JINSA Celebrates KC-46A Refueling Tanker Delivery, Strengthening U.S.-Israel Mutual Defense

Washington, DC – Israel took delivery of its first of six KC-46A aerial refueling tankers yesterday in an official ceremony at Nevatim Airbase in southern Israel.

The Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) celebrates this momentous occasion, which enables Israel to better project power and extend its aircrafts’ range. In 2018, JINSA, alone among organizations, began pressing for the United States to sell Israel these advanced aerial refueling tankers. And then, after the United States approved this sale in 2021, JINSA published detailed proposals to expedite the initial transfer of KC-46s to Israel, train Israeli Air Force pilots on the new aircraft, and deploy U.S. KC-46s to Israel before the Israeli aircraft arrived, which the United States did shortly before Operation Epic Fury.

By upgrading the Israel Air Force’s obsolescing tanker fleet and expanding the reach and capacity of its combat aircraft, the KC-46 will act as a force-multiplier for Israel’s ability to counter shared threats from Iran and its proxies. It also will reduce the burdens and risks facing American forces in the region, after the U.S. Air Force helped fill gaps in Israel’s aerial refueling capacity during the recent war with Iran.

Furthermore, Israel’s use of the most advanced U.S.-made aerial refueling tankers will deepen the interoperability of U.S. and Israeli forces that proved so effective in Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion.

JINSA wants to thank President Donald Trump, former President Joe Biden, Congress, and the Pentagon for helping ensure Israel can utilize the latest-generation U.S. capabilities for the mutual defense of our two countries.

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Jewish Institute for National Security of America
1101 14th Street, NW
Suite 1030
Washington, DC 20005
www.jinsa.org

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The United States and the Iranian regime are reportedly nearing an agreement to end the war. However, unless Tehran completely and verifiably forfeits its nuclear infrastructure, America may face this situation again in the future, JINSA President and CEO Michael Makovsky, PhD, argued during a May 27 interview on Fox News Radio’s The Brian Kilmeade Show.

Dr. Makovsky further stated that President Trump’s responsibility to protect Americans requires a lasting, strategic solution to the Iranian nuclear threat. Otherwise, he contended, the deceptive Islamic Republic regime will likely pursue nuclear weapons at a later date, under a different U.S. administration.

He also questioned why Iran’s regime would agree to a deal that is good for the United States, and bad for itself, when it didn’t do so even during active combat.

In addition, Dr. Makovsky discussed the escalating conflict in Lebanon, which, as he noted, is intensifying due to continued inaction from Beirut. He stressed that Israel is facing an increasingly serious threat from Hezbollah’s evolving military tactics, like fiber-optic drone attacks, which are proving hard to stop.

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“The Americans and the Iranians are apparently not finished. I say ostensibly because it depends on who leaks from the negotiations. If there is an agreement, then there will be a very long temporary break because they give themselves 60 days of negotiations. From my acquaintance with the Iranians, they will not be quick to make the concessions that President Trump demands of them. America will have to decide what it will do after these 60 days,” Amidror clarified.

Regarding the return to fighting, the former head of the National Security Council explained: “As long as the American army is here, it’s a matter of decision, the American army doesn’t have to call up the reserves, the American army will move the ships from here to there and bring them back. Iran will be stronger after 60 days, they will have a long rest, but the Americans will also get a rest and continue to prepare for war. There’s an entire command here under the leadership of ADM Brad Cooper, and they have to prepare for war after 60 days. What the president is doing doesn’t interest them.”

Amidror then analyzed the American position from his point of view: “Trump will not want to come out of this event as a clown, someone who made repeated promises but did not carry them out. We have an interest in having a good agreement. We’re not looking for war, if they bring a good agreement, we’re in favor of it. We have a number of interests in ending this fighting, and we have to stand up for them. Will the Americans clarify them or not? They don’t know, the Iranians don’t know and we don’t know either. Are we slaves of America? No, but if you head a small startup and you take Google as a partner, then you have to assume that Google will have the same impact as yours if not more. We have learned that it is possible to attack in Iran. We intended to go to war without them. They joined us.”

“Who thought that in three weeks they would fold Iran? We have to get out of the illusions”

Amidror also referred to the possibility of a prolonged campaign against Iran: “This is not Hamas – this is a country of 90 million people. It is 60 times larger than Israel. Who thought that in three weeks they would fold Iran? We have to get out of the illusions. Iran is a struggle for a very long time as long as the government is like that. We will have to be alert and ready for war. We may have to go back at a certain point and say that as soon as the nuclear program is established, for example, we will have to come back and destroy it.”

In addition, he discussed the mutual relations and close cooperation between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Trump: “The Prime Minister talks with President Trump quite a bit. There is trust between them, they reveal to each other, and the American programs at the lower levels are done by CENTCOM, a headquarters that has our representatives and very strong connections. Are we aware of what the Americans said every day in the negotiations? In the spirit of the negotiations, it is the White House that decides. The talks between the prime minister and Trump are extremely important. What are the Americans preparing to do and what are they preparing? CENTCOM is the most important and we are familiar with it. Can we influence the issues and gives? We don’t talk to them. I think that the details of the things that are exchanged between them are less important to us. The latest version of the agreement is important to us.”

“It’s not good for us in the end if the Iranian agreement includes Lebanon as well”

Moreover, Amidror presented his position on the situation in Lebanon and warned against connecting the arenas: “One of our interests is that there should be no connection between the agreement in Iran and the situation in Lebanon. Yesterday there was an American statement that Hezbollah is violating the ceasefire and the Israelis will attack. It is better for us to be at this stage, it is better for us as long as there is no agreement to coordinate with the Americans. It depends again on what happens.”

He added, “In the end, it is not good for us if the Iranian agreement includes Lebanon as well. This will give confirmation to Iranian influence in Lebanon. The chances of dismantling Hezbollah have dropped even further. The Americans are conducting the negotiations, and I hope that our position has been expressed in full force. I’m not sure that the Americans can dismantle the relationship that has been created at this stage, it’s not good for us if there is such a connection. Life is in the end, but it’s a matter of alternatives, and it’s better for us as long as the Americans negotiate terms for a ceasefire and an agreement, we have to try to coordinate with the Americans.”

Read the original interview in Maariv (in Hebrew).

The post Israel’s Former National Security Advisor: “Trump Will Not Want To Leave This Event as a Clown” appeared first on JINSA.

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“We’re figuring it out ourselves,” said Michael Makovsky, the president and CEO of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, adding that he believed Israel “made a mistake” in choosing to forgo U.S. financial aid. He suggested that the U.S. sign “one more” MOU with Israel to cover the next 10 years and help Israel replenish its munitions stocks amid the war against Iran, which he believes is key to advancing American interests in the region. “It zeroes down at the very end,” he explained to JI.

In lieu of an agreement, Makovsky floated “non-monetary” alternatives, for instance, a U.S.-Israel mutual defense treaty — though he questioned whether such a pact could gain enough support in the Senate, where most Democrats recently voted in favor of resolutions to block arms sales to Israel.

Read the original article in Jewish Insider.

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In a February 2026 report for the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), Jonathan Ruhe and Ari Cicurel note that Iran disperses its missile and drone infrastructure across numerous sites, including underground “missile cities.”

Ruhe and Cicurel pinpoint at least 24 missile sites in western Iran before the 12-Day War, including key clusters around Kermanshah, the Konesh Canyon tunnel complex, Lorestan and the Zagros region.

They also note that Iran’s drone infrastructure consists of underground bases, airfields and production facilities spread across central, western and southern Iran. The writers add that missile cities are better protected and concealed than road-mobile systems, but they are less flexible due to fixed locations and narrow firing apertures.

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Read the original article in Asia Times.

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JINSA: President Trump Should Reject the MOU with Iran

Washington, D.C. – “If the reported details of a proposed U.S.-Iran MOU are broadly accurate, it would represent a loss of American nerve and damaging strategic reversal in recent American policy, abandoning many of President Trump’s prior redlines, undercutting many of the tremendous achievements of the military campaign, and undermining U.S. credibility.

“I hope President Trump recognizes the enormous dangers posed by this reported MOU and rejects this disastrous arrangement. He should reverse course and restore American credibility by resuming military action that further weakens Iran’s conventional military and nuclear capabilities, ensuring the freedom of commerce through the Strait of Hormuz, maintains economic pressure on the Tehran regime, and supporting Iranians seeking to bring about the regime’s collapse, which is the ultimate strategic prize for the United States.

“The U.S.-Israeli military campaign made major advances in curbing Iran’s ability to project power and weakening the regime, for which both countries’ militaries and political leaders are to be commended. However, rather than degrading Iran further, this deal would strengthen and enrich it, thereby prolonging its survival.

“Comparisons to President Barack Obama’s 2015 JCPOA would be immediate and deserved. The United States would again be financially rewarding the Tehran regime to negotiate on its nuclear program while not addressing Iran’s missile capabilities or its aggressive regional activities.

“In some respects, this agreement is worse than the JCPOA, since the United States would be relinquishing leverage accumulated through 38 days of direct military confrontation, strategic isolation, maritime pressure, and visible deterioration of Iran’s internal and regional position.

“If Iran would not agree to acceptable American terms on its nuclear program during a ceasefire — while facing a blockade, economic strangulation, internal instability, and the credible prospect of renewed severe U.S.-Israeli military operations — there is no serious reason to believe lifting that pressure will produce a better outcome.

“Without the complete, permanent, and verifiable dismantlement of Iran’s entire nuclear program, the regime’s pathway back to nuclear weapons capability is preserved and will restart, no later than after President Trump leaves office.

“The Iranian regime and its supporters will rightly see this agreement as a victory over the United States, emerging not only intact but with new life thanks to the unfreezing of assets, the resumption of significant oil sales (mostly to China), and effective control over the Strait of Hormuz. President Trump would also be abandoning the Iranian population, with whom he has repeatedly expressed solidarity and support, by rescuing this brutal and corrupt regime from collapse.

“It betrays Israel, our full-fledged partner in the war, which reportedly opposes this deal and was given little say in it. Israel will undoubtedly need to conduct another military action against Iran at some point to undo the damage from this deal. Israel also cannot be expected to adhere to any Iranian veto over Lebanon, and will be compelled to maintain its military action against Iran’s terrorist proxy Hezbollah that continues to threaten Israel’s northern towns.

“The MOU also leaves exposed our Gulf Arab allies to an emboldened Iran as America retreats from the region.

“The lesson for the rest of the world will be that America can be coerced through brinkmanship, defiance, and threats to maritime commerce and energy markets. China will take note and is a clear winner, and Taiwan a loser.

“There should be no memorandum of understanding, interim deal, or partial arrangement with the Tehran regime, as it will not be worth the paper it is written on.

“A deal that leaves the regime stronger, wealthier, and intact guarantees neither peace nor stability. It guarantees only that the next war will come under worse conditions.”

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Jewish Institute for National Security of America
1101 14th Street, NW
Suite 1030
Washington, DC 20005
www.jinsa.org

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Today, a consequential fault line in the Middle East runs not just between Riyadh and Tehran but between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi — two capitals that share a region, a border, and a security patron, but little else in terms of strategic vision. Understanding this rivalry is no longer optional for serious American statecraft. It is a geopolitical condition that Washington will likely be navigating for years to come.

The Saudi–Emirati rivalry, which exploded into public view last December, is characterized by a deep divergence over what a post-American, or at least less American, Middle East should look like, who should lead it, and on what terms. The two states have been drifting apart for years, but fractures have now surfaced across every major regional issue: Yemen, the Horn of Africa, energy markets, relations with Israel, and the competition for economic dominance through diversification.

In 2015, Saudi Arabia and the UAE entered Yemen’s civil war as partners in a coalition against the Houthis. They left it, for all practical purposes, as rivals. The UAE backed the Southern Transitional Council, a separatist group that opposed the Saudi-supported goal of restoring Yemen’s internationally recognized government in Sanaa. The result was a war within a war, in which forces trained and armed by the UAE occasionally clashed with Saudi-backed units. The truce frameworks that followed never fully resolved the underlying question: Whose Yemen is it?

Across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been projecting power and competing for port access, the right to establish military bases, and political influence in Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. The stakes are high. Control of Red Sea choke points and Horn of Africa logistics corridors is central to both countries’ long-term security strategies. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are not coordinating; they are racing for dominance.

Energy policy has become another area of strategic competition. The UAE’s departure earlier this month from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) — which it joined to help regulate the international oil market — made that clear. Abu Dhabi’s decision was overdetermined: frustration with production quotas, confidence in its own production capacity, and a desire for strategic autonomy contributed to it. But at its core, it was a rejection of Saudi Arabia’s domination of OPEC. Riyadh, which has staked its Vision 2030 project on the assumption that it can manage global oil prices through cartel discipline, correctly interpreted the decision as a direct challenge. The two countries are now, in effect, energy competitors with fundamentally different market strategies.

The countries diverge most significantly over Israel. The UAE signed the Abraham Accords in 2020 and has steadily deepened its economic and security ties with Jerusalem. During the war with Iran, the relationship has crossed a threshold that would have been unthinkable even a year ago: Israel deployed an Iron Dome battery and military personnel to operate it on Emirati soil. This was the first time the system had ever been used outside Israel or the United States, and the first confirmed deployment of Israeli troops to an Arab Gulf state. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has conditioned normalization with Israel on concessions from Jerusalem and the United States that have so far proved undeliverable, instead investing its diplomatic energy in building a trilateral defense framework with Turkey and Pakistan. The UAE bet early on integration with Israel as a pillar of its security architecture, while Saudi Arabia is building a security framework that does not require Israel.

None of this means that the two countries are enemies. They share vital security interests, particularly regarding Iran, despite their radically divergent visions. They cooperate on counterterrorism. Their economies are intertwined. Saudi nationals are among the UAE’s largest sources of investment and tourism. But strategic rivalry and economic interdependence often coexist — just ask France and Germany — and the rivalry will define the policy challenges Washington faces in the Gulf.

American policymakers will be tempted to pick a side, but they should resist. The United States has deep and important interests in both countries, such as security cooperation, energy stability, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and the regional balance of power. Choosing between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi would be strategically mistaken and practically impossible. Both relationships are essential to American foreign policy.

But that does not mean we can afford to ignore the matter. The Saudi–UAE rivalry will not be resolved by a summit or a phone call. It will shape the internal dynamics of every multilateral framework in the region, from the Gulf Cooperation Council to OPEC+ to the Abraham Accords themselves. Above all, American policymakers must recognize that the future of both relationships, and Washington’s leverage within each, rests on how the war with Iran concludes.

The post-Iran regional order will determine how Riyadh and Abu Dhabi compete, cooperate, and calculate their respective needs for American partnership. If we get the Iran endgame wrong, managing the Saudi–UAE rivalry will become an exercise in diminishing returns. If we get it right, the United States will retain the strategic position to shape a Gulf that works with American interests rather than around them. The first step toward a serious Gulf policy is admitting that our two most important Arab partners are playing very different games — and that managing the distance between them may be a defining feature of American strategy in the Middle East for the foreseeable future.

Hussein Aboubakr Mansour is a Fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). 

Originally published in National Review.

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But Tel Aviv seems rather determined to do everything to block the adoption of an agreement that does not resolve the nuclear issue. “If the Americans obtain an agreement in which all enriched uranium is exported and the enrichment facilities dismantled, then from the Israeli point of view, it is a good agreement,” analyzes Yaakov Amidror, Distinguished Fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, to the Wall Street Journal. “If it is a bad agreement, Israel will do everything it can to prevent its implementation.”

Read the original interview in L’Express (in French).

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“If the Americans achieve an agreement in which all enriched uranium is exported and the facilities enriching uranium are dismantled, from an Israeli point of view, it’s a good agreement,” said Yaakov Amidror, a former Israeli national security adviser who is now a fellow at the Washington-based Jewish Institute for National Security of America. “If it is a bad agreement, Israel will do whatever it can to prevent its implementation.”

Read the original article in the Wall Street Journal.

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