Gemunder Center Senior Advisor Lt. Gen. Deptula in Breaking Defense
How To Defeat ISIL: It’s All About The Strategy
By Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (ret.) – Sept. 5, 2014
Those who oppose ISIL – the so-called “Islamic State (IS)” – must grasp the fact that no amount of kinetic force will make up for an inadequate plan to crush it. American power, both within and without the battlespace, will only be realized when power is guided by a comprehensive, coherent and realistic strategy.
How To Defeat ISIL: It’s All About The Strategy
By Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (ret.) – Sept. 5, 2014
Those who oppose ISIL – the so-called “Islamic State (IS)” – must grasp the fact that no amount of kinetic force will make up for an inadequate plan to crush it. American power, both within and without the battlespace, will only be realized when power is guided by a comprehensive, coherent and realistic strategy.
To date, much of the public discussion is focused on means – vice the ways and ends – of the use of force. In discussions of military campaigns, many often focus on the tools through which operations are prosecuted: elements like boots on the ground, air power, or sea power. However, such assessments ignore the strategic principles that guide their use.
Looking at the present set of circumstances in Iraq, current U.S. objectives are tactical at best, and center on protecting American outposts and conducting humanitarian relief. American aircrews are striking a very limited set of targets to facilitate these objectives. This is a far different mission set than what is called for to render IS ineffective.
The self-proclaimed “Islamic State” presents the world with a moral crisis. IS cannot be reasoned with – they must be terminated. So let’s define that as our desired strategic end state and move forward rapidly to create a coalition, and a campaign plan that will succeed in accomplishing that. The operational objectives are 1) halt any further expansion of IS influence in the region of Iraq and Syria; 2) paralyze IS leadership, command, and control elements, and 3) render IS operations ineffective.