The U.S.-Israel Security Policy Project examines the various ways to strengthen the U.S.-Israel security relationship amid dramatic regional changes to meet growing dangers and capitalize on new opportunities.
Learn MoreJINSA’s Abraham Accords Policy Project examines the historic implications of Israeli-Arab normalization for U.S. and Middle East security and provides policy recommendations for American decision-makers to expand and deepen these agreements, particularly in terms of enhanced regional defense cooperation.
Read MoreThe Gemunder Center’s revamped Iran Policy Project brings together former senior military officers, high-ranking government officials, energy experts and business leaders to address the pressing challenges to U.S. national security posed by Iran and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear program.
Learn MoreThe Eastern Mediterranean Policy Project was established by JINSA to examine evolving threats and opportunities, and to provide recommendations, for U.S. policy toward the region, including Turkey’s increasingly aggressive posture, the return of great power competition and significant energy discoveries.
Read More
The strategy that Hamas employed in the 2014 Gaza War represents the new face of war that threatens to undermine the effectiveness of conventional militaries, endangers civilians in irregular conflicts, and distorts the international legal structure.The Gaza Assessment Policy Project closely studies the evolution of this strategy and Israel’s response, based on primary source research and discussions with senior Israeli, Palestinian, and United Nations (U.N.) officials.
Read More
The Hybrid Warfare Policy Project was established by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s (JINSA) Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy to define the requirements of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and to evaluate the performance of the U.S., Israeli, and other allied militaries in compliance with – and sometimes, beyond – the dictates of that law. The Policy Project also seeks to focus attention on the conduct of hybrid adversaries such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic State, which often intentionally exploit that same body of law to stymie U.S., Israeli,and allied forces in battle and to discredit their self-defense operations in the forum of public opinion.
Learn MoreJINSA’s Jordan Valley Policy Project examines the strategic importance of Israeli sovereignty in the Jordan Valley for Israel’s self-defense, U.S. national security interests and stability in the Middle East.
Learn MoreJINSA’s Israel-China Policy Project examines ways that the United States and Israel can cooperate to address the growing geopolitical and economic challenges from China.
Read MoreJINSA’s Gemunder Center EMP Policy Project convenes former high-ranking government and military officials, directors of national laboratories, nuclear engineers and other experts to raise awareness and develop actionable recommendations to enhance U.S. strategic deterrence, critical infrastructure and societal resiliency against the spectrum of electromagnetic threats.
Read More
National Security Briefs
- National Security Briefs
Deadly Iranian-linked Drone Attack in Syria
An Iranian-linked drone attack in Syria killed an American contractor and wounded six other Americans on March 23. Later that day, the United States conducted airstrikes against facilities of the Iranian-backed militia responsible for the attack, reportedly killing eight fighters. This was only the fourth Biden administration response to any of the roughly seventy-eight attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria since the start of 2021. Importantly, it was also the strongest and swiftest. Nevertheless, the U.S. response was not sufficient to deter further Iranian attacks. The next day, March 24, Iranian proxies retaliated against U.S. forces near the al-Omar oil field in northern Syria, with no casualties immediately reported. This appears...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 3/15
Visit our Iran Status Page Authors Anna Schaftel - Programs and Outreach Associate Negotiation status: dead or alive? Despite previously admitting privately the JCPOA was “dead,” since January Biden Administration officials have wavered on the status of the deal and nuclear diplomacy with Iran. On January 30, U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley said diplomacy is “still the priority... diplomacy never ends.” On February 21, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said, “we’ve also been clear that the Iran nuclear deal, the so-called JCPOA, is not now on the table…” before adding, “the door is always open to diplomacy going forward, but a lot depends on what Iran says and does….” On Marc...
Expanding Middle East Maritime Security Cooperation
Fifty nations, including Israel, and international organizations from around the world are currently participating in the U.S.-led International Maritime Exercise (IMX) and Cutlass Express (CE) joint training exercises in Middle Eastern waters. The global interest in these drills—far more than in any regional air- or ground-based exercise—indicates significant international concern about the region’s maritime security, which is directly threatened by Iran’s repeated aggression at sea. In the last two years, JINSA has recorded thirty-four incidents of Iranian naval aggression. Since Israel is often the target of Iranian attacks at sea and has significant relevant technological capabilities, to better protect the region’s critica...
Iran’s Nuclear Advances While U.S. Diplomacy Dithers
Iran has tiptoed to the very edge of a nuclear weapons capability: according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Tehran has now enriched uranium to 84 percent, its highest level ever and just shy of weapons-grade (90 percent). Meanwhile, the Biden administration is engaged in a months-long public debate with itself about whether to continue negotiating a nuclear deal with Iran, as shown in a new JINSA infographic. President Biden has admitted the deal is dead, while other officials repeatedly insist diplomacy must continue. Yet, Iran’s nuclear advances continue to shorten and weaken what was already an unacceptable JCPOA nuclear deal to the point of insignificance. In the year since American officials first idly warned t...
Infographic: Iran Nuclear Deal: Out of Time, Dead, or Alive?
For nearly a year and a half, beginning in mid-2021, U.S. and European officials repeatedly warned that time was running out to revive the nuclear deal with Iran. Yet, they never walked away from negotiations. Western policy on Iran has only grown more confused since September 2022, when Tehran rejected U.S. & EU proposals and killed Mahsa Amini, sparking revolutionary protests. President Biden himself admitted, albeit unofficially, that the JCPOA was dead. Nevertheless, U.S. and EU officials have since continued to insist they remain committed to diplomacy. It’s time the United States make up its mind and publicly acknowledge the reality that nuclear diplomacy with Iran has failed, and move on to Plan B.
Infographic: The IRGC’s Dangerous Campaign in Europe Map
The European Union has not yet labelled Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization—despite it being involved in numerous terrorist attacks and plots on European territory. According to a new JINSA infographic, the IRGC has conducted 33 terrorist attacks in Europe since 2012 and been caught conducting espionage on several occasions. Recently, the IRGC has transferred drones to Russia and deployed military officials to help Moscow conduct its illegal invasion of Ukraine. It is time for the EU to recognize what the United States already has: the IRGC is a terrorist organization.
Biden Hasn’t Given an Iran Speech, State of the Union is His Opportunity
President Biden has made a mainstay of his foreign policy standing up for democracy around the world and supporting U.S. partners fighting against aggressive authoritarian states, mentioning these topics in nearly 50 speeches over the last two years. Except when it comes to Iran. Unlike his predecessors, two years into his tenure the president has never given a speech dedicated to Iran, neither supporting the democratic demands of protesters in Iran, helping America’s Middle East partners defend themselves against Iranian attacks, nor addressing the nuclear talks. His State of the Union address on February 7, 2023, presents the perfect opportunity to rectify this oversight. President Biden should use the State of Union to announce a P...
U.S.-Israel Exercises Signal Capabilities to Iran, Not U.S. Willingness to Strike
The United States and Israel recently concluded their largest ever combined military exercise, Juniper Oak, a massive, week-long, multidomain drill clearly designed to signal to Tehran the full extent of U.S.-Israeli joint military capability. This is the culmination of a two-year trend of U.S.-Israel exercises increasing in frequency and operational focus on the Iranian threat. Yet, as significant as the exercise was, it is unlikely that, by itself, it will serve as an effective deterrent against Iran. Deterring Iran from attaining a nuclear weapons capability requires convincing the Iranian regime that either the United States, on its own or together with Israel, or Israel operating on its own are not only capable, but willing to execu...
Israel Degrades Iranian Capabilities, Protects International Security
Multiple attacks over the past weekend against Iranian military targets—including sites reportedly linked to the production of drones possibly destined for use by Russia against Ukraine—likely represent a continuation of Israeli efforts to disrupt Iran’s proliferation of rockets, missiles, and drones across the Middle East and beyond, into Europe. If indeed conducted by Israel, these strikes demonstrate the Jewish state’s unique ability and determination to defend itself, as well as the interests of the United States, other regional partners, and even Europe, through bold and ingenious military action. The United States should adopt Israel’s policy of proactively preventing Iran’s proliferation of weaponry as well as assist Isra...
Infographic: 2023 Events to Watch
As 2023 begins, it is already proving to be an inflection point for U.S. cooperation with partners in the Middle East, efforts to thwart Iran’s nuclear and regional aggression, and the stability of the Iranian regime. The attached graphic details noteworthy events this year that JINSA will be closely watching to examine how they shape the security and stability of the Middle East. Look out for JINSA’s timely and detailed analysis on these and other issues throughout the year.
Upgrading U.S. Stockpile in Israel After Weapons Transfer to Ukraine
The Pentagon’s decision to transfer U.S. artillery to Ukraine from a prepositioned stockpile in Israel, known as WRSA-I, provides both crucial support to Kyiv and an overdue opportunity to review and upgrade the stockpile with vital weaponry to help Israel uphold shared interests in the Middle East. Working with Israel, the United States now should fulfill WRSA-I’s strategic purpose by replenishing it with precision guided munitions and potentially other much-needed systems for U.S., Israeli, and other partner operations. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. Authors Jonathan Ruhe - Director of Foreign Policy Ari Cicurel - Senior Policy Analyst
Marines Move Forward with Iron Dome
In a critical step toward better integrating American and Israel defense platforms and reaping the benefits of U.S. investment in Israeli defense technology, the Marine Corps has approved a mobile air defense platform based on Israel’s battle-proven and incredibly successful Iron Dome to move onto the next stage of testing and certification for eventual acquisition. This is an important development after the U.S. Army had previously acquired two Iron Dome batteries and opted not to purchase any more. The other U.S. military services should follow the Marine Corps’ lead and integrate proven Israeli air defense and other technologies. The United States should also leverage the technological capabilities of its Israeli partner by pursuing ...
2023 Starts with Strikes on U.S. Forces in Syria
Once again, U.S. forces in Syria have come under attack with Iran the most likely culprit. The two rockets fired at a U.S. base in northeast Syria on January 4 mark at least the 79th attack on American troops in Syria or Iraq since Biden took office in January 2021. The Biden administration has launched only three rounds of retaliatory strikes during this spate of attacks. This sporadic U.S. response has been too little and too infrequent to deter further Iranian aggression. The United States should quickly attribute blame for this latest attack and respond with strong, consistent military force against those responsible, including both the group that launched the rockets and their likely Iranian superiors. Click here to read the NatSec ...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 1/9
Visit our Iran Status Page Authors Andrew Ghalili - Senior Policy Analyst Stuart Harris - Intern Negotiation Status: DEAD (Still trying to revive it) In a noticeable adjustment, private rhetoric from the Biden administration has suggested that nuclear diplomacy with Iran is paused and that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is dead. Notably, however, no administration official has been willing to say as much publicly. Though the U.S. has placed additional sanctions on Iranian entities, and European countries have increased pressure on the Islamic Republic as well, neither the United States nor EU are willing to leave the negotiations table altogether. U.S. officials further entrench the stance of...
Congress’s New Confirmation Power Should Apply to Current Special Envoys
In a major change, the Senate is about to get significant new powers over an entire class of important diplomatic positions. Beginning in January 2023, U.S. Special Envoys—previously appointed at presidential discretion—will require Senate confirmation thanks to a provision included in the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act. While there is ambiguity in the law, it strongly suggests that currently sitting Special Envoys reporting to the Secretary of State also require Senate confirmation, including Special Envoy for Iran Rob Malley. There are 54 Special Envoy or similar positions of which 41 are currently filled. Congress should clarify whether the law applies to sitting Special Envoys. However, given the particular importance ...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 12/22
Visit our Iran Status Page Author Andrew Ghalili - Senior Policy Analyst Negotiation Status: PAUSED (No Progress) Nuclear negotiations between the United States and Iran remain at a standstill as Iranian officials continue to push for restarting talks. Though U.S. officials have consistently said for months that a nuclear deal is no longer on the agenda, the European mediators of the negotiations have been less firm. The European Union’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borell, said on December 15, “We do not have a better option than the JCPOA to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons. This remains in our own interest in spite of the fact that the nuclear deal remains in a stalemate and the escalati...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 11/14
Visit our Iran Status Page Author Andrew Ghalili - Senior Policy Analyst Negotiation Status: PAUSED (No Progress Made) Nuclear negotiations between the United States and Iran have been stagnant for several months as the Islamic Republic has been preoccupied with brutally repressing the Iranian citizens protesting for their freedom from the regime, and while the United States held its midterm elections. The last round of indirect talks between U.S. and Iranian officials at the negotiation headquarters in Vienna was held in August. With revolutionary protests continuing throughout Iran, U.S. elections were held on November 8, potentially creating room for the Biden administration to recommence indirect negotiation...
Keeping Russia Out of Alexandroupolis
The Greek government’s abrupt cancellation of U.S.-backed bids to privatize the strategic port of Alexandroupolis raises concerns about possible Russian interference, and threatens to undermine American, trans-Atlantic, and broader interests in expanding the port’s capacity. Given the high potential of Alexandroupolis to boost European energy security, NATO collective defense, and global food supplies in the wake of Moscow’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, Washington must get clarity from Athens about the decision while making clear its continued emphasis on ensuring the port receives the investments needed to grow its operations without falling into Russian hands. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. Author Jonathan Ruhe - Dir...
The Expanding Russia-Iran Arms Nexus
After deploying Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to devastating effect against Ukraine, Russia is now set to purchase Iranian short-range ballistic missiles—demonstrating growing ties between these two U.S. adversaries. Russia is currently the largest operator of Iranian UAVs anywhere, increasingly using them to target civilian positions away from the frontlines. However, Ukraine has reportedly shot down most of these drones. Ballistic missiles would be more dangerous than UAVs because they carry larger explosive payloads and are harder to defend against. Although Iranian missiles are unlikely to alter the balance of territorial control in Ukraine, they would further enable Russia to devastate Ukraine’s population and infras...
U.S. Overreaction to OPEC+ Production Cut
OPEC and its partners such as Russia, known as OPEC+, announced on October 5 that it will cut its total oil production quota by two million barrels per day. This decision, its impetus, and implications have been badly misunderstood in Washington. Rather than a drastic politically-motivated production cut that will send oil prices skyrocketing in order to aid Russia and spite the United States, the move will result in a modest actual production cut, based on economic considerations driven by OPEC+’s forecast of dwindling global oil demand. The United States should avoid overreacting to the OPEC+ decision and should reengage in discussions with Saudi officials on how to rebuild a more constructive partnership between Washington and Riyadh. ...
Israel Trades Future Gas for Drilling and Possible Security Today
Israel and Lebanon have agreed to a U.S.-mediated deal that demarcates the majority of their maritime border, granting Lebanon almost all of the territory it had originally laid claim to except for a critical, 5-kilometer-long security area near the coast. Lebanese President Michel Aoun, who leaves office on October 31, has approved the agreement. The Israeli government gave its initial approval and is set to have a final approval vote in the coming day, without submitting the deal to the Knesset for a vote. Israel’s security establishment has expressed unanimous support for the deal. The most important benefit of the deal for Israel is the ability to begin pumping natural gas as quickly as possible from the offshore Karish natural gas...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 10/14
Visit our Iran Status Page Author Andrew Ghalili - Senior Policy Analyst Negotiation Status: PAUSED Nuclear deal negotiations between Iran and the United States remain at a stalemate while the Islamic Republic attempts to violently suppress widespread anti-regime protests. In August and early September, the two countries were exchanging proposals through the European Union. The most recent exchange, however, occurred on September 1, when Iran sent demands that U.S. and EU officials claimed were “counterproductive.” Since then, the killing of a 22-year old Iranian woman, Mahsa Amini, in Tehran on September 16 sparked prolonged, nationwide protests, and provoked a brutal reaction from the regime. On...
Iran’s Sanctioned Terror Airlines Still Fly Throughout Europe
In the past few weeks, Russia has used Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to attack Ukrainian forces and destroy U.S.-supplied military equipment. The three Iranian airlines that flew those UAVs to Russia—Mahan Air, Iran Air, and Qeshm Air—also operate commercial flights to European airports. By allowing these flights, even as NATO arms Ukraine to repel Russia’s illegal invasion, several alliance members, namely the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, and Turkey, are enabling a revenue stream that facilitates the transport of Iranian drones to Russia. The United States should impose additional sanctions on these Iranian airlines as well as strongly push European and other countries to fo...
Unparalleled Iranian Attack on Kurds
On September 28, Iran launched its single largest bombardment in decades—using 93 ballistic missiles and drones—against Kurdish targets in neighboring Iraq, killing at least 13, including a U.S. citizen. This escalation comes amid increasingly widespread protests against the Iranian regime following its killing of Mahsa Amini, a Kurdish Iranian woman. Iran is falsely blaming—and attacking—Kurdish militants and outside forces, like, Saudi Arabia and Israel, to portray the protests as an ethnic struggle or external manipulation, rather than the grassroots, nation-wide anti-regime movement they have become. Tehran is also flaunting its capability to strike targets beyond its borders with impunity—perhaps in a warning to both protesto...
Civil Unrest Reaches “State of Explosion” in Iran
After nearly a week of escalating unrest in Iran, following the Iranian regime’s murder of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini on September 16 for “improper hijab,” President Biden uttered a brief, one-sentence remark at the United Nations yesterday in support of “the brave citizens and the brave women of Iran,” without mentioning Mahsa by name. The Biden Administration should be far more forceful in its support of Iranian women and the human rights of all Iranian people, particularly by removing obstacles to technology companies providing internet access beyond the regime’s control. This is the morally correct and wise policy, that will only enhance U.S. leverage with Iran. Meanwhile, the unrest, coming amid reports of Supreme Leader Ali K...
Russia Begins Using Iranian Drones Against Ukraine
Iran is supplying Russia with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Despite some early difficulties, Russia is now using the Iranian platforms for effective short-range air-to-ground attacks against frontline Ukrainian forces. This is in an effort to slow Ukraine’s counter-offensive while evading Ukrainian air defenses and without committing additional Russian forces. U.S. sanctions limiting Russia’s ability to buy Western components, particularly electronics, Iran’s readily available UAV arsenal despite extensive U.S. sanctions, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA) elimination of the conventional arms embargo on Iran in 2020, have contributed to bringing these two pariah states and aggressors into closer cooperation. ...
Risks and Rewards of a Potential Israel-Lebanon Maritime Border Agreement
Israel and Lebanon are reportedly nearing a resolution to their disputed maritime border, which could enable each country to explore and exploit more fully offshore natural gas reserves. Yet, Hezbollah has threatened to disrupt these efforts. Concrete U.S. leadership is required, both to realize the regional benefits of the peaceful development of Eastern Mediterranean energy resources and to support Israel’s capability to deter and defend itself against aggression by Hezbollah and its Iranian backers. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. Author Ari Cicurel - Senior Policy Analyst This brief was made possible by the generous support of the Gettler Family Foundation and a portion of the research was conducted on...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 9/12
Visit our Iran Status Page Negotiation Status: PAUSED American and European officials now believe that a nuclear agreement between the United States and Iran is unlikely to be reached “in the near future.” Iran continues to insist that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) close its investigation into suspected undeclared, and illegal, Iranian efforts to build a nuclear weapon – a probe which is wholly separate from Iran’s obligations under a renewed nuclear deal. Though Iran had consistently said it wouldn’t enter an agreement until the probe was ended, it had not previously demanded that such assurances be included in the text of the agreement. E3: Not Convinced Iran Wants a Deal France, Ger...
Analysis: Iran Still Wants More
Visit our Iran Status Page In the 3rd exchange of indirect proposals between Iran and the United States since the EU sent what it called the “final” text to Iran, Tehran has sent another response, which U.S. negotiators are now studying. Despite Iran’s disappointing response and repeated claims that time is running out for negotiations, the Biden administration indicated it wants to keep talking. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. Click here to view infographic: “Final” Iran Deal Still Open for Debate Author Andrew Ghalili - Senior Policy Analyst
Iran Tries to Steal U.S. Maritime Drone
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) made the brazen attempt to capture a U.S. unmanned surface vessel (USV) overnight on August 29. Another example of Iran’s increased regional aggression against U.S. targets, this marks the first time Iran targeted Task Force 59, the U.S. Fifth Fleet’s unmanned systems initiative. Though the IRGC vessel quickly released the American Saildrone Explorer once approached by a U.S. patrol ship and helicopter, this represents a pattern of Iranian aggression that will only exacerbate if the U.S. fails to respond with force and instead continues to negotiate a nuclear deal. The United States should quickly pivot toward a Plan B policy for Iran that includes consistent and forceful military action...
Iranian Leaks Reveal Biden Administration Efforts to Circumvent Congressional Review
Recent Iranian reports indicate the nuclear deal negotiated by the Biden administration would lift over 170 sanctions imposed on Iran by executive order prior to President Biden submitting the deal to Congress. This is technically permitted under the relatively permissive Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) but goes beyond Obama administration concessions in 2015 and undermines the original intention of the law to provide congressional review on such an important subject. To retain its oversight prerogatives, Congress should rapidly codify the existing executive orders on Iran or broaden the scope of INARA to keep them under congressional review. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. Author Gabriel Noronha - Gemunder Center ...
U.S. Retaliation Against Iranian Proxies in Syria
On August 24, U.S. airstrikes targeted Iranian-backed groups in Syria that had attacked American troops there on August 15. Later that day, a second round of Iran-backed attacks injured three American service members and U.S. counterstrikes killed four Iranian-backed militants. American troops reportedly conducted a third round of strikes in Syria on August 25, marking the most extensive exchange of fire between U.S. and Iranian-backed groups in Syria since President Biden took office. The U.S. responses have been too limited and, at least initially, avoided targeting militants, even as the Iranian-backed groups sought to kill American troops. In light of Tehran’s use of its proxies’ attacks as leverage against Washington, and given tha...
Analysis: US (unlike EU) Doesn’t Find Iran’s Demands “Reasonable”
Visit our Iran Status Page Negotiation status: PAUSED (exchanging responses) Via the EU, the United States replied today to Iran’s response to an initial EU draft text aimed at overcoming remaining hurdles to a nuclear deal. Though U.S. officials have yet to clarify the contents of the reply, initial reports suggest the United States did not meet Iran’s demands. Axios reported that the United States clarified “it will not agree to conditions between Iran's return to implementing the nuclear agreement and the closing of the International Atomic Energy Agency's investigations into its suspected nuclear activities.” According to Politico, a person familiar with the U.S. response said it focused on Iran’s demand fo...
U.S. Forces Face Repeated Strikes in Syria
Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and rocket attacks targeted American forces in Syria on August 15, shortly after Israeli airstrikes against Syrian and Iranian positions in Tartus and Damascus. If conducted by Iranian-backed groups, as is likely the case, the strikes indicate that the lack of U.S. retaliation for previous attacks—including recently against American citizens on U.S. soil—combined with ongoing nuclear negotiations has emboldened Tehran and made the United States a more attractive target in comparison to Israel. Iranian-backed groups target U.S. forces because they will not suffer significant consequences. The United States should quickly identify Iran as the perpetrator of the latest attack if true, hold the regime in Tehran...
Analysis: Iran Responds to “Final” Nuclear Deal Proposal
Visit our Iran Status Page Negotiation Status: PAUSED Talks should be over and the deal should be dead—but negotiations could soon be reopened, yet again. The EU set August 15 as the deadline for Iran to approve its final nuclear deal text, saying that there was no room for further negotiation. EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell firmly set the deadline on August 8, stating, “What can be negotiated has been negotiated, and it’s now in a final text.” A statement by the E3—Britain, France, and Germany—confirmed on August 5 that “there will be no re-opening of negotiations.” Instead, Iran responded with additional, long-standing demands that are now being considered by the United States. ...
Greece Looks to Israel for Defenses Against Turkish Drones
Turkey’s drones have gained international fame helping Ukraine defend against Russia’s unprovoked invasion. However, Turkey also uses its unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to threaten its NATO ally, Greece. Now, Greece has implemented a counter-unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) using Israeli technology to defend against a recent spike in Turkish violations of Greek airspace. As Turkey increasingly behaves as an unreliable ally, the United States should increase its support for the growing Greek-Israel partnership, especially efforts to bolster their C-UAS and other air defense capabilities. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Ari Cicurel - Senior Policy Analyst This brief was made possible ...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 8/9
Visit our Iran Status Page Negotiation status: PAUSED Though European and American officials claim the text for a revived Iran nuclear deal has been finalized and the negotiations have concluded, no agreement has been reached and Iran maintains that more is needed “to reach the final text of the agreement.” European Union (EU) Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell stated on August 8, “What can be negotiated has been negotiated, and it’s now in a final text.” A senior EU official stated on August 8, “The negotiation is over. It is up to the parties to take the deal.” A statement by the E3—Britain, France, and Germany—confirmed on August 5 that “there will be no re-opening of negotiations.” R...
Operation Breaking Dawn
Israel launched Operation Breaking Dawn against Iran-armed Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) on August 5 as part of a new, preemptive strategy to disrupt the Gazan terrorist group’s plans to launch anti-tank missile strikes on Israel, restore deterrence against the group, and, most importantly, send a strong deterrent signal to other terrorist groups, particularly Hezbollah. The operation killed a top PIJ commander, Taysir al Jabari, as well as several other operatives before they could conduct planned terrorist attacks. The United States should give Israel the time and space to protect itself against terrorist threats. It can further signal its support by rearticulating its commitment to resupply Israel’s supply of Tamir interceptors for...
Israel looks to India, not China, for Haifa Port
In July, Israel awarded the tender for the privatization of the original Haifa Port (separate from but located next to the new, Chinese-operated Haifa Bayport Terminal) to an Indian firm—despite competing Chinese bids for the project. This decision reflects a growing Israeli appreciation for U.S. concerns about the threat posed by Chinese investment in Israel. At the same time, the deal, the first-ever Indian acquisition of a Mediterranean port, highlights India’s growing geo-economic interest in the Middle East. Increased Israeli wariness of high-risk Chinese capital, coupled with an influx of lower-risk Indian investment, could provide a powerful counter to China’s intensifying efforts to penetrate the region, as well as a valuable ...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 8/4
Visit our Iran Status Page The Iran nuclear negotiations are set to resume in Vienna on Thursday, August 4, as officials plan to discuss the draft of an agreement proposed in July by European Union (EU) Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell. Reports suggest the International Atomic Energy Association’s (IAEA) censure of Iran for violations of its requirements to allow monitoring and inspection of its nuclear facilities will be a major issue for Iran in these negotiations, although one that the United States and E.U. consider to be outside the scope of the JCPOA. The first round of the Vienna talks commenced in April 2021, and negotiators were last in Vienna on March 11 when the eighth round of talks concluded. Talks briefly re...
U.S. Must Build on Rising East Med-Gulf Cooperation
The Saudi crown prince’s recent visit to Athens highlights the two countries’ geostrategic importance – both for reducing Europe’s dangerous dependence on Russian energy and, in conjunction with Greece’s vital roles in growing Israel-Gulf ties, as security providers supporting regional stability and U.S. interests in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. The Biden administration should encourage and capitalize on these developments by explicitly supporting greater trans-regional cooperation among its Eastern Mediterranean and Gulf partners, including by encouraging Greece’s continued development as a renewable energy and natural gas hub. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Jonathan Ruhe...
Infographic: Time (Keeps on Never) Running Out for Iran Nuclear Talks
JINSA’s newly updated infographic details the numerous continued warnings from U.S. and European officials that time is running out to revive the JCPOA agreement. These repeated, unfulfilled warnings merely encourage Tehran to further drag out negotiations, advance its nuclear weapons program and extract more U.S. concessions. It’s time for the Biden administration to declare negotiations dead and move on to Plan B Read JINSA Report: Time for Plan B on Iran
Cyprus Satisfies U.S. Legal Requirements for Arms Exports
Cyprus is an important U.S. partner in the Eastern Mediterranean for energy security, economic development, and impeding Turkish and Russian aggression. However, U.S. law currently prohibits providing Cyprus with needed U.S.-made weaponry so long as it receives Russian foreign direct investment and allows Russian naval vessels to use its ports for resupply and refueling. Cyprus has now fulfilled these requirements. After U.S. and EU pressure, Cyprus took steps to strengthen its anti-money laundering regulations and, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has ended scheduled visits from Russian naval ships. President Biden should recognize Cyprus’s progress in these two areas and lift arms export restrictions so long as Cyprus continues to ...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 7/7
Visit our Iran Status Page Renewed nuclear negotiations in Qatar ended after two days on June 29 without making any progress toward a deal or setting plans for another round of talks. The European Union (E.U.) coordinator for the negotiations Enrique Mora tweeted on June 29 that the Doha talks failed to produce “the progress the E.U. team as coordinator had hoped for.” U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley told NPR on July 5 that the recent indirect talks were “more than a little bit of a wasted occasion.” In contrast to Mora’s assessment, on June 30 Iran’s Ambassador to the United Nations (U.N.) Majid Takht Ravanchi referred to the talks in Qatar as “serious and positive.” Iranian Foreign Minister Ho...
Iranian Terrorism Concerns Surround New Biden Immigration Regulation
A new Biden administration immigration regulation, purportedly designed to aid processing of visas for U.S.-friendly Afghan nationals, contains concerning loopholes that could seriously weaken immigration restrictions against members and supporters of terrorist organizations. Simultaneous with the re-opening of negotiations with Iran this week, the regulation also seems to reduce visa restrictions on many conscripts from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a move that might appear as a partial concession to Iran’s demand to lift the IRGC’s terrorist designation. If this regulation is truly intended only for the restricted case of Afghanistan, the administration should quickly amend this regulation to remove the troubling l...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 6/27
Visit our Iran Status Page Sixteen weeks after being officially paused, nuclear deal negotiations between the United States and Iran are expected to pick back up in Qatar on Tuesday, June 28. The resumption of talks follows European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell’s visit to Tehran over the weekend, despite no outstanding issues being resolved during his trip. Iran is still demanding the removal of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation as well as political guarantees that future U.S. administrations will abide by any deal. Borrell stated that “the US and Iran will talk – not directly – with a facilitation by me and my team as coordinator.” ...
U.S. Leadership Needed on East Med Energy
Last week’s EU-Israel-Egypt natural gas agreement shows how the Eastern Mediterranean offers valuable opportunities to help reduce the dependence of America’s European allies on Russian energy. However, the peaceful development and transportation of these resources by Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and Israel also faces growing challenges from Turkey, Hezbollah and potentially others. To fully realize the region’s potential to advance Europe’s energy security in the face of Moscow’s aggression, the United States must reverse its hands-off approach and support its partners’ proactive heavy lifting to bring Eastern Mediterranean energy online – including by appointing a Special Envoy for the region and backing the expansion of natural ga...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 6/9
Visit our Iran Status Page On June 8 as the Board of Governors (BoG) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) passed a resolution led by France, Germany, Great Britain and the United States calling on Iran to “urgently cooperate with the IAEA’s probe into undeclared nuclear material in Iran.” For years, Iran has blocked efforts by IAEA inspectors to clarify Tehran’s past work on a nuclear weapon, including by denying access to suspected undeclared nuclear facilities. Iran’s non-compliance with a three-month roadmap it agreed on with the IAEA in March to resolve these concerns led to the BoG’s decision to pass the resolution at its June meeting. The June 8 resolution “expresse[d] profound concern...
After Greek Seizure of Iranian Tanker, Iran Escalates
Iran detained two Greek-flagged tankers on May 27 in response to Greece’s seizure, announced a day earlier and carried out at the behest of the United States, of an Iranian-flagged vessel carrying Iranian oil to Turkey. The almost routine Iranian escalation comes straight from its counter-pressure playbook designed to deter both U.S. pressure and sanctions enforcement in a bid to continue reaping the benefits of the current open-ended but dead-end nuclear negotiations. More curious is the case of the Iranian oil-laden tanker seized by Greece. Strangely, it remains uncertain if it was detained due to its attempts to circumvent sanctions on Iranian oil exports or because of the ships seeming ties to sanctioned Russian entities. Yet, th...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 6/2
Visit our Iran Status Page Nuclear deal negotiations between the United States and Iran remain officially paused as Iran appears to shift its key demands, having accepted that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will remain listed as a terrorist organization. Tehran has reverted to highlighting a previous demand: any agreement must be binding for future U.S. presidential administrations. Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian again stressed concerns about the absence of a guarantee that future administrations would obey a deal. Iran has insisted that the White House commit future administrations to follow a nuclear deal, however the U.S. is unable to make this guarantee – something it has repeatedly communi...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 5/27
Visit our Iran Status Page The JINSA Iran Policy Project, co-chaired by Amb. Eric Edelman and Gen. Chuck Wald (Ret.), released a new report, “Time for Plan B on Iran,” detailing why the administration needs to acknowledge that its attempts to return to the JCPOA have failed and how to implement a plan B. Though Iran nuclear deal negotiations have been stalled for weeks over Iran’s demand that the U.S. lift the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation, President Biden has reportedly made a final decision not to give in to that demand. Iranian officials stated that the removal of the FTO designation is a prerequisite for the country’s return to the agreement. ...
Boosting Greece’s Roles as Vital Defense and Energy Ally
This week’s visit to Washington by Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis is a timely opportunity to deepen the bilateral defense partnership and strengthen Greece’s role as a vital NATO and energy hub in Europe, in light of both Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Turkey’s continued unreliability as an ally. The Biden administration should support projects to fast-track Greece becoming a reliable and critical EU energy distribution hub, and the Pentagon should enhance U.S. deployments through Greece in order to more effectively and rapidly project power into Eastern Europe and other nearby hotspots. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Jonathan Ruhe - Director of Foreign Policy Ari Cicurel - Seni...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 5/12
Visit our Iran Status Page Negotiations over a new Iran nuclear deal remain paused as the European Union’s lead negotiator, Enrique Mora, is in Tehran this week to meet with Iranian negotiator Ali Bagheri-Kani and seek a “middle way” to end the stalemate over Iran’s demand that its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) be removed from the U.S. State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list. U.S. foreign policy chief Josep Borrell described the diplomatic effort as “the last bullet.” Venting his frustration with the status of negotiations, Borrell added, “we cannot continue like this forever, because in the meantime Iran continues developing their nuclear program.” Axios reported that Biden a...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 5/6
Visit our Iran Status Page With negotiations over a new Iran nuclear deal stalemated due to Tehran’s demand that the United States remove Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from the State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list, Reuters reported on May 2 that “Western officials have largely lost hope the Iran nuclear deal can be resurrected.” While the United States previously offered to lift the FTO designation in exchange for various commitments from Iran, including ending its pursuit of retribution for the 2020 killing of Gen. Qasem Soleimani, the more recent line from officials is that some form of “reciprocity” would be needed from Iran, though they have yet to officially rule out d...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 4/28
Talks remain paused as Iran continues to demand that the United States lift the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ (IRGC) Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation, though Iranian and European officials appear eager to resume negotiations. Recent comments from Iranian officials suggest a renewed urgency to resume talks in-person in Vienna. Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh called for a return to Vienna, saying on April 25, “it is appropriate that a face-to-face meeting is held as soon as possible,” and adding, “it is not yet decided where and when to have this meeting and at what level it should be held, but it is on the agenda.” Khatibzadeh also said, "prolonging the pause in the negotiations is no...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 4/25
Nuclear negotiations with Iran have been stalled since early March, with the final outstanding issue reportedly being Tehran’s demand that the United States lift its Foreign Terrorism Organization (FTO) designation against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Recent reports suggest that the Biden administration intends to reject Iran’s demand to lift the FTO designation on the IRGC. After a call between President Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett on April 24, Bennett said, “I am sure that President Biden … will not allow the IRGC to be removed from the list of terrorist organizations,” adding, “Israel has clarified its position on the issue: The IRGC is the largest terrorist organization in the wo...
U.S. Terrorism Sanctions Must Remain on Iran’s IRGC
Negotiations with Iran remain stalled, reportedly due to a single Iranian demand unrelated to the 2015 nuclear deal: that the United States remove the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from its Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list. With mounting bipartisan opposition in Congress and concern among U.S. allies in Israel and the Sunni Arab world, the Biden administration is reportedly reconsidering lifting the designation or perhaps maintaining just part of the IRGC on the FTO list. It is critical that the entire IRGC, not just part of it, retain its FTO designation since it continues to meet the U.S. legal criteria for a terrorist organization. Regardless of whether the IRGC is delisted, the emerging deal is dangerously short ...
Infographic: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Remains a Foreign Terrorist Organization
The Biden administration is reportedly considering removing Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) from the U.S. list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) as part of a new nuclear deal. However, the IRGC remains a terrorist organization and does not meet the criteria for removal from the FTO list under U.S. law.
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 4/12
The Washington Post reported on Friday that the United States plans to reject the Iranian demand that the United States lift its designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in order to renew the 2015 nuclear agreement. Despite this report, which cited a senior Biden administration official, the administration has not officially ruled out lifting the FTO designation. On April 12, a reporter from The Wall Street Journal tweeted that the U.S. has ruled out lifting the FTO unconditionally and accepting the political cost, writing, “Iran needs to accept conditions for lifting of FTO or it’s not a price the administration at the top level is prepared to pay.” On April 6, Secr...
State Department Misleads on Iranian Aggression
Last week, State Department Spokesperson Ned Price made the misleading claim, based on limited and unclear data, that Iranian aggression is the result of the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, implying that reaching a deal with Tehran will lead to de-escalation. A comprehensive analysis demonstrates Iranian aggression began well before JCPOA withdrawal and has increased most in the aftermath of the JCPOA agreement and again during the Biden administration’s open-ended negotiations. This data suggests the United States and its regional partners are likely to face a rise in Iranian aggression if there is a new nuclear agreement. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA St...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 4/5
Negotiation status: PAUSED State Department spokesman Ned Price was described on April 4 as saying, “the United States still believes there is an opportunity to overcome the remaining differences with Iran in talks over its nuclear program.” Also on April 4, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh said, "America is responsible for the halt of these talks ... a deal is very much within reach.” Where are negotiators? Negotiators are currently in their home countries. Officials have not been in Vienna, the site of negotiations, since the eighth round of talks was suspended indefinitely on March 7. It has been roughly 5 months since the Biden administration first said that only weeks remained to se...
Expect More Iranian Aggression with New Nuclear Deal
Supporters of reentering the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have wrongly attributed Iran’s malign regional activity to President Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement, implying there will be a de-escalation once a new nuclear agreement goes into effect. However, data collected by JINSA indicates the greatest increases in Iranian violence come during periods of diplomatic engagement. For the 3.5 years the JCPOA was in effect, Iran attacked the United States and its partners more than three times as often as it did preceding the deal. In the 14 months since President Biden took office seeking to reenter the deal, Iranian aggression has nearly doubled compared to the second half of President Trump’s term. If the Biden adm...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 3/29
No officials have returned to Vienna to resume talks on an Iran nuclear deal since leaving for their respective capitals in mid-March. There have been suggestions that negotiators may not need to return to Vienna to finalize an agreement. Though several European officials recently reiterated that a deal is just days away, United States officials’ tone remained more pessimistic. Speaking in Doha, Qatar, about a possible agreement, Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley said on Sunday he “can’t be confident it is imminent,” echoing State Department Spokesperson Ned Price’s comments from last week. The European Union foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, also in Doha on Sunday, sounded more optimistic, repeating West...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 3/24
Statements from U.S. officials about the prospects for a new nuclear deal have become more pessimistic in recent days, while the Biden administration faces growing pressure not to lift terrorism sanctions against Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Axios confirmed that the lead U.S. negotiator, Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley, recently offered to lift the IRGC’s Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation in exchange for a public commitment to de-escalate malign activities in the region, which Iran declined. Lifting the FTO designation is reportedly the final hurdle to an agreement, but Iran has every incentive to keep dragging out talks while its nuclear programs advances. The FTO designation and its r...
A “Disgusting” Lack of Transparency on New Iran Nuclear Deal
With a new Iran nuclear deal potentially just days away, bipartisan concerns remain in Congress about the reported concessions being offered to Iran and the Biden administration’s highly concerning lack of transparency about negotiations. President Biden should submit any agreement to Congress, as required by U.S. law, and also refuse to lift terrorism sanctions on Iran unrelated to its nuclear program. Congress should urgently convene long overdue public hearings on the administration’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear program and malign behaviors more generally. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. Click here to download the infographic. JINSA Staff Contributors Jonathan Ruhe - Director of Foreign Policy Andrew ...
Houthi Attacks Show Need for Stronger U.S.-Saudi Defense Cooperation
As part of their steadily escalating aggression against Saudi Arabia, over the weekend Iran’s Houthi proxies in Yemen launched one of their most impactful missile and drone attack in months against vital energy, water, and power facilities in the kingdom. While reports indicate the Biden administration recently rushed additional air defenses to protect Saudi Arabia, critical targets across the country remain vulnerable to Houthi attacks, and U.S.-Saudi relations remain strained to the detriment of both countries and regional security. The Biden administration should prioritize strengthening America’s diplomatic coordination and dialogue with its Arab Gulf partners and bolster security cooperation against shared Iran-backed threats, espe...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 3/16
A new nuclear agreement with Iran once again looks imminent in the wake of three key developments in the last 24 hours: Russia said it’s received the guarantees it asked for and is ready to agree to a deal; The United States is reportedly considering lifting the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); and Iran released two British hostages in exchange for more than $500 million. Iranian Foreign Minister (FM) Amir-Abdollahian said, “2 of 4 remaining issues (Iran’s red lines) in Vienna Talks have been resolved, but 2 issues including economic guarantees are still unresolved. If US is ready to settle these two, we’re ready to convene ministerial gatherin...
U.S. Must Support East Med Energy Security
The Biden administration’s abrupt decision in January to withdraw support for the EastMed Pipeline, which would deliver Israeli and Cypriot natural gas to Europe via Greece upon completion in 2025, has been proven misguided by momentous events following Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. With the Eastern Mediterranean’s abundant offshore energy resources becoming increasingly important economically and geopolitically as America’s European allies work to lessen their hydrocarbon dependence on Russia, the administration should reverse its January decision, commit itself to studying the most effective means to transport Eastern Mediterranean energy to Europe, and make clear its support for the region’s peaceful energy development m...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 3/15
Nuclear negotiations with Iran have been on hold since Friday, when EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell tweeted “a pause in #ViennaTalks is needed.” The pause stems from Russia’s sudden demands last week – for guarantees that its trade with Iran will be exempt from U.S. sanctions related to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine – but the added delays also buy more time for Iran to continue advancing its nuclear program. The U.S. State Department has said it would not agree to Russia’s demands, with Secretary Blinken calling Russia’s demands “irrelevant” and “not in any way linked together” with the JCPOA nuclear agreement. Despite Iran’s and Russia’s demands, both countries argue the United States re...
As Nuclear Talks Pause, Iran Escalates
On March 13, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) fired twelve ballistic missiles from Iranian territory targeting the U.S. consulate site in Erbil, Iraq, marking a major escalation of its already intense pressure campaign against the United States and its Middle Eastern partners. Tehran seeks to test the Biden administration recently announced “indefinite pause” in nuclear negotiations, to push it to return to the table and make further, dangerous concessions, and to exert pressure on Israel to stop its “campaign between the wars” against Iranian regional aggression. Having seen the Biden administration’s extremely limited and indirect response to past attacks on U.S. forces, Iran clearly believes that the United Sta...
U.S. Tensions with Saudi Arabia and UAE
Tuesday’s report that leaders of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) declined to speak with President Biden about increasing their oil output reflects a clear perception by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi that their vital security concerns are being ignored by Washington, as it negotiates a dangerous new nuclear deal with Iran and failed to provide proper assistance during a sustained escalation in attacks by Iran and its proxies. Despite these differences, the United States and the two Gulf countries still stand to gain more from cooperation than from cold shoulders. The United States should first reassure its partners by rejecting a bad nuclear deal with Iran, redesignating the Houthis as a terrorist organization, promoting collecti...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 3/11
Negotiations over a new Iran nuclear deal hit a road block this week as outstanding Iranian demands plus last-minute demands from Russia led to a “break” in talks. On Friday morning, European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell announced the break. Borrell: “A pause in #ViennaTalks is needed, due to external factors. A final text is essentially ready and on the table … As coordinator, I will, with my team, continue to be in touch with all #JCPOA participants and the U.S. to overcome the current situation and to close the agreement.” Iranian Foreign Minister Saeed Khatibzadeh denied external factors were derailing the process, writing, “Successful conclusion of talks will be the main focus of all … No external...
Infographic: Never-Ending Iran Deadlines (Updated)
JINSA’s updated infographic details the numerous continued warnings from U.S. and European officials that time is running out to revive the JCPOA agreement. These repeated, unfulfilled warnings merely encourage Tehran to further drag out negotiations, advance its nuclear weapons program and extract more U.S. concessions.
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 3/7
Despite parties to the JCPOA talks in Vienna expressing strong hope that a return to the deal could be secured over the weekend, Russia potentially threw a wrench in the talks by demanding guarantees to protect its cooperation with Iran against Ukraine-related sanctions. In parallel, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Rafael Grossi traveled to Tehran where he claimed to reach an agreement for a three-month plan to resolve Iran’s obstruction of inspectors at suspected undeclared nuclear sites. In a lengthy interview with Iranian media over the weekend, Russian Ambassador Mikhail Ulyanov emphasized Iran’s accomplishments throughout the negotiations, saying, “realistically speaking, Iran got more than frankly I expected, ...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 3/3
The 8th round of Iran nuclear negotiations remains ongoing as new details emerge regarding the expected end-date for talks as well as Iran’s nuclear developments over the last several months. Officials’ comments continue to suggest that a deal will be reached within the next few days, although that now largely depends on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Rafael Grossi’s trip to Tehran this weekend. European Union coordinator for the negotiations Enrique Mora tweeted, “We are at the final stages of the Vienna Talks on JCPOA. Some relevant issues are still open and success is never guaranteed in such a complex negotiation. Doing our best in the coordinator's team. But we are definitely not there yet.” Iran F...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 3/2
The 8th and supposedly final round of Iranian nuclear talks continued on Wednesday, March 2, in Vienna. Reports suggest that little has changed over the last few days of negotiations, as the three major sticking points in the negotiation from Monday – safeguards, the scope of sanctions, and economic guarantees – remain outstanding. Former U.S. State Department official Gabriel Noronha released what his sources claim are details of the extensive sanctions relief – far beyond what is required under the initial JCPOA agreement – that the Biden administration has offered Tehran for rejoining the nuclear deal. The new deal will allegedly exceed the JCPOA by granting sanctions relief to key political and economic pillars of the regi...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 3/1
The 8th and supposedly final round of Iranian nuclear deal talks continued on Tuesday, March 1, in Vienna, as several key issues remain unsolved. Upon the conclusion of Monday’s meetings between Iranian chief negotiator Ali Bagheri-Kani and the P4+1 yesterday, officials from sides involved in the talks publicly noted the increasing urgency to wrap up negotiations: “It is now or never. If they cannot reach a deal this week, the talks will collapse forever,” said an Iranian diplomat in Tehran. Russian Ambassador Mikhail Ulyanov: “completion [of talks] will fall on the beginning of March, very soon.” Ulyanov tweeted photos of the Monday evening meeting, saying, “Tremendous progress has been made since April 2021, wh...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 2/28
On Monday, February 28, Ali Bagheri-Kani, Iran’s chief negotiator, returned to Vienna and resumed negotiations, after having left for Tehran on Thursday for consultations. U.S. and Western government officials are signaling this may be the last week to negotiate a return to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Although similar statements have been made previously, these are much more specific – albeit so far only attributed to anonymous sources, not made publicly by high-ranking officials. Over the weekend, Western diplomatic sources warned if “within the next few days [the] remaining issues are not resolved, the JCPOA will definitely be dead and it will be impossible to revive it.” On Monday, a senior unn...
Iran’s Short Breakout Time Under JCPOA 2.0
With the United States and Iran closing in on a return to the JCPOA nuclear agreement, the revived deal will likely fail to restore what its Obama-era predecessors claimed as the JCPOA’s primary benefit – putting Iran at least a year away from being able to enrich a bomb’s worth of fissile material. Indeed, if the restored deal keeps the same terms as the original by permitting Tehran to store its advanced centrifuges, we estimate breakout time would be 4.8-6.5 months until early 2026, at which point the JCPOA permits Iran to steadily shrink these timeframes further. Unless the Biden administration insists Iran ship out or destroy its advanced centrifuges, any new deal will delay Iran’s nuclear program only half as much for half as ...
The Urgency of Now: The Administration and Congress on Time Running Out For Iran Deal
With the Biden administration warning that time is running out for the United States to rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement with Iran, Congress is becoming anxious about the status of ongoing negotiations and demanding oversight of any deal that comes out of Vienna. On February 1, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez announced his growing concerns on the Senate floor; on February 8, thirty-two Senate Republicans sent a letter to the president demanding he send any deal to Congress for approval – as required by law. Under pressure from both chambers, the White House’s lead Iran negotiator Rob Malley briefed the House and Senate foreign relations committees on February 8 and 9, respe...
Iran’s Unprecedented Wave of Attacks Against the UAE
Iranian-backed militias have expanded their regional aggression by launching an unprecedented wave of attacks against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2022. The Houthis in Yemen and, most recently, a pro-Iran militia in Iraq have targeted the UAE this year with at least four ballistic missiles, six drones, and four cruise missiles, the first time these groups are known to have targeted the previously safe Emirates. While the combined efforts of Emirati and U.S.-operated air defenses intercepted multiple projectiles, several reached their targets, causing destruction and casualties. These strikes are part of a significant escalation of attacks by Iranian-backed groups since the beginning of 2021 that has continued this year. The Biden admin...
Time Never Seems to Run Out for Iran Negotiations
It has been seven months since the Biden administration has been warning Iran that time was running out for nuclear diplomacy. For nearly two months, U.S. and European officials have been claiming there are “weeks, not months” left to get to a deal. Yet, talks keep dragging on. In the absence of credible “Plan B” alternatives to further open-ended diplomacy with Iran, these repeated and unfulfilled warnings that time is running out – as detailed in JINSA’s infographic below – merely encourage Tehran to drag out talks, advance its nuclear weapons program and accrue more leverage to extract U.S. concessions. The United States should work urgently with Israel and others to develop viable military options that can deter or prev...
Iran’s Drone Offensive
Since the start of 2022, Iranian-backed militias have escalated their attacks, predominantly using drones, against U.S. service members and regional partners. On January 17, in a major expansion of the Yemeni conflict, the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels launched a combined ballistic and cruise missile and drone strike against the United Arab Emirates (UAE), killing three. Earlier in the month, Shia militias tied to Iran launched a spate of rocket and drone attacks surrounding the second anniversary of the U.S. strike that killed Iranian Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani. This wave of aggression spotlights the need for strong American leadership that leverages the Abraham Accords, as detailed in JINSA’s report, A Stronger and Wider Peace...
Setting a Deadline for U.S.-Iran Nuclear Talks
As the United States and Iran resume nuclear negotiations in Vienna, the Biden administration finds itself at even greater disadvantages than when previous talks broke off in June, given growing Iranian nuclear leverage, a new hardline president in Tehran and eroding U.S. credibility. With time currently on Iran’s side, the White House should issue a year-end deadline for Iran to rejoin the JCPOA, as well as commit to submitting any agreement to Congress for approval. Regardless of the outcome of talks, the United States urgently must build credible military alternatives to open-ended diplomacy, including by supporting Israel’s freedom of action. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Blaise Misztal -...
U.S. & Israel “Plan B” for Iran
Iran is rapidly approaching the nuclear threshold, even as its officials recently announced they will return to stalled negotiations about reentering the JCPOA nuclear agreement by the end of November. Beyond diplomacy, the United States and Israel declared their readiness to explore “other options” for preventing a nuclear Iran, with Israel recently accelerating military operational preparations including increased funding, planning and exercising. In addition to developing its own credible threat of force, the United States should promptly take action to bolster Israel’s self-defense capabilities to gain additional diplomatic leverage against Iran. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Jonathan R...
Brazen Drone Strike Against Iraqi Prime Minister
In a brazen attack, three armed drones targeted the residence of Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi on November 7. The attack was likely launched by Iranian-backed Shia militias in the aftermath of a recent poor electoral performance for pro-Iranian Shia parties. Iranian-backed groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen have significantly escalated their attacks on U.S. service members, partners, and interests this year, particularly through drone strikes with little overt U.S. response. Deterring attacks in Iraq and throughout the Middle East requires a regionwide strategy that includes strong U.S. military force against perpetrators, cooperation with regional partners, and the deployment of a regional air defense architecture capable of thwart...
Turkey Prepares for Possible Offensive Against U.S. Partners in Syria
Turkey appears to be planning a new military incursion against five Kurdish-controlled areas in northeastern Syria. Turkey’s use of drones will likely be a crucial element in any new offensive. Since May 2021, Turkey has significantly escalated the frequency of its drone strikes against Kurdish targets in Syria and northern Iraq that it claims are members of terrorist organizations. However, Ankara’s growing aggression in northeast Syria against U.S.-partnered Kurdish forces undermines U.S. counterterrorism operations and regional stability as well as likely helping Assad and Russia consolidate their power in the area. The Biden administration should respond by asserting greater command over U.S.-controlled airspace and publicly in...
Drone Strike Against U.S. Forces in Tanf, Syria
A coordinated drone and rocket attack, likely from an Iranian-backed militia, struck the U.S. outpost at Tanf in southern Syria on October 20. Groups with ties to Tehran have significantly escalated their attacks on, and use of drones against, U.S. military personnel, partners, and interests in the Middle East this year, probing for weaknesses. In the near-term, the United States must respond forcefully against the perpetrators of the Tanf attack, and the Iranian network supporting them, to deter further attacks. To protect U.S. personnel from further Iranian-backed attacks it is imperative that the Biden administration restore deterrence against Iran which has only be eroded by its limited and inconsistent retaliation for some past att...
Sectarian Violence In Beirut
The deadliest sectarian violence in Lebanon in over a decade erupted as hundreds of armed Hezbollah and Amal Party supporters marched toward the Palace of Justice in Beirut to call for the removal of a judge leading the investigation into the August 2020 port explosion. Sniper fire from rooftops—allegedly by the Christian Lebanese forces—killed at least six people, forcing demonstrators and journalists to take shelter. The willingness of the terrorist group Hezbollah, Iran’s largest proxy, to publicly threaten perhaps the sole remaining functioning Lebanese institution, leaves Lebanon on the brink of either total state failure or complete Hezbollah control. Meanwhile, the sectarian clashes could push Lebanon into a new civil war and H...
Recent Turkish Naval Harassment of Greece and Cyprus
Turkey has resumed its naval harassment of another NATO ally of the United States, Greece, in an attempt to force concessions in a territorial dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean. Continued Turkish bellicosity is likely to continue so long as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan believes there is no price to pay for it. To encourage a diplomatic solution, and forestall the possibility of escalation, the United States should condemn Turkish actions, work with other NATO partners to apply coordinated political and, if necessary, economic pressure on Turkey to encourage good-faith negotiations, strengthen its deterrent posture in the Eastern Mediterranean, and expand security cooperation with Greece and other partners safely navigating these criti...
Iran’s Looming Centrifuge Breakout
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) recent report on Iran’s nuclear activities shows how, despite attention-grabbing progress in its enrichment of 20 and 60 percent uranium, Iran’s greatest advances toward a nuclear weapons capability in the near-term will likely come from its research and deployment of thousands of new, much more efficient centrifuges. If Iran’s current plans for expanding its enrichment facilities move forward, it could reach the point of being able to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon in well under one month. However, two covert attacks since July 2020 targeting Tehran’s ability to manufacture these machines, appear to have bought valuable time. How much time is unclear because Ir...
Progressives’ Protest Removes Iron Dome Funding
On September 21, progressives in the House of Representatives indicated they would not vote for stopgap legislation preventing a government shutdown later this month because it allocated $1 billion to the Israeli government for its Iron Dome air defense system, which is co-produced with the United States. With only a slim majority in the House, Democratic leadership conceded and removed the funding from the continuing resolution. Because the Iron Dome is a defensive weapons system that saves Israeli and Palestinian lives, Congress must quickly fund President Biden’s promise to replenish the IDF’s supply of Tamir interceptors. RESPONSE: Congress should immediately pass legislation to restore this funding, keeping President Biden’s...
New U.S. Drone Initiative is an Opportunity to Counter Iranian Aggression
The U.S. Navy recently announced an initiative, named Task Force 59, to expand its use of unmanned systems in Middle Eastern waters. The plan coincides with a large escalation of aggression by Iran and its proxies—both at sea and with drones—that has triggered little U.S. military response so far. Task Force 59 intends to provide the United States with expanded capabilities to better address this threat. To best leverage these new unmanned capabilities, the U.S. Navy should expand Task Force 59’s mission to include joint operations with regional partners. Meanwhile, Congress should conduct urgent oversight hearings and briefings to examine Iranian naval aggression and how lessons learned can be applied to the Indo-Pacific Command to c...
Iran Continues Blocking Nuclear Inspectors
On September 12, Iran reached a last-minute deal with international inspectors that does not require it to stop obstructing legally-binding transparency measures on its nuclear program. This one-sided agreement, which potentially paves the way for a resumption of talks on reentering the JCPOA nuclear deal, threatens to undermine the broader nonproliferation regime and leave the outside world in the dark about Iran’s nuclear progress as its breakout window to a bomb becomes dangerously small. These developments only heighten the need for more concerted action by the United States and its allies to uphold the Nonproliferation Treaty and prevent a nuclear Iran. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Blaise Mis...
After Biden-Bennett Meeting, Potential Israeli Action Against Chinese Investments
The August 27, 2021 meeting between President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett provided an important opportunity for the two leaders to discuss the threat posed by China, particularly its investment in Israel. However, reports reveal that their focus on China was surprisingly limited. Following his meeting with Biden, Bennett announced that he would bring under his authority a newly formed committee for reviewing foreign investment into Israel. While a welcome step, more work is needed in this area. Both nations should make it a priority to develop a shared and cooperative approach to the common national security challenges that China poses, including intellectual property theft and acquisition of dual-use technologies,...
Israel Officially Moves to CENTCOM
On September 1, the U.S. Department of Defense officially reorganized Israel within the area of responsibility (AOR) of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) alongside the other Middle Eastern nations. Amid U.S. retrenchment, the move could facilitate enhancement of Israeli capabilities and enhance coordination among American forces in the region, its Arab partners and Israel as they focus on combatting an increasingly aggressive Iran. With the unofficial transition expected to take several more years to complete, the United States must ensure Israel does not lose any capacity in the process, particularly in the realm of joint air and missile defense. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Blaise Misztal - Vice Pres...
Iranian Naval Provocations
An Iranian suicide drone attack near Oman against the Israeli-operated MT Mercer Street killed two crewmembers on July 29, marking the most significant escalation in Tehran’s aggression at sea since 2019. The attack is an alarming convergence of two dangerous trends in Iran’s aggressive activities: its maritime harassment and increasing use of drones. This year, Iran and its proxies are increasingly using drones to strike U.S. service members, partners, and interests in Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, with limited U.S. response to date. Now, Tehran is signaling its willingness and ability to apply the lessons it has learned about drones—including its relative impunity—to its maritime aggression. Shortly after the Mercer Stre...
Lebanon Rocket Attacks
On August 6, Hezbollah fired nineteen rockets into Israel, which the Israelis quickly retaliated against with artillery fire into southern Lebanon. The incident is a further escalation of what was already the largest uptick in cross-border fire in years. Left unchecked, there is growing potential for the tense situation along the Israel-Lebanon border to erupt into a deadly multifront war. The Lebanese state is at best failed and at worst coopted by Hezbollah, its misery a direct result of Iranian meddling in the country’s affairs. The United States should not allow the Lebanese state and international community to escape responsibility for restraining Hezbollah and holding the group accountable for destabilizing rocket fire. But Washingt...
Iran’s Provocative 20% Enriched Uranium Claims
European officials recently expressed grave concern about Iran’s July 6 announcement that it would begin using its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium to produce enriched uranium metal. But it is another, earlier, and mostly unremarked on Iranian announcement that should be much more alarming. On June 15, Iran claimed to have 108 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium on hand. This would represent a remarkable advance over the 62.8 kilograms it had just 24 days earlier. If this rate of growth were sustained, Iran would be on course to accumulate enough 20 percent enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon, thereby dropping its breakout time to as little as 6 weeks, by mid- to late-July. Producing 20 percent enriched uranium at this r...
Bombings in Iraq Despite Biden Retaliation
Iranian-backed proxies have escalated their attacks on U.S. personnel in Iraq soon after President Biden launched limited airstrikes in response to earlier attacks by these same groups, showing that the administration’s attempts to deter further aggression are not succeeding. Biden’s use of military force against Iranian-linked militias has been too narrow and inconsistent to have the desired effect. Moreover, whatever deterrent value the U.S. reprisals might have is further undermined by administration’s withdrawal of air defense assets necessary to protect against Iranian-linked attacks and negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear program. Instead, the Biden Administration should pursue more forceful retaliation against groups resp...
Iran’s Projectile Threat to U.S. Interests and Partners
For the second time since February, President Biden has ordered airstrikes on Iranian-backed militias after they fired munitions at American servicemembers in Iraq. This action will be insufficient to deter further Iranian aggression throughout the region. Instead, Tehran will perceive the recently announced withdrawal of U.S. air defense assets from the region as a victory, continuing, if not further increasing its attacks, to achieve its goal of driving the United States out of the Middle East. Iranian-fired, -designed, -produced, and/or -supplied projectiles are the greatest current threat to not just to U.S. forces in Iraq but the security of the Middle East more broadly. Comprehensive data assembled by JINSA shows that projectile atta...
Evaluating the Danger from Gaza’s Weapons Stockpile
The fighting between Israel and Gaza that took place from May 10-21, known in Israel as Operation Guardian of the Walls (OGW), proved that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) maintain a large, diverse, and growing arsenal of projectiles of increasing range that can be fired in coordinated salvos intended to overwhelm Israel’s robust air defenses. These advancements in Palestinian rocket technology threaten Israel’s ability to deter future conflicts and defend against attacks when they occur; they are also a harbinger of the much more devastating potential conflict with Hezbollah on Israel’s northern front. Israel’s ability to deter and defend itself against these growing rocket arsenals, while abiding by the law of armed co...
Assessing Operation Guardians of the Wall
As Israel and Hamas announce a ceasefire last week, IDF MGs (ret.) Yaacov Ayish and Yaakov Amidror discuss the success of Operation Guardians of the Wall, what can be gathered from the latest clash, and the effects of the operation on future deterrence strategy. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Erielle Davidson Senior Policy Analyst
Unprecedented Rocket Fire from Gaza: Ongoing Escalations and Recommendations for the Biden Administration
Taking advantage of violence in Jerusalem precipitated by efforts to evict Palestinians from the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood, Palestinian terrorists in Gaza have once again fired rockets into Israel. Israel and Hamas have been fierce adversaries in recent years, frequently trading rocket fire, but have avoided fighting a major war since 2014. The Biden administration should work diligently to avoid further escalation between Gazan terrorists and Israel hastening actions that indicate U.S. support for Israel—like appointing an ambassador—and fully backing Israel’s right to self-defense. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Ari Cicurel Senior Policy Analyst Erielle Davidson Senior Policy Analyst
Iran’s Newest Nuclear Steps Won’t Make Up for Delays Caused by Explosion
Iran has attempted to make up for an April 11 explosion at its Natanz enrichment facility by announcing new nuclear advances: enriching uranium to 60 percent and installing an additional 1,000 advanced centrifuges. Though these moves are designed to regain leverage and convince the United States to grant Iran sanctions relief, neither of these announcements will, for now, materially accelerate Iran’s ability to sprint for a nuclear weapon. Instead, the explosion at Natanz appears to have set back Iran’s “breakout” clock — the amount of time needed to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a single nuclear weapon — by roughly two months. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Blaise Misztal Vice Presi...
Explosion at Iranian Nuclear Plant Buys U.S. Time and Leverage
On April 11, what appears to be an explosion at Iran’s main Natanz nuclear facility, widely suspected to be the result of Israeli sabotage, set back recent advances in Tehran’s ability to enrich uranium quickly and on a large scale – and with it, to pressure Washington to return to the JCPOA. The Biden Administration should embrace the additional leverage and time bought by this action to pursue a more effective strategy for preventing a nuclear Iran, including by publicly endorsing Israel’s freedom of action and working with it to develop further credible military options against Tehran’s nuclear aggression. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Blaise Misztal Vice President for Policy Jonathan Ruhe ...
Biden’s Middle East Drawdown
The Biden Administration is reportedly in the process of redeploying military assets from the Middle East. This is part of a broader effort to rebalance America’s global force posture, which is seen as requiring reduced U.S. presence in the region. However, this move sends the wrong signal as the United States begins nuclear negotiations with Iran as it will leave U.S. interests and Arab partners exposed to, and therefore will likely provoke, growing aggression from Iran and its proxies. Washington must work closely with its regional partners to expand defensive and offensive capabilities for protecting against and deterring Iran and its proxies. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Charles Perkins Director fo...
Iran-Backed Missile and Drone Strikes
Earlier this week, Iran’s Houthi proxies in Yemen escalated their ongoing missile and drone offensive against Saudi Arabia by targeting one of the world’s major oil export terminals. This is part of a larger Iranian strategy to exert regional dominance by developing, proliferating and using these increasingly capable precision munitions to target and exploit its adversaries’ lack of strategic depth in the Middle East. This could eventually give Iran the ability to conduct highly costly, even catastrophic, conventional military strikes in the region. As Tehran relies more and more on these tools and tactics to pressure its neighbors, including American forces, Washington and its partners must proactively deter and degrade Iran’s use ...
Iranian Aggression Despite U.S. Retaliation
Aggression by Iran and its regional proxies continues to escalate along multiple lines of effort with a March 3, 2021 attack on U.S. forces at Al Asad Air Base in Iraq and several alleged attacks against Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Biden Administration’s efforts to engage Tehran diplomatically while deterring it through a discrete, unilateral, and pin-prick military response in Syria on February 25 has not succeeded. Iran will likely continue its comprehensive regional counterpressure strategy of nuclear and military escalation so long as it believes it will be effective in achieving U.S. economic and geopolitical concessions. To establish deterrence, Washington should work with its regional partners to hold Iran accountable for its cont...
U.S. Retaliation in Syria
On February 25, 2021, President Biden ordered an airstrike, his first known use of military force, against buildings tied to Iranian-backed proxies in Syria in retaliation for recent attacks on American personnel in Iraq. This was a welcome response but likely insufficient to deter future Iranian aggression. Indeed, given reports of an explosion on an Israeli-owned ship in the Gulf of Oman just hours later, apparently linked to Iran, it remains to be seen if the United States, or Israel, intends to respond. As the U.S. pursues new nuclear talks with Iran, much in the region, and in U.S.-Iran relations, remains fluid. This policy memo from JINSA staff provides details and context of the airstrike in Syria, background on Iranian-backed ag...
Without U.S. Response, Rocket Attacks Continue
Following a U.S. statement promising “support for all efforts to investigate and hold accountable those responsible” for a February 15, 2021 rocket attack on a U.S. base in Erbil, Iranian proxies have twice more struck at the U.S. targets in Iraq. Most recently, three rockets struck near the U.S. Embassy in Iraq on February 22, 2021. Such attacks by Iranian proxies are likely to become more frequent and dangerous in the absence of a strong U.S. response. This policy memo from JINSA staff provides details of the recent rocket attacks in Iraq, background on Iranian-backed aggression against Americans in Iraq, and policy recommendations for U.S. officials. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Blaise Misztal Vic...
Implications of Rocket Attack in Erbil
A rocket attack in Erbil, Iraq on February 15 killed a civilian contractor and left another nine injured. While attacks by Iranian-backed groups on Americans have become common, it is the first such test that the Biden administration faces as they pursue nuclear negotiations with Tehran. This policy memo from JINSA staff provides details of the recent rocket attack in Erbil, background on aggression against American positions in Iraq, and policy recommendations for U.S. officials. Click here to read the memo. JINSA Staff Contributors Blaise Misztal Vice President for Policy Ari Cicurel Senior Policy Analyst
Israel’s Acceleration of U.S. Weapons Procurement: Analysis and Recommendations
The Israeli government’s recent approval to purchase U.S.-made aircraft and munitions was enabled in part by providing for earlier use, or “frontloading,” of American defense assistance funds. Building on previous JINSA recommendations, this policy memo provides background for how frontloading supports Israel’s qualitative military edge – and U.S. national security interests in the Middle East – by accelerating Israeli procurement of vital weaponry to counter growing shared threats from Iran and others, without raising the overall cost to the United States. Click here to read the memo. JINSA Staff Contributors Jonathan Ruhe Director of Foreign Policy Charles B. Perkins Director for U.S.-Israel Security Policy Ari Cicurel ...
Implications of Iran’s Enrichment to 20 Percent
Iran’s announcement that it has begun enriching uranium to 20 percent represents its gravest nuclear escalation in years and a shift in its counterpressure strategy against the United States. This policy memo from JINSA staff lays out the implications of Iran’s move and provides policy recommendations for U.S. officials. Click here to read the memo. JINSA Staff Contributors Blaise Misztal Vice President for Policy Jonathan Ruhe Director of Foreign Policy
Possible Attack From Iran: Analysis & U.S. Policy Implications
As the anniversary of the U.S. strike that killed Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2020 nears, the U.S. military is reportedly preparing for Iranian reprisals. Although important, strategic signaling, such as by flying B-52 bombers over the region, is not adequate to stopping more likely lower-level Iranian attacks, especially since the U.S. is drawing down its regional forces at the same time. To deter and defend against Iranian aggression, both the Trump and Biden teams will have to communicate resolve to defend U.S. personnel and partners, alike. This policy memo from JINSA staff provides background on U.S.-Iran tensions in 2020, possible Iranian motivations if the regime decides to strike, and policy recommendations for U.S. off...
Turkey’s Offensive in Ayn Issa, Syria: Analysis & U.S. Policy Implications
On December 18, 2020, Turkish forces and proxies began attacking the Syrian city of Ayn Issa, currently held by the Syrian Democratic Forces. Although Ankara has not released any public statement about the nature or intent of their operations, this could mark the beginning of a coordinated offensive to retake other SDF-held towns, such as Manbij or Kobane. This policy memo from JINSA staff provides background, ongoing developments, analysis of possible Turkish objectives, and implications for U.S. policy. Click here to read the memo. JINSA Staff Contributors Blaise Misztal Vice President for Policy Jonathan Ruhe Director of Foreign Policy Ari Cicurel Senior Policy Analyst Erielle Davidson Senior Policy Analyst Shiri...
| 1 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 1 | 9999 | 9999 | Makovsky, PhD |
Michael Makovsky, PhDPresident and Chief Executive Officer |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 4 | 9999 | 9999 | Ruhe |
Jonathan RuheDirector of Foreign Policy |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 3 | 9999 | 9999 | Hannah |
John HannahRandi & Charles Wax Senior Fellow; Former Assistant for National Security Affairs to the Vice President |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 2 | 9999 | 9999 | Misztal |
Blaise MisztalVice President for Policy |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Cicurel |
Ari CicurelAssistant Director of Foreign Policy, Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Bird, USN (ret.) |
VADM John M. Bird, USN (ret.)Former Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Conway, USMC (ret.) |
Gen James T Conway, USMC (ret.)34th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Stutzriem, USAF (ret.) |
Maj Gen Larry "Stutz" Stutzriem, USAF (ret.)Former Director, Plans, Policy and Strategy at North American Aerospace Defense Command |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Donald, USN (ret.) |
ADM Kirkland H. Donald, USN (ret.)Former Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Glueck, USMC (ret.) |
LtGen Kenneth J. Glueck, USMC (ret.)Former Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Gortney, USN (ret.) |
ADM Bill Gortney, USN (ret.)Former Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Chilton, USAF (ret.) |
Gen Kevin P. Chilton, USAF (ret.)Former Commander, U.S. Strategic Command |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Natonski, USMC (ret.) |
LtGen Richard Natonski, USMC (ret.)Former Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Hostage, USAF (ret.) |
Gen Michael Hostage, USAF (ret.)Former Commander, Air Combat Command |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Cornell |
Svante E. CornellPolicy Advisor, Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Corn, USA (ret.) |
LTC Geoffrey S. Corn, USA (ret.)Hybrid Warfare Policy Project Member, Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy; Gary A. Kuiper Distinguished Professor of National Security Law, South Texas College of Law, Houston |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Goldstein |
Larry GoldsteinFounder and Director of Energy Policy Research Institute, Inc.; JINSA Gemunder Center Senior Advisor |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 3 | 9999 | 9999 | Hannah |
John HannahRandi & Charles Wax Senior Fellow; Former Assistant for National Security Affairs to the Vice President |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Rademaker |
Hon. Stephen RademakerFormer Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation; JINSA Gemunder Center Senior Advisor |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Deptula, USAF (ret.) |
Lt Gen David Deptula, USAF (ret.)Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, U.S. Air Force Headquarters; JINSA Gemunder Center Senior Advisor |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Wald, USAF (ret.) |
Gen Charles "Chuck" Wald, USAF (ret.)Distinguished Fellow; Senior Advisor; Co-chair, Iran Policy Project, Eastern Mediterranean Policy Project; Member, Gaza Policy Project, U.S.-Israel Security Policy Project |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Gerber |
Sander GerberDistinguished Fellow, Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Amidror |
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov AmidrorDistinguished Fellow, Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Norkin |
Major General Amikam NorkinDistinguished Fellow, JINSA's Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Harward, USN (ret.) |
VADM Robert Harward, USN (ret.)Former Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Noronha |
Gabriel NoronhaFellow, JINSA's Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Abrams |
Elliot AbramsSenior Fellow for Middle East Studies at Council on Foreign Relations |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Strick |
IDF MG Yoel StrickGemunder Center Visiting Military Fellow |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Palumbo, USA (ret.) |
LTG Raymond Palumbo, USA (ret.)Former Deputy Commander of U.S. Army Special Operations |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Lanza, USA (ret.) |
LTG Stephen Lanza, USA (ret.)Former Commanding General of I Corps and Joint Base Lewis McChord |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Davis, USMC (ret.) |
Lt Gen Jon Davis, USMC (ret.)Former Deputy Commandant for Aviation |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Gibson, USA (ret.) |
LTG Karen Gibson, USA (ret.)Former Deputy Director for National Intelligence and National Security Partnerships |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Ashley, USA (ret.) |
LTG Robert Ashley, USA (ret.)Former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Matthews |
Earl G. MatthewsNon-Resident Fellow, JINSA's Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Perkins |
Charles B. PerkinsFellow, Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Greenert, USN (ret.) |
ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, USN (ret.)Former Chief, Naval Operations (CNO, 2011-2015) |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Ganyard, USMC (ret.) |
Col Stephen T. Ganyard, USMC (ret.)Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Watts, USA (ret.) |
LTC (Prof) Sean M. Watts, USA (ret.)Former Professor of International Law at the Judge Advocate General’s School |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Fiel, USAF (ret.) |
Lt Gen Eric E. Fiel, USAF (ret.)Former Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Fla. |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Newcomb, USN (ret.) |
CDR Mark E. Newcomb, USN (ret.)Former Principal Legal Advisor to Commander, Battle Force 7th Fleet. |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | VanLandingham, USAF (ret.) |
Lt Col Rachel E. VanLandingham, USAF (ret.)Former Judge Advocate in the U.S. Air Force; Professor of Law at Southwestern Law School (Los Angeles, CA) |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Clingan, USN (ret.) |
ADM Bruce Clingan, USN (ret.)Former Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and U.S. Naval Forces Africa |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Jeffery |
Reuben JefferyFormer Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Fox, USN (ret.) |
VADM Mark Fox, USN (ret.)Former Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Warren, USA (ret.) |
COL. Marc Warren, USA (ret.)Former senior legal officer in the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corp for Multi-National Forces Iraq |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Corey, USA (ret.) |
COL Ian G. Corey, USA (ret.)Former General Counsel for U.S. Army Cyber Command |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Tucker, USA (ret.) |
LTG Michael S. Tucker, USA (ret.)Former Commanding General of the First United States Army from 2013 until 2016 |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Spoehr, USA (ret.) |
LTG Thomas W. Spoehr, USA (ret.)Former Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Forces – Iraq |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Katsman |
Abraham KatsmanFellow, Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Breedlove, USAF (ret.) |
Gen Philip M. Breedlove, USAF (ret.)Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe; Former Commander U.S. European Command |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Rodriguez, USA (ret.) |
GEN. David Rodriguez, USA (ret.)Former Commander, United States Africa Command |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Toolan, Jr., USMC (ret.) |
LtGen John "Jocko" Toolan, Jr., USMC (ret.)Former Commander, Marine Forces Pacific |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Makovsky |
Alan MakovskyFormer Senior Professional Staff Member at U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Gardner, USA (ret.) |
LTG John Gardner, USA (ret.)Former Deputy Commander of U.S. European Command |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Wagner Jr. |
Dr. Richard Wagner Jr.Former Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Tegnelia |
Dr. James "Jim" TegneliaFormer Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Stoudt |
Dr. David StoudtDistinguished Engineer, Naval Surface Warfare Center |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Schneider, Jr. |
Dr. William Schneider, Jr.Former Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Popik |
Thomas PopikPresident, Foundation for Resilient Societies |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Pfaltzgraff, Jr. |
Dr. Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr.Professor of International Security Studies, Fletcher School at Tufts University |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Payne |
Dr. Keith PayneFormer Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Nanos, USN (ret.) |
VADM G. Peter Nanos, USN (ret.)Former Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Murray |
Richard MurrayHead of Liability Regimes Project, Geneva Association |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Lehman, II |
Amb. Ronald Lehman, IIFormer Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Kappenman |
John KappenmanPresident and CEO, Storm Analysis Consultants |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Foster Jr. |
Dr. John Foster Jr.Former Director, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Member, Congressional EMP Commission |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Baker |
Dr. George BakerFormer Electromagnetics Group Leader, Defense Nuclear Agency |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Joseph |
Amb. Robert JosephCo-Chair, EMP Task Force; Former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Gabbard |
Dr. Bryan GabbardCo-Chair, EMP Task Force; Executive Vice President, Defense Group Inc. |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Jones, USA (ret.) |
MG. Mike Jones, USA (ret.)Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Central Command |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Devereaux, USAF (ret.) |
Maj Gen Rick Devereaux, USAF (ret.)Former Director of Operational Planning, Policy, and Strategy |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Caldwell, IV, USA (ret.) |
LTG William B. Caldwell, IV, USA (ret.)Former Commander, U.S. Army North |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Zakheim |
Roger ZakheimFormer General Counsel and Deputy Staff Director of U.S. House Armed Services Committee |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Takeyh |
Dr. Ray TakeyhHasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies at Council on Foreign Relations |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Obering, USAF (ret.) |
Lt Gen Henry Obering, USAF (ret.)Former Director of the Missile Defense Agency |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Edelman |
Amb. Eric EdelmanCounselor; Co-Chair Iran Policy Project and Eastern Mediterranean Policy Project; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Trask, USAF (ret.) |
Lt Gen Thomas "Tom" Trask, USAF (ret.)Former Vice Commander, United States Special Operations Command |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Stavridis, USN (ret.) |
ADM James Stavridis, USN (ret.)Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander and former Commander of U.S. European Command; Chairman, Gemunder Center U.S.-Israel Security Task Force |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Corn, USA (ret.) |
LTC Geoffrey S. Corn, USA (ret.)Hybrid Warfare Policy Project Member, Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy; Gary A. Kuiper Distinguished Professor of National Security Law, South Texas College of Law, Houston |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Wald, USAF (ret.) |
Gen Charles "Chuck" Wald, USAF (ret.)Distinguished Fellow; Senior Advisor; Co-chair, Iran Policy Project, Eastern Mediterranean Policy Project; Member, Gaza Policy Project, U.S.-Israel Security Policy Project |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Gerber |
Sander GerberDistinguished Fellow, Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Amidror |
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov AmidrorDistinguished Fellow, Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Norkin |
Major General Amikam NorkinDistinguished Fellow, JINSA's Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Edelman |
Amb. Eric EdelmanCounselor; Co-Chair Iran Policy Project and Eastern Mediterranean Policy Project; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Cornell |
Svante E. CornellPolicy Advisor, Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Goldstein |
Larry GoldsteinFounder and Director of Energy Policy Research Institute, Inc.; JINSA Gemunder Center Senior Advisor |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Rademaker |
Hon. Stephen RademakerFormer Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation; JINSA Gemunder Center Senior Advisor |
| 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Deptula, USAF (ret.) |
Lt Gen David Deptula, USAF (ret.)Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, U.S. Air Force Headquarters; JINSA Gemunder Center Senior Advisor |
Benjamin Gettler Annual International Policy Trip
The Benjamin Gettler International Policy Trip annually brings high-level delegations of retired senior military officers and civilian national security experts to a country that is important to U.S. national security and/or the U.S.-Israel relationship. After completing their trip, each group shares their findings and recommendations with policymakers and opinion leaders in Washington, D.C. and across the United States. This important program is made possible by the generous support from the Gettler Family Foundation, in memory of former JINSA Chairman Benjamin Gettler.
- 2019
- 2018
- 2021
- 2022
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
The Benjamin Gettler Annual Policy Trip visited the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from November 11-18, 2022. The delegation was led by JINSA’s President & CEO, Dr. Michael Makovsky and JINSA’s Randi and Charles Wax Senior Fellow, John Hannah.
Greece
The Benjamin Gettler Annual International Policy Trip visited Greece from November 13-16, 2021. The delegation was led by JINSA President & CEO Dr. Michael Makovsky and consisted of: Gen (ret.) Philip Breedlove, USAF – Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Commander US European Command Gen (ret.) Charles Wald, USAF, former Deputy Commander of United States European Command (EUCOM) Gen (ret.) Thomas Waldhauser, USMC — Commander, U.S. Africa Command Alan Makovsky Meetings included: Minister of Hellenic National Defense Mr. Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos Minister of Environment and Energy Mr. Costas Skrekas Chief of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff, General Konstantinos Floros Chief of the Hellenic Air Fo...
Greece
The Benjamin Gettler Annual International Policy Trip visited Greece from March 31-April 4. The delegation was led by JINSA President & CEO Dr. Michael Makovsky and consisted of: Gen Charles Wald, USAF (ret.) Gen Kevin Chilton, USAF (ret.) VADM Mark Fox, USN (ret.) Lt Gen Thomas Trask, USAF (ret.) IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Ayish Dr. Svante Cornell Alan Makovsky Meetings included: Chief of the Hellenic National Defense Staff, Christos Christodoulou Defense Minister, Admiral Evangelos Apostolakis Shadow Defense Minister, Mr. Vassilis Kikilias Minister of Environment and Energy, Giorgos Stathakis Rear Admiral Dimitrios Kavoulakos Opposition Member, Giorgos Koumoutsakos Leading Greek Think Tank, E...
Egypt
April 29 - May 4, 2018 Participants included: ADM Bruce Clingan, USN (ret.) Gen Charles Wald, USAF (ret.) LTG Howard Bromberg, USA (ret.) LtGen Kenneth Glueck, USMC (ret.) Meetings included: President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi Head of the General Intelligence Service (GIS) Foreign Minister Sameh Hassan Shoukry Minister of Defense Sedki Sobhy Commentary: The U.S. is Right to Restore Aid to Egypt Reuters - July 30, 2018 by ADM Bruce Clingan, USN (ret.) and Read More
Latest Reports
JINSA’s Blueprint for Congressional Action on Iran
Port in a Storm: Enhancing U.S.-Greece Cooperation at Alexandroupolis
Recommit, Don’t Retrench: Policy Priorities for Biden’s Middle East Trip
Time for Plan B on Iran
A Stronger and Wider Peace: A U.S. Strategy for Advancing the Abraham Accords
Watch JINSA Gaza Conflict 2021 Assessment Report Release
At the Center of the Crossroads: A New U.S. Strategy for the East Med
Gaza Conflict 2021 Assessment: Observations and Lessons
Erasing the Leverage Deficit: How to Keep Tehran from the Bomb
No Deal Remains Better Than a Bad Deal: Risks of a JCPOA Return
Precious No More? A U.S. Strategy for a Lonely Turkey
No Going Back Now: The Case Against Returning to the JCPOA
Curtailing Chinese Investment in Israel: A Comprehensive and Cooperative U.S.-Israeli Strategy
Bolstering U.S.-Israel Defense of Shared Interests: An Agenda for the Biden Administration
Dangerous Conditions: The Case Against Threatening Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge
Abraham’s Command: Relocating Israel to CENTCOM’s Area of Responsibility
Leaving the JCPOA Behind: Principles for Preventing a Nuclear Iran
Reshaped After the Pandemic: Turkish Aggression in the Eastern Mediterranean
Best Line of Defense: The Case for Israeli Sovereignty in the Jordan Valley
Anchoring the U.S.-Israel Alliance: Rebuilding America’s Arms Stockpile in Israel
Turkey’s Escalation in Libya: Implications and U.S. Policy Options
U.S. & Greece: Cementing A Closer Strategic Partnership
A Narrow U.S.-Israel Defense Pact: Addressing Criticism
Arming Israel to Defeat Iranian Aggression: Frontloading Weapons Delivery
Sea Changes: U.S. Challenges and Opportunities in the Eastern Mediterranean
For a Narrow U.S.-Israel Defense Pact
If Time Runs Out Again: Implications of Iran’s Nuclear Escalation
Defending the Fence: Legal and Operational Challenges in Hamas-Israel Clashes, 2018-19
Israel’s Next Northern War: Operational and Legal Challenges
Comprehensive U.S. Strategy Toward Iran After the JCPOA
ATLAS SUPPORTED: Strengthening U.S.-Israel Strategic Cooperation
Countering Iranian Expansion in Syria
Strategy to Restore U.S. Leverage Against Iran
The Iran Nuclear Deal After One Year: Assessment and Options for the Next President
Impact of the Interim Deal with Iran
Latest Updates
- U.S.-Israel
- Iran
- Hybrid Warfare
- Miscellaneous
- Syria
- Turkey
- Israeli-Palestinian
- Eastern Mediterranean
- Israel China