Transcript: JINSA Press Briefing – July 3, 2025
JINSA Press Briefing
Thursday, Jul 03, 2025 – 9:00AM
Blake Johnson:
Hey, good morning. It’s July 3rd, a day before our independence day here in America. I’m Blake Johnson, communications director here at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America. This morning, we have JINSA’s President and CEO Dr. Michael Makovsky, and Senior Fellow John Hannah here to do a reporter briefing ahead of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit to the White House Monday to meet with the president. And we wanted to cover a number of outstanding issues that face Israel and the United States, and their security relationship, and the broader Middle East following the successful strikes on Iran’s Fordow facility and the 12-day war Israel successfully concluded with Iran.
With that, I’ll go ahead and turn it over to our CEO, Michael Makovsky, who will conduct the briefing with John. And then we will have time for Q&A and final thoughts and we’ll then provide the recording to everybody.
Michael Makovsky:
Thank you for joining, and those that are listening in later. So, look, I think Netanyahu meeting with Trump on Monday, I think there are a few things. I’ll just indicate a few, and then I’ll turn it over to my colleague John Hannah.
First of all, he’s going to say thank you to Trump, obviously. And it’s not just because President Trump likes to hear thank you. I think it will be very appropriate and very genuine. Look, I’d modify what Blake said. I think it was an extremely successful military campaign by the Israelis. Doesn’t mean it was complete, though. But I think it was extremely successful. And of course the United States came in on that Saturday near the end with the B-2s, and the MOPs, hitting—and with the cruise missiles—some of the key nuclear facilities.
So I think he’s going to say thank you, and he’s going to say, I think privately, what he has said publicly: that this was historic. Five successive presidents, including Trump, have said ‘we won’t allow a nuclear Iran.’ And it always suggests that we would use military force to ensure that. But it was only Trump that actually did it, and he’ll say that no other [crosstalk] … that only Trump actually did it. And that will be accurate. There are only, I think, a few Republicans that probably would have done what Trump did. So he’ll think him for that, and I think that he’ll also say it was historic for another reason because it was a model of bilateral collaboration between Israel and the United States. And it was a very effective one, and it should be a model going forward, and especially it will be relevant—as John’s going to suggest—if the Iranians don’t do what we need them to do on the nuclear facilities, on the nuclear program.
And I also think Netanyahu is going to communicate that it kind of, it reinforces what I think the Israelis have said. Certainly, Ron Dermer, the Minister of Strategic Affairs, who is Netanyahu’s closest confidant. People have called him Bibi’s brain, but obviously Bibi’s got a pretty strong brain himself. Dermer was a fellow with us, a distinguished fellow with JINSA, between his stints as ambassador and as minister. And we heard him, he said it at a conference of ours, I think in 2019, but it’s been a theme of his, that Israel is the most critical ally, or will be understood as, America’s most critical ally of the 21st century. That no other country could do things militarily, and offer the technology, and so on.
I think that after Trump’s trip to the MidEast where he highlighted all the building that’s going on, the modernization in the Gulf Arab countries, Netanyahu is going to communicate to President Trump what Israel has to offer the United States, and what Israel can do. Buildings are great—Israel obviously doesn’t have the money the Saudis, or the Emiratis, or the Qataris, have—but that Israel could help on concrete security ways for the United States. Because no other ally could have done what Israel did in the days leading up to America’s involvement.
Don’t forget: America, the United States, reportedly asked Israel to clear the airspace for American planes. So Israel really did a lot, I think even before, and even that day of the operation, for the American pilots and so on. And of course there are other things Israel offers, in technology, and so on. But I think he’s going to try to make that case with President Trump about what a critical ally Israel could be for the rest of his term. Now, I think there’s going to be a few main topics. Iran, making sure they cement these gains. And we don’t fully know yet everything that was achieved, but they want to cement that.
Secondly, you know, I think they’ll want to try to work out an understanding of what will trigger, at least, at a minimum, Israeli action, if not bilateral American-Israeli action. Two, they’re going to talk about Gaza and the ceasefire. And three, I think they’ll talk about normalization. They might talk about other things, but I think those will be the top topics. But on that, I think I’m going to turn it over to my colleague, John Hannah, to really delve deeper into those things. So, John, why don’t you? Please, you can take over.
John Hannah:
Very good. Thanks, Mike. Hi to everybody, either listening now or tuning in later to this, to this recording, I think Mike set out what I think the key substantive items will be in the meeting, starting with Iran. And here I’m going to be previewing a little bit from a paper that should be forthcoming within the next day or two on what the immediate agenda is for the United States and Israel toward the Iran after this very successful attack.
The thing that I think is probably the most important for these two leaders to get some kind of common agreement, and basis of understanding on, is, what is going to be their common enforcement mechanism for ensuring this ceasefire, and that Iran is not able to reverse any of the key damage that was inflicted on it during that 12-day conflict, and start rebuilding or reconstituting the most threatening elements of its military and nuclear capabilities. I think this applies whether or not we get back into a negotiation with Iran, and I think it applies whether or not Iran finally ends up allowing IAEA inspectors back in to do their job in monitoring and verifying the state of Iran’s nuclear program.
I think the United States and Israel need a common understanding about what are going to be the triggers that will allow them, or that will necessitate them, going back at the Iranians to make sure that they cannot reconstitute the parts of the programs that they have lost as a result of this war. I think both countries now, having taken military action, having crossed that Rubicon to stop Iran’s nuclear program, they now own the policy of preventing Iran from being able to put that program back together. And inevitably, I think, at the bottom line is it leaves a much lower threshold for what is going to trigger them to resume strikes. Because now it’s not a matter of allowing Iran to rebuild and be a few turns of the screwdriver away from being able to dash to a bomb. It’s stopping them from getting anywhere close to that point again.
So the things that we are thinking that are important right now, to the United States and Israel—any signs that Iran is diverting, first and foremost, any part of that stockpile of enriched uranium, 60 percent, 20 percent, 5 percent, or, frankly, any other equipment that would be critical to either their enrichment program or their ability to weaponize any effort to recollect that material and divert it, would be a trigger for resumed strikes against Iran. I think maintaining any evidence that Iran has developed or maintains or is building secret sites related in any way, shape or form to parts of the nuclear fuel cycle or to weaponization would also be a red line and a trigger for action.
Any effort to reestablish or augment existing lines for the production of long-range missiles or missile launchers would be a red line and a trigger for action. Or importing, if we see evidence that they’ve begun importing dangerous military or technological capabilities from abroad, I think first and foremost, you’ve obviously got to worry about the wild cards of countries like North Korea and Pakistan that are both already nuclear weapons powers and could be tempted to assist Iran in reconstituting some kind of nuclear capability on a more rapid basis. But I think you also have to think about what the Russians and Chinese do now, having done so little to assist Iran in the midst of the war, do they see opportunities and try to take advantage of those opportunities to help Iran rebuild some kind of significant military capability in the aftermath of this war.
Which leads me to my last red line, which in some ways maybe is the first red line, is any effort by Iran to rebuild those strategic air defenses and to deny Israel and the United States the air supremacy and dominance that they’ve now established in Iran, any effort by Iran to rebuild that capability to serve as a shield for any illicit activities, to start rebuilding other elements of their military or missile program that also, we think, needs to be seen as a trigger and a red line for the United States and Israel for some kind of resumed military strikes, either by both of them together or by probably, most likely, Israel alone. But those are some of the triggers we’re thinking of.
Again, it’s obviously a much lower threshold than that existed for either American or Israeli military action directly against Iran before this conflict, but now that this Rubicon of direct directly attacking Iran to stop its nuclear program has been crossed, I think we are in a new era, in an era where the United States and Israel need to remain laser focused, not become complacent and consolidate the successes that that we believe were achieved in this war to dramatically degrade and destroy elements of Iran’s nuclear missile program. We, you know, having done this, we have to recognize that there’s a likelihood and a real chance that Iran will not relent on its efforts to perhaps reestablish some capability here, and we just need to remain very vigilant in consolidating our gains.
The model we have in mind, I think, that the president should discuss, is the very successful model that’s worked during the ceasefire in Lebanon. It’s, of course, not a perfect analogy. These are two separate countries, one directly on Israel’s border, and one, you know, 1,000 miles away. But the principle that it will be up to the United States and Israel to actually enforce this ceasefire, ultimately, if Iran decides and makes the wrong decision, to begin, covertly or otherwise, beginning to reconstitute its most dangerous and threatening programs, then the United States and Israel will have an agreement on what their redlines are, what their triggers are for action, and one or both of them will have the freedom of action to enforce those red lines. So, the Lebanon model is one that we think has proved its utility: the ceasefire in Lebanon since November and probably in excess of 500 Israeli strikes to prevent Hezbollah from being able to reconstitute its military threat to Israel, particularly along Israel’s northern border.
Obviously, particularly if we do not get IAEA inspectors back up and running very quickly to begin looking at all facets of Iran’s program and what kind of damage has been done, and exactly what’s the disposition of that very large stockpile of enriched material, as well as any advanced centrifuges that Iran, we know Iran produced, and yet did not deploy and can’t be accounted for—if the IAEA isn’t able to re establish that kind of intrusive inspection regime, but even if it does, there’s going to be a very high premium. And I think the president, the prime minister, need to discuss this as well, even tighter intelligence cooperation than we’ve had heretofore, and it’s been very, very close, obviously, and very, very successful in understanding Iran’s nuclear missile programs and was so essential to this successful attack. But that’s going to, even, we need even a greater emphasis. We need both countries’ leadership to be ordering their intelligence communities to redouble their efforts to exploit every opportunity that exists, even after the war, maybe even more opportunities, given possible dissension in the ranks and inside of Iran, to establish intelligence networks and assets and agents that are capable of giving us as much early warning as possible regarding the agreed upon triggers for resumed action, any signs that we see of a resumption or reconstitution of Iranian capabilities in these in these areas. So redoubling efforts on intelligence, on our cooperation, and the kind of resources and attention that we focus on that effort, I think is going to be absolutely critical.
Obviously, if we get to a negotiation, there will be questions on what U.S. demands need to be. Ican get into those if people are interested. I don’t think we’re that close to a new negotiation. We’ll see. But I think whatever we demand, in addition to the end of all enrichment inside of Iran and any adjacent activities, obviously, the inspection regime, and going even above and beyond what the IAEA is able to do now and to a much more intrusive regime is probably going to be necessary.
We’re going to have to almost certainly include missiles in any new agreement we have. Anything, certainly long, extended range, nuclear-capable, that’s going to have to be included, as well as what capabilities Iran is able to import into the country, and certainly, whatever it does to export items out of the country, is going to be going to be very critical. And I think the watch word that the president, as successful as this operation was, it’s important that they stay focused, that they make clear they’re not going to be too triumphant, too euphoric, and not allow their governments to become complacent. The Iranian Islamic Republic is down, but it’s certainly not out, and we need to remain very, very vigilant.
On Gaza, I you know, the key player in this, I think, is going to be President Trump. There’s lots of indications that he sees a need to try and bring the Gaza war to a conclusion. Whether he does that through an initial step of trying to secure a 60-day ceasefire that brings back half of the living and dead hostages and then maybe moves on to a negotiation about the end of the war, or whether he tries to go for a comprehensive deal right now, as apparently a majority of the population in Israel believes is necessary to bring back all of the hostages as soon as possible, end the war, at least for the time being, secure Israel’s immediate perimeter along its border, as well as that Philadelphi Corridor along the border with Egypt, to establish a regime there that ensures that there won’t be the kind of smuggling we’d seen previously, that would allow Hamas to reconstitute in any way, shape or form. And then really get our Arab partners into this game in a much more serious way to look at coming in, displacing Hamas with some kind of new technocratic government and supervision that would be responsible for the final disarmament of whatever remains of Hamas’ weapons, and reestablishing some new alternative, non Hamas civil administration in Gaza that’s prepared to live in peace and security with Israel.
We’ll have to see if the President goes for that. I do think that kind of comprehensive settlement, at the end of the day, while very difficult for Israel, I think, and particularly for this Israeli coalition government that has a very strong, if relatively small, but influential, right wing component. But I do think that kind of comprehensive settlement, and I think the president and the people around him probably understand this, is the road that you’re going to have to travel through to get and exploit this much grander vision that I think the president sees for expanding in a dramatic way and a really historic and transformative way, the circle of peace in the Middle East: bringing in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, perhaps even Syria. There’s now a lot of talk into their own versions of the Abraham Accords and really consolidating this new pragmatic, moderate American led coalition of Israel, together with several Sunni Arab states, a bloc in the region that is fundamentally opposed to any ability of Iran to rehabilitate its most dangerous and threatening capabilities in the region, whether It’s the nuclear program, the missile program, or that ring of fire, that network of regional terrorist armies that had so successfully built up over the last 30 years.
Final point is just a note, to do a foot stomp on what Mike talked about, which is that we’ve entered a new era of U.S.-Israel strategic partnership as a result of this conflict. For the first time in history, the United States and Israel have gone to war together, jointly, in offensive operations against the military capabilities of a primary common adversary. That’s a very big deal. Over the last year, of course, particularly starting in April and then again, last October of 2024, we saw the United States do an awful lot via CENTCOM to provide for the defense of Israel against attack by that common foe. But now that we’ve crossed that line of offensive action going to war together, it’s a new day, and that has raises new questions about where the strategic partnership and relationship goes, and I think what’s expected of each party, obviously, people need to protect their own freedom of actions and their own maneuvering room to be able to do things when they think it’s in their own individual interests. And yet, you know, we’re in a different day.
The sort of slogan that we’ve all lived off of for the last 30 or 40 years, if Israel has to be able to defend itself by itself, has a different meaning over the last 20 months, particularly what happened in 2024 and 2025: it wasn’t Israel defending itself by itself. It was Israel and the United States together taking care of these major regional threats that they face in common. And we’ve just got to have serious conversations about what that would look like, what that requires, what parts of that can be formalized, strengthened, deepened. We just need some very good set of understandings. And hopefully that conversation can begin, and the obvious place for it to continue over the next year or two years is through the negotiation of a new U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding on defense cooperation, which the old 10-year understanding is coming up in the next couple of years, it’s ending. We need to replace it with at least another 10-year, maybe even longer than that, possibly.
But all of these questions, it’s much more than a question of what important new equipment and technologies the United States is going to provide to Israel and what kind of financial assistance it’s going to provide to Israel. But there’s a much larger question about, as Mike says, the future of this strategic partnership, which has obviously, I think, proven itself so important in the last month, but I think over the coming years and decades, will Probably even become much more important as Israel’s obvious superpower status in the Middle East becomes more and more evident along military intelligence technological lines. So, Blake, why don’t I stop there and turn it over back to you if anybody has any questions.
Blake Johnson:
Yeah, so for folks who are on, who may have questions, we’ll give you a few minutes. Mike, I just wanted to turn back to you, just to get any additional thoughts on your thinking around the priorities. But I think that might be, I think, I think then the signal move on. But so, I guess while we’re giving reporters just a chance to weigh in here, you know, like you said, you know, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, potential, pragmatic coalition. Were there any senses right now, like, where you think the dynamics with the President, how he feels about his efforts on this, and you said it’s going to be a big celebration for Monday, and does that have any additional weight that that’s going to carry over into these other, you know, tough issues that Netanyahu is facing at home? He’s been seen as sort of the Trump whisperer, I guess, on his ability to maintain a closer relationship with the US throughout very difficult challenges that Israel faced over these past decades. And how this is sort of seen as a culmination of that, and his ability to navigate that, that relationship.
Michael Makovsky:
Well, by the way, I want to say that on the bilateral, it’s hard to divine what President Trump thinks, and it’s hard to divine what he’s going to think a minute later. But I think that you get a sense of Trump with his speech that he gave. I think it was that Saturday night Washington time after the U.S. strikes. I think he, you could see this, even he had that outburst, you know, a few days later. But then he’s also been tweeting Bibi, you know, against Bibi’s prosecution domestically. And I think that he, I think he feels like, you know, he went through something together with Bibi. And, you know, even though it was short, the U.S. direct involvement was relatively brief, you know, it took guts. He defied many of the isolationists within his own party, Trump, but I think it bonded. We’ll see. It’s hard to know what bonds Trump, but I think he feels he bonded with Bibi on this. You know, what happens when people go through tense situations together, and we’ll see how this plays out on Monday. But anyway, it just is saying domestically, I don’t know, but it clearly, you know, Netanyahu is, obviously, as John talked about with Gaza, , it has emboldened Bibi, I think, to take more risk on Gaza, and maybe more risks with his coalition on this stuff. Anyway, we’ll see how this plays out.
Blake Johnson:
I’m going to turn it over to Caitlin McFall at Fox News. Go ahead.
Question:
Hi. Thanks so much. I have two questions, really. Do you think that Trump and Netanyahu will address the future of their partnership in this upcoming meeting, and if so, what changes do you think we can expect, particularly as the U.S. is tightening its arms exports elsewhere in the world? And then two, do you think that Trump can leverage supplying certain strategic capabilities, like B-2 bombers, for example, to get Israel to end its military operations in Gaza?
Michael Makovsky:
Okay, well, I mean, he certainly leveraged it on Gaza. I think he’s, I think one that Bibi feels greater willingness to take risks. Because I think one of the concerns that Netanyahu had about making too many concessions with Hamas is, as much as he wants the hostages back, is one, he doesn’t want Israel look weak. And two, he doesn’t want to look like he’s not fulfilling his promise of total victory over Hamas. I think after Iran, which followed, obviously, the great success over Hezbollah, and the fall of Assad, although Israel didn’t directly trigger it, but it helped it by destroying or decapitating Hezbollah, I think Bibi is able to withstand some criticism on Gaza a bit more. And of course, Trump feels like I did you a solid. I participated. I bombed these sites with my B-2s. Now you need to help me, and we need to finish this Gaza war already, and we need to pivot to normalization with the Saudis and other countries. So, I think there’s obviously leverage there.
It’s hard to know, but sometimes you wonder if Trump thinks in terms of, like, TV episodes, you know. And he finished the episode with the bombing on that Saturday, and it’s important to either have a new episode or turn the channel, you know. And he wants to, clearly, turn the channel or have a new episode, that involves really peacemaking, peace in the ceasefire in Gaza that he hopes will last, and then that will hopefully enable something with normalization. On the B-2s, you know, I wrote an op ed in the Wall Street Journal in 2014 saying we should give B-52s and the MOPs to Israel. That was in 2014. But I’m a little more skeptical about giving, even though there’s legislation that’s been put forward recently, bipartisan legislation by giving it to be too we only have about, I can’t remember, is it 18 or 19 operational ones. So, I’m a little more skeptical that we’re going to, we’re going to even temporarily give Israel those planes to carry the MOPs. I’d much rather see us do things together again, like we just did last month. But, but, but I think you’re right that there’s, you know reports that today they’re withholding certain weapons, it seems like on Ukraine, but I have got to think on Israel, there’s a real effort here now to replenish Israel. They have got to replenish a lot of interceptors on the air defense and a lot of munitions. And I don’t see Trump holding back on that, but it does give them leverage on other things.
John Hannah:
The only thing I the only thing I’d add to that, Mike, is, I think I agree with you on the B-2, that they’re so critical to so many different strategic contingencies versus other adversaries that the thought of, you know, giving some away to anybody, even very good allies, is, I think, would be, you know, a very difficult mountain to climb with the U.S. military, given how few of them there are in our arsenal. As well as that, obviously, the MOPs are not, not unlimited as well, and are very useful in some other contingencies. But [there is] one system that we’ve talked about very frequently that could be expedited, that Israel is obviously requesting and seeking. It hasn’t been seeking B-2s and MOPs, it has been seeking new aerial refueling capabilities, which in an operation over Iran in particular, so far away, to be able to sustain what they did with the very few and old tanker capability that they had was quite remarkable, and, I think, extremely stressful.
So we’ve, JINSA, for, I don’t know if it’s going on six, seven years now, been advocating this new KC-46 aerial refueling tanker by Boeing, that they’re, you know, close to 200 I think now in the U.S. arsenal, several have gone to Japan, I think, is the only exports, but Israel’s in line to get a couple. And I don’t know if it’s now the date is 26, 27; but if anything, those ought to be expedited. And Israel how to have that capability, if it needs to on its own to be able to sustain those long range operations that were so essential to establishing aerial supremacy over Iran, and any effort to maintain that aerial supremacy, which again, as we’ll say in a forthcoming report, I think, is absolutely critical, and any effort by Iran to defeat American and Israeli aerial supremacy ought to be a trigger for resumed action against its any new air defense capabilities it tries to reestablish.
Michael Makovsky:
I one hundred percent agree with what John said, and this is something that JINSA has been very focused on since 2018, we’ve been helping get some legislation passed on expediting delivery. We wanted this delivered before the need for a military strike on Iran. As John suggested, it’s amazing what they did with these old 707s. But I would just add, you know, they we don’t know how the Houthi threat is going to, what’s going to happen there? They’ve been rather quiet lately, but Israel has been able to hit them. But anyway, the air refueling tankers will also help on that story, besides Iran. And also, if I may add it would be an important signal for the United States, given what we still face on Iran, it would be an important signal of U.S. support for Israel, because if the U.S. doesn’t decide, if Trump doesn’t want to go back and do this again with Israel, then he’s got to just kind of help out. It would be very useful, and it’d be a strong signal to the Iranians, if we give Israel whatever tools they need to help enhance their capabilities to do things inside Iran. And the KC-46 would be very useful.
Blake Johnson:
A reporter asked in the chat, when it comes to the ceasefire in Gaza, will President Trump pressure Netanyahu into the ceasefire? I think I’ve had this asked by a few other reporters, just, where’s the vision from Netanyahu for Gaza versus where Trump is on that, and do we have any thinking around that?
John Hannah:
Yeah, I mean, the bottom line is, of course, we don’t exactly know, other than we know that if he had his druthers, the Gaza war would deescalate, would end, would provide a opportunity to completely marginalize Hamas, get the Arabs probably involved in some effort to rebuild in Gaza and ensure take responsibility for the final disarmament of whatever weapons were made in Hamas’ arms, but allow the President and the Prime Minister to move on to winning their Nobel Peace Prizes with Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, this dramatic expansion of the circle of peace and the Abraham Accords, all under American leadership. The ultimate legacy, I think, for President Trump in foreign affairs that he’s so obviously interested in, [is] leaving that mark as a major peacemaker who really did end up transforming the region in a more radical and dramatic way than anyone has since least the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace accord. So, I think that’s his brothers.
Whether or not it happens, you know, via the instrument as an interim ceasefire, 60 days, that gets out half [the hostages] and then provides a basis in which Trump can further negotiate with Netanyahu to bring this war to a close. Or whether he goes for a comprehensive ceasefire now that really does end the war for the time being, is, you know, I still think a bit of a mystery. Because I think you’re right that it would probably requires some expenditure of political capital by President Trump. I do think the prime minister has been strengthened internally in his ability to stand up to elements of his right wing, and I’m sure the president will be fully supportive of the prime minister, if he chose to do that in the interest of ending the Gaza war, bringing it to a close, and then moving on to this much bigger agenda of peace in the broader Middle East.
And what President Trump does, whether we like it or not, or think it’s appropriate or not, it seems to have an important impact and be an important variable in Israeli internal politics, particularly amongst people that are to the right of center and wish one of those paths the President will choose to move on, and how much political capital and energy he’s prepared to put into helping Prime Minister Netanyahu reach the conclusion that we’ve done enough in Gaza for the moment. Now, let’s focus on what the day after looks like. What’s the regime that ensures Israel’s security, gets back all of those hostages, and ensures that we’ve got a strategy for whatever is left of Hamas political presence in Gaza, we can marginalize that very quickly through the establishment of some kind of new non-Hamas civil administration that has full international backing, particularly of the key Arab stakeholders, particularly in the Gulf and in Egypt and in Jordan, something that they can get behind and take some responsibility and accountability. So you know, but which of those paths the President will choose? I really can’t, can’t claim to say at this point in time, or to know.
Blake Johnson:
Mike, do you have any final thoughts?
Michael Makovsky:
I think Bibi could use Trump, and I’m sure he has, to help him with his coalition, his right-wing coalition. I mean, if he doesn’t mind risking it falling apart, he could say to his coalition partners on the right, you know, Smotrich and Ben Gvir, look, President Trump did a tremendous thing for Israel. He wants us to do certain things in Gaza. He wants us to make certain concessions in Gaza, you know, I don’t think these particular things. I’m just making up a conversation, but it’s on the margins. I think he’s able to say, if it doesn’t really affect Israel’s security in a strong way, we should just concede to President Trump. So, I think the relationship allows Bibi, and this Iran effort allows Bibi, to kind of leverage Trump against his some of his partners.
John Hannah:
But I do think it’s important that if the president decides to do that, that there they work as hard as possible in advance in preparing this to ensure that it’s not just pressure on the Prime Minister, but the president also works with our Arab partners to make sure there’s incentive, some incentives, rewards to the prime minister in terms of the larger region and Israel’s prospects for the with the larger region and with Saudi Arabia in particular, that if he decides to take some bold risks in Gaza in bringing this war to a conclusion, getting back those hostages, with the full support of President Trump, with the involvement and backing of other elements in the international community, particularly the Arab world, and then the prospect, the real prospect, that opens quite quickly, of renewed negotiations and a track for normalization with Saudi Arabia and other key states in the region. I think that you’ve got to put together a package, not just pressure on the prime minister, that really does make sense to him as a leader, and as a leader of a country, and as a politician who’s taking, taking some serious risks.
Michael Makovsky:
I think you get a sense this is what the country as a whole wants. There, you have a lot of reservists who have done too many tours, and it’s really weighed on them. Look, you’re seeing these casualties in Gaza, it is not cost free what Israel is doing, unfortunately. So that’s another reason. You know, the focus on the hostages, but you know people shouldn’t forget about the actual casualties of the soldiers, and that’s, these are only the ones that, the ones who are wounded, that we tend to read about. So clearly, there’s a fatigue in the country. I think the Iran operation was a high. They want to use this to move on, I think, and the country needs some relief. So I think Bibi certainly understands all that. So, anyhow, I think that’s another reason for why he wants to try to move on, but it, but just to put a bow on what we started out with, or whatever the terminology is, the Gaza thing is what I think really rips apart the country. Iran obviously had a lot of impact and damage. It killed about 25 Israelis, I think. And of course, it damaged a lot of households and so on. But I think Israel very well might have to go in again to Iran, but I think the country will understand that. It’s Gaza they want to really move on from, or this war particularly, I think they want to move on from already.
Blake Johnson:
Thank you, Mike. I’d like to thank everybody for tuning in today, and for those traveling with the president who’ve asked for copies and transcripts. Yeah, we’ll say a prayer for your arteries as you visit the Iowa State Fair today, and we’ll make this available. I want to flag for everybody that JINSA will soon have a short, brief report coming out from John Mike and the team about the priorities for the US and our regional partners following the current state of the ceasefire with Iran, and we look forward to seeing you guys at our next briefing. So Mike, John, thank you for leading us here today, and we’ll see you all next time.
Thanks for joining. Okay. Bye.