As a former deputy commander of U.S. Central Command, a Navy SEAL and a member of the National Security Council under former President George W. Bush, I spent decades helping oversee U.S. military operations across the Middle East under leaders including Jim Mattisand Lloyd Austin, both of whom later served this nation as Defense secretary. If I were advising President Donald Trump now, my message would be simple: Do not confuse a pause in hostilities with Iran — or even a limited, chaotic “opening” of the Strait of Hormuz — with a durable solution to the hostility between our nations.

The president’s position on Iran has, at times, appeared inconsistent. At times, he has suggested regime change in Iran as an objective. At others, his focus has shifted toward more limited goals, such as preventing a nuclear weapon, reopening the Strait of Hormuz or securing concessions through negotiation. Those are important objectives but they are not, by themselves, a strategy for ending the threat posed by the regime in Tehran. A lasting resolution requires a clearly defined end state.

That kind of clarity has been missing in how the United States has communicated its objectives. Statements suggesting overwhelming or immediate destruction may project strength, but they can also create ambiguity about U.S. intent. Deterrence works best when it’s consistent and tied to clear strategic objectives.

That starts with being clear about the threat. Iran’s leadership has consistently pursued nuclear capability, advanced its missile program, expanded proxy networks across the region and actively supported U.S. adversaries. Those are still their goals, and those goals are not going away. Iran will continue pursuing them regardless of temporary pauses or agreements.

For nearly five decades, U.S. policy has focused on slowing Iran’s progress rather than stopping it outright. Sanctions, limited strikes and negotiated agreements have each had moments of success. But nothing yet has altered the regime’s direction. Instead, our actions have bought more time for Iran to rebuild and continue advancing under less immediate pressure. The current ceasefire fits that pattern. It will lower tensions in the short term, but it will not resolve the underlying conflict.

That raises a more fundamental question: What is the objective? If the goal is simply to manage the threat, then another ceasefire and another round of negotiations may suffice. But if the goal is a lasting resolution, then the U.S. must be clear about what that requires. As long as the current regime remains in power, Iran will continue pursuing the same policies it has for decades. That’s why regime change is not a secondary objective; it is the only path to a durable resolution.

But that does not mean a U.S. invasion of Iran. It means pursuing a different strategy: one that applies sustained economic and operational pressure to the regime’s core institutions, including measures such as targeted economic and maritime restrictions, one that sets clear and enforceable conditions in any negotiation and creates the conditions for internal change over time.

First, any negotiation must be anchored in non-negotiable outcomes. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure must be fully dismantled. Its stockpile of highly enriched uranium must be removed. Support for proxy militias and terrorist networks must end. The free flow of commerce through critical waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz must be guaranteed.

Second, pressure must extend beyond military targets to the core structures that sustain the regime’s power. That includes the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, its financial networks and the internal security apparatus that enforces control at home.

Third, the U.S. should more clearly support Iranians. If regime change is to occur, then it will ultimately be driven from within. American policy can influence the conditions under which that change becomes possible: through information access, economic pressure and coordinated international isolation of the regime’s leadership.

The events of the past several weeks have already shifted the landscape. Iran’s leadership is under greater strain, its capabilities have been tested and its vulnerabilities are more visible than they have been in years. This is not a moment to reset the status quo on a regime that’s now operating from a weaker and more exposed position.

Trump was right to act on the threat Iran poses. But a ceasefire without a clearly defined political objective risks turning military gains into another temporary pause in a decades-long cycle. If the U.S. wants something more than a moment of calm, then it must be willing to define and pursue a different outcome.

There can be no lasting peace with the current regime in Tehran, which is why the current blockade is a step in the right direction. By applying sustained economic pressure without causing further destruction, or making sweeping financial concessions to Iran, it weakens the regime from within and moves us closer to the only outcome that can deliver lasting stability and peace.

VADM Robert Harward, USN (ret.), former Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command, is an Iran Policy Project Advisor at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA).

Originally published in MS NOW.

The post Regime Change in Iran Remains as Necessary as Ever appeared first on JINSA.

For almost half a century, the Islamic Republic of Iran has fused revolutionary ideology, clerical authority, and modern statecraft into a system that reshaped the Middle East. With the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the severe damage the Islamic Republic has taken, is the regime’s long shadow finally fading away? In Mosaic‘s April essay, Hussein Aboubakr Mansour argues that it is.

On March 31, Mansour was joined by the Israeli scholar of national security Dan Schueftan and Mosaic‘s editor Jonathan Silver to discuss his thesis.

Hussein Aboubakr Mansour is a Fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). 

Dan Schueftan is an Israeli scholar of national security. 

Jonathan Silver is an editor for Mosaic.

…

Originally published in Mosaic.

The post After the Ayatollah: Is This the End of Political Islam? appeared first on JINSA.

As the United States and Israel continue to decimate Iran’s conventional capabilities, it becomes clearer that their campaign cannot stop until at least one of two objectives is achieved: the collapse of the Tehran regime, or the end of its nuclear program. If the regime survives, it will be even more determined and desperate to go nuclear.

The Tehran regime already understood that giving up on a nuclear program is a recipe for being invaded, as happened with Ukraine; toppled like Bashar al-Assad; or invaded, toppled, and killed like Moamar Qaddafi and Saddam Hussein. Meanwhile, North Korea achieved nuclear weapons and its impoverished hermit regime remains safely in power. This history lesson is even clearer now that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other top officials have been eliminated. Assuming it survives in some form, the regime will have every incentive to secure the ultimate deterrent against another such war.

Michael Makovsky, a former Pentagon official, is President and CEO of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA)

Jonathan Ruhe is Fellow for American Strategy at JINSA.

Originally published in RealClearDefense.

The post Iran’s Next Move Is the Bomb—If the Regime Survives appeared first on JINSA.

Just over a month ago, in the opening hours of Operation Epic Fury, President Donald Trump offered a theory of victory premised on ending Iran’s military and nuclear threats and enabling the Iranian people to rise up.  For all the U.S.-Israeli battlefield success since then, his first prime-time address last week gave the American people, the Iranian regime, and the wider world no idea how this war is actually supposed to end. Regime change is not the goal, but it’s been achieved anyway, he claimed. The war will soon be over because Iran’s capabilities are destroyed, yet still it must be hit extremely hard. Others should deal with the Strait of Hormuz, but it will reopen on its own.

Jonathan Ruhe is Fellow for American Strategy at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA).

Originally published in The Dispatch.

The post Trump Risks Losing the Plot—and the War—in Iran appeared first on JINSA.

For weeks, Operation Epic Fury showcased the breathtaking reach, precision, and persistence of American air and space power: more than 13,000 combat sorties and more than 12,300 targets struck by April 1. The striking figures speak to extraordinary military capability, global reach, relentless operational tempo, and the unmatched technical excellence that defines the United States Air Force and United States Space Force.

But numbers do not tell the most important story.

What is truly important is what happened on April 3, when an F-15E Strike Eagle was shot down over Iran. After weeks of combat and thousands upon thousands of sorties, the enemy destroyed a U.S. fighter aircraft for the first time in this conflict. In an instant, this war was no longer just about sorties, targets, and battle damage assessments, but about the survival and rescue of two American Airmen on the ground in hostile territory, separated, exposed, and in mortal danger.

What followed was a rebuttal to one of the criticisms often aimed at the Air Force and Space Force.

Both crew members ejected safely, but they landed in different locations in rough and hostile terrain. One was recovered within hours, but the other—a wounded weapons systems officer—spent more than 24 hours in evading capture in the mountains while enemy forces hunted him. Every minute increased the danger and raised the stakes. Somewhere in that unforgiving terrain was an American service member who knew the enemy was looking for him, knew capture or death was a real possibility, and yet fought for his survival.

And somewhere above him, around him, and far beyond his line of sight, hundreds of fellow Americans were rallying to his cause, doing what Americans in uniform have always done: refusing to leave one of their own behind.

This is more than a rescue mission; it is a declaration of values.

U.S. helicopters took enemy fire and crew members were wounded. An A-10 supporting the operation was dealt a deadly blow, but its pilot successfully made it to friendly airspace. The effort to save the second Airman required capabilities no other country posesses: extraordinary intelligence, deception, special operations forces, air cover, strike coordination, not to mention uncommon courage. It was an enormous effort, involving far more aircraft—both in number and variety—than one might assume. But those details, while fascinating and surely the subject of future films, are not the point. It required Americans in the air and on the ground risking their lives for one reason above all others: One of their own was still out there.

And they were going to get him home.

Too often the simplistic charge that the Air Force and Space Force are too enamored with technology, too centered on their platforms, too focused on hardware over humanity, simply misses the mark completely.

As important as technology is—aircraft, satellites, secure communications, precision navigation, resilient networks, and intelligence fusion are all indispensable to modern warfare—the Air Force and Space Force have never been about technology for its own sake. These services are about people empowered by technology, people sustained by trust, people bound by duty, and people willing to risk everything for one another.

Contrary to popular misconceptions, the Air Force and Space Force do not worship machines. They do not elevate platforms over people or technology over the human dimension. On the contrary, they see technology and the human dimension as complementary and inseparable, not competing priorities. The machine extends the reach of the warrior, and the warrior gives the machine purpose.

And when one of our own is down, every Airman, every Guardian, every aircraft, satellite, sensor, and network matters for only one reason: because a fellow American is in danger.

That is what made this mission so powerful. It was not just a feat of operational integration. It was the visible expression of loyalty, duty, and the sacred promise that binds those in uniform together: If you go down, we will come for you.

That promise is not sentimental. It is not ceremonial. It is not something recited on special occasions and forgotten in battle. It is real, imposing obligations and demanding action in the face of danger. It demands that others climb into cockpits, helicopters, command centers, and travel into kill zones not to destroy but to rescue, for the sake of a fellow servicemember in peril. Here, courage is no abstraction; it is a choice.

Space Force Guardians may not fly into danger in the same way, but they are no less woven into the campaign, providing critical communications, navigation, targeting support, and warning functions. Those contributions, while technical, are deeply human in purpose. They are protecting lives. They are helping find the isolated. They are helping bring warriors home. Behind every signal, every warning, every transmission, every coordinate, and every operational decision is an Airman or Guardian whose work can mean the difference between rescue and loss.

This is the human dimension of air and space power.

War is never remote and antiseptic. It involves real people risking their lives for missions in the face of true danger. Even after thousands of sorties and weeks of successful combat operations, danger endures. The enemy always gets a vote.

What Americans should recognize in the wake of this weekend is not that a U.S. jet was shot down but that the character of our American military is unparalleled.

Under pressure, under fire, and against the clock, Airmen and Guardians, Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines, performed exceptionally: They focused on the mission, trusted one another, accepted the risk, and refused to leave their comrades behind.

We saw Airmen and Guardians prove that the soul of these services is not cold machinery, but human devotion. We saw the professionalism that prepares people to perform under the harshest conditions. We saw the discipline that enables clarity amid chaos. And above all, we saw the love of comrades that compels men and women in uniform to risk everything to save one of their own.

That is the promise our Airmen and Guardians make to each other. And that is why this mission should be remembered: Not simply as a successful combat rescue, but as a living testament to the heart, character, and humanity of American air and space power.

Lt Gen Dave Deptula, USAF (ret.) is the Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, U.S Air Force Headquarters and a 2013 JINSA Generals & Admirals Program participant.

Originally published in Air and Space Forces Magazine.

The post The Soul of Aerospace Power: It’s the People, Not the Machines appeared first on JINSA.

The Air Force’s fighter inventory has shrunk over 60 percent since the end of the Cold War and has been flown relentlessly in combat ever since. Today those aircraft—and their crews—are worn hard. Yet missions such as air superiority and strike remain central to deterrence and warfighting as evidenced by recent results over Iran. If the United States intends to maintain military primacy, the Trump administration and Congress must accelerate procurement of modern fighters. The warning lights are already flashing that it is time to accelerate investment in these forces.

At the center of that effort is the F-35A, which the Air Force itself describes as “the foundation of the USAF fighter force structure.” Delivering on that promise requires four things: expanding fighter capacity, stabilizing procurement, continuing modernization, and improving readiness.

Capacity Matters

The Air Force that won the Cold War fielded more than 4,000 fighters, most less than a decade old. Today the service operates roughly 1,100 fighters in its primary mission aircraft inventory—the aircraft available for real-world operations—and their average age is around 30 years.

Air Force analysis identifies a requirement for more than 1,500 fighters. When accounting for growing homeland defense demands, missile defense requirements, and the attrition expected in a peer conflict, that number may prove to be much higher.

During the Cold War, the fighter force focused primarily on one adversary: the Soviet Union. Today the United States faces a far broader set of challenges—China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and persistent homeland defense requirements.

Aircraft—and their pilots—cannot be in two places at once. Capacity matters.

Without sufficient numbers, the existing force is stretched thin. Fighters and crews deploy repeatedly, disrupting training cycles, delaying major maintenance, and eroding readiness.

Recent operations illustrate the strain. F-35As that participated in the removal of Maduro from Venezuela were quickly redeployed to the Middle East during rising tensions with Iran. Some did not even make it back to the U.S. to reset. The reality is that demand is particularly high for stealth fighters that can leverage sensor fusion and networking capabilities—attributes that allow them to support operations far beyond traditional strike missions. If a concurrent fight were to erupt while Operation Epic Fury was underway, demand for U.S. fighters—especially the F-35A—would rapidly exceed supply.

China’s Airpower Is Expanding Faster

For decades many Americans viewed major war as theoretical. That complacency was, and remains, dangerous.

China is rapidly expanding and modernizing its airpower. Since 2021, Beijing has added more than eight million square feet of aircraft manufacturing capacity—larger than the F-35 production facility in Fort Worth. The reason is straightforward: China is in the middle of a massive combat aviation buildup reminiscent of the U.S. modernization surge during the Reagan administration.

China’s J-20 stealth fighter fleet already exceeds the size of the Air Force’s F-22 inventory. Analysts estimate China could produce as many as 300 fighters annually by 2028. Current projections suggest the PLAAF is on track to surpass the United States in both combat aircraft size and modernization by the end of the decade.

The contrast with U.S. procurement trends is stark. In its FY2026 budget request, the Air Force proposed retiring 258 fighters, while purchasing just 45 new aircraft.

For years, Air Force leaders have said they must procure at least 72 fighters annually simply to prevent the fleet from shrinking. Prior to the FY2024 budget request, the last time the Air Force purchased 72 or more fighters in a single year was 1998—more than a quarter century ago. Buying fewer than that causes the fighter inventory to shrink, which is exactly what has happened since the end of the Cold War. After decades of deferred modernization, the necessary procurement rate is now significantly higher.

The consequences are already visible. Okinawa—one of America’s most strategically important locations in the Pacific no longer has permanently assigned fighters. The Maryland Air National Guard lost its flying mission in 2025 when its A-10s were retired without replacement. In both cases, insufficient procurement forced capacity reductions.

The Air Force’s fighter force structure assessment acknowledges the problem and recommends maximizing production of aircraft already in production. For the F-35A that would mean roughly 72 aircraft annually. Additional procurement of aircraft such as the F-15EX and the emerging F-47 will also be necessary.

During the Reagan buildup, the Air Force purchased nearly 200 fighters per year. Given today’s aging fleet, those numbers represent replacement—not expansion.

Procurement Stability Matters

Expanding production requires predictable demand.

Pentagon plans in the early 2000s projected the Air Force buying roughly 80 F-35s annually beginning in the mid-2010s. Reality has been far different. Procurement has ranged from more than 60 aircraft in some years to as few as 24 in FY2026.

This volatility makes it extremely difficult for industry to invest in additional production capacity, particularly among smaller suppliers deeper in the supply chain.

Workforces, specialized equipment, and production space cannot expand and contract with yearly budget swings. Businesses simply cannot operate effectively under those conditions.

Lockheed Martin has attempted to stabilize production by using international orders as a buffer against fluctuating U.S. demand. But that approach has limits.

A multi-year procurement contract would provide the stability necessary for the industrial base to expand production and lower costs through economies of scale. These agreements typically deliver savings of roughly ten percent—stretching both U.S. and allied defense budgets further.

Expanded production is also necessary to meet growing international demand. Many allied nations delayed airpower modernization and now urgently require new aircraft. If the United States cannot meet that demand, partners will inevitably seek alternatives—undermining both U.S. economic interests and the operational advantages of allied interoperability.

Modernization Cannot Slow

The F-35 is not simply another fighter aircraft. It is an information-age combat system whose low-observability, sensors, computing power, electronic warfare capabilities, and connectivity are as important as its weapons.

Operation Epic Fury over Iran illustrates this evolution. In these missions stealth aircraft act as airborne data nodes—collecting intelligence inside contested airspace and distributing it across the entire military force in real time. In such operations, the aircraft’s ability to fuse information and direct other aircraft can be as decisive as its ability to deliver weapons.

Maintaining that advantage requires continued modernization. Major upgrades like technical refresh (TR) 3 and block 4 have dominated news headlines in recent years and significant progress has been made with both. However, modernization is a continual effort that demands sustained investment given the evolution of threats.

One of the biggest examples in this regard ties to generating additional power and cooling for a combat aircraft that is a flying supercomputer. Early F-35 variants required roughly 15 kilowatts of electrical power. Current mission systems require more than 30 kilowatts, and future upgrades could push demand toward 80 kilowatts. This is a good news story because it means the F-35 has growing capability. However, investments must be made to support that growth.

Meeting those requirements will require upgrades to both the aircraft’s engine core and its power-thermal management systems (PTMS). Pratt and Whitney is progressing on the engine front and there are options for the PTMS, including a program known as enhanced power and cooling system (EPACS). These foundational improvements rarely attract headlines, but they are essential to enabling future capability growth.

Readiness Matters

Even the most advanced aircraft is only useful if it is ready to fly.

Improving F-35 readiness requires progress on two fronts. First, sustainment costs must continue to decline. Encouraging progress has already been made: the cost per flying hour dropped dramatically between 2014 and 2022. Further progress must continue as the Air Force must be able to afford to operate the aircraft it acquires.

Second, the services must adequately fund operations and maintenance accounts—particularly spare parts.

When supplied with sufficient parts, F-35 mission capable rates can exceed 90 percent in operational deployments. At home stations, however, aircraft sometimes sit idle waiting for components to be repaired or replaced. That is a major reason why Air Force leaders are making such a big push to boost readiness.

Because the F-35 operates through a shared global sustainment enterprise across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, all services must contribute adequately to sustain readiness. This is an area in major need of a funding boost. The FY26 defense budget made an important downpayment in that regard, but the investment must continue.

The Strategic Choice

Current headlines demonstrate what modern airpower can achieve. The striking military success of Operation Epic Fury rests on a campaign built around airpower. Aircrews are accomplishing what many once considered impossible, building on gains achieved less than a year ago when Israeli and U.S. aircraft struck critical targets deep inside Iran. Those operations reshaped the strategic balance in the Middle East—within some of the most heavily defended airspace in the world—and the F-35 was central to that success.

Just a few hundred miles away, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine offers a stark contrast. There, the conflict has devolved into grinding attrition reminiscent of World War I trench warfare. The difference is clear: over Iran, we see the decisive effects of effectively employed modern airpower. Over Russia and Ukraine, by contrast, neither side has achieved air superiority—leaving the battlefield contested and the war locked in costly stalemate.

The F-35 is the cornerstone of America’s future air dominance, providing the asymmetric advantage needed to deter adversaries and prevail in conflict. But that advantage exists only if the United States fields the aircraft in meaningful numbers.

China is producing fighters at scale. To meet that challenge the United States must double down on the F-35—expand production capacity, continue its modernization, and stabilize procurement at 72 F-35As annually for the U.S. Air Force.

Lt Gen David Deptula, USAF (ret.) is the former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance for the U.S. Air Force and JINSA Senior Advisor.

The post China Is Building Fighters At Scale: Time To Step Up F-35 Procurement appeared first on JINSA.

Warner condemned President Donald Trump for launching a “war of choice” against Iran. Without releasing classified information, it might be difficult for the administration to rebut criticism relating to the imminence of Iran’s nuclear threat.

There is, however, another more compelling international legal justification: This campaign continues an ongoing and long-term armed conflict with Iran.

Why does this matter? As reflected in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, all states have a right to act in self-defense in response to an actual or imminent unlawful armed attack. Iran’s assaults against U.S. personnel, bases, ships and Israel, which have been ongoing for at least the past several years, triggered that right, as reflected in the military responses ordered by Trump and President Joe Biden against the regime and its proxies. That U.S. right of self-defense continues until Iran’s willingness or capacity to continue such aggression ends.

International law does not require a distinct self-defense justification for every attack conducted once the right of self-defense is triggered. Once that right is initiated, military action is justified to achieve the overall self-defense objective, in this case terminating Iran’s capacity to strike the United States and its allies.

Some may argue that Iran’s attacks on America and other nations have been a series of distinct events rather than a continuing conflict justifying U.S. military action. This view is illogical and inconsistent with international law. Iran has for years exploited perceived moments of opportunity to launch attacks, directly or through its proxies.

There are strong arguments that the conflict has been ongoing for the 47 years since the Iranian Revolution. Unquestionably, this armed conflict has persisted over the past several years. That the U.S. has historically chosen to tolerate acts of Iranian aggression or respond in limited ways in no way negates the reality of this conflict.

Before the current hostilities, Iran’s most recent actions against the U.S. occurred on Feb. 3, when an Iranian drone “aggressively approached” and was shot down by a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea. Hours later, two gunboats operated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) threatened to seize a U.S.-flagged tanker in international waters.

According to a 2024 report by Biden’s Director of National Intelligence, between October 2023 and November 2024, “the Iranian military helped facilitate” at least 190 attacks against U.S. military forces by Iranian-aligned militants. During 2025, the Iranian-backed Houthis repeatedly attacked U.S. naval ships in the Red Sea. Also in 2025, Iranian proxies attacked U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria.

During the same period, Iran brought its “shadow war” to U.S. soil. The Biden and Trump justice departments have documented Iranian plots to assassinate Trump, former secretary of state Mike Pompeo, former national security adviser John Bolton and Iranian American women’s rights activist Masih Alinejad.

Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iran has been held responsible for the deaths of 603 U.S. troops in Iraq between 2003 and 2011, 241 service members in the 1983 U.S. Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, three soldiers in Jordan in January 2024 and dozens of U.S. civilians.

These facts justify the conclusion that the U.S. and Iran were already engaged in an armed conflict when the current round began. As a result, international law does not require the U.S. to refrain from further military action against Iran until just before the IRGC launches another assault.

Wars do not progress on a flatline of intensity. Instead, it is logical and legally valid for the U.S. to target enemy military sites when and where such strikes are most likely to accomplish objectives and produce maximum advantage. This approach is inherent in the numerous times U.S. presidents and military officials have stated the U.S. will respond to Iranian aggression “at a time and place of our choosing.”

Explaining this bipartisan cornerstone of U.S. policy, Brian J. Egan, while serving as State Department legal adviser under President Barack Obama, said, “In the view of the United States, once a State has lawfully resorted to force in self-defense against a particular armed group following an actual or imminent armed attack by that group, it is not necessary as a matter of international law to reassess whether an armed attack is imminent prior to every subsequent action taken against that group, provided that hostilities have not ended.”

International law does not require the U.S. and its allies to endlessly endure and absorb Iranian aggression. The U.S. military is engaged in decisive action to permanently stop Iranian attacks. America is fighting a war that Iran chose.

LTC Geoffrey S. Corn, USA (ret.) is a JINSA Distinguished Fellow, the George R. Killam Jr. Chair of Criminal Law at Texas Tech University School of Law, and a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel who served as an intelligence officer and military lawyer.

Orde Kittrie is a professor of law at Arizona State University and former lead State Department attorney for nuclear affairs.

Originally published in the Washington Post.

The post You Bet This Is A War of Choice. Just Not America’s. appeared first on JINSA.

In June 2025, a swift and successful operation against Iran enabled Israel, with precise but narrowly focused American assistance, to halt the nuclear programme and delay missile production. Even earlier, following Hamas’s October 7 attack, Israel fought a prolonged war on two fronts, during which it dealt a severe blow to Hezbollah and neutralised Hamas as a force capable of threatening Israel. As a result of Israel’s success against Hezbollah, Sunni rebels were able to capture Damascus, thereby completely shattering Iran’s “ring of fire”.

It became clear, however, that despite the IDF’s achievements, the tasks remained unfinished in every theatre.

In the Gaza Strip, the American President announced a 20-point plan, centred on the voluntary disarmament of Hamas. Israel is acting in accordance with those 20 points and facilitating the plan’s progress. The United States will now have to demonstrate that its part of the arrangement – the full disarmament of Hamas – is indeed implemented. Those involved understand that if the US-established mechanism fails to disarm the terrorist organisation, the IDF will do so by force. This would not be a short war. Yet by its conclusion, which would take roughly a year, Hamas would no longer be able to rule over Gaza’s residents, would cease to be a military power and a significant portion of its remaining personnel would be eliminated.

In Lebanon, following a ceasefire initiated by the United States, the Lebanese government was expected to disarm Hezbollah. The process began sluggishly in southern Lebanon, but almost nothing was done in central and northern areas. The IDF acted in line with what had been agreed with Washington as part of the ceasefire, countering Hezbollah’s attempts to rebuild its capabilities.

Nevertheless, the damage inflicted on the organisation was only partial. Hezbollah’s decision this week to join the assault against Israel on the second day of the war demonstrates how limited the achievements of the Lebanese Army have been, despite its declaration that disarmament had begun. Hezbollah’s opening of hostilities is likely to bring a dramatic shift: the IDF is prepared to deliver a severe blow, potentially including a full-scale ground operation. The objective is to dismantle Hezbollah as a military organisation, thereby enabling the Lebanese government to complete its disarmament.

With regard to Iran, a more complex reality emerged. Despite Israel’s successes in June 2025, the regime swiftly resumed ballistic missile production, with substantial assistance from China, and made efforts to restore the nuclear programme. As a result, Israel concluded that another campaign against Iran would be unavoidable. Lessons from the June operation were thoroughly analysed in order to determine what should be done, where resources should be invested, and where genuine improvement was required.

No one planned it in advance, but the situation created by protests erupting across Iran triggered by severe economic hardship and acute water shortages – to the extent that there was even talk of evacuating parts of Tehran’s civilian population – presented a new opportunity. Moreover, the US President’s call on Iranian demonstrators to take to the streets because “help is on the way” created a US commitment to act against Iran.

The US, genuinely seeking a comprehensive agreement that would dismantle the nuclear project without the use of force, entered negotiations and allowed the Iranians room to compromise. They did not. Their evasive responses designed to buy time and their calculated formulations – intended to avoid blame for the crisis – led Washington to conclude that there was no partner for dialogue and that force was necessary. Israel’s Prime Minister persuaded the President that the missile programme was also a grave threat to the wider world. Thus, eliminating the nuclear programme and destroying the missile production infrastructure became the two central objectives of the present war.

To prepare for the possible use of force, the US assembled a vast and sophisticated air armada across the region – in neighbouring states, the Mediterranean, and the Gulf. This served as leverage in negotiations: a demonstration of the alternative should no agreement be reached. At the same time, it constituted the very force that would be deployed in the absence of a deal. The military capabilities the US gathered led to a new strategic assessment. As a result – and in light of the regime’s brutal suppression of protests – an additional mission was added: creating the conditions for the Iranian people to overthrow the regime.

Israel recognised this as a historic opportunity unlikely to return, given both the regime’s fragility and the current American President’s willingness to embark on a major and potentially prolonged war, despite uncertainties surrounding the mission of “creating the conditions for revolution”. The uncertainty does not stem from any doubt about the legitimacy of the objective – quite the contrary. Rather, it arises from the fact that, however justified, it remains unclear whether such an outcome can be achieved through air power alone, however extensive. Close cooperation between the US and Israel increases the likelihood of success, as their combined air force capabilities are formidable.

The war is being fought in exceptionally close cooperation between the IDF and CENTCOM, the US command responsible for the region. Following the President’s decision that this was the correct course of action, the two militaries achieved unprecedented coordination, creating a formidable war machine composed of two very different armed forces. Each side contributes its comparative advantage; each relies fully on the other. For the first time in Israel’s history, a genuine military coalition has emerged. The personal closeness and mutual respect between the US President and Israel’s Prime Minister have undoubtedly strengthened the alliance, but at its core lie shared strategic outlooks and closely aligned interests.

Many demand to know what will happen “the day after”. The leaders focus instead on the military campaign ahead, aware that the degree of military success will profoundly shape post-war realities. They are correct to emphasise the next stages of the war rather than speculate about the world that will follow. Outcomes will determine the options.

One example of how the war will shape the future more than any prior planning is the potential transformation in the Gulf as a result of Iran’s decision to attack its neighbours. Different reactions could lead to markedly different scenarios during and after the war, and there was no practical way to factor such developments into advance planning.

Now that Iran has widened the theatre to include all Gulf states, the US–Israeli alliance will need to respond and leverage the situation to advance its three objectives. That could not have been pre-designed. Flexibility is essential, along with timely responses to new developments, while resolutely pursuing the operational plan formulated by Washington and Jerusalem before the campaign began. In that resolve and determination lies the capacity to succeed — and ultimately to shape a less violent Middle East that promotes prosperity and better lives for all. That is the “day after” worth striving for.

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror, who served in the IDF for 36 years, is a former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister and Head of the National Security Council. He is currently a distinguished fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) in Washington DC and at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Originally published in the Jewish Chronicle.

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Killing Khamenei is important in its own right. His regime killed American service members and civilians; Iran’s reputation as the world’s top state sponsor of terrorism is well-deserved. Khamenei also oversaw the Revolutionary Guard’s (IRGC) resurgence from a humiliated and hollow force after the Iran-Iraq War to a leading regional power bristling with conventional, proxy, and near-nuclear arsenals. Even after their sharp defeat last summer, Khamenei and his coterie made clear that their military and atomic ambitions were undimmed.

The supreme leader’s welcome demise also affects how the ongoing war will be fought. The stakes of the standoff with America and Israel—the Great and Little Satans, as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini labeled them—were clear in Tehran even before Khamenei’s death. Revolutionary regimes see sedition everywhere, with internal and external threats innately linked. President Donald Trump’s promise of help amid protests of unprecedented breadth and intensity earlier this year convinced the regime that the next round of conflict would be existential, and Trump’s recent call for the Iranian people to rise up as the United States and Israel take out Tehran’s military and internal security forces only reinforced such concerns. In exposing the regime’s brittleness, Khamenei’s death will spur his replacements to demonstrate just how dangerous they can be, both at home and in the region.

Knowing it cannot defeat the American or Israeli militaries directly, Iran is opting for horizontal escalation that raises the war’s political and economic costs by broadening and prolonging it. Attacks against military bases, critical infrastructure, and shipping in the region are intended to inflict American casualties, strain stocks of U.S. and Israeli critical munitions, and push world powers to demand the war cease before spiraling out of control. Though fraught with risk for Tehran, this strategy is its best counter to Trump’s preference for short, decisive, and contained campaigns.

This approach will create a competition between Iran’s ability to sustain drone and missile fire on the one hand and the United States and Israel’s capacity to neutralize those systems on the other. Last summer’s 12-Day War and this weekend’s strikes both made clear that Iran cannot orchestrate mass projectile barrages if under active assault. Coordinating hundreds of missile and drone launches, as it did twice against Israel in 2024, required unleashing the big first shot unhindered.

Despite being under fire and outgunned, however, Tehran has a key tactical advantage in the unfolding conflict, since even the threat of smaller attacks can have outsized effects. This is evident from the reaction to small handfuls of drones and missiles—or even just one—slamming into energy facilities, airport terminals, skyscrapers, merchant ships, and other conspicuous civilian targets throughout the region. These attacks jeopardize Gulf countries’ carefully cultivated image as the region’s stable oasis for investment, technology, and tourism, and by undermining trust in U.S. security umbrellas and air defenses, they may fray the political threads binding Iran’s adversaries together. Spiking crude oil prices and raising inflationary pressures will also affect America’s Asian allies, which consume most Middle East energy exports, and pinprick attacks on British and French bases could prompt those countries to call for de-escalation as well—or so Iran hopes. And while Israel is far more inured to combat, having to remobilize tens of thousands of reservists against Iran and its proxies compounds the stresses from two long years of war.

The IRGC prepared for precisely this kind of conflict, reflecting its ability to adapt between and amid exchanges of fire with the United States and Israel. It pre-dispersed authorities and locations of its launchers after Israel devastated its over-centralized command and control last June. It learned to leverage the country’s strategic depth by moving missile infrastructure deeper into its interior, farther from Israeli and U.S. bases but still in range of high-value targets in the Gulf and beyond. Initial losses during the 12-Day War also taught the IRGC to make a virtue of necessity by spreading out its attacks, seeking to besiege its enemies rather than pummel them with all-out blitzes.

Even in flux, Iran’s regime underlines this approach by signaling defiance at home and abroad. The IRGC vowed after Khamenei’s death to “ stand firm against internal and external conspiracies” and to “[punish] the aggressors.” Its former commander, Ali Larijani, and another close associate, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, have begun filling the ensuing vacuum. The IRGC’s worldview was forged in its death grapple with Iraq in the 1980s when Iran’s missile attacks on Iraqi cities, so the story goes, staved off catastrophic defeat. By that same logic, missile strikes on U.S. forces in Qatar last summer, and in Iraq in 2020, persuaded Trump to end hostilities.

Joint U.S.-Israeli operations—also reflecting lessons from past conflict—aim to invalidate this theory of victory, racing to degrade Iran’s launch capabilities and internal security command structure as swiftly as possible. Strikes appeared to prioritize Iran’s air defense radars and mobile above-ground launchers, all of which proved vulnerable last summer. America’s first-ever operational deployment of aerial refueling tankers to Israel helps address what proved to be the major chokepoint in Israel’s capacity to generate long-range strikes last June, and the parallel deployment of F-22 stealth fighters to Israel gives the United States its first land-based platform in the region to strike Iran. The absence of this option last summer was one reason Operation Midnight Hammer required so many bombers and tankers to fly halfway around the world.

More broadly, the ongoing campaign reflects last summer’s biggest takeaway: U.S.-Israeli intelligence sharing, planning, and combined operations are force multipliers. Israeli planes literally cleared the way for Midnight Hammer, even conducting last-minute strikes at America’s request. Months later, this cooperation proved invaluable once again in targeting Khamenei and other Iranian leaders, as well as devising an effective operational division of labor: The United States has focused on Iran’s threats to the Gulf, while Israel has targeted longer-range capabilities and pillars of internal control.

The weight of U.S. and Israeli operations currently falls heaviest on western and southern Iran, where many launchers, naval forces, and IRGC and other regime leaders are located. Many of the country’s urban areas lie along this belt and, with them, key nodes in the regime’s internal repressive apparatus. As attrition takes its toll, the IRGC will have two options to extend the conflict and amplify its costs: Trade space for time, relocating inward to make it harder for U.S. and Israeli warplanes to reach its launchers and leaders, and close the Gulf by force with naval mines and attack craft. The U.S. Navy has limited countermeasures against the latter threat, and clearing them entails operating in cramped waters directly off Iran’s coast.

Escalating to de-escalate is often the gravest roll of the iron dice, but the Iranian regime will have it no other way. Its remaining leaders are uniting against U.S.-managed regime reshuffling, leaving little opening for the internal coups and fissures that forced capitulations by Germany in 1918, for example, or Japan in 1945. And Khamenei’s martyrdom, coupled with a deeply hostile populace, means that the poisoned chalice of surrender is off the table for his successors.

Having rolled the same dice, Trump should be crystal clear that he agrees with Iran’s leaders on one thing: There is no Venezuela-style outcome here. Anything short of regime collapse, even any hint of negotiations or other off-ramps, only portends an even more dangerous, IRGC-led junta, founded on the conviction that its own aggression overcame the worst its enemies could throw at it. This would forsake the president’s explicit pledge to clear the way for the Iranian people, forever erase his redline against crushing protesters, and crater U.S. credibility globally among allies and adversaries alike.

Trump should address the nation, the Iranian people, and the world to clarify and reiterate why he has committed the American military to its most consequential conflict in decades. Having perhaps grown accustomed to relatively short and cost-free ventures, the American people need to understand why eliminating the Iranian regime’s pillars of power is worth the risks it may bring. They also need to appreciate the burdens and costs borne by Israel in this shared fight, as well as the value of the bilateral partnership now and in the future.

And ultimately, Trump should stand by his commitment to the Iranian people. He could draw inspiration from Franklin Roosevelt’s fireside chats of the early 1940s. Though easily forgotten in the gauzy memories of “The Good War,” FDR, too, had to justify the patience and perseverance he was asking of Americans, our allies, and our fighting men and women. Those conversations gave hope to people suffering under the grip of our enemies and outlined his vision for a better future.

Jonathan Ruhe is Fellow for American Strategy at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA).

Originally published in The Dispatch.

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Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is dead. The man who ruled the Islamic Republic of Iran for 36 years, outlasted six American presidents, built and sustained the most consequential sponsor of terrorism in the modern Middle East, forged an empire that extended from Iran to the Mediterranean shores in the north and to the entry of the Red Sea in the south, whose proxies dragged Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen into decades of war and chaos, whose Revolutionary Guard propped up Bashar al-Assad as he gassed and barrel-bombed his own population into the largest refugee crisis since the Second World War, whose Houthis brought famine to Yemen, whose funding and direction made October 7 possible, and whose missiles rained on Israel as Hamas executed the worst massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, who oversaw the weekly chants of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel” as liturgical rituals of his power—that man is gone, killed on a Saturday morning by the joint force of the two nations he swore to destroy.

Read more in Mosaic.

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