A “War on Piracy”?

Bravo, bravo to the U.S. Navy SEALs that dispatched three Somali pirates with three shots and saved Captain Richard Phillips. Like the Israeli naval special operations raid that captured the Iranian weapons ship Karine A, and as they should be, the American SEALs were quick and lethal. Bravo, as well, to Captain Phillips who made himself a hostage in exchange for his ship and crew, and who remembered the obligation of prisoners of war and tried to escape at the first possible moment.

Bravo, bravo to the U.S. Navy SEALs that dispatched three Somali pirates with three shots and saved Captain Richard Phillips. Like the Israeli naval special operations raid that captured the Iranian weapons ship Karine A, and as they should be, the American SEALs were quick and lethal. Bravo, as well, to Captain Phillips who made himself a hostage in exchange for his ship and crew, and who remembered the obligation of prisoners of war and tried to escape at the first possible moment.

But this is NOT “all’s well that ends well,” because it has only ended for the ship and crew of the Maersk Alabama. Dozens, hundreds or thousands of ships sail every day through treacherous waters. Most are unarmed for a combination of reasons including, as Nikola Gvosdev said, “the expense, the hassle and the insurance liability of having armed guards aboard.” Even private security services hired to protect ships are often unarmed.

Gvosdev, a teacher of national security studies at the United States Naval War College, noted in an interview some months ago that armed ships are less likely to be prey for pirates, and paying ransom has its own drawbacks – particularly in an ungoverned place like Somalia. He told of a British reporter traveling through Somali coastal villages. The reporter “learned that the piracy trade is well organized among criminal leaders who divide up the ransom money and set a percentage aside for improved equipment, such as better radios, GPS systems, boats and guns. ‘Therefore, by paying the ransom, you’re also enabling them to increase their capabilities to launch further attacks.'”

In Somalia, without a formal government since 1991, links between a lucrative, illicit business and terrorist organizations cannot be discounted. Former Under Secretary of Defense Fred Iklé laid it out in The Washington Post:

Terrorists…can easily force pirates – petty thieves in comparison – to share their ransom money… Somalia is an ideal fortress and headquarters for global terrorist activity… [and] not an easy place for our [American] military to establish law and order; two of our interventions there became embarrassing defeats — in 1993 and more recently in support of Ethiopian forces.

This is not about unhappy Somalis turning to terrorism because of some real or imagined grievance against the West or the United States or Israel or Christianity or whatever. Piracy is as old as the seas. And the response to piracy is well enshrined in international law. Ikle´ continues:

[There are] powerful international laws that exist against piracy. The right of self-defense – a principle of international law – justifies killing pirates as they try to board a ship.

A “war on piracy” is no more possible than a “war on terror.” But like the notion that there exists an obligation to defend against and defeat terrorists and the states that harbor and support them, captains and crews should not be sailing into known dangers without the arms and political support to defend themselves and their cargo.