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Iran Task Force Report Release on Capitol Hill – July 12, 2016

Iran Task Force Report Release on Capitol Hill – July 12, 2016

Panel: Iran Experts Provide “Scorecard” for Final Nuclear Deal

Capitol Hill Panel – Negotiating to Prevent a Nuclear Iran: Options for the New Congress

Panel: The Elusive Final Deal with Iran – Developments and Options Going Forward

Panel: Prospects for a Final Deal with Iran

Panel: Assessment of the Interim Deal with Iran

Panel: U.S. Policy Toward Iran and Syria on C-SPAN

Video – June 10, 2013 Panel Discussion – Iran at A Crossroads

Press Release – June 10, 2013 Panel Discussion

The post Events appeared first on JINSA.

Commentary: How Trump can prevent a nuclear Iran
Reuters, October 31, 2017
By Eric Edelman and General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.)

Commentary: How Trump can prevent a nuclear Iran
Reuters, October 31, 2017
By Eric Edelman and General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.)

How Trump should handle Iran
Politico, October 31, 2017
By Eric Edelman and General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.)

North Korea proved allowing the Iran deal to collapse could lead to proliferation
The Hill, September 26, 2017
By John Bird and Stephen Rademaker

Iran needs to take America seriously again
USA Today, July 14, 2016
By Eric Edelman, Michael Makovsky, and Jonathan Ruhe

Time to take aim at Iranian missiles
Politico, April 12, 2016
By Dr. Michael Makovsky and General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.)

Don’t Give Iran Another Pass
U.S. News and World Report, March 25, 2016
By James Conway and Charles Wald

Iranian Cheating
The Weekly Standard, October 16, 2015
By Michael Makovsky

What Next?
The Weekly Standard, September 25, 2015
By Michael Makovsky

Iran Briefing Paper: Possible Military Dimensions (PMD)

Congress must reject flawed nuke deal
The Hill, September 10, 2015
By Eric Edelman and Michael Makovsky

JINSA CEO Makvosky Talks Iran on Power Talk Radio 1280 in Modesto, CA
The Trevor Carey Show, September 8, 2015 – Interview at the 6:46 mark

The problem with the Iran deal
CNN, September 4, 2015
By James Conway and Charles Wald

JINSA CEO Makvosky Talks Iran Deal on News Radio 1130 WISN
The Vicki McKenna Show, August 6, 2015

Blaming Israel First
The Weekly Standard, July 31, 2015
By Michael Makovsky and William Kristol

Deal Brings Iran Closer to Obtaining Nuclear Weapons Capability
The Weekly Standard, July 24, 2015
By Michael Makovsky

On the Consequences of the Deal
The Weekly Standard, July 17, 2015
By Michael Makovsky

Remind Iran of U.S. military option
Newsday, July 11, 2015
By General Charles Wald and Lt. Gen. William Caldwell

‘A Perverse Consequence’
The Weekly Standard, May 13, 2015
By Michael Makovsky and William Kristol

Iran’s Cheating
The Weekly Standard, April 13, 2015
By Michael Makovsky

A nuclear deal with Iran will require the West to reevaluate its presumptions
The Washington Post, December 4, 2014
By Eric Edelman, Dennis Ross and Ray Takeyh

No Deal
The Weekly Standard, November 28, 2014
By Michael Makovsky and William Kristol

Gemunder Center Conference Call on Extension of Iran Nuclear Deadline
With Dennis Ross, Eric Edelman, and John Hannah, November 26, 2014

How To Muddle Through With Iran
Foreign Affairs, October 16, 2014
By Dennis Ross

Iran remains America’s biggest challenge
The Washington Post, September 18, 2014
By Eric Edelman, Dennis Ross and Ray Takeyh

When Proxies Fail, Force Must Prevail
Fletcher Security Review, May 22, 2014
By Jonathan Ruhe, Gemunder Center Senior Analyst

Is The Iranian Interim Deal Working?
The American Interest, May 16, 2014

Sending a bunker-busting message to Iran
The Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2014
By Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (ret.) and Dr. Michael Makovsky

The Obama Complex
The Weekly Standard, January 31, 2014
By Michael Makovsky and William Kristol

How to Solve Obama’s Iran Dilemma
Politico, January 26, 2014
By Dennis Ross

‘Folly, Fatuity, and Futility’
The Weekly Standard, November 27, 2013
By Michael Makovsky and William Kristol

How to think about Obama’s deal with Iran
Politico, November 25, 2013
By Dennis Ross

In talks with Iran, France stood on principle
The Los Angeles Times, November 14, 2013
By Eric Edelman and Ray Takeyh

How to negotiate with Iran
The Los Angeles Times, October 29, 2013
By Dennis Ross, Eric Edelman and Michael Makovsky

Standing Alone
The Weekly Standard, October 4, 2013
By Michael Makovsky and William Kristol

U.S. Must Mandate Zero Oil Exports for Iran
The Weekly Standard, July 25, 2013
By Michael Makovsky and Jonathan Ruhe

Lessons from Syria for Iran
The Weekly Standard, June 6, 2013
By Michael Makovsky and Blaise Misztal

The post Articles and Analysis appeared first on JINSA.

Gemunder Center Iran Task Force Co-Chair General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.) Testifies Before House Foreign Affairs Committee Committee
October 11, 2017

Gemunder Center Iran Task Force Co-Chair Ambassador Eric Edelman Testifies Before Senate Armed Services Committee
December 14, 2017

Gemunder Center Iran Task Force Co-Chair General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.) Testifies Before House Foreign Affairs Committee Committee
October 11, 2017

Gemunder Center Iran Task Force Chair Amb. Eric Edelman Testifies Before Senate Banking Committee
September 21, 2016

Testimony for Hearing, “Implications of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran (Part IV)”
House Committee on Foreign Affairs – September 9, 2015
With Gen. (ret.) Charles Wald and VADM (ret.) John Bird

Gemunder Center Iran Task Force Co-Chair Amb. Eric Edelman Testifies Before the Senate Armed Services Committee
August 4, 2015

Testimony for Hearing, “Implications of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran” (Part I)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs – July 9, 2015
With Michael Makovsky and Steve Rademaker

Gemunder Center Senior Advisor and Iran Task Force Member Stephen Rademaker Testifies Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
April 22, 2015

Iran Task Force Co-Chair Amb. Eric Edelman Testifies Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
January 27, 2015
With Eric Edelman, John Hannah, and Ray Takeyh

The post Congressional Testimony appeared first on JINSA.

Strategy to Restore U.S. Leverage Against Iran
July 12, 2017

Countering Iranian Expansion in Syria
November, 2017

Strategy to Restore U.S. Leverage Against Iran
July 12, 2017

The Iran Nuclear Deal After One Year: Options for the Next Administration
July 12, 2016

Scorecard for the Final Deal with Iran
July 29, 2015

Necessary Safeguards for a Final Deal with Iran
June 18, 2015

Questions About Iran Framework Agreement
April 13, 2015

Questions for a Final Deal with Iran
March 24, 2015

Centrifuge Cascades and a Final Deal with Iran
November 6, 2014

Separative Work Units (SWU) and a Final Deal with Iran
September 22, 2014

Improving the Prospects for an Acceptable Final Deal with Iran
July 17, 2014

Impact of Interim Deal with Iran
May 12, 2014

Assessment of Interim Deal with Iran
January 27, 2014

Principles for Diplomacy with Iran
October 14, 2013

Strategy to Prevent a Nuclear Iran
September 4, 2013

The post Iran Task Force Reports appeared first on JINSA.

Assessment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: Strategic Consequences for U.S. National Security

Mitigating the Strategic Consequences of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Assessment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: Strategic Consequences for U.S. National Security

Executive Summary

Reports

Assessment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: Strategic Consequences for U.S. National Security

Mitigating the Strategic Consequences of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Assessment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: Strategic Consequences for U.S. National Security

Executive Summary

The final agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), has potentially grave strategic implications that directly threaten to undermine the national security of the United States and our closest regional allies. By allowing Iran to become a nuclear threshold state and enabling it to become more powerful and expand its influence and destabilizing activities – across the Middle East and possibly directly threatening the U.S. homeland – the JCPOA will place the United States in far worse position to prevent a nuclear Iran. This study aims to analyze and understand the likely impact of these consequences on U.S. national security, to help policymakers craft and implement a response.

We assess:

• The JCPOA will not prevent a nuclear Iran. No later than 15 years, the deal’s major nuclear restrictions will lapse, Iran will stand on the brink of nuclear weapons capability, and once again the United States will likely have to devote significant resources and attention to keeping Tehran from attaining nuclear weapons.

• The JCPOA will enable Iran to increase support for terrorist and insurgent proxies, aggravate sectarian conflict and trigger both nuclear and conventional proliferation cascades. It will provide the expansionist regime in Tehran with access to resources, technology and international arms markets required to bolster offensive military capabilities in the vital Persian Gulf region, acquire long-range ballistic missiles and develop other major weapons systems.

• Our long-standing allies feel betrayed – even angry – with the JCPOA, seeing it as a weakening of U.S. security guarantees and reversal of decades of U.S. regional security policy. The mere fact that such perceptions persist, regardless of their veracity, will undermine U.S. credibility, threatening to turn them into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

• Simultaneously, sequestration is diminishing the ability of the United States to respond to Iranian aggression, mitigate security threats emanating from Iran and protect U.S. regional allies. Leaving it with fewer and older ships and planes as well as fewer and less well-trained troops, these cuts will severely damage the U.S. military’s ability to project power in the region, even as the Iranian threat grows.

• The United States is in a far better position to prevent a nuclear Iran today, even by military means if necessary, than when the JCPOA sunsets. The strategic environment will grow much more treacherous in the next 15 years. Comparatively, Iran will be economically stronger, regionally more powerful and militarily more capable, while the United States will have a smaller, less capable fighting force, diminished credibility and fewer allies.

Contrary to the false choice between support for the JCPOA and military confrontation, the agreement increases both the probability and danger of hostilities with Iran. Given the deleterious strategic consequences to the United States, implementation of the JCPOA will demand increased political and military engagement in the Middle East that carries significantly greater risks and costs relative to current planning assumptions.

Click to download the full report

Mitigating the Strategic Consequences of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Executive Summary

The final agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was only agreed last summer, and as predicted the strategic balance in the Middle East is beginning to tilt dangerously toward Iran, its allies and its proxies. This Council’s initial September 2015 study assessed that the JCPOA could have “grave strategic implications that directly threaten to undermine the national security of the United States and our closest regional allies.” Now, the pace and degree to which this shift in the regional balance of power is occurring exceeds even our prior analysis, and it threatens to overwhelm the ability of the United States to correct course.

As we asserted last September, the JCPOA fails to prevent a nuclear Iran, while granting Iran the resources to improve its military capabilities and increase its support for terrorist and proxy forces in the region. But Tehran is not simply receiving this strategic windfall passively. Ever since the JCPOA was officially adopted in October 2015, Iran has become startlingly more belligerent in both word and deed.

Increasingly, Iran’s military and proxy forces are engaged across the region. Thousands of Iranian soldiers backed by Russia and Hezbollah have turned the tide of the war in Syria, with their campaigns far outpacing even ISIS in numbers of civilians killed or forced to flee. At the same time, Tehran did not even wait for United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against its ballistic missile program to expire before undertaking two test launches. Since then it has conducted several more launches, with “Israel must be wiped off the earth” stamped in Hebrew on two of the missiles. It also brazenly provoked U.S. forces in the region by taking 10 sailors captive and firing missiles in close proximity to U.S. and allied ships in the Persian Gulf. These and other actions demonstrate how Iran’s dangerous regional ambitions are unmoderated, and in fact encouraged, by the JCPOA.

By tolerating these provocations, the United States has unwisely exceeded its own obligations under the JCPOA. In recent months, this includes: assuring Iran it would not be subject to new counterterrorism measures to restrict entry to the United States for foreign nationals; dismissing charges or granting clemency to more than 20 Iranians charged with sanctions violations or cyberwarfare; and delaying new sanctions for Iran’s ballistic missile tests.

Unaddressed, Iran’s violations of both the letter and the spirit of the JCPOA will likely worsen as its dividends from the deal grow. Energy export revenue, the Iranian regime’s lifeblood, will be rejuvenated now that sanctions are lifted. Its military capabilities likewise will improve as it regains access to international arms markets and advanced technologies under the JCPOA. With more butter and guns alike flowing to Iran, and from Iran to its proxies, U.S. policymakers should expect Tehran’s uptick in destabilizing behavior of the past few months to become ever more aggressive over the course of the nuclear agreement.

If these trajectories hold, the ability of the United States to influence events in the Middle
East will continue eroding at an alarming rate. The moment at which U.S. power is no longer sufficient to protect our regional interests and allies might arrive sooner than expected. This outcome is only encouraged when the United States reacts piecemeal or not at all to Iran’s serial encroachments. Waiting for a new Administration and Congress in 2017 is an equally high-risk approach. The United States urgently needs a coherent and comprehensive strategy to counter Iran’s unchecked and unabashed pursuit of its revisionist goals in the face of the JCPOA.

We believe there is a set of actions that can meet with bipartisan support to stanch the spread of Iranian-driven instability and conflict, and restore dwindling U.S. credibility and influence
in the region. These actions reflect the fact that Iran – with its adversarial and far-reaching objectives, and growing potential to accomplish them – is the preeminent national security challenge to the United States and our Middle East allies. To counter this growing threat, we recommend the United States articulate a comprehensive strategy with the following five mutually-supporting elements:

• Prevent a nuclear Iran – Ensure compliance with the deal and the existence of credible military options to detect, deter and if necessary defeat Iranian violations. Congress should pass a resolution declaring U.S. policy to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear weapons capability and authorize use of military force (AUMF) against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure under certain clearly-defined breaches of the JCPOA.

• Confront Iranian aggression – Mitigate the JCPOA’s negative strategic consequences by recognizing Iran as the prime mover of conflict, rather than an honest broker, in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere.

• Strengthen ties with regional allies:

Maintain our commitment to Israel’s “qualitative military edge” (QME) – Reach a new, expanded memorandum of understanding (MoU) on defense assistance that raises the total from the current $30 billion to as much as $50 billion over ten years. Given the growing range of shared threats, both since the current ten-year agreement was signed in 2007 and going forward under the JCPOA, greater cooperation is vital as the current agreement ends late next year. While still less than Israel might need, this amount is vital to any realistic hope of maintaining Israel’s QME as Iran’s annual defense spending could grow by more than $30 billion over the same period.

Improve regional coordination – Collaborate more closely and increase support to our Arab allies. A coherent shared strategy and appropriate capabilities, including theater missile defenses, anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare platforms, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, are needed to deter or deny Iranian aggression. The United States must expedite the transfer of these capabilities.

Reengage wavering partners – Bolster significantly efforts to rebuild our relationship with countries being pulled into Iran’s orbit, principally Iraq.

• Preserve the United States’ military edge – Rebuild U.S. capability through recapitalization, investment and modernization of our forces.

• Restore U.S. credibility – Strengthen the bedrock of U.S. deterrence with a clearer declaratory policy underscoring assurances of protection for our allies, laying out penalties for Iranian non-adherence to the JCPOA and stating other forms of Iranian belligerence against which the United States will respond forcefully. This is fundamental to clarifying U.S. intent and resolve toward Iranian behavior, and to restoring U.S. credibility around the globe.

The United States must acknowledge the stark reality of Iran’s regional ambitions in the face of the JCPOA. Now is the time to begin taking serious actions to confront the rising Iranian challenge.

Click here to download the full report

The post Iran Strategy Council Reports appeared first on JINSA.

Executive Summary

The final agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was only agreed last summer, and as predicted the strategic balance in the Middle East is beginning to tilt dangerously toward Iran, its allies and its proxies. This Council’s initial September 2015 study assessed that the JCPOA could have “grave strategic implications that directly threaten to undermine the national security of the United States and our closest regional allies.” Now, the pace and degree to which this shift in the regional balance of power is occurring exceeds even our prior analysis, and it threatens to overwhelm the ability of the United States to correct course.

As we asserted last September, the JCPOA fails to prevent a nuclear Iran, while granting Iran the resources to improve its military capabilities and increase its support for terrorist and proxy forces in the region. But Tehran is not simply receiving this strategic windfall passively. Ever since the JCPOA was officially adopted in October 2015, Iran has become startlingly more belligerent in both word and deed.

Increasingly, Iran’s military and proxy forces are engaged across the region. Thousands of Iranian soldiers backed by Russia and Hezbollah have turned the tide of the war in Syria, with their campaigns far outpacing even ISIS in numbers of civilians killed or forced to flee. At the same time, Tehran did not even wait for United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against its ballistic missile program to expire before undertaking two test launches. Since then it has conducted several more launches, with “Israel must be wiped off the earth” stamped in Hebrew on two of the missiles. It also brazenly provoked U.S. forces in the region by taking 10 sailors captive and firing missiles in close proximity to U.S. and allied ships in the Persian Gulf. These and other actions demonstrate how Iran’s dangerous regional ambitions are unmoderated, and in fact encouraged, by the JCPOA.

By tolerating these provocations, the United States has unwisely exceeded its own obligations under the JCPOA. In recent months, this includes: assuring Iran it would not be subject to new counterterrorism measures to restrict entry to the United States for foreign nationals; dismissing charges or granting clemency to more than 20 Iranians charged with sanctions violations or cyberwarfare; and delaying new sanctions for Iran’s ballistic missile tests.

Unaddressed, Iran’s violations of both the letter and the spirit of the JCPOA will likely worsen as its dividends from the deal grow. Energy export revenue, the Iranian regime’s lifeblood, will be rejuvenated now that sanctions are lifted. Its military capabilities likewise will improve as it regains access to international arms markets and advanced technologies under the JCPOA. With more butter and guns alike flowing to Iran, and from Iran to its proxies, U.S. policymakers should expect Tehran’s uptick in destabilizing behavior of the past few months to become ever more aggressive over the course of the nuclear agreement.

If these trajectories hold, the ability of the United States to influence events in the Middle
East will continue eroding at an alarming rate. The moment at which U.S. power is no longer sufficient to protect our regional interests and allies might arrive sooner than expected. This outcome is only encouraged when the United States reacts piecemeal or not at all to Iran’s serial encroachments. Waiting for a new Administration and Congress in 2017 is an equally high-risk approach. The United States urgently needs a coherent and comprehensive strategy to counter Iran’s unchecked and unabashed pursuit of its revisionist goals in the face of the JCPOA.

We believe there is a set of actions that can meet with bipartisan support to stanch the spread of Iranian-driven instability and conflict, and restore dwindling U.S. credibility and influence
in the region. These actions reflect the fact that Iran – with its adversarial and far-reaching objectives, and growing potential to accomplish them – is the preeminent national security challenge to the United States and our Middle East allies. To counter this growing threat, we recommend the United States articulate a comprehensive strategy with the following five mutually-supporting elements:

• Prevent a nuclear Iran – Ensure compliance with the deal and the existence of credible military options to detect, deter and if necessary defeat Iranian violations. Congress should pass a resolution declaring U.S. policy to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear weapons capability and authorize use of military force (AUMF) against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure under certain clearly-defined breaches of the JCPOA.

• Confront Iranian aggression – Mitigate the JCPOA’s negative strategic consequences by recognizing Iran as the prime mover of conflict, rather than an honest broker, in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere.

• Strengthen ties with regional allies:

Maintain our commitment to Israel’s “qualitative military edge” (QME) – Reach a new, expanded memorandum of understanding (MoU) on defense assistance that raises the total from the current $30 billion to as much as $50 billion over ten years. Given the growing range of shared threats, both since the current ten-year agreement was signed in 2007 and going forward under the JCPOA, greater cooperation is vital as the current agreement ends late next year. While still less than Israel might need, this amount is vital to any realistic hope of maintaining Israel’s QME as Iran’s annual defense spending could grow by more than $30 billion over the same period.

Improve regional coordination – Collaborate more closely and increase support to our Arab allies. A coherent shared strategy and appropriate capabilities, including theater missile defenses, anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare platforms, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, are needed to deter or deny Iranian aggression. The United States must expedite the transfer of these capabilities.

Reengage wavering partners – Bolster significantly efforts to rebuild our relationship with countries being pulled into Iran’s orbit, principally Iraq.

• Preserve the United States’ military edge – Rebuild U.S. capability through recapitalization, investment and modernization of our forces.

• Restore U.S. credibility – Strengthen the bedrock of U.S. deterrence with a clearer declaratory policy underscoring assurances of protection for our allies, laying out penalties for Iranian non-adherence to the JCPOA and stating other forms of Iranian belligerence against which the United States will respond forcefully. This is fundamental to clarifying U.S. intent and resolve toward Iranian behavior, and to restoring U.S. credibility around the globe.

The United States must acknowledge the stark reality of Iran’s regional ambitions in the face of the JCPOA. Now is the time to begin taking serious actions to confront the rising Iranian challenge.

Click here to download the full report

The post Mitigating the Strategic Consequences of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action appeared first on JINSA.

• Opportunity to participate in JINSA’s flagship program, the Generals and Admirals Program, including program trip to Israel and Jordan.
• Private invitations to exclusive meetings with senior government and military officials.
• Invitations to JINSA VIP Patriot Reception at Annual Awards Dinner.

President’s Trustee ($25,000+)
all of the below, plus:

• Opportunity to participate in Homeland Security Program trip to Israel.


Chairman’s Trustee ($50,000+)
all of the below, plus:

• Opportunity to participate in JINSA’s flagship program, the Generals and Admirals Program, including program trip to Israel and Jordan.
• Private invitations to exclusive meetings with senior government and military officials.
• Invitations to JINSA VIP Patriot Reception at Annual Awards Dinner.

President’s Trustee ($25,000+)
all of the below, plus:

• Opportunity to participate in Homeland Security Program trip to Israel.
• Invitation to up to 3 private meetings and/or phone calls with JINSA CEO per year.
• Invitation to all U.S. military base visits, including specialized military trips. Previous participants have landed on aircraft carriers, been aboard submarines at sea, and been invited to the international air military show in Paris and London.
• Invitations to participate in international fact-finding missions with U.S. military officers, civilian national security experts, and JINSA leaders. Past trips have included South Korea, Turkey, and Ethiopia.
• Exclusive networking opportunities with retired generals, admirals and Special Forces officers.

Admiral ($10,000+)
all of the below, plus:

• Invitation to at least one private meeting or phone call with JINSA CEO per year.
• Invitation to most U.S. military base visits.
• Invitation to exclusive briefings and conference calls with high-level experts and officials.
• Invitation to attend JINSA Homeland Security Program conference.
• Invitation to attend JINSA IDF Leadership Program for one day.

Colonel ($5,000+)
all of the below, plus:

• Invitation to JINSA VIP Breakfast at Fall National Leadership Conference.
• Ability to participate on all JINSA conference calls.
• Opportunity to participate in one JINSA base visit with high-level, hands-on experiences per year.

Commander ($2,500+)
all of the below, plus:

• Opportunity to participate in up to 8 JINSA conference calls per year.
• Invitations to quarterly town hall calls with JINSA CEO.
• Complimentary invitation for one guest to attend regional cabinet meetings.

Lieutenant ($1,000+)

• Invitation to JINSA National Leadership Conference in Washington, D.C.
• Opportunity to participate in up to 4 JINSA conference calls per year.
• Invitations to regional cabinet meetings in select areas.
• Networking opportunities with other JINSA National Leaders.

*Subject to change. Opportunities to participate in briefings, base visits, and international trips are subject to availability.

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]]> https://jinsa.org/archive_page/jinsa-national-leadership-levels/feed/ 0 https://jinsa.org/archive_page/2016-2/ https://jinsa.org/archive_page/2016-2/#respond Wed, 03 Feb 2016 20:10:54 +0000 http://localhost:8888/wordpress/2016-2/ January February March April January February March April May June July August
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]]> https://jinsa.org/archive_page/2016-2/feed/ 0 https://jinsa.org/archive_page/distinguished-fellow-maj-gen-amidror/ https://jinsa.org/archive_page/distinguished-fellow-maj-gen-amidror/#respond Mon, 14 Dec 2015 17:14:52 +0000 http://localhost:8888/wordpress/distinguished-fellow-maj-gen-amidror/ IDF Major General (res.) Yaakov Amidror is a Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy Distinguished Fellow, and is the Anne and Greg Rosshandler Senior Fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies (JISS). General Amidror was formerly the National Security…
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]]> IDF Major General (res.) Yaakov Amidror is a Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy Distinguished Fellow, and is the Anne and Greg Rosshandler Senior Fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies (JISS). General Amidror was formerly the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister of Israel, as well as the head of the National Security Council, from 2011-2013. During his 36-year career in the IDF, Maj. Gen.

IDF Major General (res.) Yaakov Amidror is a Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy Distinguished Fellow, and is the Anne and Greg Rosshandler Senior Fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies (JISS). General Amidror was formerly the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister of Israel, as well as the head of the National Security Council, from 2011-2013. During his 36-year career in the IDF, Maj. Gen. Amidror served as Commander of IDF Military Colleges, Military Secretary for the Minister of Defense, Director of the Intelligence Analysis Division, and as Intelligence Officer for the Northern Command. Maj. Gen. Amidror received a Master’s degree in Political Science from the University of Haifa, and has authored several books on intelligence and military strategy, including Winning Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience.

Israel’s Active Defenses: Tactical Success with Strategic Implications
August 10, 2016

Shiites vs. Sunnis: A Region at War
January 25, 2016

Understanding Russia’s Involvement in Syria
January 8, 2016

Cool Heads Needed in the Fight against Palestinian Terrorism
November 29, 2015

Russian Involvement in Syria
November 6, 2015

This is Not the Third Intifada
October 22, 2015

Myths, Facts, and Wishful Thinking in Responding to Palestinian Violence
October 13, 2015

Non-Nuclear Ramifications of the Iran Deal
August 17, 2015

The Vienna Accord Only Postpones Confrontation with Iran
August 6, 2015

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