The Golden Dome is a Golden Opportunity for the United States

The Golden Dome project is a golden opportunity to further Israeli-US relations and defense strategies.

Sooner or later, security challenges that debut against Israel come to a theater near us. Israel cut its teeth on one of the most intense ballistic missile barrages in history during this summer’s 12-Day war with Iran after facing down two similar offensives last year and thousands of projectiles over the preceding decade. These experiences and capabilities can be assets for US efforts to build a “Golden Dome” against proliferating missile, drone, and other aerial threats that target our homeland.

Earlier this year, Tehran had planned to expand its ballistic missile arsenal from 2,500 to 8,000 missiles in just two years. This could have helped it overwhelm even Israel’s advanced defenses in the foreseeable future, with or without nuclear warheads, and was a large part of Jerusalem’s recent decision to start Operation Rising Lion. America’s evolving strategic landscape is just as concerning. China, Russia, and North Korea are expanding their existing long-range strike capabilities against the United States and, alongside Iran, simultaneously developing new ones.

The Defense Intelligence Agency noted in May that these countries’ intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) will remain the primary threat to the continental United States and projected their combined arsenals to expand from 800 today to 1,200 just a decade from now. Iran’s continued tests of satellite launch vehicles reflect its undaunted ambitions, despite the recent war, to develop ICBMs capable of reaching the US homeland. Rising numbers of Chinese and Russian ICBMs are expected to be fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS), which complicate detection and interception by flying much faster and using different flight paths than conventional long-range missiles. Then-Joint Chiefs Chairman General Milley called China’s 2021 FOBS test “a near-Sputnik moment.”

In parallel, China and Russia are developing hypersonic weapons, both conventional and nuclear, whose high speeds and maneuverability likewise make timely detection and interception especially difficult. The DIA projects both countries to produce these at scale, growing their combined arsenals fivefold by 2035, to some 5,000 weapons. The same goes for land attack cruise missiles launched from aircraft, ships, and submarines. China more than doubled its arsenal in the last four years. And when combined with Russia, the two are projected to field 10,000 such weapons by 2035—an increase greater than six-fold over ten years.

These numbers give a real sense of the sheer magnitude of challenges facing US defenses in both the near- and long-term futures. Recognizing these mounting dangers, President Donald Trump issued an executive order in January for the United States to develop a missile defense system to protect the United States from ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles. Inspired by Israel’s proven Iron Dome air defense system but much broader in scope, the Golden Dome project will use sensors alongside kinetic and non-kinetic interceptors to neutralize missiles. Trump administration plans reportedly call for one satellite-based and three land-based layers, including 11 short-range batteries across the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii, enabling a defense against global missile threats.

Although the Golden Dome does not need to intercept every threat, it must deter adversaries from launching costly or devastating attacks on critical targets. The Golden Dome requires extensive deployments of integrated sensors and interceptors to counter large-scale, sophisticated strikes with short warning times. Congress committed an initial $25 billion in funding to launch the Golden Dome project. However, developing this expansive program urgently requires much more funding, with estimates from the Congressional Budget Office suggesting total costs could soar to $831 billion over the next twenty years.

The United States needs to quickly deploy more existing defenses as temporary solutions while developing advanced systems. Yet, the main obstacle for immediate and future solutions remains production capacity, not technology. Ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have highlighted systemic weaknesses in the US defense industrial base and supply chains. Golden Dome’s new program manager, US Space Force General Michael Guetlein, framed the problem as “we have proven every element of the physics [to the point] we can make it work. What we have not proven is, first, can I do it economically, and then second, can I do it at scale?”

Amid Washington’s growing efforts to build out its air defenses, this summer’s 12 Day War offers relevant lessons for performance and production needs—now and in the future. Those 12 days of fighting marked the most sustained and intensive US operations against ballistic missiles and drones ever. Iran launched 574 ballistic missiles and 1,084 drones at Israel, prompting Israel and the United States to intercept 273 missiles—achieving an 85 percent success rate on attempted interceptions—while only 49 missiles struck populated areas or critical sites.

Nevertheless, Iran’s missile attacks killed at least 31 people and injured over 3,000 in Israel, exposing ongoing challenges and vulnerabilities that should inform US-led efforts to stand up the Golden Dome. As JINSA’s report on the air defense during the 12-Day War detailed, the sheer volume of interceptors expended and the limited ability to quickly replenish them exposed dangerous gaps in readiness.

Simply put, the United States swiftly exhausted its at-hand interceptor stockpiles during the brief conflict. American interceptors accounted for roughly 70 percent of the total fired, according to JINSA estimates, including over 150 THAAD “Talon” interceptors—amounting to about a quarter of its total stocks and a price tag of $1.8-2.1 billion. Equally concerning, the US military will take delivery of a mere 12 replacement Talons this year and only 37 more in 2026. At current production rates, refilling stocks expended in the 12-Day War would take about 1.5 years if Lockheed Martin paused all deliveries to other countries, such as Saudi Arabia.

The problem also extends to sea-based interceptors. US Navy ships launched around 80 SM-3 interceptors during the war, costing the United States anywhere from $640 million to $2 billion. The United States acquired 27 SM-3 Block IB interceptors last year and ordered 55 more in January, which will not all arrive until 2031. Only 12 SM-3 Block IIAs will be delivered this year and next year. At current maximum production rates, it will take up to two years to replace SM-3s used in the war, even with the Missile Defense Agency recently increasing production for the Block IIA variant as part of the Golden Dome program.

At roughly $2-3 million each, Israel’s Arrow interceptors cost only one-third to one-tenth as much as US interceptors. Evidence also suggests they are more effective than US systems. High US interceptor expenditure rates in the war compared to Israel may partly stem from needing more interceptors to guarantee successful interceptions, suggesting Israeli platforms may be more accurate. Indeed, US air defense systems, such as THAAD, have shown themselves to have lower interception rates than Israel’s Arrow platforms, according to JINSA data. Israeli officials who spoke with JINSA have noted improvements in the performance of US systems in June 2025 compared to October 2024. Still, questions remain about the efficiency of US air defense platforms.

These vulnerabilities are cause enough for concern in a brief regional conflict against Iran; they become truly alarming when contemplating the potential for drawn-out and potentially simultaneous conflicts with China or Russia. The experience in June underscored that current US production and resupply capacities remain insufficient for the pace and scale of future great power wars, demanding urgent investment in America’s defense industrial base.

At the same time, Israel’s Arrow missile defense systems emerged as a cornerstone of effective and resilient air defense against complicated Iranian ballistic missile attacks. Arrow’s higher interception rate compared to US interceptors sent a clear message about Arrow’s sophistication in demanding operational environments.

Equally significant was Arrow’s seamless integration with US air and missile defense systems, which proved vital during the conflict’s most intense phases. Joint operations benefited from shared situational awareness, enabled by real-time data sharing through networks like LINK-16 and direct coordination between US and Israeli command teams. LINK-16 helped US Central Command and Israel share a common operating picture, improving coordination against threats.

Arrow served as the linchpin within this integrated defense network, synthesizing information from multiple ground-, air-, and sea-based platforms and tasking US and Israeli air defenses to neutralize specific threats. The ability of US and Israeli forces to coordinate launch decisions and defensive responses in real time highlighted the Arrow system’s adaptability and depth of interoperability, setting a benchmark for future missile defense cooperation in complex, fast-evolving conflicts.

U.S. limitations and the urgent need to begin fielding initial defenses should encourage American defense planners to think creatively and boldly. Israel is a good place to start. In calling for the Golden Dome, President Donald Trump’s executive order recognized the potential to harness our partner’s existing expertise. Starting long before their combined trials under the fire of three rounds of massive Iranian barrages in just over a year, the United States devoted significant time and effort to helping design and build Israel’s world-class air and missile defense architecture. In total, America spent more than $9 billion over the past two decades on bilateral research, development, and production.

Closer cooperation with Israel can help address these capability gaps. Both nations should boost the co-production of Arrow 3 batteries and interceptors by expanding production lines. The United States should also acquire its own Arrow-3 systems for immediate, cheaper, and possibly more effective solutions. Congress should also increase funding for the joint development of the next generation of advanced Israeli air defense technologies like Arrow-4, Arrow-5, and Iron Dome-2.

While the US Army has shown reluctance to integrate other Israeli air defense systems, such as Iron Dome, the US Marines have chosen to adopt this technology, and the close integration of Israeli and American systems during the 12-Day War demonstrated not only that such cooperation is feasible but also that it significantly improves operational effectiveness.

As missile threats evolve, the Trump administration’s Golden Dome initiative offers an opportunity not only to upgrade US missile defense platforms to the next generation of technology but also to modernize the way the United States and its partners conduct air defense operations. Traditional ground-, air-, and sea-based systems alone are now insufficient, but advancements in space-based technologies enable new interception capabilities. Interceptors deployed outside Earth’s atmosphere could neutralize ballistic missiles earlier and farther from their targets, minimizing the risks from falling debris. To develop the extensive networks of small intelligence satellites, the United States should leverage Israeli experience in detecting and tracking threats.

The United States and Israel have strong potential to expand their cooperation in advanced technologies like AI, hypersonic missile defense, and directed energy. Joint efforts on AI-powered sensor networks could enhance real-time threat detection, while bilateral research may advance solutions against emerging hypersonic threats. Directed energy technologies currently being developed by Israel promise cost-effective, scalable defenses. For example, Israel’s Iron Beam laser has neutralized dozens of drones and costs only a few dollars per interception, compared to hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars for conventional kinetic interceptors. By combining Israel’s technological innovation with America’s industrial capacity, both countries can drive forward advances that will shape the future of missile defense.

These initiatives could be the tip of the spear for more concerted US-led efforts to build production partnerships with Israel and our other Middle Eastern partners. Indeed, the region remains largely overlooked in America’s worldwide hunt for defense industrial capacity, despite the opportunities to expand and better coordinate what should be a truly global campaign to boost collective outputs and share vital munitions, components, and raw materials. With these near-term efforts in the foreground, the United States should enhance joint research, development, and production of next-generation interceptors and sensors with Israel, whose cutting-edge defense sector is already at work—in many cases, with US help—designing and fielding ever more capable systems and sensors.

The evolving nature of missile threats demands deeper US-Israeli collaboration to ensure resilient defenses for the future. Now is the time for American policymakers and defense leaders to act boldly by accelerating joint innovation and expanding cooperative investments in next-generation air defense.