Special Operations by Israel and Ukraine Were Immediate Tactical Successes. Their Strategic Impact Will Take More Time to Assess.

On June 13, covert actions by Mossad inside Iran’s territory enabled Israel to start an air campaign and achieve air superiority over several days, as part of Israel’s Operation Rising Lion. Earlier in June, Ukraine’s security service, SBU, used drones smuggled into Russian territory to destroy a significant number of Russia’s nuclear-capable bombers across several airbases during its Operation Spider Web.

These operations by Israel and Ukraine demonstrated how covert special forces operating within enemy territory can be used to affect air power. But despite achieving their immediate tactical objectives, both operations’ longer-term impact on strategic stability is yet to be understood.

Israel’s Operation Rising Lion. Before Israel’s June 13 operation, hundreds of Mossad agents, based inside Iran and in headquarters, worked over many months to pre-position special weapons in Iranian territory.

In total, Mossad operatives conducted three covert operations inside Iran that enabled Israel’s air campaign. In one, Mossad commando teams smuggled a swarm of explosive drones into Iran. Shortly before Israel’s air campaign began in the early hours of June 13, these drones destroyed strategic surface-to-surface missile launchers at the Esfajabad base near Tehran, preventing them from being used against Israeli strategic targets and citizens.

Mossad also installed sophisticated strike systems on vehicles. These systems then launched weapons that destroyed Iranian air-defense systems, enabling Israeli aircraft to penetrate the Iranian airspace.

Finally, Mossad prepositioned precision-guided missile systems within range of Iranian surface-to-air missile batteries. As the Israeli air campaign commenced, these systems were activated remotely to destroy Iranian missile threats to Israeli aircraft in flight.

Mossad’s three clandestine operations opened the way for nearly 200 Israeli aircraft (including US-provided F-15I, F-16I, and F-35I) to drop more than 330 munitions on over 100 targets across Iran. Israel Defense Forces later confirmed that strikes against Iran targeted military leaders, nuclear facilities, and nuclear scientists.

By June 16—three days after launching its operation, which struck more than 865 targets across 350 locations in Iran—Israel achieved air superiority over most of Iran. The targets were reported to include one-third of Iran’s total arsenal of ballistic missile launchers, bases, and transportation vehicles, as well as air bases, command centers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), nuclear project headquarters, government buildings, and intelligence personnel. As of June 18, Israel had struck over 1,000 Iranian targets, including a missile production facility, Iran’s internal security headquarters, two centrifuge production sites, 12 missile storage and launch sites, and a total of over 70 air-defense batteries.

Without Mossad’s covert operations, Israel may have experienced many more civilian casualties and lost strategic assets to Iranian ballistic missile attacks. Israel would also have suffered downed aircraft and pilots from surface-to-air missile threats, hampering its ability to generate air power during the first few days of its operation.

Enabled by its air superiority, Israel’s strikes may have significantly degraded the Iran’s capability to successfully develop nuclear weapons in the short term, even before the United States attacked three Iranian nuclear facilities. The permanent or temporary elimination of the potential for a nuclear-armed Iran is likely to impact the strategic stability of the entire Middle East region.

It is still not clear what strategic lessons China and Russia will draw from Israel’s swift air campaign against Iran as they pursue their own interests. On June 18, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping jointly condemned Israel and insisted that the country de-escalate its attacks on Iran.

The United States’ Operation Midnight Hammer. On June 21, the US Air Force and Navy used bunker-buster bombs and submarine-launched missiles, respectively, to attack Iran’s nuclear sites, including Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, in an operation called “Midnight Hammer.”

Assessments by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) and the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reveal catastrophic destruction of key nuclear infrastructure and military capabilities that were required to weaponize Iran’s nuclear program. These reports indicate both Israeli and US operations have severely disrupted Iran’s nuclear program, setting it back by years, not months.

Some analysts have been concerned that Iran could still weaponize the “missing” 60-percent enriched uranium by integrating this material into the remaining missiles and launchers not yet destroyed by Israel. However, Israel’s defense minister, Israel Katz, affirmed that Israel’s attacks were intended to neutralise Iran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons.

Katz further asserted that Iran now has no way to produce a nuclear weapon, as the conversion facility at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center that turns gaseous enriched uranium into solid form has been destroyed in the attacks. The plant is used to convert uranium hexafluoride gas into uranium dioxide powder, which can then be converted into metallic uranium for use in reactors or nuclear weapons.

About a week before Operation Midnight Hammer, Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it had taken “special measures” to protect its nuclear materials and equipment. The US and Israeli intelligence agencies were aware of truck movements to and from the Fordo enrichment facility. The trucks were also seen by commercial satellites and analysts moving unidentified equipment a kilometer away from the facility, only hours before the US attacks.

In May, in a classified report that was leaked to the press, IAEA inspectors said they had verified that Iran had more than 400 kilograms of highly enriched (60-percent) uranium in its stockpile. More concerning, Dmitriy Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Security Council of Russia, stated that a “number of countries” were ready to supply Iran with nuclear warheads and that the enrichment of nuclear material for nuclear weapons would continue despite the US attacks.

On Friday, Katz confirmed that the United States and Israel have told Iran that it must hand over its enriched uranium. This is a developing story, and it is not clear what actions the United States and Israel would take should Iran refuse to give up its material.

Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web. On June 1, Ukraine destroyed a significant portion of Russia’s air capabilities, including nuclear-capable aircraft that Russia has been using to drop conventional ordnance on Ukraine since 2022. Before Ukraine’s operation, Russia’s strategic bomber fleet totaled 135 aircraft, including 60 Tu-95s, 60 Tu-22M3s, and 15 Tu-160s.

To conduct its covert operation, Ukraine used short-range drones to destroy (or damage beyond repair) a substantial number of high-value Russian aircraft. Targeted aircraft reportedly included at least two of Russia’s seven operational A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft, an unconfirmed number of Tu-160s, 12 Tu-22 long-range strategic and maritime strike bombers, at least eight Tu-95 long-range strategic cruise-missile bombers, and one Il-78M refueling aircraft.

Over 18 months of preparation, Ukraine covertly smuggled several truckloads of small, short-range drones armed with explosives deep inside Russia. The drones were then launched remotely from wooden sheds planted near five Russian airbases in the Murmansk, Irkutsk, Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Amur regions.

Russia’s Defense Ministry confirmed costly drone attacks on airbases in the Murmansk and Irkutsk regions but said it had thwarted the attacks on the airfields of Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Amur. The first-person-view drones also provided near real-time battle damage assessment, confirming strikes on Russian targets and providing for an easy verification by open-source intelligence analysts.

Following the attack, Russia dispersed several strategic bombers further east from Ukrainian borders, which has a direct impact on how Russia can use them in Ukraine: Russian Tu-95 aircraft, which can each carry up to eight Kh-101 cruise missiles, now need to fly for 23 hours to conduct bombing missions in Ukraine. It also puts more operational stress on personnel and the maintenance and sustainment systems, including fuel and spare parts.

According to Ukraine’s Air Force, Russia’s increased use of Tu-160 bombers may already indicate a shortage of Tu-95 bombers following Operation Spider Web. This will also add to the operational costs of Russia’s bombing missions, given that the Tu-160 is more expensive to operate and maintain than the Tu-95.

Operation Spider Web occurred in concert with longer-range strikes from Ukraine’s territory. These strikes targeted Russian strategic fuel stocks, early warning radars, weapons and missile storage depots, as well as bombers.

Ukraine’s strikes primarily sought to degrade Russia’s coercive air power. Unlike Israel in Iran, Ukraine does not have air superiority in its war against Russia and must therefore rely on the slow attrition of Russian forces.

The degradation of Russian strategic forces by Ukraine is likely to have an impact on future strategic stability, as some of the damaged and destroyed aircraft are no longer produced. For nuclear deterrence, Russia is now more dependent upon its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). In recent years, Russia has prioritized the modernization of its land-based and sea-based assets over its air-launched strategic nuclear forces.

Effects on air power, deterrence, and strategic stability. Both special operations were long in the making and required significant resources. Israel’s Operation Rising Lion took years to prepare and was only possible through collaboration between Israel Defense Forces, Mossad, and Israel’s defense industries, in addition to Israel’s past experiences from regional operations. Ukraine’s operation also required more than a year to prepare in collaboration with industry.

In both cases, the drones launched from enemy territory avoided air defenses and successfully conducted their mission. However, such clandestine operations create increased risks for human operatives behind enemy lines. While President Volodymyr Zelensky said Ukraine had safely extracted personnel from Russia before the operation started, Iran’s IRGC said it had arrested several Mossad agents who were operating inside Iran, although the arrests were made before Israel’s operation started.

Israeli and US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities underscore the ultimate value of alliances. Israel is dependent upon US technology for both defensive and offensive actions. Qatar relied on US interceptors in (mostly symbolic) Iranian retaliatory attacks on the US Air Force base in Al-Udeid. Israel’s operation cleared the way for US strikes on central nuclear facilities that would not have been possible with Israeli weapons. And the US operation was unlikely to have been possible without the cooperation of US allies; for example, the United Kingdom was given advanced warning of the US attack.

While both Israel’s and Ukraine’s special operations are sure to provide unique lessons for covert missions against air power, their full impact on deterrence and longer-term strategic stability needs to be viewed from a broader and ongoing deterrence viewpoint. A weakened Iran may be more determined than ever in its nuclear ambitions to restore deterrence, and a humiliated Russia may be more willing to use nuclear weapons. The United States and its allies and partners now need to prioritize the retrieval of the missing highly enriched uranium from Iran and seek a future of strategic stability.