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For years the Israeli security establishment has resisted calls for a defense pact with the United States, believing it would hinder its freedom of action, outsourcing Israeli security considerations to its best friend whose interests don’t always coincide with its own. The case of Iran makes the point clear.

Will a treaty limit Israel’s ability to preemptively strike Iran, especially if the Biden administration, as promised, rejoins the Iran nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA? Israel has clearly stated that the JCPOA does not satisfy its long-term security needs. If there were a treaty, would America be able to veto its ally’s choice over what it considers its existential issue? A defense pact is very much on the minds of the Biden administration as a strategy to reassure Israel that, if it rejoins the JCPOA, an Israeli preventive strike will be unnecessary.

This all came to light when it was reported recently that the chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces, Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, has endorsed the idea of a treaty between the two nations. This is unprecedented. The security and military establishments of Israel have always been wary of such a formal obligation. Reports indicate this may have been at the request of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Israel’s previous chief of staff, Gadi Eizenkot, as well as “all three of the former chiefs of staff who ran against Netanyahu in the last election — Benny Gantz, Gabi Ashkenazi and Moshe Ya’alon — publicly opposed the idea” of a treaty.

Could this mean that Netanyahu, who had favored a pact between the countries during the Trump administration, now has calculated that a preemptive attack against Iranian nuclear facilities is unlikely to succeed? Is he considering a treaty with America as the best course of action in light of the military difficulty of successfully striking fortified underground nuclear locations?

Perhaps Netanyahu now believes Israel cannot sustain tens of thousands of missiles directed by Iran from its proxies in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Iraq and the Iranian homeland, if Israel did preemptively attack. Or, is it possible that Netanyahu sees a “Goldilocks scenario” in which a treaty would not obligate Israel to heed American warnings about a preemptive attack?

It is hard to believe any Israeli prime minister would hand over the choice of whether to preemptively attack Iran to any country, even one who cares so much about Israel’s future. What this indicates is that Israel has one idea for a treaty that does not tie its hands, and the Biden administration — or any future administration — will have a very different view of what America should obligate itself to.

America wants stability in the Middle East, and buying time by delaying but not stopping the Iranian nuclear weapons program would satisfy American needs for this administration. However, Israel’s compass is the Begin Doctrine, named after former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, which asserts that Israel can never countenance any enemy state with nuclear weapons. Begin acted in 1981 against the French-built Iraqi nuclear reactor, and former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert destroyed the North Korean-built Syrian reactor in 2007.

It should be noted that the United States was unaware of the Syrian reactor even with its advanced satellite imagery until Israel showed the evidence to the Bush administration. It is no wonder that Israel has no confidence in any international body to monitor the Iranian nuclear program, knowing that the JCPOA obligates Iran to be notified before any inspections can begin, and no inspections are allowed in military sites — the most likely location for the weaponization of a nuclear warhead, the last missing piece for an Iranian nuclear weapons program.

On the surface, it makes sense that the U.S. and Israel should have a formal defense treaty. The United States counts on Israel for intelligence gathering, joint research and development of its munitions and weapons, forward placement of American weapons systems, and a deep-water port for America’s Sixth Fleet in Haifa Port.

America is the indispensable ally for Israel, as evidenced by its generous congressionally approved defense packages that provide Israel with billions of dollars to spend within the United States for its military needs. A case could be made that Israel couldn’t increase its security any better than if the world’s superpower legally obligated itself to Israel’s defense by signing a defense treaty.

Think tanks have weighed in on the merits of a treaty. Last year, a Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) report, chaired by former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Adm. (Ret.) Jim Stavridis, advocated for a joint defense pact: “By treating a major attack on one as an attack on both, an alliance would provide greater deterrence than either ally alone.” The report tries to thread the needle, limiting either country’s formal obligations; this may have been possible in the Trump era, but won’t cut it with the Biden administration.

So, the real question is whether the United States would sign a defense treaty with Israel that still gives it autonomy to preventively attack Iran. Putting the Iran nuclear weapons issue aside, Israel does not want its attacks on the transfer of precision-guided weapons from Iran to Syria and Lebanon inhibited in any way. Think of the complications a treaty would create if, as reportedly has happened in the past, Israel kills Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps members in Lebanon, Iraq or Syria.

Would a treaty help? Would it change or obligate either nation to share more intelligence than they already share, or would it increase their cyber coordination against mutual enemies, the quiet and continuing digital war happening all the time?

Why rock the apple cart with a formal treaty when the relationship has thrived without a treaty? There is no lack of cooperation between the nations in anti-missile development, intelligence sharing, or counterterrorism. A formal defense pact may ruin the plausible deniability that the U.S. can claim when Israel acts in its interests in the Levant or in Iran. And politically, there will be strong resistance from both the right and left, obligating the United States to get involved in another endless Middle Eastern war.

Once Iran crosses the threshold to become a nuclear weapons state — most likely by the U.S. rejoining the JCPOA and Iran waiting for the expiration of its sunset provisions — then Israel would be interested in a binding defense treaty. But by then America will be uninterested. That is assuming Israel does not preemptively attack Iran before it crosses the nuclear weapons threshold.

Even if the Biden administration wants a treaty to prevent Israel from acting against Iran, it is a good bet that Israel will resist signing a document that thwarts their freedom to act. That is because the Israeli credo is to defend themselves by themselves, not having to risk putting American soldiers in harm’s way to protect the Jewish state. At this time, a treaty to satisfy both nations’ interests is probably unrealistic — but stay tuned. Things always change in the Middle East.

Originally published in The Hill

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The United States and Israel are both innovation powerhouses. According to OECD data, America led the world in gross domestic spending on research and development (R&D) in 2018, while Israel led in spending as a percentage of GDP. Such investments over the decades have contributed to the growth and competitiveness of the American and Israeli economies. Through pioneering defense and dual-use technologies, they have also helped the United States and Israel maintain their QTE—their ability to protect national security through superior capabilities.

Yet there are concerns that America’s QTE is increasingly being challenged. China has dramatically grown its own R&D spending in recent decades and pursued emerging dual-use technologies like robotics and artificial intelligence (AI). As Defense Secretary Mark Esper suggested in January, China aims to leverage such technologies to “reshape the world in their favor, and often at the expense of others”—for instance, by deploying AI capabilities to repress minorities, or exporting 5G networks to gain a unique cyber presence within different countries that might be abused for military, economic, or political interests.

In its 2017 National Security Strategy, the Trump administration acknowledged the importance of maintaining the U.S. “innovation and technological edge” to protect “American prosperity and power.” It pledged to “nurture a healthy innovation economy” that, in part, “collaborates with allies and partners.” Fortunately, America’s top ally in the Middle East has long understood that innovation and collaboration are vital to security.

As a small country beset with threats, Israel heavily relies on technological advantages. Yet the challenges it faces constantly transform, forcing it to develop new solutions—whether to defend against Iranian cyberattacks or tunnel warfare by Hamas. These unique circumstances, and the deep ties between the country’s defense and civil innovation sectors, have birthed a robust technology ecosystem.

While the coronavirus crisis continues disrupting the global economy, the impact on R&D spending—particularly related to innovative dual-use technologies—remains unclear. Now more than ever, it would benefit the United States and Israel to enhance their joint efforts to preserve their QTE. While significant U.S.-Israel cooperation already exists—for instance, on the Arrow and David’s Sling missile defense systems, or joint anti-tunnel work—it is not uniformly guided. As Senators Tom Cotton and Gary Peters recently suggested, there is a need for “more systemic and institutionalized” U.S.-Israel R&D.

Washington and Jerusalem should establish a permanent umbrella body to oversee R&D collaboration, which could identify joint capability gaps, minimize duplication, and direct resources based on shared policy priorities. For instance, it could instruct the Israeli Directorate of Defense Research and Development (DDR&D) and American Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to develop a new layer of defense against the ever-evolving missile threat. This body should particularly focus on emerging dual-use fields, like AI, augmented/virtual reality, and quantum information sciences.

Critically, jointly pursuing the most sensitive ventures would necessitate elevating intelligence relations, as outlined in 2018 by a JINSA task force chaired by Admiral James Stavridis, formerly NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe. While the United States and Israel currently enjoy extensive intelligence cooperation to their joint benefit, Israel lacks formalized top-tier ally status. This can hinder it from accessing the most advanced U.S. technologies and discussing the valuable lessons it gains while deploying U.S. systems. Jerusalem should therefore be granted the same intelligence-sharing clearance afforded to the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand under the “Five Eyes” agreement. This would not necessitate Israeli inclusion in the alliance, and could rather be pursued through an executive order or a limited mutual defense pact.

Israel, in turn, must pay more heed to long-standing U.S. concerns regarding Chinese access to sensitive infrastructure and technologies. As Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s recent whirlwind visit to Jerusalem demonstrated, the United States is in an intensifying standoff with China and expects its allies to demonstrate their support. Israel’s new unity government will need to scale back ties with Beijing that strain its relationship with Washington.

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…

Washington:

Israel-US defense pact: Just before Israel’s second round of elections, in September 2019, Prime Minister Netanyahu promised to promote a US-Israel defense pact. US President Donald Trump, too, tweeted about the issue, showing a willingness to discuss such a move. However, soon after the Israelis cast their ballots, the subject was sidelined with yet another round of elections. JINSA, together with Senator Lindsey Graham, advocated for a narrow defense pact, believing it has strong support in Washington. Advancing this cause would require intense diplomatic efforts from the incoming ambassador.

…

Originally published in The Jerusalem Post

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The Jewish Institute of National Security for America (JINSA) held a phone conference with Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) on Wednesday to discuss further US-Israel cooperation in fighting the coronavirus pandemic in their respective countries together.

In order to strengthen the partnership between the United States and Israel, and to limit the dependence the US has on China, Cruz introduced new legislation that will appropriate $12 million “for investments in joint medical research with the United States and Israel… with an emphasis on collaboratively advancing the use of technology in the fight against COVID-19.”

The coronavirus pandemic has displayed “the malevolent behavior of the communist government of China and the incredible dependence the United States has for our supply chain on China,” Cruz said during the briefing.

The Chinese government has been branded for their lack of transparency throughout the pandemic, beginning with the onset of the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan. The government initially downplayed the extent of the spread within their country in order to stave off the negative economic effects and travel bans that were to come with the viral spread – allegedly reporting false figures purposefully to the World Health Organization in the process – apathetic to worldwide public health implications.

With regard to US foreign policy concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran, Cruz is recommending that the United States government keep their foots on the necks of the Iranian regime and continue to implement the “maximum economic and diplomatic pressure” strategy on Iran even throughout the coronavirus pandemic, to hopefully lead to a regime change within the country.

“It should be maximum pressure hopefully that results in regime change, that results in this regime collapsing,” the the Senator stated. “[The US must be] unequivocally clear that under no circumstances will Iran be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons and the United States will do whatever is necessary to prevent that. [This] is the single most important thing we can do to continue to strengthen our friendship and alliance with Israel.”

Additionally, the Senator supported the notion to create a US-Israel mutual defense treaty. JINSA previously compiled a rough draft in 2019 as to what that treaty would look like, garnering support for the pact from both the Trump Administration as well as the Israeli government.

“Standing with Israel is critical not only to Israel, but to America’s national defense, and Israel’s enemies are America’s enemies,” Cruz said.

Originally published in The Jerusalem Post

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The perhaps single most important wish of Tom Lantos, a Holocaust survivor and intermittently either chairman or ranking member of the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs and a consistent dedicated supporter of Israel, whose memory of the Holocaust never left him, was the establishment of a defense alliance between Israel and the US.

However, in the many conversations I had with him during my two terms as Israel’s ambassador to the US, I had to reluctantly tell him that though his intention was praiseworthy, most people involved in defense issues in Israel believed that such an agreement would not serve our interests – on the contrary, that it might curb our freedom of military action and strategic decisions – while the productive security and intelligence cooperation between the US and Israel, including the founding of joint committees on several levels, already satisfied most of the requirements of a defense alliance. Furthermore, and no less importantly, there is the principle formally agreed to by US consecutive administrations, to wit that Israel has the right to “defend itself by itself,” the significance of which goes beyond the text of its words.

Alas, no longer.

The main security threats facing Israel today and in the future are quite different from those which concerned us in the past – and which we overcame thanks to the IDF’s superiority and the staunch stance of the home front. However, now it is not a singular Arab country, or even a coalition of countries, but Iran – a mini-superpower with regional hegemonic ambitions and not insignificant technological and scientific capabilities – brandishing a fanatical religious ideology, whose threat to destroy Israel is not just empty rhetoric, and which is approaching the capability to produce nuclear weapons. The Iranian missile attack on the Saudi oil installations was an example of sophisticated planning and execution.

The fact that the Saudis did not have appropriate means of defense, or did not know how to use them, does not detract from Iran’s operational achievement. Israel is certainly not inferior compared to Iran with regard to any of its capabilities in the above as well as other matters – on the contrary, it is superior to Iran, including in the quality of its missiles. Moreover, the decisions which David Ben-Gurion took 60 years ago (over the opposition of a few narrow-minded politicians) provide Israel with a deterrent “iron wall” and significant retaliation capabilities. All this is surely not lost on Tehran.

However, Israel has an Achilles’ heel: the home front. Though intrinsically no less staunch than before, the country’s small geographical area and the concentration of its population and economy in the central region potentially might create an added factor of vulnerability to missiles launched by Iran or its proxies. While Israel has advanced and sophisticated means of protection against missiles, and the Iron Dome is not the only element in this, there are financial limitations, despite the American aid, in terms of quantity and deployment options. Iran also has means that the Arab countries did not have: acting through proxies – Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and the Shi’ite militias positioned in Syria and Iraq. In recent years, Israel has acted with marked success against the Iranian and Shi’ite forces subservient to Tehran in various places in the Middle East – the military actions attributed to it were combined generally with successful diplomatic and political activities, vis-à-vis both the US and Russia.

Still, despite the effectiveness of these actions, they will not necessarily deter Iran from continuing its direct and indirect aggressive intentions against Israel even if considerably weakened by the Trump administration’s punitive economic steps. Thus, a careful examination of this reality should perhaps bring us to a review of our previous stance with regard to the option of an Israel-US defense alliance. JINSA, an organization of former senior American military people, most of them not Jewish, and whose proven importance goes beyond the public’s awareness of it, has been working for more than a year on formulating a draft for such an agreement.

As JINSA head Michael Makovsky recently declared, this is an agreement that will clearly establish that Israel’s freedom of action is not limited, i.e. it would still have a free hand to act militarily while not contradicting the strategic interests of the US elsewhere. Leading senator Lindsey Graham has already announced that he supports the JINSA draft as a possible basis for an agreement (there may also be others), while the Trump administration’s close relations with Israel indicate that the idea of an agreement would also win White House support. But in order to ensure the validity and longevity of such an agreement once a different president will be in the White House, it is important that such an agreement be bi-partisan, i.e. enjoy the support of both sides of Congress.

Even today, there are those in Israel who are still opposed to the idea of a defense alliance, perhaps because they don’t understand the new strategic and geopolitical reality in the Middle East. But Tom Lantos, who passed away 11 years ago, may have had the foresight to see things as they are, or could eventually become.

Originally published in The Jerusalem Post

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Our policy project at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), chaired by former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Adm. (ret.) Jim Stavridis, just issued several reports laying out concrete proposals to prevent or mitigate major war by bolstering Israel’s military capabilities and deterrence against Iran.

The United States and Israel should agree a mutual defense pact. While Israel has always been exceptionally capable and insistent in defending itself, Iran’s growing regional aggression and revived nuclear program create the potential for higher-level conflict threatening Israel’s strategic viability and even its existence.

By treating a major attack on one as an attack on both, an alliance would provide greater deterrence than either ally alone. This could prevent Iran or others from initiating or escalating to large-scale action against Israel or U.S. vital interests in the Middle East – and others from joining in – or curb the scope of enemy action. Indeed, no war has broken out threatening a treaty ally’s existence since the United States first formed such partnerships in the late 1940s, which now number fifty allies on five continents.

While these alliances are careful to limit members’ formal obligations, our proposed treaty would be even more narrow to protect each country’s freedom of action. It would be activated only under exceptional circumstances in the Middle East, chiefly a major attack by Iran and proxies like Hezbollah. The United States would not be expected to defend Israel every time a rocket is fired from Gaza, for instance, nor would Israel seek such assistance.

Even with the extra layer of deterrence from a mutual defense pact, Israel will still shoulder the burdens of upholding its own and U.S. interests in an increasingly dangerous Middle East. America has not retaliated against repeated Iranian attacks in the Persian Gulf, and it withdrew from much of northeast Syria, yet regional stability remains a major U.S. foreign policy goal.

Israel has effectively been doing the hard work of defending this objective, conducting a concerted military campaign to forestall Iran’s entrenchment in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. At the same time, Israel is caught in the middle of a regionwide arms race among Iran, Arab states and an increasingly hostile Turkey. This will only worsen with the looming expiration of a U.N. arms embargo on Iran and further Iranian nuclear progress.

All these trends combine to present Israel with much more urgent and intensive threats than even a few years ago, when the Obama Administration and Israel finalized the current memorandum of understanding (MoU) on U.S. defense assistance. This $38 billion agreement forms the centerpiece of America’s commitment under U.S. law to support Israel’s self-defense, and it benefits the U.S. economy. However, it also locked in Israel’s procurement of U.S. weapons at a constant annual level through 2027 by dividing the total evenly over ten years.

The United States should accelerate much-needed weapons deliveries to Israel by shifting forward, or “frontloading,” funds set forth in the Obama MoU, without adding any cost to the American taxpayer or altering the overall agreement.

There are several financing options. Israel could borrow commercially against the MoU and pay interest however it chooses. As it has done before, Washington could enable Israel to borrow at a lower rate by guaranteeing this loan. Congress would need to authorize funds for the highly unlikely contingency of Israeli default, but otherwise no actual U.S. expenditures would be entailed. A separate option is to appropriate new U.S. funds upfront. This would be more politically challenging, since this would have to be offset by reducing other outlays or by U.S. government borrowing.

As with a mutual defense pact, frontloading would send a clear signal that America is willing to address growing Middle East security challenges. It also would give Israel a jumpstart onboarding F-35 combat aircraft, KC-46 refueling tankers, CH-53K transport helicopters and missile defenses.

Israel also needs precision munitions immediately, but U.S. production capacity faces constraints. Frontloading could enable Israel to offer more attractive contracts to acquire GBU-39, GBU-53/B and Hellfire munitions, plus JDAM kits to upgrade unguided bombs. The United States should also replenish its prepositioned stockpiles in Israel with these munitions, and consider loaning Israel these and other weapons to compensate for U.S. production shortfalls.

None of these recommended options to bolster the bilateral relationship will come easy, but unprecedented times call for unprecedented measures. With Israel increasingly indispensable to U.S. interests in the Middle East, a mutual defense pact and frontloaded MoU are vital for promoting stability in a region that still matters dearly to America.

Michael Makovsky, a former Pentagon official in the George W. Bush administration, is president and CEO of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). Gen Charles Wald, USAF (ret.), former deputy commander of U.S. European Command, is a Distinguished Fellow at JINSA’s Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy.

Originally published in The Jerusalem Post

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‘The Best Show in Town’: In IAC Speech, Trump Felt at Home – Analysis”
By: Omri Nahmias

HOLLYWOOD, Florida – When the Israeli American Council announced that US President Donald Trump would be the 2019 keynote speaker, the event was immediately sold out.

Some 4,000 people attended the Diplomat Beach Resort ballroom on Saturday night, some of them wearing Make America Great Again hats.

The crowd welcomed Trump with chants of “four more years,” followed by an introduction from Miriam and Sheldon Adelson, the IAC’s most significant donors. “It is the best show in town,” an IAC volunteer from California told The Jerusalem Post.

The president listed his actions in favor of Israel, from moving the embassy to Jerusalem and recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, to defending Israel in international forums and signing the Taylor Force Act into law.

It was also interesting to watch his condemnation of the BDS movement. For the past few months, administration officials are learning the facts about BDS and its effect on college campuses. Trump’s decision to invite a college student on stage to share her personal experience might indicate that the administration is willing to take a more active role in fighting BDS.

The president went on to wonder how come that given all these actions, there aren’t more Republican supporters in the Jewish community, saying some American Jews “don’t love Israel enough.”

Some Jewish Democratic organizations said these remarks were offensive. “We strongly denounce these vile and bigoted remarks in which the president – once again – used antisemitic stereotypes to characterize Jews as driven by money and insufficiently loyal to Israel,” said Halie Soifer, Jewish Democratic Council of America executive director. The Democratic Majority for Israel lobby group sharply criticized his remarks as well.

And while the president was in campaign mode when discussing American politics, including a comment about “Pocahontas,” in a barb to presidential hopeful Elizabeth Warren, when it comes to Israeli politics – Trump decided to stay away from controversy and not to discuss the ongoing deadlock nor the fact that no candidate was able to form a coalition for the past eight months. Unlike his past comments when Israel had its second election this year, this time he did not mention the stalemate nor its possible implications for the US and Israel, such as the administration’s desire to roll out the peace plan only after a new government is formed. The president did not even mention Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by name.

He also skipped another hot topic: a possible move to apply Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley, a move Netanyahu is openly trying to promote by gaining the support of the Trump administration.

Another point that is being discussed between the two administrations over the past few months is a bilateral defense pact. Netanyahu is trying to promote a treaty between the two countries, and the two leaders spoke about it over the phone ahead of Israel’s September election.

Ambassador Ron Dermer voiced his support last month in a treaty that JINSA is pushing. JINSA’S CEO Mike Makovsky told The Jerusalem Post last week that such a treaty would not limit Israel’s freedom of action. While Trump tweeted in September that he’d be open to discuss such a pact, he did not mention it on his speech yesterday.

Originally published in the Jerusalem Post

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U.S President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu promoted the idea of a Mutual Defense Treaty between their countries in September, with Netanyahu branding such a pact as being “historic” should it be achieved.The idea is now back in the headlines in Israel. Energy Minister and security cabinet minister Yuval Steinitz stated in recent days that the signing a defense pact is one the reasons why Netanyahu wants to remain as prime minister for the next six months.

However, the defense pact has been met with criticism from some in Israel, who argue that it could limit Israel’s freedom to maneuver and constrain the Israel Defense Forces. One of the concerns among those who have raised objections is that the pact might force Israel to consult with the United States before taking sensitive, proactive high-risk military action, subjecting Jerusalem to a potential American veto.

Opposition leader and Blue and White Party leader Benny Gantz, a former IDF chief of staff, tweeted on Dec. 2 that he would not “support an international agreement that would limit the actions of the State of Israel and the ability of the IDF to defend against the threats it faces.”

Addressing these concerns, Steinitz said that a defense pact with the United States would not tie the hands of Israel any more than Britain has been constrained by its membership in NATO.

In July, a working group run by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), under the leadership of former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Adm. (ret.) James Stavridis, issued a report making the strategic case for a U.S.-Israel mutual defense pact. JINSA drafted the text of a treaty that is similar to, but more narrowly defined than, existing U.S. arrangements with 50 countries, becoming the only organization to put out such a draft to date.

Since then, the organization said in recent a statement that various objections to a pact have been raised, “and we believe it now constructive to advance the policy conversation by elaborating the most salient counterarguments.” To that end, JINSA released a follow-up report addressing the main points of concern.

The post Israel Hayom Quotes JINSA President & CEO Michael Makovsky on US-Israel Mutual Defense Pact appeared first on JINSA.

U.S President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu promoted the idea of a Mutual Defense Treaty between their countries in September, with Netanyahu branding such a pact as being “historic” should it be achieved.The idea is now back in the headlines in Israel. Energy Minister and security cabinet minister Yuval Steinitz stated in recent days that the signing a defense pact is one the reasons why Netanyahu wants to remain as prime minister for the next six months.

However, the defense pact has been met with criticism from some in Israel, who argue that it could limit Israel’s freedom to maneuver and constrain the Israel Defense Forces. One of the concerns among those who have raised objections is that the pact might force Israel to consult with the United States before taking sensitive, proactive high-risk military action, subjecting Jerusalem to a potential American veto.

Opposition leader and Blue and White Party leader Benny Gantz, a former IDF chief of staff, tweeted on Dec. 2 that he would not “support an international agreement that would limit the actions of the State of Israel and the ability of the IDF to defend against the threats it faces.”

Addressing these concerns, Steinitz said that a defense pact with the United States would not tie the hands of Israel any more than Britain has been constrained by its membership in NATO.

In July, a working group run by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), under the leadership of former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Adm. (ret.) James Stavridis, issued a report making the strategic case for a U.S.-Israel mutual defense pact. JINSA drafted the text of a treaty that is similar to, but more narrowly defined than, existing U.S. arrangements with 50 countries, becoming the only organization to put out such a draft to date.

Since then, the organization said in recent a statement that various objections to a pact have been raised, “and we believe it now constructive to advance the policy conversation by elaborating the most salient counterarguments.” To that end, JINSA released a follow-up report addressing the main points of concern.

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