JINSAU.S. Military Study Archives - JINSA

Defending the Homeland Requires a Global Presence

Nolan Judd — Fri, 09 May 2025 13:13:57 +0000

For much of the 19th century, Americans thought that the broad expanses of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans protected our homeland from enemy attack. They believed that the United States was blessed with what historian C. Vann Woodward dubbed “free security.” As he noted:

Throughout most of its history the United States has enjoyed a remarkable degree of military security, physical security from hostile attack and invasion. This security was not only remarkably effective, but it was relatively free. Free security was based on nature’s gift of three vast bodies of water interposed between this country and any other power that might constitute a serious menace to its safety. There was not only the Atlantic to the east and the Pacific to the west, but a third body of water, considered so impenetrable as to make us virtually unaware of its importance, the Arctic Ocean and its great ice cap to the north. The security thus provided was free in the sense that it was enjoyed as a bounty of nature in place of the elaborate and costly chains of fortifications and even more expensive armies and navies that took a heavy toll of the treasuries of less fortunate countries and placed severe tax burdens upon the backs of their people.

Many historians took issue with the notion that the relative security that the U.S. enjoyed was free, noting that for the bulk of the century after the War of 1812, the U.S. sheltered behind the implicit protection of the British Royal Navy. That fact notwithstanding, Woodward was certainly correct about prevailing American views. Most political leaders and much of the public believed that forward presence was not needed to be safe in our own hemisphere.

In the first half of the 20th century, we learned that allowing hostile aggressive powers to dominate Europe and the Pacific Ocean littoral created significant dangers to our security, even if they seemed far away. The experience of World War II convinced most members of America’s national security elite that the future defense of the United States would have to begin well beyond the nation’s continental frontiers. As historian Michael Sherry concluded in 1987 in his pioneering study of American air power, policymakers came to believe that “American weakness had encouraged Axis ambitions in the 1930s” and that as a result “powerful military forces could deter or subdue future troublemakers.” Pearl Harbor and the new weapons developed subsequent to it demonstrated the nation’s nakedness to sudden attack and its need for unprecedented forces-in-being to ward off the coming blitzkrieg.” The result was a consensus that America’s national security in the future would require forward defense, the ability to project power to Europe, East Asia and the Middle East which, in turn, would require allies and partners around the world to sustain a globe-girdling system of bases and facilities.

In the second half of the 20th century the development of long-range aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and nuclear weapons underscored that overseas developments can directly threaten the U.S. homeland. We finally recognized that to defend the United States we must engage overseas to prevent future wars—which might ultimately involve us—from starting. The alliances we have built over the last 70 years offer the best possible means to discourage potential aggressors from starting local wars that will inevitably become global. They allow us to maintain the global commons—including freedom of the seas—across which worldwide commerce flows, creating the unprecedented increase in wealth and prosperity that has developed since World War II. The ability to provide defense in depth and rapidly project power forward to regions of concern became the fundamental basis of America’s unique global role.

Today the United States is facing two highly dangerous, aggressive, autocratic, and expansionist foreign leaders. Yet despite the traditional emphasis on forward defense and the importance of U.S. bases as a form of reassurance for allies there have been persistent calls from the Trump administration for reductions of the U.S. overseas presence.

Vladimir Putin, who famously declared that the breakup of the USSR was the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century, has been pursuing the reconstitution of the Soviet empire since he took power. His forces occupy parts of Georgia and Moldova; he has taken Crimea; three years ago, he began a bloody and merciless full-scale war to conquer Ukraine. He has made clear that Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia are in his sights. And he covets the recreation of a buffer zone to Russia’s west along the lines of the defunct Warsaw Pact, a sphere of influence which would allow him to dominate Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania. In addition, his regime has declared the NATO alliance to be Russia’s enemy, routinely threatens the use of Russian nuclear weapons in response to policies he opposes, and has been carrying out a clandestine campaign of sabotage against Western communications cables, armaments factories and warehouses, and transportation grids.

Half a world away, Xi Jinping, under a similar belief that China has been denied a leading role in the world by “the West,” seeks to create a de facto empire that dominates the Asia-Pacific region. His regime has declared that the South China Sea, a key waterway through which one-third of global maritime trade flows, should be declared “an internal Chinese lake,” subject to control by Beijing. China also seeks to control the two key chokepoints, the Malacca and Lombok Straits, that offer access to the South China Sea from the west. Xi has made clear his intention of reunifying China with Taiwan, with force if he cannot achieve it by coercion. The Beijing regime has, further, claimed parts of the exclusive economic zones of several of its neighbors and has used armed force to protect Chinese commercial activity in those areas.

Ominously, both Russia and China are expanding their intercontinental and particularly their regional nuclear forces. And both have demonstrated a complete and total disregard for any treaties or obligations they might have undertaken.

Should either Putin or Xi believe they can take their neighbors’ territory without suffering significant cost, they might attempt to do so. The result, an imbalance in global power, a possible denial of U.S. access to areas of the world vital to us, and an invitation for further aggression could result in war, including possibly the use of nuclear weapons—all of which could have catastrophic effects on our own security.

It becomes imperative, therefore, to make clear to both Putin and Xi that the cost of such attacks would be prohibitive, that they would significantly exceed any gains they might hope to make. Only the United States can provide the military capability to make such a threat. And we can only do so credibly if we are present in those regions. While there are costs involved in forward presence, they pale in comparison to the costs of the likely global war that would result if deterrence failed. The recent bipartisan report of the NDS Commission estimates that a global war that began in the Indo-Pacific could cost the global economy as much as $10 trillion—and that is probably an underestimate.

All this said, it is worth raising the question of what benefits, precisely, the U.S. derives from what some have quantified as a $55 billion to $80 billion annual expense. Many so-called realists who seek to diminish the U.S. presence overseas, in order to reduce defense spending and avoid foreign entanglements that might lead to “endless wars,” never acknowledge that host nations provide support and some compensation for U.S. bases, but it is still worth reminding ourselves of the non-monetary compensation the U.S. gets from its overseas presence.

Base access enables us to deploy forces forward. Repeated studies by the RAND Corporation have demonstrated that the presence of significant U.S. military forces reduces the likelihood of major interstate conflict or escalation of local conflicts into major war. Our presence sends the signal that the U.S. is committed to and can prevent a fait accompli. It also can also provide opportunities for training and improving interoperability with allies, strengthening deterrence by conveying to potential adversaries that they will face a powerful counter coalition if they choose to pursue aggression. Reassurance of allies is a particularly important and underappreciated element of U.S. base presence overseas. U.S. bases are a visible sign of U.S. commitment and willingness to extend U.S. military deterrent power to friends and allies.

The U.S. presence can also block adversaries from seeking precisely the advantages described above for themselves by arranging for access or basing themselves. The small U.S. deployment in Syria, for example, has both helped keep a lid on a resurgence of ISIS terrorism and provided U.S. overwatch of Iranian efforts to rebuild its proxy network that Israel has done so much to weaken over the last few years. When the U.S. ignores a region or vacates its positions there, we can be sure that our adversaries will seek to move in. One can already see the PRC seeking precisely these kinds of access and advantages in places where the U.S. has been chronically inattentive like Latin America, Africa, and especially the South Pacific.

The bottom line is that while U.S. forward deployed forces, in concert with and assisted by the military forces of our allies, defend allied territory—the first targets of potential aggression—they also provide a jumping off point for U.S. forces in case deterrence fails in any major contingency. The record shows that their very existence helps to prevent war and the catastrophic consequences that would engulf us too were a global conflict to break out. In doing so they also protect the American homeland. And that makes our bases and forward presence a bargain when compared to the alternative.

Originally published in the Dispatch.

Amb. Eric Edelman is a JINSA Distinguished Scholar and counselor at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, as well as former U.S. ambassador to Turkey and Finland and undersecretary of defense for policy.

Franklin C. Miller served for three decades as a senior nuclear policy and arms control official in the Pentagon and on the National Security Council staff. He is a principal at the Scowcroft Group.

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For the Sake of Israelis and Palestinians, Israel Must Completely Defeat Hamas in Gaza

Nolan Judd — Thu, 31 Oct 2024 15:46:09 +0000

It is fitting that Israeli soldiers finally killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in the period between the one-year anniversary of the October 7 attack, and the Hebrew calendar anniversary on the Jewish holiday of Simchat Torah.

The terrorist leader’s death marks a major milestone in the conflict. But it does not — and cannot — mark the end of Israel’s war in Gaza, or beyond. Those who would urge Israel simply to “move on” fail to understand the sheer brutality that Sinwar orchestrated, and the subsequent necessity of Israel’s operations to defeat Hamas and rescue the hostages.

Both of us witnessed Hamas’ brutality as part of programming organized by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), including an annual trip to Israel for retired senior US military officers.

Yet, even given our background, we were horrified by the raw footage of the attack, much of which Hamas terrorists filmed themselves, and a somber walk about and firsthand observation of one of the many devastated kibbutzim, Kfar Azza.

More alarming is that the full scope of the October 7 atrocities still has not reached the American public. The coordinated air, land, and sea invasion, and the barbaric violence against civilians, including rape, sexual violence, and mutilation, indicated this was not a spontaneous outbreak of violence — but a prepared assault fueled by the conditioned hatred of Jews.

Beyond the death and destruction, the October 7 attack also overturned Israelis’ sense of security and eroded deterrence against enemies even beyond Gaza.

But Sinwar also terrorized his own people. He served 22 years of four life sentences in Israeli prison for murdering Palestinians in his role as a brutal Hamas enforcer, until he was released in 2011 as part of a hostage release deal. Under his rule, life in Gaza even before 10/7 was subverted to Hamas’ military goals. Money and supplies were diverted, and civilian structures were appropriated to build “fortress Gaza” — turning the entire territory into a series of above- and below-ground fortified positions designed specifically for fighting the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

Sinwar wanted to bring the fight to the streets of Gaza because he knew they housed a potent weapon against Israel — not any of the tunnels or hidden bombs, but the Palestinian civilians that Hamas would ensure were caught in the crossfire.

Recognizing that Hamas cannot defeat Israeli forces militarily, Sinwar’s strategy sought to maximize the number of civilian casualties in Gaza to rally international pressure against Israel.

With this strategy, Sinwar intentionally sacrificed the lives of thousands of Gazans, and turned that of hundreds of thousands into a living hell. As we detailed in a JINSA report following our trip, Hamas has serially violated international law by turning the civilian population of Gaza into human shields to hide its fighters and weapons inside hospitals, schools, humanitarian zones, and United Nations facilities. It tried to force civilians to remain in harm’s way, attacking those who sought to flee. For those lucky to escape, Hamas nevertheless ensured their suffering by repeatedly stealing humanitarian aid, preventing it from reaching the civilians who need it.

Hamas then weaponized this suffering against Israel, waging a disinformation campaign to blame Israel for civilian deaths and insufficient aid. Indeed, Hamas’s disinformation has generated public pressure that has led to widening public tensions between the United States and Israel, including pauses of key US weapons transfers and threats of an arms embargo.

One senior IDF officer told us that international pressure against Israel was more challenging to Israeli success than any battlefield complexities.

With Sinwar’s death, that pressure is already mounting again, urging Israel to declare victory and end in the war in Gaza. To be sure, the death of Sinwar, the man responsible for the deadliest attack against Jews since the Holocaust, sends a clear message that anyone who threatens Israeli lives will face justice. But it does not mark the end of the war in Gaza, nor the start of a new, more secure future for either Israelis or Palestinians.

This war is not about punishing the man responsible for 10/7. It is about ensuring that 10/7 can never happen again. It is about bringing home the remaining 100 hostages that were taken from their homes and kept, inhumanely, in tunnels for the last year. And it is about dismantling the remaining military capability of Hamas so that Gazans do not, once again, live under a terrorist regime. As long as Hamas persists in Gaza, these goals are not met and this war will continue.

The end of Sinwar is not the end of the war. Hamas will survive Sinwar unless Israel finishes its mission in Gaza. The United States should redouble its support for Israel to prevent the terrorist group’s next leader from rebuilding and not avoid pursuing victory for short term domestic political gain.

RADM Paul Becker, USN (ret.) served as Director of Intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and participated in JINSA’s 2024 Generals and Admirals Program. Ari Cicurel is Assistant Director of Foreign Policy at JINSA.

Originally published in Algemeiner.

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Fighting underground: The US military must learn from Israel’s experience

Nolan Judd — Thu, 24 Oct 2024 12:00:46 +0000

As Israel conducts limited ground operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon, it already has encountered tunnels similar to the dangerous unseen combat it has fought for a year beneath Gaza.

Not for the first time, Israel is engaged in a new kind of fight that the United States will face in its future conflicts.

Just as the United States has learned from Israel’s wars in the past, the risks of tunnel warfare and how Israel is overcoming those challenges through coordinated troop maneuvers and technological adaptations should drive a shift in the US approach to subterranean combat.

The United States has a long history of learning from Israel’s wars. The 1973 Yom Kippur War had such a transformational effect that the US Army made the largest change to its doctrine since World War II. The Egyptian and Syrian armies’ use of new Soviet weapons and tactics that were more lethal and rapid, the ability of anti-tank weapons to neutralize more tanks in the first six days of the war than the United States had deployed throughout all of Europe, and tank battles occurring at much greater ranges than ever before shocked American defense planners preparing for a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.

After the war, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) sent a team to Israel, whose findings led to the adoption of the AirLand Battle doctrine that would guide decades of thinking about winning a conventional war in Europe through close coordination between ground forces and aircraft.

Similarly, the wars under Gaza and southern Lebanon have shown how the subterranean environment poses challenges that US troops must be better prepared to fight. Tunnels will be a growing problem for Western-style militaries because they provide physical protection and create challenges for differentiating and isolating fighters from civilians.

Recognizing those advantages, Hamas spent nearly two decades fortifying Gaza with more than 350 miles of interconnected underground tunnels. They intentionally designed the urban landscape to enable attacks, protect Hamas fighters, and thwart IDF advances. Hezbollah built similar underground fortifications in southern Lebanon but over a much larger expanse of land.

Indeed, searching Hamas’s vast, subterranean labyrinth for terrorist fighters and hostages has been among the most difficult aspects of the war and has already proved a time-consuming process in southern Lebanon. Fighters have appeared suddenly from tunnels to quickly target Israeli soldiers before escaping through hidden passageways. Deep and fortified tunnels also held command-and-control centers, weapons production facilities, storage depots, and hostages.

Hamas and Hezbollah also constructed tunnels for strategic purposes as well. Building tunnels inside and below residential buildings, hospitals, schools, mosques, and United Nations facilities leveraged civilians as human shields to discourage Israeli operations. Despite Israel’s pledge to use precise military efforts to minimize collateral damage by distinguishing between terrorists and civilians, hiding fighters beneath civilian sites enabled the willful blindness about who Israeli strikes had targeted that fueled Hamas’s disinformation campaign, contributing to international pressure for Israel to stop the war prematurely.

Early in the war, Israel adapted after it became evident that its initial plan to collapse the tunnels with airstrikes or destroy the entry points would not be widely effective because of how expansive and deep the tunnels were and because such operations could be dangerous to the hostages. Instead, Israel utilized cameras mounted on drones or dogs and AI technology to detect threats so that Israeli forces could analyze the best means of responding.

In Gaza, the IDF quickly transformed its approach to subterranean operations while in contact with enemy fighters. A key adaptation was its implementation of new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for its troops to maneuver underground simultaneously with those moving above ground to use explosives that either completely destroy or render tunnels impassable.

After isolating the area around a tunnel entrance and establishing a secure perimeter to ensure there were no hidden entrances that terrorists could use to mount a surprise attack or escape, the IDF then sent in ground troops to defeat any threats, including with a liquid emulsion explosive that avoided the risk of inadvertent detonation on the surface.

Building on the decades of US experience in subterranean warfare in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam, examining Israel’s underground warfare could help the US and partner militaries prepare for operations against adversaries like Iran, Russia, China, and North Korea, who are growing increasingly close and learning from one another. As a senior Pentagon special operations official put it, it would be “foolish” to assume future fights won’t consist of a similar operational environment.

Borrowing from the IDF’s efforts to coordinate ground troops above and below ground as well as air assets, US doctrine and TTPs for subterranean warfare should emphasize the necessity to detect, analyze, differentiate, isolate, and defeat threats.

With the US military also seeking to transform while in contact with an enemy, just as the IDF continues to do, the US Defense Department should emphasize subterranean combat during collaborations with Israel about the future of warfare, expand the US-Israel anti-tunnel cooperation program to fund technologies that explore or collapse tunnels, and conduct regular subterranean warfare exercises with Israeli forces. Joint drills that focus on maneuvering troops simultaneously above and below ground and utilizing emergent technologies would have immense value to US missions from counterterrorism to hostage rescue.

Fighting underground is challenging in any scenario. Yet, Israel’s successful adaptations have once again provided a transformational model for the US military to study.

General David Perkins, USA (ret.) was the former Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and a participant on the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s (JINSA) 2019 Generals and Admirals Program.
Ari Cicurel is the Assistant Director of Foreign Policy at JINSA.

Originally published in Breaking Defense.

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To Deter Iran, US Must Rethink Military Basing in the Middle East

Nolan Judd — Thu, 10 Oct 2024 16:42:48 +0000

Geography is destiny, but when it comes to U.S. bases in the Middle East, it needn’t be. Our current basing structure detracts from our ability to deter Iran — the core threat — because it reduces our ability to fight effectively in a high-intensity scenario. We need to overcome the tyranny of geography.

In a full-blown war with Iran, these existing bases will be rendered unusable by sustained Iranian attack. The Iranians can see this and have created a large and very capable missile and drone force in part to exploit this situation.

Therefore, we need to reexamine where we are based in the region, both on a day-to-day and contingency basis.

Our presence at existing bases provides an important assurance mission to host countries. Thus, we are unlikely to permanently leave bases like Al Dhafra in the United Arab Emirates and Al Udeid in Qatar.

We should, however, work with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman and Egypt to identify bases as far to the west as possible where we can deploy aircraft, maintenance capabilities, refueling capabilities and weapons.

We have already done some of this work. The “Western Basing Network” was a joint U.S.-Saudi decision to evaluate bases near the Red Sea for use in times of war. Not as far advanced but still under consideration were basing concepts that included Oman, Egypt and Jordan. The U.S. Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid has also shifted some of its responsibilities to locations in the United States, significantly reducing air command and control vulnerabilities.

How does this approach, known as “agile combat employment,” work? Based on warnings and indications of war, land-based air assets would relocate to the western bases from their locations along the Arabian Gulf. The number of Iranian weapons that could reach them would be significantly reduced, warning times would be increased and the Iranians would have a targeting problem in ascertaining from which bases U.S. aircraft operated.

In the event of hostilities, these aircraft would launch from the distant bases, be refueled en route and conduct combat operations over Iran. Depending on how the fight was going, they could land and refuel/rearm at the existing forward bases on the Arabian Gulf, minimizing their time on the ground, and increasing their “cycle rate.” Regardless, they would return to the western bases to “bed down.”

However, access to these installations is not guaranteed. The necessary political decisions are not necessarily made quickly in this region. The facilities themselves range from “bare bones” bases to fully equipped ones. Nonetheless, this is something that is squarely in the best interest of all concerned.

There is a second component to this new basing construct, and it is the opportunity made possible by Israel’s 2021 entry into the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). It is now possible to consider basing in Israel in the event of a war with Iran. It has the same geographic advantages as basing in western Saudi Arabia or other Arab states. Additionally, Israel has a powerful, proven air and missile defense capability. The fact that Israel is now in CENTCOM also facilitates training, interoperability, and even maintenance. Israel should certainly be at the forefront of possible basing alternatives.

The third component to the basing solution also involves Israel, and it is the growing normalization of ties with Arab states. This was made diplomatically possible by the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020. It was made operationally feasible by Israel’s move into the CENTCOM AOR. It was further underwritten by Iranian malign behavior which has finally convinced the Gulf States that a collective approach to air and missile defense is necessary, practicable and achievable without sacrificing sovereignty. It is largely a matter of sharing tactics, techniques, and procedures and agreeing what sensor information to share, and how to share it, with the U.S. acting as the honest broker.

We have a clear-cut example of this concept at work. The Iranians’ large, complex attack against Nevatim Airfield in Israel on April 13, 2024, failed because of Israeli competence, U.S. and allied assistance and the cooperation and assistance of Arab neighbors. Information was shared; airspace was shared. In every measurable way, this was a remarkable success story.

Deterrence must be continuous; in the Middle East, it can have a very short half-life unless it is refreshed systematically. The events of the past two months clearly show that Iran can be deterred from undertaking irresponsible and deadly attacks in the region, but this requires resources, careful messaging and the demonstrated ability to fight and win if necessary.

We now need to move aggressively to develop basing alternatives that demonstrate that we are prepared to fight and prevail in a sustained, high-intensity war with Iran. Geography is destiny for some, but not for all. Being obviously ready to rebase rapidly, and frequently exercising the capability, will increase the chances of peace in the region, because Iran will be watching.

Gen McKenzie, a retired U.S. Marine general, served as commander of U.S. Central Command from 2019 to 2022. He is the Hertog Distinguished Fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) and author of “The Melting Point: High Command and War in the 21st Century.”

Originally published in Military Times.

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JINSA National Leadership Visits U.S. Navy at Mayport and Naval Air Station Jacksonville

Ethan Pupkin — Mon, 06 Aug 2018 21:01:27 +0000

JINSA National Leadership toured the U.S. Navy’s Mayport and NAS JAX bases in Jacksonville, Florida. The delegation was led by VADM (ret.) Carol Pottenger, a 2016 JINSA General and Admiral Program Participant and a member of JINSA’s Board of Advisors.

JINSA Delegation visiting P-8A Squadron at NAS JAX

The JINSA delegation’s two-day tour included high-level briefings and site visits to 4th fleet, a P-8A squadron, a helicopter Strike squadron (HSM-40), and the USS Milwaukee which is a Littoral Combat Ship Class (LCS). The group was able to experience first-hand the critical work the sailors are doing. The delegation also witnessed simulator training operations; operations which enable our sailors to be combat-ready and perform at the highest level.

The delegation was graciously hosted by VADM Pottenger, and her husband Mike Condon, for a welcome dinner at their home. They were joined by ADM (ret.) Mark “Lobster” Fitzgerald, a past Generals and Admirals Program participant, and his wife Barbara, along with other senior leadership from both Mayport and NAS JAX. The relaxed atmosphere allowed the JINSA delegation to socialize with base leadership on a personal level. The dinner included an unforgettable briefing by CAPT (ret.) Dale Raebel, a Vietnam POW. CAPT Raebel discussed his experiences while being held captive and displayed some of his memorabilia from that time.

JINSA organizes base visits as part of our outreach efforts to ensure that our leadership better understands the work our servicemen and women are doing to keep the U.S. safe and to bring this knowledge back to their communities to advocate for a strong U.S. military. Conversely, we also educate officers and enlisted ranks on the important national security policy work JINSA is doing nationally and in their communities.

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JINSA Leadership Visits U.S. Army’s National Training Center at Ft. Irwin

Ethan Pupkin — Wed, 07 Mar 2018 21:06:50 +0000

JINSA National Leadership recently had the honor to tour the U.S. Army’s National Training Center (NTC) at Ft. Irwin. The delegation was hosted by BG Jeff Broadwater, Commanding General, National Training Center at Ft. Irwin and was accompanied by two JINSA past Generals and Admirals Program participants VADM John Bird, USN (ret.) and LTG Guy Swan III, USA (ret.).

JINSA experienced first-hand the training operations and procedures that enable our soldiers to be combat-ready and preform at the highest level. The visit included a welcome dinner with senior base leadership, briefings, interactions and lunch in the field with soldiers, and a tour of one of their urban combat training facilities.

BG Jeff Broadwater, Commanding General NTC, with JINSA Chairman David Steinmann.

The soldiers at the National Training Center briefed JINSA at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Base leadership demonstrated the different types of training that the army requires in order to achieve army readiness.

We would like to thank GEN JD Thurman, USA (ret.), former Commander at NTC and member of JINSA’s Board of Advisors, for helping to organize the JINSA visit.

JINSA Delegation with MG John Thomson III and BG Jeff Broadwater.

JINSA organizes base visits as part of our outreach efforts to ensure that our leadership understands the work our servicemen and women are doing to keep the U.S. safe and to bring this knowledge back to their communities to advocate for a strong U.S. military. Conversely, we also educate officers and enlisted ranks on the important work JINSA is doing nationally and in their communities.

Briefing on urban combat training (left) and JINSA COO Butch Kievenaar, USA (ret.) briefing officers at NTC (right).

Discussing troop movements with JINSA delegation (left) and MAJ Patrick Merriss with VADM John Bird discussing Army training (right).

Delegation touring urban warfare training facility (left) and VADM John Bird, BG Jeff Broadwater, JINSA Chairman David Steinmann and LTG Guy Swan at welcome dinner (right).

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JINSA Leadership Embarks on the USS Truman

Ethan Pupkin — Sat, 16 Dec 2017 21:14:24 +0000

On December 5-6, JINSA National Leadership had the honor to embark on the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) and visit the amazing sailors of our Unites States Navy. The delegation was hosted by ADM Phil Davidson, Commander U.S. Fleet Forces Command and ADM William Gortney, USN (ret.) who serves on JINSA’s Board of Advisors, and was a 2017 Generals and Admiral’s Program participant.

JINSA experienced first-hand what it takes for our Navy to operate an aircraft carrier, what is essentially an airport in the middle of the ocean. Everything is centered around the 60-70 aircraft that take off and land multiple times a day. These young patriots, men and women, who are often 18, 19 and 20 years old, carry the weight of our national security on their shoulders, and work tirelessly to perform their duties without error.

CAPT Nicholas Dienna, Commanding Officer, with former JINSA Chairman Michael Nachman.

Delegation witnessing flight deck operations first-hand, behind them is an F/A-18E Super Hornet with tail hook down about to land.

The crew of the USS Truman educated JINSA on all aspects of carrier operations, including having the delegation carry out an arrested landing aboard Truman, and a catapult takeoff. The embark included briefings and dinner with senior leadership, breakfast with sailors, and a tour of the flight deck while witnessing both day and evening operations.

If you would like more information about our upcoming base visits, please contact Harris Vederman athvederman@jinsa.orgor call 202-524-5515.

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JINSA Leadership visits Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego and Camp Pendleton

wpengine — Thu, 27 Jul 2017 14:17:02 +0000

On July 11-12, JINSA National Leadership had the honor to visit the Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) and Camp Pendleton. The delegation was led by LtGen Ken Glueck, USMC (ret.) who serves on JINSA’s Board of Advisors and is a 2016 Generals and Admiral’s Program participant.

The delegation witnessed first-hand the unique training and final steps that the recruits go through in order to become Marines.

At Camp Pendleton, the delegation had the opportunity to observe The Crucible, a test lasting over 54 hours that every USMC recruit must go through in order to officially become a Marine. This serves as the culmination of Marine training and includes food and sleep deprivation and intense physical activity. The Crucible is designed to instill in the Marines a set of core values that they will use to face any obstacles in their future.

JINSA organizes base visits as part of our outreach efforts to ensure that our leadership understands the work our servicemen and women are doing to keep the U.S. safe and to bring this knowledge back to their communities to advocate for a strong U.S. military. Conversely, we also educate military officers and enlisted ranks on the important work JINSA is doing nationally and in their communities.

Marine recruits 48 hours into The Crucible.

JINSA delegation with Col.Suttee and his team while observing The Crucible at Camp Pendleton.

If you would like more information about future base visits or our National Leadership, please contact Harris Vederman athvederman@jinsa.orgor call 202-667-3900.

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JINSA National Leadership Delegation Visits Naval Station Norfolk and Newport News Shipbuilding

wpengine — Fri, 10 Mar 2017 22:42:11 +0000

On February 27-28, a JINSA National Leadership delegation got a first-hand look at a wide range of warfare capabilities of the United States Navy Surface Fleet aboard the USS San Antonio and USS Nitze. Naval Station Norfolk supports the operational readiness of the US Atlantic Fleet, providing facilities and services to enable mission accomplishment.

The fact-finding trip was led by JINSA Board of Advisor member and 2016 Generals and Admirals Program participant VADM Carol Pottenger, USN (ret.).

Members from our delegation came from across the country to interact with both senior U.S. naval officers and enlisted sailors. They toured the USS San Antonio, an amphibious transport ship and the USS Nitze, an Arleigh Burke class guided-missile destroyer. JINSA Chairman David Steinmann remarked,

The young sailors I met on those ships make me proud to be an American. And there is one moment I will never, ever forget. I spoke with as many of the young sailors as I could – thanking them for what they do for all of us. I shook hands with one sailor, wearing a sidearm and posted as security at the entrance to the pier at which the Nitze was moored. I thanked him for his service and he looked me right in the eye and said, “Thank you for your trust, sir.”

RADM Pat Piercey, Naval Surfaces Forces Atlantic joined the delegation for a working lunch and briefed them on the current state of the U.S. Navy surface fleet and the importance of the stated goal of a 355 ship fleet by the U.S. Navy. RADM Piercey also discussed his experience while visiting Israel for work and the impact it has had on his life.

USS San Antonio CAPT Darren Nelson and Executive Officer CAPT Edgardo A. Moreno gave the delegation a hands-on tour of the amphibious transport ship from top to bottom. We were able to witness first-hand the size and capability of this amazing ship.

USS Nitze CDR Paul Kaylor briefed the delegation on the critical work the crew of the Arleigh Burke class guided-missile destroyer does to keep America safe.

The main purpose of the Norfolk Naval visit was to better understand the mission of the U.S. Navy’s surface fleet, as well as the needs of the dedicated sailors that staff some of the world’s most advanced weapons. This knowledge will allow our leadership to more effectively advocate on behalf of the Navy and the surface fleet in their communities and for the U.S. Navy leadership and sailors to know that they have a friend and supporter in JINSA.

While in Norfolk, a portion of the delegation visited Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS), inspected the carrier USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) which is being built, and viewed USS Gerald R Ford (CVN-78), soon to be delivered to the US Navy.

The group received briefings by NNS President Matt Mulherin, VADM Mark Fox, USN (ret.) and other senior NNS staff on the critical work they are doing in building and refurbishing our carrier fleet.

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JINSA Leaders Visit Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay

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On February 29 through March 1, JINSA Leaders got a first-hand look at Submarine Group 10 based at Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay in Kingsland, Georgia. The base is the U.S. Atlantic Fleet’s home port for Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines armed with Trident missile nuclear weapons.

The fact-finding trip was led by JINSA Advisor and 2014 Generals and Admirals Program Participant Vice Admiral John Bird, USN (Ret.), who spoke at the welcome event along with Rear Admiral Randy Crites, the Commander of Submarine Group 10.

The next day, Adm. Crites briefed the group on the current state of the Navy fleet and the needs of the submarine force.

JINSA National Leaders came from across the country and interacted with both senior naval officers and enlisted sailors. They toured the facilities at the base including the USS Wyoming, an Ohio-class submarine, the Trident missile training facility, and Lockheed Martin’s Trident missile facility. JINSA Chairman David Steinmann remarked on the sheer size of the Wyoming: “Picture a quarterback handing off the ball to his star running back on their own one yard line. Now watch that running back take off, weaving and dashing downfield and crossing the goal line 99 yards away. If he had been running through an SSBN “Boomer” submarine, he’d be just a little over half way to the other end of the boat.”

The main purpose of the visit was to better understand the mission of the U.S. Navy’s submarine fleet, as well as the needs of the dedicated sailors that staff some of the world’s most advanced weapons. This knowledge will allow our leadership to more effectively advocate on behalf of the Navy and the sub fleet in their communities.

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