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Daylight

- Friday, August 22, 2008 |

It used to be said that there was “no daylight” between the United States and Israel on the subject of Iran and its nuclear ambitions. Both countries agreed on what Iran was doing, the need to find a mechanism to make it stop and the ultimate impermissibility of letting the mullahs have the bomb. No longer.

A definitional crack appeared about two years ago, with a disagreement on the “point of no return” for declaring Iran to be an open threat. American intelligence said the point would be when Iran mastered bomb-making capability; Israeli intelligence said it was when Iran mastered the fuel cycle. It was a difference that could be measured in months, but it was a difference.

A second crack opened with the 2007 publication of the American National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), stating that Iran had “halted” its “covert uranium enrichment program” in 2003 and was “less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging.” The NIE’s mandate was to “assess Iran’s capability and intent (or lack thereof) to acquire nuclear weapons.” Israel considers only an adversary’s capabilities, leaving intent aside.

These differences are not semantic – they reflect the much smaller margin of error Israel has for national security and its closer proximity to Iran – and they have military implications, some of which are becoming apparent. While Israel joins the United States in insisting there is still time for diplomacy and sanctions to work, it is clear that Israel believes it needs to be prepared for a failure of peaceful conflict resolution.

And here the crack widens to a chasm. If Iran does indeed cross a red line in the development of nuclear weapons capability (either country’s red line), the United States will have two choices – to destroy it or learn to live with it. Israeli government and military officials have said they will have only one choice.

A long list of Israeli military officials have visited Washington this month, presumably to close the definitional gap and to ensure that Israel is prepared for the worst. They were treated politely, that’s all. Public reports suggest the United States has denied Israeli requests for bunker-buster bombs and long-range refueling aircraft. No comment on any conceivable deal to let Israel overfly Iraq to reach Iran (the only practical way to get there and back). A deal has been made on providing X-band radars to integrate with Israeli missile defense systems to provide better target discrimination for Israeli defense.

This is not a “right and wrong” situation. We clearly lean toward the Israeli definition of the threat because it is more immediate and potentially more destructive. But a preemptive attack on Iran, while it might set back the nuclear program, will also open the way for military and diplomatic retaliation – since Israel (and/or the United States) will clearly be the aggressor. It is not unreasonable for the United States to want to hedge that bet.

Or is it?

A nuclear-armed Iran threatens more than Israel in the region – for starters, Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf States are hugely alarmed by the prospect of Shiite irredentism protected by a nuclear patron. The possibility of a Sunni Arab nuclear arms race cannot be discounted. Nuclear-armed Pakistan, predominantly Sunni, increasingly fragile, and undermined by radical forces, may share nuclear weapons with the Arab world. The United States is the patron of all of them. To the extent that the Sunni Islamic world hopes Israel will solve the problem for them, Washington probably hopes so too.

In that case, the United States should be working hard to close the gaps with Israel and present a united front against Iran – not only as regards the nuclear issue, but also as regards support for terrorism, and the undermining of pro-Western Gulf States and the new government of Iraq. Diplomacy and/or military action should be undertaken in a way that leaves no daylight between allies.