Any Action Against Iran Needs to Account for the Proxies

As Washington once again attempts diplomacy with Tehran amid an expanded US naval and air posture, the United States faces a familiar risk: defining success too narrowly.

Past efforts to manage the Iran challenge have understandably focused on Iran’s nuclear program while treating regional proxies as secondary concerns. Yet Iran retains dangerous tools beyond its borders. Any outcome that leaves its proxies, in particular the Houthis in Yemen, intact risks repeating earlier failures.

Within Iran’s proxy network, the Houthis are more than just the last group standing. They are unique in their proven ability to impose costs far beyond their borders and directly target core US national security interests. After October 7, 2023, the group opened a new front from Yemen, launching nearly 300 missiles and drones at Israeli territory and roughly 700 projectiles at commercial and military vessels, according to data from the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), thus turning a regional conflict into a global economic problem. Sustained attacks caused higher prices for US consumers, forced major carriers to reroute traffic around the Cape of Good Hope, drove insurance premiums higher, tied down US and allied naval forces, and imposed significant financial and operational costs on global shipping companies.

Thanks to years of Iranian support, the Houthis now benefit from a production system that blends local assembly with imported components. The Houthis assemble ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and uncrewed aerial vehicles from hardened facilities embedded in mountainous terrain. They fabricate airframes, integrate warheads, and prepare launch infrastructure locally, allowing them to regenerate forces after strikes. However, this system still depends on Iranian supply chains for engines, propulsion systems, guidance units, avionics, and other specialized electronics, providing the Houthis with range, accuracy, and an operational tempo far beyond what Yemen’s industrial base could otherwise support.

U.S. policy has nonetheless prioritized managing escalation over eliminating the threat. Operation Prosperity Guardian focused on defending shipping and intercepting incoming missiles and drones, but did not dismantle Houthi capacity to conduct these attacks. From March to May 2024, Operation Rough Rider went further, expanding strikes against Houthi launch sites, storage areas, and military infrastructure. It contributed to a ceasefire that halted attacks on US naval vessels, but it did not severely degrade the group’s capabilities, did not stop Houthi attacks against Israel, and has not deterred them from threatening to resume attacks on Israel and international shipping.

Against Iran and the Houthis, deterrence has failed, negotiations have produced no restraint and defensive measures and limited strikes have not reduced their ability or willingness to attack. The United States now has an opportunity to undermine a regime that has terrorized the Middle East and its own people for 40 years. But only if Washington treats the Houthi threat as part of the Iran problem rather than a parallel challenge.

An outcome that leaves supply to the Houthis intact—whether through omission, ambiguity, or unenforced commitments—would leave Iran’s proxy leverage untouched. It is unacceptable to leave intact such a dangerous network that can continue undermining regional stability and the credibility of America’s commitment to security.

Originally published in Breaking Defense.