Gemunder Center Distinguished Fellow Maj. Gen. Amidror on the Non-Nuclear Ramifications of the Iran Deal
Non-Nuclear Ramifications of the Iran Deal
By Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror
JINSA Gemunder Center Distinguished Fellow
The P5+1 agreement with Iran over its military nuclear program doesn’t solve any problems, it merely delays addressing them, at most by 15 years. Afterward, these problems will again need to be dealt with, unless a change takes place within the Iranian regime.
Non-Nuclear Ramifications of the Iran Deal
By Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror
JINSA Gemunder Center Distinguished Fellow
The P5+1 agreement with Iran over its military nuclear program doesn’t solve any problems, it merely delays addressing them, at most by 15 years. Afterward, these problems will again need to be dealt with, unless a change takes place within the Iranian regime.
There are however several ramifications of the deal that are unrelated to the Iranian nuclear program, and these dangers should not be ignored. The first and almost immediate ramification of the agreement will be a tremendous arms race in the Middle East, both in terms of conventional and nuclear weapons.
The conventional arms race will begin when the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia, set off on a large spending spree, mostly in the United States but also in France and Britain as well. As their spending will be limitless, so too will there be no limit on the cutting-edge weapons they will be able to purchase. With the ban on selling conventional arms to Iran set to expire after 5 years, countries will jockey for their slice of the Iranian defense budget. It appears that the Russians won’t wait for the ban to expire and it would not be surprising to see Russian arms sales to Iran within the next few months. After all, the Russians too want to benefit. The floodgates are expected to open with the never-ending sale of weapons designed to protect Iranian airspace. If Iran decides to build a bomb someday, it must improve its aerial defenses. Russia will provide all of Iran’s needs in this area. The arms race between Iran and its neighbors will become a race to sell military equipment between Russia (and perhaps even China) and their Western partners in the P5+1. If a Marxist were to analyze the deal, he would argue that the whole purpose of the agreement was to allow the biggest players in the arms trade, states and corporations alike, to turn large profits. Even if this wasn’t the intention, it’s clear that this will be the result- a tremendous amount of weaponry will now flow to the region.
A nuclear arms race is more dangerous and while this one will see the hidden participation of foreign countries, the majority of the activity will be of regional states. The Saudis have announced and have written that they will dedicate their efforts to developing a nuclear weapon. In light of their relationships with Pakistan and the longstanding ties between the two states with regard to this issue, it would not be surprising for this to be a short process based on some type of cooperation with Pakistan. The Egyptians have not been as explicit about their intentions as have the Saudis, but there is no doubt that they will also begin similar efforts. The Egyptians don’t have access to the same shortcuts that the Saudis do but they do have the academic infrastructure to support this type of years-long undertaking. Based on historical precedents, it would be appropriate to assess that once the decision is made, provided there is no unexpected interference, the Egyptians will achieve preliminary capabilities within 10-15 years, right around the time that Iran is freed of the deal’s restrictions. Turkey has been even quieter than Egypt on this issue but Turkey cannot afford to be in a situation where Egypt, the largest Arab state and Shiite Iran have nuclear weapons while Turkey – who until 100 years ago ruled over the entire Middle East and is supposed to lead the Sunni world – is left without a bomb. Turkish officials said this explicitly to Congressional staff members and it is likely that this information is accurate and not some type of manipulation or speculation.
The second repercussion of this agreement is related to a more fundamental issue. The Middle East is in the midst of an unbridled sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites. This is a war of life and death, and a rather brutal death at that. This agreement, seen by the majority of the Sunni states as benefitting Iran, was preceded by other Western decisions that were harmful to the Sunnis. For instance: the removal of the Sunni regime in Iraq during the Iraq War and the exclusion of the Sunnis from the new U.S. erected regime, avoiding arming the rebels in Syria, avoiding striking Assad after he used chemical weapons against the Sunnis despite the warnings issued by President Obama, and allowing Iran and Hezbollah unhindered intervention in the civil war in Syria. The decisions have led the Sunnis to understand that the U.S. has taken sides in this regional conflict and that it is joining with Russia to help the Shiites over the Sunnis. The Sunnis, as opposed to the Shiites, have no regional leadership and there is no Sunni parallel to the Iranian hegemony over the Shiite world. The Sunnis may search for such a body to counter the successes of the Shiite minority that represents only 15% of Muslims worldwide. It would not be surprising to see ISIS benefit from these attitudes amongst the Sunnis. It is currently the strongest and most authentic Sunni organization, ready to fight both regional and global powers and sees itself as the leading Sunni body. The “Islamic State” is not just the name of the organization but it is a moniker that hints at a worldview that sees the group as enjoying hegemony in the Sunni world and sees its leader as the leader of all Sunnis. If that is true, who more appropriate than ISIS to fight the Shiites and their ally, the West? Thus, the nuclear deal might increase recruitment for ISIS amongst Muslim youth both in the region and around the world, the majority of whom are searching for personal and religious identity, both of which they will receive in the Islamic State. This agreement unwittingly fans the flames of this violent sectarian conflict in the Middle East.
This agreement provides a boost to terrorist organizations fighting Israel in three different ways. The deal will free up large amounts of money that will strengthen the Iranian economy, some of which will be transferred to these organizations in order to strengthen them militarily. These amounts represent a tremendous amount in terms of the funds needed by terrorist organizations in order to vastly improve their capabilities. It gives these terrorist organizations much greater freedom of action under the protection of a stronger Iran- freed of economic pressure – and it clearly shows that when push came to shove, the United States preferred Iran’s needs over the needs of other states in the region. This will encourage these organizations to act against Israel and against other countries that Iran seeks to harm.
All of these negative outcomes represent unintended side-effects of an agreement that ostensibly dealt only with the nuclear issue (It’s obvious that for Iran, there was more than just the nuclear considerations at stake. Iran demanded the removal of the restrictions on conventional weapons and ballistic missiles, despite the fact that both of these are outside of the realm of the nuclear issue.) It is important to consider how these outcomes should be dealt with because a final agreement may come knocking at the door in only a few weeks, if Congressional ratification or presidential veto make it real.
Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, Distinguished Fellow at JINSA’s Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy and former national security advisor to the Prime Minister Netanyahu. He is also the Greg and Anne Rosshandler Senior Fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. He served 36 years in senior IDF posts, including commander of the Military Colleges, military secretary to the Minister of Defense, director of the Intelligence Analysis Division in Military Intelligence, and chief intelligence officer of the Northern Command.