Transcript: Webinar – Gaza War Update (9/18)
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PANELISTS
Michael Makovsky, PhD
JINSA President & CEO
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
JINSA Distinguished Fellow; Israel’s Former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister
IDF MG (ret.) Yaacov Ayish
JINSA Julian & Jenny Josephson Senior Vice President for Israeli Affairs; Former Head of the Israel Defense Forces General Staff Operations Branch
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TRANSCRIPT
Please note quotations have been edited for flow and clarity.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
Hi I’m Michael Makovsky. I’m the President and CEO of JINSA. I’m joined, as often the case, with two of my colleagues, General Yaacov [Ayish], the Julian [& Jenny] Josephson Senior VP here at JINSA, [the] former head of [Israeli Defense Force] operations, [and] J3 and General Amidror, [a] Distinguished Fellow here at JINSA and among other things, [the] former National Security Advisor to Prime Minister [Benjamin] Netanyahu. Welcome generals.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaacov Ayish
Just for the sake and the memory of Julian, it is really important to take the opportunity and mention it.
Makovsky:
I appreciate you saying that, and we do want to express our condolences, as we did privately to the Josephson family on the passing recently of Julian Josephson, who was a major supporter at JINSA and sponsored General Ayish. Really a unique individual and lover of Israel. Thank you very much for mentioning that General Ayish.
Okay, let’s talk about Gaza. We haven’t done that for a little bit, but I think that’s the main topic of today. And I want to start with General Ayish. But before I ask you a question, General Ayish, I don’t need to explain to everybody in the audience about how important it is, but this operation has been causing a lot of international controversy to say the least. It seems to be triggering, perhaps, or at least they’re using this as an excuse, a number of countries say they’re planning next week to recognize the Palestinian State, which the United States and Israel oppose, [as it] would reward terror, among other things. But also, I’ll just mention a couple of quotes here, obviously, Israel’s getting a lot of criticism about this operation. France says it’s a destructive campaign. Germany’s been critical [of it]. China fully opposes [it]. Obviously, the Qataris mentioned genocide. You have Senator Bernie Sanders today being the first U.S. Senator to claim Israel is conducting a genocide in Gaza. On the other hand, you have the administration generally supportive [and] wants the war to be over with. But Secretary of State [Marco] Rubio was just in Israel and indicated that Israel might not have any choice but to defeat Hamas. He said that he can’t allow Hamas to govern Gaza anymore, but you’ve got to get the hostages out. It’s obviously been a controversial issue inside Israel, with leaks about, perhaps, according to reports, there’s some disagreement between the IDF leadership and the government on this.
First, General Ayish, could you explain exactly what’s going on on the ground? Obviously, the IDF is confronting what is perceived [as], I guess, the last bastion—the main, big stronghold of Hamas in Gaza City. How much [does] Israel control [of Gaza City]? They’ve been, it seems, slowly taking more territory in Gaza City, but now they’re really going, according to reports, further in. So, could you explain kind of what’s going on on the ground, and then we’ll get to General Amidror.
Ayish:
Okay, thank you very much for having me. I’ll start by trying to remind everyone what is the simple strategy and strategic goal of the State of Israel. Whatever we [have done] in Gaza since October 7 [has been] simply to remove the Hamas threat from Gaza, and to allow the Israeli residents of the south, and the rest of the Israelis, to live their lives safely.
Until now, we have achieved many of these goals, but [have] not yet completed [them]. And in order to achieve [them], we had to eliminate Hamas’s military capabilities, and for that, we have eliminated more than 24 battalions of Hamas. We control quite a good level—75 percent of the area inside of the Gaza Strip, [including] Rafah refugee camp, the northern part of Gaza, [and] the area of Khan Younis. And right now, in order to complete the mission, we are fighting literally in Gaza City. And when people are hearing the names of neighborhoods such as Zeitoun, or Shati or Jabaliya, these are neighborhoods inside Gaza City.
Now, when I’m saying city, people have to understand that we are talking about multi-story buildings, and we are talking about an underground infrastructure and around 7000 terrorists that fled into the city, to use it as a safe haven. As we do in almost every build up area, before we enter that area, we are using leaflets [and] text messages, [to communicate] with the local population, and try to mobilize them and to evacuate them to a humanitarian zone. The most known humanitarian zone is the area of the Mawasi and the area north to the Rafah area, where we see the humanitarian support flowing in. But the same stuff is happening elsewhere.
In Gaza City, before we started the current phase in the operation, there were around a million Gazans. 450,000 have left in the last three weeks. There are half a million left inside that we are urging and trying to mobilize [to leave for their safety]. And for that, there are a few factors, maybe later on we will discuss, that are delaying it.
One of them is Hamas, who is literally preventing them and threatening them from leaving Gaza City. The second element: for Gazans to leave Gaza City, they need quite a lot of money in Palestinian terms, to hire or to rent cars that will mobilize them [or] to have a place that can accommodate them later on in the humanitarian zone. And this is without speaking about the traffic jams that are right now happening along the roads. But in terms of operations, we are trying to push them, and then who[ever] is left in Gaza City, is suspected [to be] a terrorist.
So, this is the stage where we are. And in terms of analyzing, what we had to complete is literally to gain control [of] Gaza City, and then to clear it up under the ground. The subterranean dimension has to be covered. And the multi-story buildings that are still standing [have to be covered].
When you see on TV [that the Israeli military has conducted] a multi-story building attack, it means that it was incriminated. It means that Hamas [was] using it [for] other [purposes]—for [its] people, HQ command and control or observation or to attack IDF forces. And this is the only reason why we are attacking certain buildings and not everything over there.
We have to understand about fighting in a buildup area: [it] is no longer 3D fighting, but it’s [fighting] all around. It’s [fighting] above and under the ground. And when you’re thinking about Hamas, it’s not the same Hamas that we met [in Gaza on] October 8. Later on, we started to fight in the neighborhoods. It’s more like guerilla fighting—small squads that are trying to use IEDs [and] anti-tank capabilities in order to hit the IDF when they are entering Gaza City.
So, this is basically one operational effort that has to be concluded with a lot of constraints. And first and foremost is the hostages. As far as we know [about] their possible location, we are marking those locations on our maps, and obviously the IDF does whatever it can in order to avoid hitting the hostages and to fight in those areas surgically and accurately.
This is one dimension and the second dimension [is that] while we are fighting in Gaza City and elsewhere, we are continuing to allow humanitarian support, food, fuel, water, clothing, medical support, etc. into the Gaza Strip. This is all over Gaza—the northern part and the southern part and the area of Khan Younis and elsewhere. And today, we suffered a terror attack on the Allenby Bridge [caused by] a truck [carrying] humanitarian support coming from Jordan. It was manned by a terrorist that was using and exploiting the fact that he’s [going] back and forth into Gaza. And while he was on the bridge, before he started being screened by the soldiers, he killed two IDF soldiers.
So, this is basically the situation in Gaza. In order to execute that, we have two divisions right now fighting inside Gaza and another division that is fully responsible [for monitoring] the fence with Gaza to make sure that Gazans and Hamas [are] not exploiting the opportunity in order to penetrate into Israel. That’s basically the operational situation. And I assume that once it will be completed inside Gaza City, it will take us further on, a few months, in order to clear up the city. I’m sure that those who [have been] with us in the last two years understand the complexity of fighting in buildup areas, and especially when you have the hostage constraints on one hand and on the other hand, you have the subterranean capabilities of the other side.
We are using all sorts of capabilities, including the close air support and massive air strikes on Gaza and the armored units, together with infantry and engineering units—all of them are fighting inside. And it’s not only in Gaza City. People have to understand that today we lost four soldiers in the area of Rafah. So, the way we are fighting and the way we are challenged by Hamas, [it has] transformed into something like guerilla [warfare] and nowadays, and it’s still a severe challenge for the IDF. So, this is the general picture.
Makovsky:
All right, thanks, General Ayish. I have some questions, but why don’t we turn to General Amidror. Look, we’ve been talking with you about Gaza for almost two years now, and we [can] go through some of the questions again, but do you want to lay out why what you see [and] the value of what Israel is doing now?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
In this war, I think I explained in the past, we have more than one goal. The first one, the very simple one, is to [be] in a situation [where] Hamas will not be in a position to attack Israel. That was achieved outside the Gaza Strip. Hamas is willing to take Israel out of the Gaza Strip. They cannot launch rockets because they don’t have [them], they don’t have the ability to manufacture them, because we destroyed the many factories they had. They cannot do something which is equivalent to the seventh of October raid into Israel, because, as an organization, they are not functioning. They don’t have the ability to organize many people and to build the capabilities, the trucks, and so on and so forth.
Hamas is still the main force inside the Gaza Strip. There are three reasons why we should destroy them completely. One is because of the day after in Gaza. If Hamas is stronger than any other element inside Gaza, no one will be ready to come in, because no one is ready to fight Hamas. So, under the third party, which will take responsibility for the [the day after plan in Gaza], we compromise with Hamas, [but] Hamas will be actually, practically the one who is making the decisions. You know, the Lebanese situation in which there was a government, but Hezbollah did what it wanted [to]. So, if we want someone to come in and to rebuild Gaza, we need to get rid of Hamas.
The second reason is, [as] someone said today, that if Israel declared the war over before Hamas is [gone], the notion in the Middle East and with the Palestinians, will be that Hamas won the war. And in spite of all the destruction in Gaza, we succeeded to eliminate its leadership. If Hamas get[s] out of the war and can make a parade in Gaza and say, “Gaza is ours! Israel [may be] a superpower, they can win the war against Hezbollah, they can win the war against Iran, [but] they cannot defeat us, Hamas.” For the future of Israel in the Middle East, it’s a devastating situation. We have to rebuild our position in the Middle East for future deterrence, future credibility in the Middle East. And after the seventh of October, it cannot be done without the full destruction of Hamas.
And I mean, there is another reason. It is not about Israel; it is not about us and Hamas. It’s about the Middle East. If Hamas is not distracted and Hamas declares that [it] won the war, [and] more and more countries recognize the Palestinian state, you can be sure that Hamas-like organizations will come out and flourish in states like Jordan, the Gulf countries, [just like] the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. It will symbolize the success of the Muslim Brotherhood kind of organizations, and we see it all around the Middle East. If we succeed in destroying Hamas, it will be understood in the Middle East that this kind of movement leads nowhere. And that is a very strong signal around the Middle East, not because of Israel, [and] not even because of the Palestinians. It’s about the other Muslim countries, other Sunni, Muslim countries in the Middle East. If we lose [to] Hamas, we [end up getting] out of the war in Gaza with the claim that they survived. This is the result of the resistance and they succeeded to implement it. And yes, at the end, they lost many people, but they are still controlling Gaza.
People don’t understand—this is a huge issue. It is the only place in which a Muslim Brotherhood kind of organization is controlling a full area, a group of people, and is the practical ruler of the area. There is not any other example of that now in the Middle East. And if they succeed to have [Gaza] after the war, to keep it after the war, to run it after the war, it will be very bad for the whole Middle East.
So, in a way, we are not now fighting in Gaza [to] practically eliminate every capability to attack Israel. Members of Hamas will be there, the idea will be there, but no one will have the ability to attack Israel. And we are fighting to show the Arab World that war is leading to catastrophe and [terrorism] cannot succeed. And for that, we have to fight and to sacrifice. There is no free lunch.
Makovsky:
And General, you laid out why it’s strategically valuable, critical for Israel. Obviously, there have been some costs, and you might see them as secondary. But how do you assess the reaction lately, of France, England, Canada, well Canada was more [critical] about [Israel’s strikes on] Doha, it seemed like, but they’ve generally been critical. I mean, this might just be internal politics for these countries, but what do you make of it?
Amidror:
I say this is a very stupid and irresponsible act. Why? It is encouraging the school of thoughts of Hezbollah-like organizations, or Hamas-like organizations. Hamas is showing that you can do what they did on the seventh of October, and at the end of the day, the world is helping them, encouraging them, appreciating what they did, because something very important was achieved by the Palestinians. This is why this is so stupid. Even if they want to achieve something in the future, they’re losing leverage [over] the Palestinians. And from our point of view, we have to decide: What is more important for Israel’s future? [Either] we have good relations with Canada, Australia, [and] have Hamas as the ruler of Gaza, or not. And it is a question that was on the table in the past, [and] probably on the table in the future. What is more important for Israel to accomplish—to save international relations with all these countries and to have Hamas as the one who is ruling Gaza? Or to get rid of Hamas as the one who is ruling Gaza, and [have] bad relationships with those [Western] capitals?
Makovsky:
Another thing on this, you had Rubio just in Israel, you know [who] pretty much backed Israel’s views—Hamas can’t be allowed to govern, and the hostages have to be removed. But how do you see the U.S. approach? Does Israel have carte blanche? Or are there certain restrictions on what Israel could be doing?
Amidror:
I think what Israel does not have kind of a carte blanche about is time. Some American generals and even the professionals understand that what Israel is doing [in Gaza] is the only way to fight Hamas. Those who say, “don’t kill civilians, don’t destroy buildings,” the practical meaning of it is “do not fight Hamas.” And because we decided to fight Hamas, these are the side effects.
But on the table, there were two approaches. One is the religious resolve. The lives of the hostages [are] very important. Everything is [not] more important than destroying Hamas. When and how, [we don’t know], but one day we will do it. The other approach was, it is more important to destroy Hamas, and [then] one day we will restore the relations with these countries. And if we win the war in Gaza, it will be even easier.
One remark I have to say. People are saying, “What do you mean winning the war? How do we know what that looks like?” And the answer is what you want to achieve is basically Area A and B in the West Bank [in] the Gaza Strip. Gaza Strip is a big Area A. It’s not so big, but a big Area A. It’s 360 square kilometers. It’ll be a big Area A in which someone is responsible for all the civilian [institutions], someone with the responsibility for rebuilding Gaza. It [will cost lots of] money—I think 15 billion, [but that] will not be good enough. And it will need someone responsible for the security. [I don’t mean] the domestic security, but the boundaries of Gaza and any attempt to build something that might attack Israel or endanger Israel in the future. [Those capabilities] should be destroyed. Israel is responsible for the security; the third party is responsible for organizing a new Gaza society and institutions. And at the end of the day, it could be probably [a] combination of Arab states, the Palestinian Authority, the Americans, and maybe others. By the way, all those that we met during the two years, speaking with them about the day after in Gaza, all of them told us, “Okay, we are ready to consider it if Hamas is not there, if Hamas was eliminated.”
Makovsky:
Let me ask General Ayish one question that I just see already from [the audience]. He raises that there was some report on NPR yesterday that Israel bombed a fertility clinic and that it approved [of a] genocide [in Gaza]. If you could address that first, and then I’ll ask a broader question.
Ayish:
Well, I saw that question. You know, Israel is doing whatever it can in order to avoid collateral damage, [especially in] a clinic. I must admit, personally, that the same clinic, the same question, comes time and time again. Almost every operation. I remember [hearing these] types of questions since Operation Protective Edge.
Makovsky:
Okay, all right, let me ask you also on timeline.
Amidror:
I must say something about genocide. I think it’s very important. In genocide, the assumption is that the community, which is genocided by someone, the number of the people in this community will be reduced, be killed, expelled.
In the whole history, since [19]67 when [Israel ruled] both [the] Gaza Strip and the West Bank, the number of Palestinians in both places [increased]. There was never any year in which at the end of the year someone could crowd statistics [and say] “you know, the Israelis are very successful [in carrying out a genocide.] We have now less Palestinians in the West Bank or in Gaza.” It’s a very peculiar “genocide” [where] we are stupid enough to make it [where] the Palestinians are flourishing. During the war itself, no question, the Palestinians in Gaza suffer[ed] a huge blow and their lives are miserable. But genocide it is not. We didn’t kill Palestinians in big numbers [on purpose]. Maybe some Palestinians had been killed because we made a mistake. [The Palestinians] say they are coming to take their food, but at the end of the day, [Israel finds] out, [that they are] threatening our positions [for] securing this area and the commander on the ground made a mistake and killed a hundred Palestinians. It’s not a genocide. It’s a big mistake, but it’s not a genocide. Genocide means that one society decided to reduce the ability of the other society to live and to be better in the next generation. [Palestine’s population hasn’t declined since] 67.
So, you can say that we are very cruel, that we are making mistakes, that we are killing too many Palestinians that should not be killed. We can argue about it. But to say that this is a genocide, there is not any [evidence] for what we are doing in [Gaza that points to a] genocide. A genocide should [reduce] the number of Palestinians, not [increase the number compared to the previous] year.
Makovsky:
Yeah, Israel’s genocide is certainly failing. Let me ask you, General Ayish. Let me go back to the operation for a second in Gaza City. I think Effie Defrin, the Israeli military spokesperson, who was a former Visiting Fellow with JINSA and a great guy, I think he said something like it would take several months. [The IDF] control the city, its centers of gravity, and [it would take] several more months, or even more, to [clear] the city [of Hamas] whose infrastructure is deep and well established. Now, some non-military officials are saying it could take by the end of the year. Now, I know estimates in these kind of things—you’ve got to be very careful with them. I remember at the beginning going to Israel in November of 2023, I was told major operations in Gaza would end at the end of December of 2023. And then, I think I was there the final month in December, and I was told they would end by January. Obviously, that didn’t happen. We’re almost two years later.
Amidror:
I think that from the beginning, I told you it would be at least a year.
Makovsky:
Yes, you have said that.
Amidror:
I was the most pessimistic one. And if you count the number of days that we really fought in Gaza, we didn’t wait [for Hamas to] release the hostages. Then we waited to enter Rafah because of America. Then we decided [to] move the forces to Lebanon, because there was the issue of use it or lose it and we had no other choice but to move forces into Lebanon. We didn’t know what the reaction of Hezbollah would be to the pager approach. So, I think if you count the actual months in which we were very active in Gaza, it is less than a year.
Makovsky:
General Ayish, besides Effie, I spoke to another Israeli general, and obviously I imagine there are disagreements within the military even on this, but he also told me about six months, which is what kind of Effie’s quotes suggest, including cleaning the city out of terrorists.
Are you willing to hazard a guess on this? How long are we talking about? Because I think, I can’t remember what Prime Minister Netanyahu exactly said, but I think he said something like “it’ll end soon.” It seems like the civilian leadership has been trying to suggest it’ll end soon. And the military guys are saying that it could go longer. I don’t know if you want to address that.
Ayish:
Okay, so I think we should understand a bit more in detail, as to what is going on over there, and what someone means when he is saying, “we are going to take control [over] a certain area.” [The IDF] controls Rafah and we lost four soldiers over there. We’re still fighting, and no one is sure if the IED [on] their Humvee was planted [last] night or a month ago. And no one yet can tell us that all the tunnels that are in that area are demolished.
Even in the day after, listening carefully to what General Amidror was saying, he was saying, “I want it like Area A [in the West Bank]. It means that you are going in and out [of Gaza] for what? For hitting terror squads, finding their labs, finding their depots, finding their HQs, finding their equipment and hitting them? So, if you try and compare it to what is going on right now in Judea and Samaria, we are going [out] on a nightly basis into those refugee camps and cities when we identify terror activities or terror squads or terror organizations planning to do this or that.
So, at the end of the day, when we complete the mission, there is a missing link here. We talked about removing the threat of Hamas. We talked about destroying their military capabilities, destroying their military infrastructure, specifically this one under the ground. We didn’t mention the missing link, which is, who is the alternative? Who is going to take control? The mission is going to be completed only when someone else will administrate the Gaza Strip. And in that sense, it’s a very sensitive matter between the school of thoughts within the military. There are certain voices. And the direction given by the government—it’s not yet clear who is going to control, and I’m not sure that someone has a complete answer on that.
Once we clear up the underground, subterranean capabilities, we have to administrate that area somehow. And it’s not only food and water—it’s all the other elements that comes with it and someone will have to administrate it. And right now, it seems that the IDF will have to do it. That’s why I think what General Defrin was describing in the media is very close to reality. Having said that, you know, you can see surprises. Take a look at what has happened in the last two years when we shifted the main effort to the north or to Syria or to Iran, or we decided to go for a ceasefire for the hostages. So, it’s very unstable, but in terms of time frame, it’s a matter of a few months, and afterwards, we will have to continue fighting guerrilla terrorist cells that are going to be in that area. We are not going to finish it until the last terrorist. It’s going to be an effort done on a daily basis, [just] as we are doing it in Judea and Samaria.
Amidror:
We are in dialogue with some countries in the Middle East and out of the Middle East to try to understand what they’re ready to do, and how we can build a kind of coalition for controlling Gaza afterwards. Here in Israel, there is an argument if you should bring to this coalition elements from the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, because the system there is very corrupt, inefficient, and they are paying terrorist families based on what they did. And those in prison in Israel, the families are getting paid [while they are in prison]. So, there is a big argument here [regarding] if we need [to include the Palestinian Authority in this plan]. I believe that we cannot do it without them, not because they [are efficient], but because any Arab country will need legitimacy. The legitimacy can be given only by the Palestinian Authority. What they’re sharing in the whole spectrum of providing the civilians with the [necessary] services and so on and so forth. I don’t know it, but I think that at the end, the Arab countries, which will be ready to invest and to help the Palestinians in Gaza, need some kind of semi approval from the Palestinian Authority. In the end, we will have to compromise on that if we want someone to come into the Gaza Strip. The second one, the dream about the Riviera in Gaza, after all the Palestinians [immigrate]. I think it’s nothing practical, not because the setting in Gaza is not fantastic for another Palm Beach, it’s because I don’t see [any] countries who are ready to accept the people of Gaza. They have [a] very bad reputation. So, countries which will be ready to accept them, like South Sudan, it’s not any place that the people of Gaza will be ready to integrate. So, the whole issue is to find the countries which will be ready to bring in two million Palestinians from Gaza. I’m very skeptical about this possibility. Number three, the Israelis will not agree to any solution in which the IDF is not the supreme responsible [figure] for the security [in Gaza]. After the lesson of the seventh of October, it is not going to happen.
Makovsky:
I wanted to ask about the UN week. Next week, you have Netanyahu coming to speak. I assume Trump is also speaking next week. I think [there was] maybe a little less media about [Netanyahu] reportedly coming to Washington after that. Of course, you got Rosh Hashanah next week, and he’s going to meet with President Trump, reportedly.
So, let me ask you, General Amidror, what are you looking for next week? It should be an interesting week. I mean, you got, Ron Dermer, former JINSA Distinguished Fellow, reportedly in London this week to meet with [U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve] Witkoff. They’re trying to see if they cut a deal. I assume they’re trying to head off this effort to recognize a Palestinian State. And I should mention that last week, there was a big UN vote about recognizing the Palestinian State. And, you know, Israel [and] the United States opposed and maybe another eight other countries, like Argentina and Hungary, I can’t remember the exact number, 140 or something [countries], supported that resolution. Even the Greeks and the Germans supported it. The Czechs abstained. But given all this, there’s the isolation that even Netanyahu spoke about this week. And he said Israel needs to be a super Sparta, which caused a little [controversy].
Amidror:
[That was a] very bad example. I’ll try to elaborate. Look, first of all, it’s [an] issue of decision. Israel should say, “What is more important? To have good relations with Paris, Berlin, London, Canberra and Canada, and having Hamas stay in Gaza and control Gaza? [Or not?] These are the two options to stop the war now. To take the hostages, go out and to make the relations with the Europeans and others much better, but Hamas will remain in Gaza. Or, to say, “It’s a high price, but it should be paid because it is important for Israel to destroy Hamas.” These are the two options. There is no third way to deal with it. You know, people are saying, “But General, you have to think out of the box! Everything is not black and white.” No, in this case, it’s black and white. Either you will stop your war, or you don’t stop your war. If you don’t stop the war, you will lose the international [support]. If you continue the war, you must [destroy] Hamas. And was a decision made by the Prime Minister of Israel and the cabinet.
With all due respect to all these countries with which Israel [has] had very good relations in the past, not all of them voted for the independence of Israel in the United Nations in [19]47. But it’s something more than that. I’m sure that in the [foreseeable] future, there will not be an independent Palestinian state. Why? Because Israel is a democracy, and you know, on that day, if 70-75 or 80 percent of the citizens of Israel cannot agree to a Palestinian state that no one can guarantee will not be controlled by Hamas, it is not going to happen. The government will not have any pressure from within to agree to a Palestinian state. On the contrary, the pressure will be not to let it happen, because all those who recommend us to have a Palestinian state. Can you guarantee that, in the free elections that you envisioned [for] the new Palestinian state, can you guarantee that Hamas will not win the elections? And if they are honest with themselves, Hamas will win the elections as it is today.
So, it’s a hollow decision by the United Nations. Today, the representative of Iran, ex-ambassador to the United Nations, was nominated, the woman was nominated, as a member of the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations. So, this is the United Nations. I don’t have any expectations. And why it is stupid, even from the point of view of those who think that [there should] be a Palestinian state, [is] because it’s clear that any negotiators with Palestine say “we need both sides [to] compromise.” What leverage remains in the hands of the Prime Minister of Britain and the President of France if they give legitimacy and recognition to the Palestinian state? What leverage do we have with the Palestinians afterwards?
Makovsky:
Just one last thing, and then I’ll turn to General Ayish. I understand about the UN. I guess I was a little more focused about what you see happening next week, with France and Saudi Arabia and so on, and also with the Trump-Netanyahu meeting later next week.
Amidror:
About the United Nations, other than 14 countries voting for recognition of the Palestinian state, nothing will happen. It’s an overall decision without any basis. About the meeting with [Trump and Netanyahu], I think it’s a very crucial meeting. Why? The success of Israel in the war changed the balance in the Middle East. It’s another Middle East. Geopolitics, different geopolitics. There is no Axis [of Resistance], there is no Shiite Crescent, there is not any [strong] connection between Iran and Lebanon and Hezbollah and Hamas. You see the situation. It’s a different Middle East. There is no way to see aggression [from] Iran, because the Iranians are exposed to Israel’s Air Force. [They] don’t have [an] anti-air system, and they have been pushed, I don’t know for how many years [exactly, but they have been pushed] back in their nuclear program, and they don’t have the ability to produce missiles. I mean, it’s a different Middle East. And these two gentlemen should sit together with their advisors to decide what kind of a Middle East they want. [They should] list the problems, list the opportunities and [then decide], “okay, what should be done?” Because now, [with] the combination of the United States of America and Israel, [they are] so strong that they can [make] a list and decide [what] will be implemented.
And as Prince Turki of Saudi Arabia [once] told me, with the Israeli money and the Saudi money, we can change the Middle East. I’m telling you, with the capabilities of Israel and America today, they can change the Middle East, but they have to sit and to decide what they want. Do they want regime change in Tehran? I’m not sure that this is the right decision to take, but if they want it, they have to implement it. They have to begin to work on that. They have to decide what they do if Iran is going back to the nuclear project or the missile project or both. [They have to decide] if we are sharing the monitoring system and what do we do, if [that happens]. How [could we] continue to pressure the government in Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah? What is the American part of it and what is the Israeli part of it? There are more rumors that we might have a kind of security agreement with the [new] Syrian regime. I mean, for them to deal with Syria, it’s a very important issue. Okay, what [do we do with this] new Syria? If it’s new, I’m not sure, by the way, that it’s so new, but let’s assume that it is, and we have an agreement, okay, where [do] we continue from here? It’s a new Middle East.
Makovsky:
Thank you, General Amidror. Do you have anything you want to add about next week that people should be looking for [regarding] what’s going on in New York? I think the meeting with Netanyahu and Trump, I assume, is here in Washington.
Ayish:
Well, I assume that the most important part next week is the meeting in Washington, not necessarily the General Assembly vote that was mentioned here. In fact, the two-state solution is not something new. Over here in Israel, we had, for a certain period of time, that notion. Prime Minister Netanyahu [mentioned] it in the Bar-Ilan [University] speech. It’s not relevant.
Show me the leader that would lead the Palestinians. I’m looking forward to seeing it in Judea and Samaria and in Gaza. I’m afraid that we [will] have to remove Hamas as a threat, and hopefully we will see a future leadership that can bring some hope to the region. So far, I don’t see any of it.
Makovsky:
Okay, all right, fair enough. All right. I think we should conclude. I want to thank both of you generals, General Ayish, [and] General Amidror, for joining us. I want to thank everybody for and, by the way, for joining us as usual late at night in Israel. [I want to] thank the whole audience for joining us. For those watching who are Jewish—I want to wish everyone a happy and healthy New Year. Shanah Tovah.