Operation Protective Edge
Update – August 22, 2014
Phase I Overviews
David Horovitz offered what would have been a great summary of Operation Protective Edge’s historical significance…had the ceasefire held.
Update – August 22, 2014
Phase I Overviews
David Horovitz offered what would have been a great summary of Operation Protective Edge’s historical significance…had the ceasefire held.
In the Telegraph (UK), Alan Johnson provides a comprehensive catalogue of Hamas’ intimidation and manipulation of the media over the two months of the current conflict.
And in U.S. News and World Report, Oren Kessler digs deeper into the casualty figures provided by Hamas and generally repeated uncritically by the Western media.
UNRWA and the Palestinian Authority
A Jerusalem Post editorial outlines the biases of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East, while Alexander Joffe and Asaf Romirowsky argue in the New Republic that any post-conflict reconstruction money for Gaza should go through the Palestinian Authority (PA) rather than UNRWA.
Similarly, former U.S. National Security Advisors Sandy Berger and Stephen Hadley argue that any ceasefire must empower the PA rather than Hamas, although Jonathan Tobin argues in Commentary that the PA will still not be able to enforce its will against Hamas post-conflict (or that it would make much of a difference anyways).
Renewed Operations
On Wednesday Hamas fired rockets at the offshore gas platforms this year’s Generals and Admirals’ delegation visited via Israeli Navy Fast Patrol Boat; Simon Henderson offers preliminary analysis, suggesting that although it would take a small miracle for Hamas’ unguided rockets to hit the platforms, the mere threat may alter the conflict’s equation.
For the first time in the conflict, on Wednesday night Israeli successfully targeted senior Hamas military commanders, killing three of the al-Qassam Brigades’ senior leaders. Avi Issacharoff of The Times of Israel provides analysis, arguing that in conjunction with the attack on Qassam Brigades commander Muhmammad Deif, the operation shows that Israeli intelligence has penetrated Hamas’ military wing.
In response to the attack, Hamas summarily executed 18 suspected informants in Gaza. This follows reporting [Note: yet to be independently confirmed] last week that Hamas executed dozens of workers responsible for its extensive tunnel system in order to prevent them from providing information to Israeli intelligence.
Hamas Terrorism
In the wake of ISIS’s beheading of American photojournalist James Foley, three separate authors – Daniel Gordis in Bloomberg, Alan Dershowitz in The Jerusalem Post, Jonathan Tobin in Commentary – analogize Hamas’s threat to Israel to ISIS’s threat to the West.
Finally, on Wednesday a senior Hamas official publicly confirmed that the Hamas was indeed behind the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers that triggered the chain of events leading to the current conflict. This is significant, because some news outlets/analysts had seized on an anonymous quote allegedly from an Israeli official a month ago saying the Israeli government did not know who was behind the attack as evidence that the entire conflict was an Israeli conspiracy.
Update – August 8, 2014
Israeli Options
The last week saw several useful analyses of Israel’s policy options – from both before and during the now-defunct ceasefire – that remain relevant in the wake of renewed fighting:
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Before the previous ceasefire failed on Monday morning, Amos Yadlin outlined Israel’s strategic alternatives and argued a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza was better than a bad agreement with Hamas;
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MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror, who participated in a JINSA conference call briefing last week, agreed that a redeployment was the best course after the destruction of Hamas’ terror tunnels; and
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Jonathan Spyer, who attended the Shabbat dinner in Jerusalem with our Generals and Admirals’ Trip delegation in May, casts the decision not to reoccupy Gaza in terms of the broader threats Israel faces in the region.
Hamas’ Options
Two good pieces assessed the ceasefire from Hamas’ perspective, which goes some way towards explaining why they were willing to resume hostilities so quickly:
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Shlomi Eldar in Al-Monitor on how Israel’s withdrawal left Hamas empty-handed in terms of its stated demands; and
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Avi Issacharoff in The Times of Israel on Hamas’ unappealing choice between a large attack or a long-term ceasefire.
Hamas’ Ideology
A few writers also explored another factor driving the conflict – Hamas’ ideological motivations – which have received surprisingly little attention in the press:
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In The American Interest, historian Jeffrey Herf unpacks Hamas’ 1988 Covenant, which clearly outlines the genocidal anti-Semitism motivating the group; and
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Jeffrey Goldberg dismantles the claims of Hamas apologists by asking a simple question: “What Would Hamas Do If It Could Do Whatever It Wanted?”
And in the New Republic, counter-terrorism expert Matthew Levitt argues that the social dynamics within Gaza make it highly unlikely that ISIS or another Salafist group could assert control of that territory if Hamas were swept from power.
The Media and Casualties
In The Commentator, Daniel Schwammenthal cites numerous incidents suggesting the apparent willful blindness of the Western media in reporting from Gaza.
Conversely, two separate articles in The New York Times and the BBC urge caution at taking civilian casualty figures reported from Gaza at face value, noting that Hamas operatives seldom wear uniforms and that a disproportionately large number of reported civilian casualties have been military age males.
And this week the IDF posted a copy of Hamas’ Combat Manual on its blog, which provides explicit guidance to the terror network’s operatives to operate from heavily populated areas.
The United Nations and Gaza
Finally, two pieces assess the damage caused by the United Nations’ actions:
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Canadian parliamentarian (and former Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada) excoriates the UN for its silence with regards to Hamas’ systematic violations of the Law of War; and
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Peter Berkowitz criticizes the UN Human Rights Council’s decision to investigate Israel in the middle of the conflict, noting that the Council’s previous investigation was a travesty and only provided incentive for Hamas’ use of human shields.
Update – August 1, 2014
Overview
Defense News compares Operation Protective Edge at the 23-day mark to 2008-2009’s Operation Cast Lead by the numbers, while The Times of Israel has produced an informative primer on Hamas’ military capabilities, from troop strength to tactics.
As public opinion polls consistently show that over 90% of Israelis oppose a ceasefire in Gaza before Israel’s objectives are achieved, Ari Shavit writes in Ha’aretz: “Those who are even slightly forgiving of Hamas are cooperating with a fanatically tyrannical regime,” showing even the Israeli Left is strongly behind Operation Protective Edge.
Similarly, in the Wall Street Journal Brett Stephens writes that “To argue the Palestinian side, in this war, is to make the case for barbarism.”
Israel’s Options
David Horovitz, who has been providing some of the best analysis of Israeli side of the conflict, outlines why Prime Minister Netanyahu is reluctant to commit to a full-scale ground offensive.
Arguing against the conventional wisdom that Israel is winning tactically but losing the narrative war, Brent Sasley writes in Politico that Israel is clearly winning strategically as well.
Proportionality and the Laws of War
As the Washington Post documents Hamas’ use of hospitals, mosques, and schools as weapons depots, former prosecutor Andrew McCarthy outlines how these actions violate the laws of war and make such structures legitimate targets in time of war.
Dore Gold (whom we briefly met in Jerusalem in May as we waited for Prime Minister Netanyahu) explains why Israeli operations in Shajaiya, Gaza, were both necessary and in accordance with the principle of proportionality in international law.
The Diplomatic Front
The New York Times reports that Arab leaders perceive Hamas as a greater threat than Israel, and unlike in past operations are remaining silent in the face of Israel’s offensive.
Secretary of State John Kerry’s attempt to negotiate a ceasefire has drawn fire from some unlikely quarters:
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In the Washington Post, columnist David Ignatius calls the Secretary’s initiative a “big blunder” that “undercut not simply the Israelis but also the Egyptians and the Fatah movement that runs the Palestinian authority.”
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An even stronger indictment against the Sec State’s proposal is made by Khaled Abu Toameh, whom this year’s Generals and Admirals delegation met with in Jerusalem.
Tactics and Technology
Finally, after three weeks of operations, some interesting analysis of the tactics and technology involved in the fighting:
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Ha’aretz talks to U.S. military analysts to examine how the American military might view the lessons learned from Operation Protective Edge;
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Although the Iron Dome missile defense system has gotten most of the attention during this conflict, the “Trophy” anti-guided missile system has also had a significant operational effect; and
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An interesting piece in The National Interest argues that Operation Protective Edge shows the limits of a campaign built around standoff strikes.
Update – July 25, 2014
Overview
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Citing his personal observations from JINSA’s G&A Trip to Israel in May, General James T. Conway (USMC, ret.) outlined the moral chasm between the IDF and Hamas in today’s Wall Street Journal.
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Michael Herzog, who briefed this year’s delegation in Jerusalem on the strategic importance of the Jordan Valley, outlines in Foreign Policywhy Operation Protective Edge is a war of necessity for Israel, not one of choice.
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Adam Garfinkle, writing in The American Interest, provides a thorough overview of the continuities and differences between Operation Protective Edge and the two previous Gaza incursions (Operation Cast Lead, 2008-2009; Operation Pillar of Defense, 2012) that preceded it.
Strategic Options
Two good pieces this week focusing on Israel’s strategic options as Operation Protective Edge enters its third week:
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In a BESA Center paper, Major General (res.) Yaacov Amidror argues that Israel is reaching the point where it must decide between two options: achieving limited objectives that risk future conflicts or a costly total war to eliminate Hamas.
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Former Ambassador Michael Oren argues that if one truly cares for the Palestinian people, Israel must be allowed to crush Hamas to prevent it from initiating future conflicts to their detriment.
In an earlier piece, Amb. Oren suggests the solution to the conflict is to demilitarize Gaza, citing the PLO’s 1982 evacuation of Beirut and the removal of chemical weapons from Syria as precedents. The Washington Post editorial board similarly argued that disarming Hamas should be U.S. policy and the key to a cease fire.
Terror Tunnels
Three pieces discuss the terror tunnels the JINSA delegation visited in May, and which precipitated the current ground offensive:
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Eli Lake reports on the “offensive” tunnels in The Daily Beast;
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Former U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey argues that Hamas initiated the conflict for fear that Israel would discover the breadth of their tunnel network and thwart a planned mass-casualty attack; and
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The Jerusalem Center for Public Affair’s Jonathan Halevi provides a deeper analysis of the tactical, operational, and strategic implications of Hamas’ attack tunnels.
Human Shields in Gaza
Several reports noted the deeper significance behind the rising death toll amongst Palestinian civilians in Gaza:
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In “Hamas Is Destroying Gaza,” William Saletan says that whether or not one supports Israeli policy, Hamas is flouting international law sacrificing the lives of Palestinian non-combatants for its political objectives;
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AP reports on one example of this disregard for Palestinian lives: the stashing of rockets in United Nations-run schools in Gaza;
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The prolific Michael Oren stresses that Hamas’ media strategy explicitly depends on increasing the suffering of its people; and
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Ambassador Dore Gold similarly notes that because Hamas has lost support throughout the Arab world in the last three years, it is relying on the exploitive media strategy in order to gain political allies in Europe.
Media War
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Two pieces focus more narrowly on the strategic communications aspect of the conflict, a topic that generated a great deal of discussion during the G&A Trip in May:
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A report on the web magazine Mashable claims that Israel is losing the narrative battle on social media, at least as reflected in the number of hashtags on twitter.
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One possible explanation for the imbalanced reporting of the conflict lies in Hamas’ intimidation of journalists, as exemplified in this account of a French-Palestinian correspondent’s ordeal. (Note also that in Dagga’s account all the Hamas fighters are wearing civilian clothes, and their headquarters are in a Gaza hospital.)
Israel’s Home Front
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Finally, a stirring piece by David Horovitz in The Times of Israel on the human cost of the conflict and the Israeli national mood as operations continue.
Background
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Elliott Abrams, who briefed us on the history of the Israeli-Palestinian “peace process”, analyzes why Hamas provoked the current conflict by breaking the 2012 ceasefire and firing scores of rockets into Israel.
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Amos Yadlin, the former head of Israeli military intelligence who briefed us in Jerusalem in May, lays out Israel’s objectives and strategy for Operation Protective Edge.
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Israeli forces engaged 13 Hamas gunmen as they emerged from a tunnel – much like the one we visited this year – 250 meters inside Israel, near Kibbutz Sufa.