On August 4, media reports indicated that a major U.S. defense contractor is, for the first time, planning to source germanium and scandium—critical minerals used to build high-end defense items—from American firms. Here’s the problem: the prospective supplier does not have an operational mine—and will not until at least 2028. To highlight the scope of this challenge, consider the fact that the United States has not mined scandium since the 1960s.

Critical minerals are vital elements used in numerous defense platforms: warships, stealth bombers, fighter jets, missiles, sensors, and radars. Today the United States is import-reliant when it comes to critical minerals. China accounts for 90 percent of worldwide refining and processing capacity and is the top global refiner for 19 of 20 strategic minerals especially relevant to defense production.

Beijing’s critical minerals dominance is a threat to the national security of the United States and must end. For that reason, Washington is seeking to curtail critical mineral imports from China. It is also working to stockpile its own critical minerals. To that end, the Trump administration ordered the creation of the U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve, or Project Vault, in February—a logical complement to America’s existing petroleum and uranium strategic reserves.

To create viable domestic stockpiles, the United States has looked beyond its borders. The Trump administration has recently signed nearly 20 bilateral framework deals, and created multilateral forums like Pax Silica designed to form U.S.-friendly critical minerals supply chains. Washington is right to pursue a multilateral approach to U.S. critical minerals security, but there are better ways to do so.

Relying on partners’ reserves to meet U.S. demand, however, is problematic. For reasons of geography alone, even the most U.S.-friendly countries cannot be relied upon to supply the United States’ needs in a true crisis.

The geostrategic vulnerabilities are glaring. The United States signed a critical minerals deal in 2023 with Mongolia, a landlocked country surrounded by China and Russia. Similarly, Kazakhstan, a Pax Silica member, shares long and arguably indefensible borders with both China and Russia. And the COVID-19 pandemic, Iran, and the Houthis have exposed the extant fragility of global supply chains more broadly.

During a great power conflict, depending on global shipping would become problematic—potentially jeopardizing America’s ability to import critical minerals. Key sea lines of communication (SLOCs) through chokepoints like Asia’s Strait of Malacca and Europe’s Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap would be threatened by U.S. adversaries. Imagine the United States, in World War II, having to import defense production items through the same waters where it was fighting the German Navy.

Even in peacetime, overseas sources have perils. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which has large cobalt, nickel, and lithium reserves, has become a focal point of U.S. critical minerals strategy. Washington likely seeks to counter China’s own strategic mining in the DRC. However, the country’s track record of corruption and instability—including its recent yearslong war with Rwanda—makes it a risky bet for U.S. sourcing.

Fortunately, low-cost alternatives are emerging. The Trump administration, on July 30, gave the Commerce Department authority to impose export controls on industrial waste, which is often shipped abroad despite containing recoverable minerals. Extracting those critical minerals requires considerable technical capacity and expertise—which is where America’s allies can help.

Washington should consider forming a critical minerals consortium with friendly countries to boost American extraction, recycling, and reprocessing capacity. Pooling that technology and know-how would accelerate the U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve’s progress. In exchange, the United States could offer mutually beneficial defense arrangements. Such inducements can include new or expanded joint research and development (R&D) projects and defense co-production.

The timing is auspicious: several major U.S. bilateral defense pacts are up for renewal. For example, the next version of the soon-to-expire U.S.-Greek Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement could leverage Greece’s new advances in refining gallium. Currently, China enjoys a near-monopoly on gallium, which is reportedly used in over 11,000 U.S. military components. The upcoming expiration of the U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding presents another opportunity. Israel is making significant advances in neodymium-iron-boron recycling and accelerating state-backed critical minerals research.

This approach has several advantages. First, reducing U.S. dependence on foreign-based mining hedges against potential supply disruption. Second, utilizing cheap and plentiful American materials—like industrial waste—would boost U.S. stockpiles at low expense. Third, harnessing partners’ existing R&D efforts would reduce private-sector research costs. That could stimulate industry interest in those U.S. critical minerals projects for which, as Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS) recently said, “no free market [demand] exists.”

With challenges come opportunities. By better leveraging its partners and allies in the critical minerals race, Washington can breathe new life into its defense industrial base. The United States is, unfortunately, in another interwar period; it is time to act accordingly.

MajGen Tracy King, USMC (ret). is former Commander of Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa, and a Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) Generals and Admirals Program Participant. MajGen King also has served as Director of Asia Strategy on the Joint Staff.

Yoni Tobin is a Senior Policy Analyst at JINSA.

Originally published in RealClearDefense.

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The U.S. destroyed five Iranian oil tankers on Tuesday in response to fresh attempts by Tehran to strike U.S. warships in the Middle East in recent days, according to U.S. Central Command.

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Read the full piece in the Wall Street Journal.

The post U.S. Strikes Iranian Oil Tankers in Response to Tehran’s Attacks on Navy Ships appeared first on JINSA.

For nearly 20 years, the United States’ military aid to Israel has come in the form of foreign military financing. A provision in the 2027 National Defense Authorization Act would deepen the military ties between the two countries at a time when many Americans are increasingly skeptical of the relationship and some members of Congress would prefer to cut aid ties entirely.

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“Israel is not an industrial superpower, but in some areas they are a technology superpower,” Bowman said. Israeli technologies like the Iron Beam, a directed-energy air defense system, are one example and could be an area for manufacturing collaboration with the United States, according to Ruhe. Countering drones with traditional air-defense systems is expensive and resource-intensive, but Iron Beam can theoretically eliminate an unlimited number of incoming drones, according to Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, the Israeli defense company behind the technology.

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“Neither the U.S., nor Israeli governments, nor defense companies in either country, want to give one another the types of control that this bill’s critics say it does,” Ruhe told The Dispatch. “Israelis’ sensitivities about such issues are innately high, and have only risen higher amid tussles with Biden and Trump over arms resupplies, Gaza, Lebanon, and a potential nuclear deal with Iran.” 

Read the full piece in the Dispatch.

The post Military Tech Cooperation With Israel Is Less Radical Than Critics Claim appeared first on JINSA.

For decades, a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish conflict was long seen as vital for Turkey’s full democratization. Yet last month’s development was met with widespread criticism from some of the most outspoken supporters of Turkish democracy. Their concern, which has been voiced widely in Turkey, is that the agreement is a cynical ploy by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to win Kurdish support for perpetuating his authoritarian rule. Moreover, many question whether the government will actually follow through and provide real political concessions to the country’s Kurds.

When it comes to Erdogan, suspicion is always prudent, and the concerns raised about the peace process are hardly unreasonable. It is true that Erdogan faces constitutional constraints on securing a third term that require him to navigate significant parliamentary hurdles. It is also true that he will seek to extract domestic political benefit from this process, as he does from most political developments.

Yet this is not the full story. The government’s willingness to make peace with the PKK is also driven by important national security concerns. Understanding the agreement on foreign-policy terms is crucial to appreciating why it will likely succeed—and ultimately prove beneficial for Turkey.

The primary drivers of this peace process have always lain beyond Turkey’s borders, in a cascading series of events that began with Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attacks on Israel and led through the destruction of Hezbollah, fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024, and the current war with Iran.

The fall of the Assad regime “is a direct result of the blows we have inflicted on Iran and Hezbollah,” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed at the time. He was not wrong, and in Turkey, Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Erdogan’s coalition partner, agreed with him: “The fire that began in Gaza spread to Lebanon, extended its shadow over Syria, reached Iraq, and ultimately produced a shock wave that penetrated the heart of Iran.”

In October of 2024, shortly before the rebel assault that brought down Assad, Erdogan spoke at the opening of the Turkish parliament. In his speech, he warned that “Israel’s next target will be Turkey” and called for the “strengthening of the home front.” The very same day, Bahceli shook hands with pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party representatives in parliament—something that he had previously refrained from doing with members of a party that he had called to be banned on multiple occasions. This action alone immediately ignited talks of a new peace process between Turkey and the Kurds.

Amid these geopolitical dynamics, Erdogan’s domestic political concerns played a more complicated role in the process. While he no doubt ultimately hopes to secure Kurdish support for a new term in office, any concessions to the PKK or the Kurdish movement also risk an intense nationalist backlash. Erdogan has consistently appeared uncertain about how the process would be received by Turkish nationalists and whether the Kurdish support he may be banking on will be sufficient to carry him over the line in the next election.

Indeed, it was precisely the same fears that led to the collapse of the last significant peace process between the two sides more than 10 years ago. In this context, Bahceli himself has often taken the lead in publicly promoting the process, working to overcome the delays by pushing for several measures that the government had been slow to implement.

Initially, as Turkey’s regional anxieties overrode Erdogan’s political hesitations, the peace process got off to a hectic start. Numan Kurtulmus, the speaker of the Turkish parliament and a senior figure in Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, framed the urgency of the new peace process through a familiar conspiratorial trope in Turkish nationalist and Islamist traditions: the belief that external powers seek to weaken and ultimately partition Turkey. Warning that “in the so-called ‘Greater Israel’ project, Turkey is seen as the primary force to be absorbed,” he argued that this reality requires Ankara to “fortify its home front.”

Since the outset of the process, fortifying the home front against “global imperialist conspiracies and Zionist ambitions” has emerged as a central organizing concept across the Turkish government’s public messaging. While the Palestinian cause is an ideological issue for Erdogan, the widening instability in the region—and its implications for Kurdish aspirations—is a unifying concern for the entire Turkish political and security establishment.

With Operation Midnight Hammer in 2025, a major fear for Turkey had become reality. Iran—the country with the second-largest Kurdish population after Turkey—was now in the crosshairs, and, after Iraq in 2003 and Syria in 2011, the Kurds once again appeared to be poised to take center stage. In both Syria and Iran, the most capable forces on the ground are PKK-affiliated groups—the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK), respectively. In an attempt to get ahead of the curve, the Turkish government turned to negotiating with the person whom both organizations see as their leader: Abdullah Ocalan.

Ankara’s main concern was that regional upheaval, especially in Syria and Iran, could strengthen Kurdish autonomy or political leverage in ways that eventually reverberate inside Turkey. A second concern is the prospect of Israel deepening ties with Kurdish actors—again, especially in Syria and Iran.

From Ankara’s perspective, closer Israeli-Kurdish relations would not only empower Kurdish movements in ways that complicate Turkey’s own domestic challenges but would also alter the regional balance of power by enhancing Israel’s reach and capabilities in the emerging Turkey-Israel regional rivalry. While it was widely reported last year that Syrian Kurdish officials had met with Israeli counterparts, such contacts remained far removed from the kind of sustained and institutional engagement that Ankara fears. Ankara regularly hosts Hamas, but we remain far from seeing the PKK in Tel Aviv.

In effect, the presence and operational capabilities of the SDF and PJAK have given Ocalan more leverage in his negotiations with the Turkish government than the PKK ever possessed within Turkey alone. It is no coincidence, then, that the earliest and most visible outcomes of the negotiations have so far materialized in these two arenas. Ocalan reportedly intervened in Syria to help peacefully resolve the fighting between the SDF and the new government in Damascus at the beginning of this year, leading to the SDF’s integration into the new Syrian state.

The Turkey-PKK peace process’s impact on Iran has yet to fully manifest itself, but Turkish columnist Abdulkadir Selvi—widely seen as a conduit for government messaging—recently argued that it prevented the United States from deploying PKK-affiliated groups into Iran during Operation Epic Fury, forcing Washington to instead engage with less-capable Kurdish organizations.

The chain of regional events set in motion on Oct. 7, 2023, coupled with a need to transcend Turkey’s historic vulnerabilities, have both energized and unified Turkey’s ruling elites around a new Kurdish policy. Even the main opposition party has backed the peace process, despite its leading presidential contender, Ekrem Imamoglu, being imprisoned in what is widely viewed as a politically motivated trial.

This exceptionally rare political consensus reflects a deeper, if paradoxical, reality: No other country has grasped the significance of Kurdish agency in the Middle East quite like Turkey has.

In a recent statement, Bahceli characterized the peace process as “not merely a matter of security, but one of strengthening brotherhood, national unity, and solidarity.”

In a country where a significant portion of the population has been willing to take up arms in pursuit of ethnic rights, there is a lot to do for true unity to be achieved. It will ultimately require legal and constitutional reforms that allow Kurds to govern their towns and their local economies without the risk of arbitrary intervention by the government. What’s more, it is unrealistic to expect Kurds to feel secure in their rights unless Turkey’s authoritarian downtrend is reversed and members of other political parties are no longer being systematically jailed.

That said, the PKK’s immediate expectations are more limited and pragmatic than a wholesale democratization of Turkey. At the outset of negotiations, Ocalan made it clear that he had no cultural or ethnic preconditions for ending the armed struggle. At this stage, the process rests on the PKK’s confidence that it can transition from an armed movement into a legitimate political and civil actor without being dismantled or excluded from public life.

The most immediate test for Ankara will be Ocalan’s status. The PKK expects improvements to his working conditions in prison and, crucially, greater access to the outside world so that he can communicate freely with the movement and play an effective role in managing its transition away from armed struggle.

None of this necessarily requires Erdogan to stop repressing political opponents or suddenly embrace liberal democracy, and Ocalan’s willingness to bring the process this far without such commitments suggests that he does not regard broader democratization as a prerequisite for taking the first steps.

But for the process to advance beyond disarmament, the PKK will need evidence that laying down its weapons creates political space rather than simply eliminating the only leverage that it has possessed for half a century. In that sense, the immediate question is less about whether Erdogan is prepared to democratize Turkey than whether he is prepared to accommodate the PKK’s transformation into a legitimate, exclusively civilian actor.

Peace does not guarantee democracy, but it is a prerequisite for it. Pro-democracy critics of the current process should recognize that even while the fate of Turkish democracy will remain dangerously uncertain whatever happens with the Kurds, ending the state’s military conflict with the PKK is an important achievement in its own right. The PKK has now laid down its arms. If Turkey permanently ends its military operations against all Kurdish organizations, including those in Syria, Iraq, and Iran, then the process will have succeeded on geopolitical terms. This will measurably improve the lives of all people in the region and set the stage for the fight for democracy to continue on more favorable terrain.

At a moment when the Middle East appears to be poised for prolonged turbulence, stabilizing the Kurdish question at home may prove to be Turkey’s most consequential strategic investment in its own future.

Giran Ozcan is Fellow for Kurdish Affairs at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA).

Originally published in Foreign Policy.

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Western intelligence reports recently revealed that much of China’s fleet of commercial-civilian ships serve as a secret arm of military intelligence. This means that civilian cargo ships of the state-owned shipping giant COSCO, along with fishing vessels belonging to China’s “naval militia,” carry sophisticated and camouflaged signal intelligence collection systems (SIGINT), as Western intelligence sources claim.

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Read the full piece in Mako (originally in Hebrew).

The post Western Intelligence Reports: Chinese Ships Secretly Used to Gather Intelligence – Passed on to Iran appeared first on JINSA.

As the conflict between the United States and Iran passes the six month mark, former White House officials and regional analysts remain divided over whether Washington’s economic campaign and naval blockade are meaningfully changing the strategic landscape.

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Read the full piece in Jewish Insider.

The post Six Months Into the Iran War, Is Trump’s Economic Pressure Campaign Yielding Dividends? appeared first on JINSA.

“Help has arrived,” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared on Feb. 28, speaking after the Israeli and U.S. militaries launched a joint operation, “Roaring Lion/Epic Fury,” against Iran, killing then-Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the opening salvo.

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Read the full piece in JNS.

The post Six Months on, Israel Waiting in the Wings as Trump’s War on Iran Shifts to Economic Pressure appeared first on JINSA.

The Knesset will be asked over the coming month, meeting in special recess session, to vote on expansion of the defense budget for urgent IDF weapons procurement from NIS 70 billion to NIS 90b. (a rise from $20b. to $25b.).

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Read the full piece in the Jerusalem Post.

The post Israel Must Spend More on Defense – and Rethink Its U.S. Alliance appeared first on JINSA.

On Monday, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stood onstage at the Treasury Department in Washington to publicly unveil the Trump administration’s latest move against the Islamic Republic.

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Rather than structuring policy around the hope for a deal, the US may gain more from pursuing the long-term weakening of Iran, argued Michael Makovsky, president of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America think tank.

“The goal should just be persistent pressure and weakening of the regime in every way possible,” he said.

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Read the full piece in the Times of Israel. 

The post Going All In on Sanctions, Trump Limits How Much He Can Squeeze Out of Iran appeared first on JINSA.

On Aug. 18, Israel attacked the Abu al-Duhur air base in Syria, escalating brewing tensions with Turkey—the United States’ other key ally in the region.

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Israel, however, views Turkey as a hostile power and dreads a “Sunni ring of fire”—a Turkey-led alliance of Muslim Arab nations that Israel fears might encircle and isolate it in the region.

“We cannot allow Turkey to deploy troops on our borders,” said Yaakov Amidror, a distinguished fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America and a former advisor to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “I don’t think anyone will host Turkish forces against Israel’s wishes. That will be a basis for friction in the future—a big mistake.”

Israel’s mistrust of Turkey is underpinned by Erdogan’s support for Hamas, sympathy for the Muslim Brotherhood, and a suspicion that it harbors imperial ambitions. “Erdogan is very close to the Muslim Brotherhood,” Amidror said, noting that Hamas is an offshoot of the organization. “Turkey is hosting Hamas’s leadership, from where they can still plot terror attacks inside Israel.”

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Read the full piece in Foreign Policy.

The post Turkey’s Rise Is Israel’s New Problem appeared first on JINSA.