John Hannah, the Randi & Charles Wax Senior Fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, served as national security advisor to former Vice President Dick Cheney. 

Originally published in the Washington Examiner.

The post Trump Is Stuck and His Iran Leverage Is Spent appeared first on JINSA.

Sander Gerber is a JINSA Distinguished Fellow, the founder and CEO of Hudson Bay Capital, and a member of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board. All views expressed are his own.

Shawn Chenoweth is the director of Cognitive Advantage at the National Security Council. All views expressed are his own.

Originally published in The Washington Times.

The post Social Media Deception Gives Iran A Weapon Against America appeared first on JINSA.

Maj Gen Charles Corcoran  (U.S. Air Force, ret.) is former Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Air Force, and a participant in the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s (JINSA) Generals and Admirals Program.
Yoni Tobin is a senior policy analyst at JINSA.

Originally published in RealClearDefense.

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Today, a consequential fault line in the Middle East runs not just between Riyadh and Tehran but between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi — two capitals that share a region, a border, and a security patron, but little else in terms of strategic vision. Understanding this rivalry is no longer optional for serious American statecraft. It is a geopolitical condition that Washington will likely be navigating for years to come.

The Saudi–Emirati rivalry, which exploded into public view last December, is characterized by a deep divergence over what a post-American, or at least less American, Middle East should look like, who should lead it, and on what terms. The two states have been drifting apart for years, but fractures have now surfaced across every major regional issue: Yemen, the Horn of Africa, energy markets, relations with Israel, and the competition for economic dominance through diversification.

In 2015, Saudi Arabia and the UAE entered Yemen’s civil war as partners in a coalition against the Houthis. They left it, for all practical purposes, as rivals. The UAE backed the Southern Transitional Council, a separatist group that opposed the Saudi-supported goal of restoring Yemen’s internationally recognized government in Sanaa. The result was a war within a war, in which forces trained and armed by the UAE occasionally clashed with Saudi-backed units. The truce frameworks that followed never fully resolved the underlying question: Whose Yemen is it?

Across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been projecting power and competing for port access, the right to establish military bases, and political influence in Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. The stakes are high. Control of Red Sea choke points and Horn of Africa logistics corridors is central to both countries’ long-term security strategies. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are not coordinating; they are racing for dominance.

Energy policy has become another area of strategic competition. The UAE’s departure earlier this month from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) — which it joined to help regulate the international oil market — made that clear. Abu Dhabi’s decision was overdetermined: frustration with production quotas, confidence in its own production capacity, and a desire for strategic autonomy contributed to it. But at its core, it was a rejection of Saudi Arabia’s domination of OPEC. Riyadh, which has staked its Vision 2030 project on the assumption that it can manage global oil prices through cartel discipline, correctly interpreted the decision as a direct challenge. The two countries are now, in effect, energy competitors with fundamentally different market strategies.

The countries diverge most significantly over Israel. The UAE signed the Abraham Accords in 2020 and has steadily deepened its economic and security ties with Jerusalem. During the war with Iran, the relationship has crossed a threshold that would have been unthinkable even a year ago: Israel deployed an Iron Dome battery and military personnel to operate it on Emirati soil. This was the first time the system had ever been used outside Israel or the United States, and the first confirmed deployment of Israeli troops to an Arab Gulf state. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has conditioned normalization with Israel on concessions from Jerusalem and the United States that have so far proved undeliverable, instead investing its diplomatic energy in building a trilateral defense framework with Turkey and Pakistan. The UAE bet early on integration with Israel as a pillar of its security architecture, while Saudi Arabia is building a security framework that does not require Israel.

None of this means that the two countries are enemies. They share vital security interests, particularly regarding Iran, despite their radically divergent visions. They cooperate on counterterrorism. Their economies are intertwined. Saudi nationals are among the UAE’s largest sources of investment and tourism. But strategic rivalry and economic interdependence often coexist — just ask France and Germany — and the rivalry will define the policy challenges Washington faces in the Gulf.

American policymakers will be tempted to pick a side, but they should resist. The United States has deep and important interests in both countries, such as security cooperation, energy stability, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and the regional balance of power. Choosing between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi would be strategically mistaken and practically impossible. Both relationships are essential to American foreign policy.

But that does not mean we can afford to ignore the matter. The Saudi–UAE rivalry will not be resolved by a summit or a phone call. It will shape the internal dynamics of every multilateral framework in the region, from the Gulf Cooperation Council to OPEC+ to the Abraham Accords themselves. Above all, American policymakers must recognize that the future of both relationships, and Washington’s leverage within each, rests on how the war with Iran concludes.

The post-Iran regional order will determine how Riyadh and Abu Dhabi compete, cooperate, and calculate their respective needs for American partnership. If we get the Iran endgame wrong, managing the Saudi–UAE rivalry will become an exercise in diminishing returns. If we get it right, the United States will retain the strategic position to shape a Gulf that works with American interests rather than around them. The first step toward a serious Gulf policy is admitting that our two most important Arab partners are playing very different games — and that managing the distance between them may be a defining feature of American strategy in the Middle East for the foreseeable future.

Hussein Aboubakr Mansour is a Fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). 

Originally published in National Review.

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IF THERE IS ONE STORY FROM THE PAST WEEK that best represents the brave new world we are entering as the Trump administration continues its dismantling of the much derided “liberal international order” that was underpinned by U.S. military power, our system of alliances, and rules-based free trade, it wasn’t the will-they-won’t-they back-and-forth about the Strait of Hormuz ceasefire agreement, nor the thousands of pages of government documents about UFOs the administration released, presumably to distract from the Hormuz business. Instead, it was that Turkey, on May 5, unveiled an intercontinental ballistic missile in Istanbul at the 2026 SAHA defense and aerospace exhibition.

The body of the prototype missile on display this week interestingly bears the signature of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the modern secular Turkish republic, and the tughra (a calligraphic seal or signature) of Sultan Bayezid I, also know as Bayezid “the Thunderbolt,” who in the early fifteenth century reduced the population of Anatolia to Ottoman vassalage, besieged Constantinople only to be defeated in a rearguard action by Tamarlane, and spent the end of his days as a prisoner. The “Yıldırımhan” or “Lightning” missile—which is designed to carry conventional warheads—symbolizes the fusion of Turkish nationalism and its Ottoman Islamic past, much as the ruling AK Party has attempted to do over its quarter century of rule. Not to put too fine a point on things, an AI video produced to tout the missile (which has yet to be tested) appeared to show it “hitting nuclear facilities and other targets that appeared to be in the U.S.,” according to the Financial Times. It was not totally reassuring that Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler insisted the missile was meant for deterrence and appeared unaware of the AI video.

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Amb. Eric Edelman is a JINSA Distinguished Scholar and former U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. From 2003–2005, Amb. Edelman served as the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey.

Read the full article in the The Bulwark.

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The US naval blockade of Iran is a good policy, but its potential effectiveness appears overstated and its purpose misguided. Rather than back down from efforts to reopen the Strait of Hormuz (as the Trump administration appears to be doing), the United States needs to double down on creating real leverage against Iran. That means maintaining the blockade, rejecting any further negotiations with Iran, and taking actions to make regime collapse more likely.

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Michael Makovsky, PhD, is President and CEO of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA).
Blaise Misztal is Vice President for Policy at JINSA.

Read the full article in the The National Interest.

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As a former deputy commander of U.S. Central Command, a Navy SEAL and a member of the National Security Council under former President George W. Bush, I spent decades helping oversee U.S. military operations across the Middle East under leaders including Jim Mattisand Lloyd Austin, both of whom later served this nation as Defense secretary. If I were advising President Donald Trump now, my message would be simple: Do not confuse a pause in hostilities with Iran — or even a limited, chaotic “opening” of the Strait of Hormuz — with a durable solution to the hostility between our nations.

The president’s position on Iran has, at times, appeared inconsistent. At times, he has suggested regime change in Iran as an objective. At others, his focus has shifted toward more limited goals, such as preventing a nuclear weapon, reopening the Strait of Hormuz or securing concessions through negotiation. Those are important objectives but they are not, by themselves, a strategy for ending the threat posed by the regime in Tehran. A lasting resolution requires a clearly defined end state.

That kind of clarity has been missing in how the United States has communicated its objectives. Statements suggesting overwhelming or immediate destruction may project strength, but they can also create ambiguity about U.S. intent. Deterrence works best when it’s consistent and tied to clear strategic objectives.

That starts with being clear about the threat. Iran’s leadership has consistently pursued nuclear capability, advanced its missile program, expanded proxy networks across the region and actively supported U.S. adversaries. Those are still their goals, and those goals are not going away. Iran will continue pursuing them regardless of temporary pauses or agreements.

For nearly five decades, U.S. policy has focused on slowing Iran’s progress rather than stopping it outright. Sanctions, limited strikes and negotiated agreements have each had moments of success. But nothing yet has altered the regime’s direction. Instead, our actions have bought more time for Iran to rebuild and continue advancing under less immediate pressure. The current ceasefire fits that pattern. It will lower tensions in the short term, but it will not resolve the underlying conflict.

That raises a more fundamental question: What is the objective? If the goal is simply to manage the threat, then another ceasefire and another round of negotiations may suffice. But if the goal is a lasting resolution, then the U.S. must be clear about what that requires. As long as the current regime remains in power, Iran will continue pursuing the same policies it has for decades. That’s why regime change is not a secondary objective; it is the only path to a durable resolution.

But that does not mean a U.S. invasion of Iran. It means pursuing a different strategy: one that applies sustained economic and operational pressure to the regime’s core institutions, including measures such as targeted economic and maritime restrictions, one that sets clear and enforceable conditions in any negotiation and creates the conditions for internal change over time.

First, any negotiation must be anchored in non-negotiable outcomes. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure must be fully dismantled. Its stockpile of highly enriched uranium must be removed. Support for proxy militias and terrorist networks must end. The free flow of commerce through critical waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz must be guaranteed.

Second, pressure must extend beyond military targets to the core structures that sustain the regime’s power. That includes the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, its financial networks and the internal security apparatus that enforces control at home.

Third, the U.S. should more clearly support Iranians. If regime change is to occur, then it will ultimately be driven from within. American policy can influence the conditions under which that change becomes possible: through information access, economic pressure and coordinated international isolation of the regime’s leadership.

The events of the past several weeks have already shifted the landscape. Iran’s leadership is under greater strain, its capabilities have been tested and its vulnerabilities are more visible than they have been in years. This is not a moment to reset the status quo on a regime that’s now operating from a weaker and more exposed position.

Trump was right to act on the threat Iran poses. But a ceasefire without a clearly defined political objective risks turning military gains into another temporary pause in a decades-long cycle. If the U.S. wants something more than a moment of calm, then it must be willing to define and pursue a different outcome.

There can be no lasting peace with the current regime in Tehran, which is why the current blockade is a step in the right direction. By applying sustained economic pressure without causing further destruction, or making sweeping financial concessions to Iran, it weakens the regime from within and moves us closer to the only outcome that can deliver lasting stability and peace.

VADM Robert Harward, USN (ret.), former Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command, is an Iran Policy Project Advisor at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA).

Originally published in MS NOW.

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For almost half a century, the Islamic Republic of Iran has fused revolutionary ideology, clerical authority, and modern statecraft into a system that reshaped the Middle East. With the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the severe damage the Islamic Republic has taken, is the regime’s long shadow finally fading away? In Mosaic‘s April essay, Hussein Aboubakr Mansour argues that it is.

On March 31, Mansour was joined by the Israeli scholar of national security Dan Schueftan and Mosaic‘s editor Jonathan Silver to discuss his thesis.

Hussein Aboubakr Mansour is a Fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). 

Dan Schueftan is an Israeli scholar of national security. 

Jonathan Silver is an editor for Mosaic.

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Originally published in Mosaic.

The post After the Ayatollah: Is This the End of Political Islam? appeared first on JINSA.

As the United States and Israel continue to decimate Iran’s conventional capabilities, it becomes clearer that their campaign cannot stop until at least one of two objectives is achieved: the collapse of the Tehran regime, or the end of its nuclear program. If the regime survives, it will be even more determined and desperate to go nuclear.

The Tehran regime already understood that giving up on a nuclear program is a recipe for being invaded, as happened with Ukraine; toppled like Bashar al-Assad; or invaded, toppled, and killed like Moamar Qaddafi and Saddam Hussein. Meanwhile, North Korea achieved nuclear weapons and its impoverished hermit regime remains safely in power. This history lesson is even clearer now that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other top officials have been eliminated. Assuming it survives in some form, the regime will have every incentive to secure the ultimate deterrent against another such war.

Michael Makovsky, a former Pentagon official, is President and CEO of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA)

Jonathan Ruhe is Fellow for American Strategy at JINSA.

Originally published in RealClearDefense.

The post Iran’s Next Move Is the Bomb—If the Regime Survives appeared first on JINSA.

Just over a month ago, in the opening hours of Operation Epic Fury, President Donald Trump offered a theory of victory premised on ending Iran’s military and nuclear threats and enabling the Iranian people to rise up.  For all the U.S.-Israeli battlefield success since then, his first prime-time address last week gave the American people, the Iranian regime, and the wider world no idea how this war is actually supposed to end. Regime change is not the goal, but it’s been achieved anyway, he claimed. The war will soon be over because Iran’s capabilities are destroyed, yet still it must be hit extremely hard. Others should deal with the Strait of Hormuz, but it will reopen on its own.

Jonathan Ruhe is Fellow for American Strategy at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA).

Originally published in The Dispatch.

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