategies for likely contingencies given that the employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is currently a distinct possibility in the region.

5. Develop and advance plans for working with regional actors to secure and/or destroy the Assad regime’s chemical and biological weapons arsenal in the event of a governmental loss of control. In doing so, make the most of Israel’s significant intelligence collection capabilities.

Furthermore, Congress – where the American public’s overwhelming support for Israel is most apparent – should make clear its support for Israel’s right to take action against the Assad regime if it is shown to be arming Hezbollah or Iranian-allied forces with WMD.

The post Supporting Israel in the Face of Syrian War Spillover appeared first on JINSA.

The Syrian civil war has passed an inflection point and Washington is running to catch up. While it may be too late for the United States to have a decisive impact on the ground, there is still time to salvage an American role in the end game and, hence, an opportunity to help shape Syria’s future for the better.

The anti-Assad forces -mostly fighting under the banner of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) – have more than held their own against the regime’s powerful military. And they have done so without American assistance. Due in large part to their success at overrunning Syrian military storage sites, they now possess stocks of potent weaponry, especially anti-aircraft systems.

In contrast, the Assad regime has been reduced to launching Scud missiles at suspected FSA concentrations. The Scud is poorly suited for attacks on a dispersed, guerilla army and shows the desperate straits the Syrian military finds itself in.

While the rebels may not be able to fully defeat the loyalist forces – especially if Assad continues to receive the military and financial backing of his Iranian and Russian patrons, and his soldiers continue to fear post-war reprisals – it has become abundantly clear that there is no reversing the rebels’ gains.

Four outcomes are likely. Near the bottom would see Syria broken apart along sectarian lines into warring statelets. Less unfavorable would be the country’s transformation into a loose confederation of sectarian states, which could well be expected to be antagonistic to each other. At best, the result would be a confessionalist unitary state (de jure power sharing along religious or ethnic lines) similar to that of neighboring Lebanon, which is, ironically, the very country that the Assad family spent decades undermining.

While the first two possibilities would certainly result in entities ripe for Iranian subversion, there is no doubt that the mullahs would prefer the fourth (and worse) outcome – that Syria would become an overtly Islamist state governed by sharia law and committed to undermining its neighbors, especially Jordan and Lebanon, while heating up what had been a cold war with Israel.

Early on in the conflict, wealthy Islamic fundamentalist Gulf Arabs began pumping money into extremist Salafist groups fighting the Assad regime. This largesse bolstered the Salafis influence amongst the Syrian population and helped to spread their narrative whereby the West, through its inaction, is complicit in the Assad regime’s war against them. Certainly, White House indecision over the past year and a half has won America no friends among the Syrian opposition.

An Islamist successor to the Assad family’s Baathist rule would hurt American interests by coming into conflict with major non-NATO ally Israel, strong partner Jordan, and fragile Lebanon. A Salafist jihadist leadership would even pose a threat to fellow NATO member Turkey.

On the other hand, a transitional leadership striving to become a pluralist government would thwart the regional ambitions of Russia, Iran, and a long list of violent, extremist Islamist organizations including a resurgent al Qaeda and other Salafi jihadist groups.

But the various groups that together compose the opposition to the Assad regime hardly constitute a government-in-waiting as yet. The largest such group, the Turkey-based Syrian National Council (SNC), while boasting a democratic platform and a set of plans for Syria’s political, economic, and military transition, is unfortunately quite close to Turkey’s ruling AKP government, an ally of the Muslim Brotherhood. The SNC is the largest member of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, known as the Syrian National Coalition, holding 22 of the Coalition’s 60 seats.

President Obama announced in mid-December that he recognized the Syrian National Coalition as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people, and pledged to tighten U.S. ties to the group. To date, nearly every country in the world has endorsed the Coalition.

While its ideological proximity to Muslim Brotherhood-type beliefs is disturbing, it is clear that the Coalition is the body with which the United States must deal if it is to have any impact on the Syrian situation.

What is not clear is the degree to which the Free Syrian Army and other smaller armed opposition groups harbor loyalty to the Coalition. Evidence suggests that such ties are not strong. Also, every anti-Assad organization, of which there are several dozen, bears a degree of allegiance to foreign benefactors, which include the aforementioned Turkey as well as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and entities and individuals with profoundly Islamist agendas.

Further complicating matters are Syria’s roughly 2.5 million Kurds, making up 12 percent of the population. They have long sought autonomy if not a fully independent state along with Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. Attempting to stymie his armed opposition, Assad gave a pass to Syria’s Kurds if their militias stayed out of the fighting. The Free Syrian Army, dominated by nationalist Sunni Muslims, has skirmished at least once with a Kurdish force at the town of Ras al-Ayn, abutting the Turkish border. Confusing the situation further, these FSA leaders – most of whom are former officers in Assad’s military – have long distrusted the Kurds and oppose their goal of independence. Meanwhile, the Islamist factions wish to bring the rather secular Kurds under sharia law.

The very real prospect of an autonomous Kurdish enclave in northern Syria, if not an independent statelet, has Turkey in fits. Without Turkish cooperation, there is little chance for military and economic aid to flow into Syria.

Then, there are the Alawites who also make up some 12 percent of the Syrian population. It is from the Alawi community that the Assad family and its fiercest defenders come, including the preponderance of Syrian generals and field commanders. Fear of vicious reprisals by the Sunni-dominated opposition may keep the Alawi-dominated Syrian military fighting until the bitter end. Assurances by the anti-regime forces to the Alawite community that such reprisals will not be allowed to occur could well hasten the collapse of Assad’s military.

By severely curtailing Hezbollah’s arms supply as well as restricting the movement of Tehran’s Revolutionary Guards cadres, a non-Islamist successor government in Syria would set back Iran’s Middle East strategy of destabilizing Iraq and Lebanon.

While a strictly secular government in Damascus may not be possible, any degree to which Syria’s future rulers are not representative of or beholden to jihadist movements should be seen as a success.

For now, it appears that military stalemate defines the situation in Syria. This is not good. The longer the conflict lasts, the more attractive the Islamist extremist groups fighting Assad’s forces, especially the virulently anti-U.S. Salafi jihadist groups, become to the Syrian population. The United States can still act to tip the scales in favor of the anti-regime forces and thereby end the fighting faster.

To do so, the United States should pursue the following policies:

1. Humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees should be provided as soon as possible, especially winter-specific items desperately needed in the teeming camps operating in Turkey and Jordan. Strict measures should be taken to ensure such assistance is not politicized or corrupted by political and criminal factions active in the camps.

2. Determine straightforward standards for identifying the Islamist extremist groups that will not be dealt with and move decisively to begin cooperation with the others as long as they support an inclusive agenda for the country.

3. Determine those groups’ immediate needs including weaponry, and institute the means to provide for them in cooperation with Turkey, without whose consent nearly all U.S. efforts to aid the anti-Assad forces would fail.

4. Work with those groups, including the Syrian National Coalition, to identify and promote a national leader with the intention of creating a pluralist government in Syria.

5. Utilize its influence and ties to Turkey and other regional actors to obtain cooperation for the securing of the Assad regime’s chemical and biological weapons arsenal and place those plans into action as soon as practicable.

6. Continue to work with European partners to prepare future Syrian officials to set up and operate the structures of a pluralistic government including an impartial judicial system. While regime officials accused of war crimes can be expected to face trial, assurances to the Alawite community that wholesale reprisals will not occur will bring progress toward a post-war peace that much faster.

7. Economic assistance should be lined up to provide for the rebuilding of the Syrian state, with clear guidelines to ensure that aid is provided only as long as the transitional government adheres to specified standards of behavior and makes progress toward a pluralistic style of governance.

8. Offer attractive alternatives to Tehran’s mediation/peace talk machinations with the long-term goal of degrading Iran’s influence in Syria.

9. Leverage its relationship with Russia to reduce Moscow’s diplomatic and military assistance to the Assad regime.

The post Taking Action on Syria appeared first on JINSA.

In his public statements, Hagel, a decorated war veteran with two Purple Hearts from service in Vietnam, has made it clear that “the Pentagon needs to be pared down,” including our already diminished nuclear arsenal, and that America should lead not only from behind, but far behind. Current Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has declared the severe defense cuts that Congress mandated to take effect January 1 under the sequestration process, “would have a devastating effect not only on our national defense but I think on the rest of the country. It’s totally unacceptable, and frankly our political leaders cannot allow it to happen.” In a September 2011 interview with the Financial Times, Hagel proclaimed, “The Defense Department, I think in many ways, has been bloated … so I think the Pentagon needs to be pared down.”

Given the turmoil in the Middle East and the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran, Hagel’s views on this critical region are particularly alarming. He recently indicated that the United States has “minimal ability to influence the outcomes” in Egypt or Syria. In fact, he has called for the Arab League, not the United States or NATO, to take the lead in any military intervention in Syria.

Regarding American ties to the region, he has stated that “we are seen by many in the Middle East as an obstacle to peace, an aggressor, an occupant.” Such statements, along with his dismal record in support of related Senate initiatives, have earned him plaudits and awards from such groups as the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) and an unindicted terrorism co-conspirator, the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR).

Unlike many other top national security appointees, Hagel has been able to compile a long public record during his two terms in the U.S. Senate on key national security issues and the United States relationship with Israel. His ability to see the big picture is suspect, to say the least.

In January 2007, Senator Hagel denounced the proposed Iraq War surge as, “the most dangerous foreign policy blunder in this country since Vietnam, if it’s carried out. I will resist it.” All Americans, regardless of their stance on the war, can be grateful he was unsuccessful in his threat.

Also worrisome are Hagel’s opposition to any exercise of a military option to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Taking the military option off the table renders impotent all other measures short of war. What this mindset would mean for U.S. national security in a second Obama administration is cause for deep concern.

In August 2006, Hagel was one of only 12 Senators who refused to formally call upon the European Union to declare Hezbollah a terrorist organization. Never mind the fact that the Lebanese Shiite terror group had long been considered a terrorist organization by the U.S. government – a policy upheld by both Democratic and Republican presidents.

Whether he allowed his passions to get the better of him or his comments were born of sheer ignorance (neither an attractive quality in a Secretary of Defense), Senator Hagel appeared unaware that Hezbollah has the blood of hundreds of Americans on its hands. The list of those attacks includes the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing that claimed the lives of 241 U.S. Marines, sailors and soldiers, the 1983 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut that took the lives of 17 Americans, the 1984 murder of CIA operative William F. Buckley, the 1984 bombing of a restaurant near the U.S. air base at Torrejon, Spain that killed 18 U.S. servicemen, the 1985 murder of U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem, and the 1988 murder of U.S. Marine Col. William Higgins. Furthermore, Hezbollah was strongly implicated in the 1996 Khobar Towers truck bombing in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 American servicemen and the 2008 attack on a U.S. embassy motorcade in Beirut.

Since 2001, at least 21 Hezbollah-linked terrorism cases in the United States have prosecuted by the Justice Department. Surely, by 2007, Senator Hagel was aware that such cases were coming before the courts. His thoughtless positions on Hezbollah are an insult to anyone who has served or was serving in the U.S. armed forces and the diplomatic corps.

Continuing to fail to see the big picture, Senator Hagel voted against the Iran Counter-Proliferation Act of 2007, which in addition to imposing means to halt Iran’s proliferation of WMD to other bad actors, sought to designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a terrorist organization. Since 2006, the State Department has indicated that the IRGC provides training, funding, and weapons to Shiite militias in Iraq that target American troops. The IRGC also provides the Taliban in Afghanistan with weapons and training. In both war zones, the IRGC brought in sophisticated explosively formed penetrator IEDs and trained Shiite militias and the Taliban in their use against U.S. and NATO forces to deadly effect.

Shortsightedness (another unattractive attribute) is clearly another Hagel characteristic. In June 2004, he refused to sign a letter urging President Bush to highlight Iran’s nuclear program at the G-8 summit. In December 2005, he was one of only 27 senators who would not sign a letter to President Bush to pressure the Palestinian Authority to ban terrorist groups from participating in Palestinian legislative elections. Those elections proved to be a boon to Hamas, which, since 1997, has been recognized as a terrorist organization by the U.S. government.

Unfortunately for both countries, Hagel has demonstrated an unusual lack of sympathy (to say the least) for a reliable ally, Israel. During his 12 years in the Senate, he demonstrated indifference or opposition to initiatives with regard to confronting Iran and terrorism, while showing much less support for Israel than the overwhelming majority of his colleagues. What this portends for continued close strategic cooperation between the United States and Israel is troubling.

In a narrower sense, Hagel’s assertion that “the political reality is that… the Jewish lobby intimidates a lot of people up here,” is extremely troubling on several levels. But obviously, Hagel was not “intimidated” or, for example, he would not have one-sidedly written that, “Palestinian reformers cannot promote a democratic agenda for change while both the Israeli military occupation and settlement activity continue. Israel must take steps to show its commitment to peace.”

An indication of Hagel’s early less-than-warm feelings toward Israel came in the late 1980s when, as the president of the USO, he sought to defund the popular USO facility in the Israeli port city of Haifa – a favored destination for the sailors of the U.S. Navy’s Sixth Fleet. Fortunately, private philanthropy came to the rescue to the delight of our sailors.

What Americans have then is a disturbing picture of what could be expected from Hagel as Secretary of Defense. Given the challenges we face around the globe, it makes no sense to rely on someone who basically favors retrenchment and retreat, who would be in a position to harm a close relationship beneficial to both Israel and our own country, and who betrays a stunning insensitivity and narrow-mindedness concerning the terrorist war on the United States and Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.

There are individuals far more qualified to run the Department of Defense than Chuck Hagel. President Obama would do well to call upon one of them.

The post Hagel is the Wrong Choice to Lead the Department of Defense appeared first on JINSA.

In his address to the UN General Assembly yesterday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reminded the world that all attempts to persuade Iran to halt its progress toward developing a nuclear weapon have failed. He urged the world to impose a strict red line on Iran. “At this late hour, there is only one way to peacefully prevent Iran from getting atomic bombs. That’s by placing a clear red line on Iran’s nuclear weapons program.”

The prime minister made a strong case that red lines prevent war and that when they were not declared, aggression was invited. He listed historical examples to illustrate the point, but it was his observation of recent events that should cause those who doubt their efficacy to pay closer attention. “Clear red lines have also worked with Iran. Earlier this year, Iran threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz. The United States drew a clear red line and Iran backed off,” he said.

JINSA has long argued that the United States must affirm the credibility of a military threat against Iran’s nuclear weapons program. As necessary and important as other tools of statecraft – such as economic sanctions and diplomatic efforts – are, those who speak against military action undermine all other strategies.

In support of a clear red line to dissuade Tehran from pursuing a nuclear weapon, JINSA continues to encourage the U.S. government to, “Prepare to use military force at the optimal time regardless of elections or other political considerations, recognizing that the credible threat of force is the best insurance that measures short of war will have the greatest opportunity for success.”

Prime Minister Netanyahu offered his country’s belief that the red line should be drawn before Iran completes the second stage of nuclear enrichment. “Before Iran gets to a point where it’s a few months away or a few weeks away from amassing enough enriched uranium to make a nuclear weapon.”

Dismissing those who contend that it would be acceptable to allow Iran to amass the necessary components for a nuclear bomb because intelligence agencies would know when Iran had made the decision to assemble the weapon, Netanyahu said that no intelligence organization is infallible. “For over two years, our intelligence agencies didn’t know that Iran was building a huge nuclear enrichment plant under a mountain. Do we want to risk the security of the world on the assumption that we would find in time a small workshop in a country half the size of Europe?”

“The relevant question,” the prime minister declared, “is not when Iran will get the bomb. The relevant question is at what stage can we no longer stop Iran from getting the bomb.”

The President must decide where to draw a red line for Iran. And an American red line must be declared without further delay.

The post The Case for a Red Line appeared first on JINSA.

On this, the eleventh anniversary of 9/11, the Administration considers al Qaeda all but defeated, and eagerly anticipates a downsized U.S. military and its reorientation to Asia and the Pacific. But, to paraphrase Mark Twain’s famous quip, reports of al Qaeda’s death are greatly exaggerated.

Despite President Obama’s assertion, made in May of this year in front of hundreds of U.S. troops at Bagram Air Base, that “The goal that I set – to defeat al Qaeda and deny it a chance to rebuild – is now within our reach,” overwhelming evidence points to a global terrorist threat composed of al Qaeda and its partners that has not been crippled, but has grown more diverse and decentralized. To a significant extent, this threat is driven by a jihadist ideology and is a strategic challenge to the United States.

Unfortunately, American military, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies have been hampered in effectively countering this threat because its ideological underpinnings have been deliberately obfuscated.

The U.S. government is uncomfortable labeling such terrorism as jihadist – a murderous ideology – due to its basis in jihad, an Arabic word associated with the Muslim faith. Denying the jihadist basis of this terrorism muddies the case for countering it via a coherent and unified strategy. Instead, it has been fractured into dozens of small and/or individual causes claimed to be rooted in locality and based upon conflicts related to culture, clan, and criminality.

This is also the case regarding so-called “home grown” terror attacks attempted or carried out in the United States since 9-11, the most prominent of which was U.S. Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan’s murder of 13 people at Fort Hood, Texas on November 5, 2009. To date, the U.S. government has yet to declare a motive behind Hasan’s rampage beyond “workplace violence.”

A Defense Department report released in early 2010 placed Hasan’s actions solely in the context of his alleged personal problems. Discussion of jihadist ideology was entirely absent despite significant evidence for it, including a presentation at Walter Reed Medical Center in which he praised suicide bombers and echoed the jihadist martyr’s call to action: ‘We love death more than you love life!’

Prior to his rampage, Hasan had also warned of grave consequences if Muslims serving in the U.S. armed forces were not allowed to decline deployment abroad. Later, it was made public that he had been in communication with al Qaeda cleric Anwar al Awlaki. While the U.S. government accepted that the correspondence was consistent with a research project Hasan was conducting, an independent commission later concluded that Hasan was seeking advice on committing violence against his fellow soldiers.

Other examples include the case of the so-called underwear bomber, Umar Farouq Abdulmutallab. Though he was recruited, trained, and dispatched by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and reportedly personally met with the aforementioned Anwar al Awlaki, the Administration rushed to describe Abdulmutallab as an “isolated extremist” after his failed attempt to bring down a Northwest Airlines flight on Christmas Day 2009.

The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Matthew Olson, declared just a few days after the President’s assertion that al Qaeda was nearly defeated that, “al Qaeda’s affiliates and allies are persistent and dangerous. Al Qaeda is determined to carry out attacks against our country. We have to remain vigilant and resolute.” The NCTC, a federal joint operational planning and intelligence center, reports to the Director of National Intelligence.

Since early 2009, al Qaeda and its affiliates have plotted at least five major terrorist attacks to take place inside the United States. All were thwarted due to the vigilance and professionalism of American law enforcement and intelligence agencies, as well as operational failures on the part of the terrorist operatives.

Jihadist objectives go beyond striking the United States, however. The NCTC’s Olson also noted that, “the threats facing us have become more diverse. As al Qaeda core struggles to remain relevant, the group has turned to its affiliates and adherents to carry out attacks and to advance its ideology. These groups are from an array of countries, including Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, Iraq and Iran. To varying degrees, these groups coordinate their activities and follow the direction of [al Qaeda] leaders in Pakistan.” Not mentioned in Olson’s listing is al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which recently captured much of northern Mali, including Timbuktu.

The most dangerous of these jihadist groups, by the Administration’s own admission, is al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), based in Yemen, which only recently came into existence, in early 2009. Despite a U.S.-assisted offensive against the group by the Yemeni military, AQAP still controls significant chunks of Yemen and is bolstered by cooperation with the Somalia-based al Qaeda partner group al Shabaab.

Sinai-based jihadist groups declaring their fealty to al Qaeda have sprouted in the aftermath of Mubarak’s fall. One has already attempted to attack Israel. Al Qaeda-affiliates also exist in Gaza and the West Bank, as well as in Lebanon.

More prominently every day, al Qaeda is playing a role in the war against the Assad regime, chiefly through the resurgent al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Unchecked, the groups’ presence makes western assistance to anti-Assad forces problematic despite the ongoing slaughter of Syrian civilians by the Assad regime. Gen. Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an interview on CNN in February, noted that since al Qaeda existed within the anti-Assad forces, it was “premature to talk about arming them.”

In Afghanistan, the late 2009 surge made commendable progress in the south but was purposely not directed to the east, adjacent to Pakistan. Predictably, eastern Afghanistan remains a Taliban/al Qaeda bastion.

While many American leaders wish to claim victory over the jihadist terrorist forces arrayed against America and her allies, the fact is that they are not defeated. In many cases, they are stronger today than at any time in the past. Absent a forthright acknowledgement of the jihadist threat, U.S. forces are at a distinct disadvantage in attempting to thwart al Qaeda and its partners/affiliates’ goals.

The United States must recognize the jihadist threat for what it is and pursue strategies to defeat it based on that understanding. If we cannot define the enemy, how can our military and law enforcement agencies combat it effectively?

This September 11, while America’s eyes are focused upon the November elections, those of our jihadist enemies and their supporters will remain firmly fixed on the day when they have defeated those opposing their murderous campaigns.

The post On 9/11 in the Year 2012 America’s Jihadist Enemies Still Seek Victory appeared first on JINSA.

With his most recent comments in London last week, Gen. Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, put a greater distance between the United States and Israel over a potential attack against Iran. “I don’t want to be complicit if they [Israel] choose to do it,” Dempsey said, thereby clearly indicating that the differences between the Obama administration and the Netanyahu government surpass the previously declared red lines.

If the strategic goal remains prevention and not containment of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, then Gen. Dempsey’s remarks hampered this objective. They notified the world that the United States and Israel are not united on this front.

Gen. Dempsey’s remarks should not come as a surprise as he was publicly reiterating what we already know to be the Obama administration’s position. That is, the United States would not like to see an attack on Iran at this time. This reminds us of Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s public rumination in February that Israel would strike Iran in the spring. One must object, however, to the real purpose of communicating this message publicly and not through private channels.

It is noteworthy that these remarks were made during the same week the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released a report confirming that Iran doubled its uranium enrichment capacity in an underground facility.

JINSA has long argued that the United States and Israel must demonstrate the credibility of a military threat against Iran. As necessary and important as other tools of statecraft are – such as economic sanctions and diplomatic efforts – those who speak against military action undermine all other strategies. This latest public display of an American administration distancing itself from its closest ally in the Middle East, facing an existential threat, has reinforced the perception of a weakened alliance. And the Iranians have taken note: “all options are on the table” has become a toothless mantra.

2012 has been marked by global and domestic developments that are likely to influence the next decade of American war fighting capabilities and our nation’s pivotal role in the Middle East. With the most recent publication of the IAEA report and the gathering of the Non-Aligned Movement conference in Tehran, the United States should have reaffirmed Israeli redlines, stated its commitment for a second strike capability, and further increased its military presence in the region. It should have taken advantage of the trip to London to reinforce the international alliance against a nuclear Iran. Instead it chose to do the opposite. By doing so, the United States undermined its own efforts to prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear weapons program.

The objective of economic sanctions and other statecraft options is to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The objective of these tactics is not to stop Israel from attacking Iran. That would simply be a by-product of a successful prevention strategy. Israel does not want war, yet faced with an existential threat (in the same interview, Gen. Dempsey confirmed that a nuclear Iran poses an existential threat to Israel), it may not have a choice. If it chooses to attack Iran, Israel is likely to carry out a surgical operation and not a full-scale war. Its goal would not be to launch an all-out attack on Iran, but instead to destroy their nuclear sites.

Iranian strategy is to get to the bomb as safely as possible. The pace is not the essence, the attainment of the bomb is. The mullah regime may be flexible about the timetables, but they are very unlikely to give up the option to build. They may make concessions, but only as long as they are not diverted from their strategic goal.

Anyone who asserts that Iran has not decided to build the bomb does not understand this theocratic regime. Most Israeli military strategists concur with Gen. Dempsey that such an attack would delay but not stop Iran’s nuclear program. The delayed time frame may be exactly what the international community needs in order to prepare for a new Iranian leadership.

Sanctions are important but only with absolute isolationism and a very credible military capability. If we stood firm, they may have blinked. Instead, we blinked and now they have very little reason to modify their plans.

The post General Dempsey’s Remarks Should Not Come as a Surprise appeared first on JINSA.

When it comes to compelling Tehran to end its nuclear weapons program, sanctions – as employed by the U.S. government and our European partners – amount to little more than a time-consuming exercise with scant possibility of success. Moreover, the latest round of negotiations, which went nowhere, is just the most recent illustration of how the mullahs play for time, convinced that their sanctions-induced economic slowdown can be weathered and that the world will line up to purchase their oil once Iran’s status as a nuclear power is secure.

Much has been made of the latest round of sanctions; they have been described as the toughest ever levied against Iran. As of June 28, the United States can bar foreign banks that participate in oil-related business with the Central Bank of Iran from access to American financial markets. Since July 1, European Union members are prohibited from buying Iranian oil as well as insuring ships that carry Iranian oil. It has been reported that these new sanctions could cost Iran some $4 billion a month. That is far from enough.

Iran’s significant monetary and gold reserves (foreign currency reserves estimates run from $60 billion to $100 billion) however, coupled with a reduced but still substantial oil income, will continue to buffer the Tehran government from the degree of economic pain that even the most optimistic sanctions supporter believes would force a change in policy.

The recent parley, held in Moscow, was the third in a series involving Iran and the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain and Germany (the P5+1). To avoid a complete negotiating collapse, it was agreed that lower-level experts would meet on July 3 in Istanbul. They did, and have as little to show for their efforts as do their superiors.

Due to careful planning, even these “toughest yet” sanctions have been neutered by clever Iranian government policies, helped along by weak implementation and White House-issued waivers, lack of sustained EU commitment to their enforcement, and outright opposition by Russia and China. As we wrote in February, sanctions “are a short term tactic doomed to failure in the foreseeable future…”

Sanctions, cyber attacks, propaganda campaigns and targeted killings of Iranian nuclear scientists may slow the mullah’s progress but, if anything, fortify their resolve to prevail. Meanwhile, negotiations simply provide Iran time to enrich more uranium.

The pursuit of nuclear weapons is something the Iranian leadership views as a strategic imperative. Indeed, ideological and security concerns clearly trump the economy in Tehran.

Furthermore, as some analysts have suggested, the Iranian government believes that defiance in the face of western sanctions is yet another reason for the greater Islamic world to emulate Iran’s revolutionary example.

Rather than positing sanctions as the keystone of its policy to deny Iran nuclear weapons, the United States should resolve to:

• Discard the notion that Washington is prepared to accept a policy of containment toward a nuclear Iran.

• Expand ties to the countries immediately threatened by a nuclear Iran to include the Gulf Arab states and Israel. Areas of focus should include increasing the size and tempo of bilateral and multilateral military exercises, expansion of local basing for U.S. forces, and the promotion of a regional alliance explicitly opposed to a nuclear Iran.

• Prepare to use military force at the optimal time regardless of elections or other political considerations, recognizing that the credible threat of force is the best insurance that measures short of war will have the greatest opportunity for success.

The post Iran Sanctions Are Dangerously Ineffective appeared first on JINSA.

American Exceptionalism began when 56 brave patriots signed the Declaration of Independence, and has continued with the many thousands of Americans who paid the ultimate price to preserve the freedoms that make ours the greatest nation in the world. On Memorial Day, we remember and honor those who have made the ultimate sacrifice while serving our Nation.

In recent years, Americans have developed a renewed sense of appreciation for members of our Armed Forces. Spontaneous displays of affection and heartfelt thanks are witnessed at airports and around the country that are indicative of a renewed spirit of gratitude and respect toward our troops. This holiday is the time for us to reconnect with our country’s history and our national values by honoring those who selflessly gave their lives for those cherished ideals.

To the generations of American warriors who drew their last breaths at Khe Sanh, the Chosin Reservoir, Normandy, and on hundreds of other battlefields, we have added the patriots of this century’s battles in Iraq, Afghanistan, The Philippines and other terrorist-infested regions. Our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen have died to prevent tyranny from spreading to America’s shores. No one should ever forget that right now brave Americans are far from home serving our country, sacrificing and in some cases dying to preserve our freedoms and way of life.

Since Congress turned Memorial Day into a three-day weekend with the National Holiday Act of 1971, citizens have been distracted from the true spirit and meaning of the day.

To help Americans return to its true meaning, every year since 1989, Senator Daniel Inouye, a highly decorated soldier himself, has submitted to Congress a bill calling for the restoration of May 30th as the traditional day of observance of Memorial Day.

As Senator Inouye said upon its introduction: “[This bill] would help restore the recognition our veterans deserve for the sacrifices they have made on behalf of our nation.” As of this year, Congress has not – and has never – taken further action on the bill.

In the year 2000, Congress did pass a “National Moment of Remembrance Act,” establishing that at 3:00 p.m. local time on Memorial Day all Americans would voluntarily and informally pray for permanent peace. The Act intended to reclaim Memorial Day as a sacred and noble event.

We hope that all Americans will take this moment to remember.

On this Memorial Day, we remember the brave men and women who made the ultimate sacrifice, and we offer gratitude to the families and friends of the fallen. We appeal to our fellow Americans to always remember the values our fallen heroes stood for, to respect our men and women in uniform, and to honor service to the nation above self.

When a flag had draped a coffin
Of a brother or a friend.
I thought of all the children,
Of the mothers and the wives,
Of fathers, sons and husbands
With interrupted lives.
I thought about a graveyard
At the bottom of the sea
Of unmarked graves in Arlington.
No, freedom isn’t free.*

* Excerpt from “Freedom Is Not Free” by Kelly Strong.

The post Memorial Day: Remembering, Freedom Isn’t Free appeared first on JINSA.