Lessons About Defense

First, the Iran war reiterated the Russia-Ukraine war’s primary lesson: modern militaries must adapt to the “mosquito” threat: cheap and plentiful drones. While U.S. and partner defenses intercepted over 6,000 Iranian drones in the war, dozens, if not hundreds, struck Arab states’ critical infrastructure. Some hit U.S. military sites, causing American fatalities.

Iran’s asymmetric warfare aimed to find a way, as in jiu-jitsu, to turn its opponent’s strength to a weakness. World-class U.S. defenses were built to stop supersonic missiles, but were ill-equipped to neutralize slow, low-flying drones. That imbalance plagued U.S. forces during the Houthis’ sustained assault on Red Sea shipping, when the Navy expended $1.1 billion of munitions against basic, low-cost Houthi projectiles. And over a year later, in the Iran war, U.S. officials privately said drone defense remained a challenge.

Fortunately, this asymmetric dynamic may be ending as new approaches to the drone threat emerge. Layered, multi-spectral sensors have proven effective in Ukraine, including the novel, widely proliferated acoustic-based detection systems. Electro-optical sensor packages have also performed well in tests and in the field. Radio frequency (RF) technologies, activated by handheld radios, can detect drones’ radio signatures and neutralize them by scrambling control signals, helping protect soldiers in the field. To maximize the effectiveness of these emergent detection systems, they should be paired with low-cost kinetic systems, such as automated cannons and inexpensive interceptor drones.

Years of U.S. and Israeli investment in laser defenses are also bearing fruit. Israel reportedly deployed its Iron Beam laser system to defend Emirati territory in the war. The United States is pursuing its own laser defenses, with the Navy’s HELIOS system now deployed on nine surface combatants, and the Army and Navy jointly developing another directed energy system. However, the United States lacks operational land-based mobile laser defenses at scale, a critical need.

Second, what you don’t know can hurt you. The Iran war also showed the need for civilian awareness about imminent threats, including in the U.S. homeland. Israel and Ukraine have developed and deployed mobile applications to provide precise alerts to civilians about the location and type (drone, cruise missile, ballistic missile, etc.) of enemy attacks. America, despite facing alarming drone threats from nearby hostile actors, such as Cuba’s regime and sophisticated transnational organizations in Mexico, lacks any equivalent system. This should be addressed immediately.

While efforts like the Golden Dome project to counter hypersonic and inter-continental ballistic missile threats are worthwhile, a more holistic approach to airspace awareness and full spectrum threat mitigation, including drones and cruise missiles, must be an urgent priority. This will require greater investment in all-altitude, full-spectrum sensors across the continental U.S., particularly at U.S. critical infrastructure sites and military bases, and the effort should be fully coordinated across the Federal Aviation Authority, Department of Homeland Security, and the Pentagon.

Third, hardening sites in peacetime is much easier than interception in wartime. The United States should explore additional means to mitigate risks at home, as the Iran war showed that even a few drone strikes on energy sites can have serious costs. One option is to fortify existing U.S. energy pipelines in the homeland and to have new ones, where feasible, be constructed underground. It is also crucial that the United States employ greater passive defenses like hardening key sites; setting up decoys to interfere with enemy targeting packages; and better utilizing camouflage technologies.

Lessons About Offense

First, the U.S. Air Force can conduct high-tempo operations in enemy airspace far from the continental United States—to devastating effect—particularly when paired with a first-rate partner. U.S. forces, conducting over 10,200 sorties and over 13,500 strikes, eliminated 82 percent of Iranian air defenses; 85 percent of its defense industrial sites; and most Iranian warships. The Israeli Air Force struck over 4,000 Iranian regime targets, averaging 105 daily. The two air forces operated at will in Iranian airspace, and virtually unscathed. Iran downed two manned U.S. aircraft over 38 days; by contrast, the United States lost 42 manned aircraft over 43 days of Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

Second, America’s “eyes in the skies,” the military’s airborne battle management (ABM) fleet, remain essential—not, as some had thought, dispensable. Even the most advanced drones or fighter jets must be supported by a robust theater air command and control system. The U.S. military’s ABM aircraft, the E-2 Hawkeye and the E-3 Sentry, provide this capability. That is why the United States deployed six of its E-3 Sentry aircraft—out of just 16 Sentries total—to the Middle East days before combat began. The Navy surged its ABM platform, the Hawkeye, to the region as well.

ABM aircraft have crucial functions, serving as flying command posts and radars. They interface between combat aircraft, land, maritime, cyber and space forces, and operational command-and-control (C2) nodes. Their advanced sensors and communications gear provide invaluable track and fusion capabilities, serving as a force multiplier for both offensive and defensive operations across all domains.

Yet these platforms are in short supply and rapidly aging, even as they are increasingly indispensable. Washington had started phasing out ABMs in recent years; from 2023 to 2024, the E-3 Sentry fleet was nearly halved, going from 31 to just 16. Even the E-3’s successor, the E-7 Wedgetail, nearly got axed. Fortunately, the Pentagon reversed this decision, with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stating that the Iran war revealed the Wedgetail’s future utility.

The United States also needs new, creative approaches to ABM capability. The United States should explore all available options for affordable, redundant, multi-spectral, persistent sensors and associated resilient communication networks. At the most basic level, the military must be able to collect, distribute, and make sense of data at speed and scale. Professional ABMs can then act on that information to advance C2 operations.

Third, the industrial base is a weapon of its own. The Iran war showcases the huge upside of U.S. innovation. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Brad Cooper described the never-before-used Low-cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System (LUCAS) combat drone as “indispensable” against Iran. In addition, the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) was deployed for the first time in the war, underscoring the Pentagon’s enhanced new long-strike capabilities.

But these innovations are only a starting point. Ukraine’s performance has shown the benefits of defense manufacturers interfacing more directly with technical specialists and frontline operators in the field, a lesson the United States would be wise to study and adopt. America also needs an accelerated production model to produce weapons platforms at scale for future conflicts. The U.S. defense industrial base has shown some signs of being able to make this shift, with leading defense manufacturers pledging to quadruple production of high-end systems. However, this is likely a longer-term effort.

Lessons About Fighting Alongside Partners & Allies

First, the U.S. requires partners access, basing and overflight rights to conduct large-scale expeditionary operations. Reliable, capable partners greatly enhance American basing posture, and thus operations. The war saw the first operational deployment of U.S. fighters and refuelers at Israeli bases, out of range of most Iranian missiles. That flexible basing arrangement enabled the high U.S. sortie rate that had few precedents. American pilots flew over 10,000 sorties in 38 days, around as many as the United States conducted in the first 120 days of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2002. Washington should examine how to further broaden U.S. force posture and forward basing in Israel.

Second, interoperability with skilled partners is worth the investment—and then some. The potential of the U.S.-Israel defense relationship has been on clear display. The conflict was the first, outside of NATO operations, where American forces took to the battlefield alongside partners with interoperable platforms and habitual training relationships. Combined Israeli-U.S. operations were not a pickup game.

That dynamic provides a synergistic effect and a force multiplier – and signals to other nations the great potential that can be unlocked by working with the United States.

It also impacts the calculus of U.S. enemies. Those adversaries, now, must more carefully weigh the risks of aggression against the United States and its partners going forward.

Zooming Out From Iran

Quick learning is beneficial for individuals, but life-and-death for modern militaries. The Iran war has highlighted the potency of American air power, the benefits of strong partners and allies, and the strengths of U.S. air and missile defenses. Yet it has also underscored the enduring nature of airpower’s five core missions: Air Superiority; Strike; Mobility; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); and C2. Tools will evolve with technology, but America’s military must not lose sight of these fundamentals. Additionally, the United States must get serious about full-spectrum threats to the homeland and expeditionary forces and make greater efforts to protect both.

Finally, robust investment in the American defense industrial base and an innovative ecosystem is imperative. Converting these lessons into action is critical to sending clear signals of deterrence to potential foes, assuring U.S. allies, and if necessary, winning future wars.