JINSAJINSA

Aiming at Israel, Europe Is Hitting Its Own Defenses in a Circular Firing Squad

Yoni Tobin — Thu, 08 Oct 2026 21:51:19 +0000

Europe’s governments have stepped into a ring and leveled their weapons inward, treating Israel as the sole target in the center. The trouble is that the circle is not empty ground — it is a shared defense line.

Several European countries face concrete threats from Russia and Iran, yet Denmark, France, and Norway have lately moved to impede the military readiness of the country supplying them advanced defense technology.

Norwegian officials worry that Russian gray-zone activity near Svalbard could trigger a NATO-Russia confrontation. In late September, Danish intelligence flagged the growing risk of limited Russian military action against NATO states, citing Russia’s aggressive naval behavior in the Baltic Sea. Iran and its proxies have recently plotted attacks on Danish, French, and Norwegian targets. During the recent Iran war, Tehran also demonstrated that its long-range missiles could reach much of Western Europe.

Instead of reinforcing their defenses, the three governments have restricted Israeli port access and withheld components from the German shipyards that build Israel’s warships. Norway and Denmark barred Israel’s INS Drakon submarine, even while it sailed under a German flag, from conducting trials in their territorial waters, forcing a detour of thousands of miles and causing months of delay. France has joined them in refusing certain defense components for the German yards constructing Israeli submarines and Saar corvettes. Germany has built all four of Israel’s Saar-6 corvettes and all six of its active submarines.

Political incentives help explain these choices. Israel is a fault line in the French presidential cycle, and around 10 percent of the French population are Muslims. France’s government formally recognized a nonexistent Palestine last year. Denmark’s fragile governing coalition has taken heat for defense ties with Jerusalem, and approximately 5 percent of Denmark’s population is Muslim. The measures may be symbolic, but their effect is not.

The circular-firing-squad problem is straightforward. The same governments still buy, or plan to buy, combat-proven Israeli systems to protect their own forces. Norway, which also recognizes a Palestinian state, this year began receiving Leopard 2A8 tanks fitted with Israeli firm Rafael’s Trophy active protection system — the only such system with a sustained combat record against anti-tank missiles. Without it, Norwegian armor would be more exposed to the Russian threat Oslo itself describes as growing. Norway is also acquiring British Type 26 frigates whose electronic warfare suites draw on Israeli technology.

Denmark purchased Israeli rocket artillery and has shown interest in Israel’s Barak-MX air defenses and in frigates carrying Israeli systems, precisely to counter Russian naval and aerial pressure. The shared stock is broader still: interceptor and sensor families, and parts pools that feed multiple NATO inventories.

In a circular firing squad, the danger is not only that you miss the person you meant to punish. It is that a slight misfire — in this case, a restriction that travels through the common pipeline of components and technology — could hit your ally. Europe depends on the same line it is starting to cut. Should Israel answer with reciprocal limits, the buyers would lose access to systems they have already judged necessary. Even without reciprocity, delays to Israel’s submarine and surface fleet weaken a navy that helps secure the Mediterranean sea lanes necessary for European energy imports.

For the United States, the friction is worse than ordinary disagreement between allies. NATO partners are actively complicating the readiness of Israel, a country with Major Non-NATO Ally status and which the current administration has called a model ally. A visible circular firing squad inside the broader US alliance structure undercuts domestic support for those partnerships and signals to Russia and Iran that Western defense cooperation can be fractured from within.

Washington should warn against further steps that degrade Israeli readiness and should be prepared to attach costs if the warnings are ignored. As Denmark’s foreign minister has framed his own government’s measures targeting Israel, the correction would be for Europe’s own good.

RADM Paul Becker, USN (ret.), is former Director of Intelligence (J2) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s (JINSA) Generals and Admirals Program participant, and a member of JINSA’s Board of Advisors.

Yoni Tobin is a senior policy analyst at JINSA.

Read the original piece in Algemeiner.

The post Aiming at Israel, Europe Is Hitting Its Own Defenses in a Circular Firing Squad appeared first on JINSA.

Unmanned Warfare Has Now Expanded to the High Seas. Is the U.S. Ready?

Yoni Tobin — Thu, 08 Oct 2026 07:35:01 +0000

Drone warfare is expanding from the skies to the seas, and the United States must be ready. The Russia-Ukraine war, which has become synonymous with aerial drone warfare, has now featured the first naval battle in history between unmanned boats, according to the Ukrainian Navy. On September 14, a Ukrainian Sargan 300 drone boat fired at and sank a Russian unmanned surface vessel (USV) in the Black Sea — a significant milestone in warfare’s rapid evolution.

Unmanned naval platforms are also starting to see combat beyond the battlefield laboratory of eastern Europe. During the Iran war, in July, three American one-way attack USVs struck an Iranian submarine and naval facility — the first-ever U.S. use of USVs to strike enemy targets. Just weeks prior, a USV rescued two U.S. Army pilots from nearby waters after an Iranian drone struck their helicopter.

Nor are recent U.S. unmanned successes confined to the Middle East. They have occurred right in America’s backyard. Reporting from Aug. 5 indicated that an American USV recently detected, tracked, and helped intercept a U.S.-bound narcotics shipment worth $81 million in the Caribbean Sea.

Now, accelerated U.S. efforts, not complacency, are needed to build on this recent tactical success. Greater strategic imagination is the first step. The Pentagon needs to think bigger about unmanned military platforms — but also smaller. Thinking smaller means complementing high-end platforms with inexpensive, expendable ones. Thinking bigger means integrating them into a single network with manned assets and human warfighters. Today, the U.S. military does neither at scale.

The American military’s recent success with autonomous platforms — as well as the unmanned advances of partners like Israel, Ukraine and Taiwan — offers three main lessons for generating the Pentagon’s next unmanned leap forward.

First, expendability has its own currency. Ukraine has achieved outsized battlefield effects with lower-end, expendable unmanned platforms — as have Iran and Russia. This is true for sea-based autonomous systems too. However, one-way attack USVs, like those American forces used against Iran, remain in short supply.

That shortfall stems from bureaucratic, not technological, reasons. The Pentagon applies the same rigid standards to unmanned, expendable platforms as to high-end, manned surface combatants. Yet overly rigorous testing and evaluation inhibits production at the pace which the battlefield demands.

Second, as the recent USV rescue of U.S. aviators from the Arabian Gulf demonstrates, unmanned platforms offer more than strike or surveillance functions. In fact, those lower-tech functions may have greater upside involving less rigorous testing and faster deployment timetables.

Take, for example, the since-axed UCLASS program to build carrier-based surveillance-and-strike drones. Due to a lengthy requirements list, the project became unsustainable. That is subtraction by addition. Now, the Navy is developing the MQ-25 Stingray, an unmanned aerial refueler — a simpler platform meeting a more fundamental need.

Unmanned platforms offer additional types of unconventional utility, like logistics resupply and forward basing. An Israeli firm is exploring turning commercial ships into camouflaged floating drone bases. Another has developed heavy-lift drones to move materiel to the battlefield. These concepts are relevant to a primary challenge America would face in a future Pacific war: contested logistics across a broad geographic area far from the homeland and near the enemy’s turf. Fortunately, unmanned systems could ease those logistical headaches by offering greater concealment, dispersal, and flexibility while preserving manpower.

Another potential evolution is now on the horizon: unmanned amphibious landings. A Ukrainian startup has a prototype for an autonomous amphibious vehicle, resembling a small truck. It can carry drones, travel underwater with a low radar profile, and drive onto enemy shores. The United States, by acquiring that capability, could facilitate a naval version of Operation Spiderweb, where Ukrainian drones hidden inside cargo trucks infiltrated Russia and neutralized strategic Russian bombers across the country.

Third, the Pentagon’s unmanned advances must be complementary, but currently are not. This is the “think bigger” half of the equation, and what makes the first two lessons pay off. Expendable autonomous mass, low-cost single-purpose platforms, and distributed unmanned hubs reach their potential only by working as a team. Recognizing this, Taiwan is seeking over 200,000 one-way attack drones and over 1,200 USVs, but also the systems architecture to link them together.

To prevail in a hypothetical Pacific war, American forces must have persistent adversary surveillance. Currently, that interconnectivity is lacking, impeding readiness. Surveillance drones cannot directly communicate with nearby submarines or USVs, nor fuse data into a common operating picture.

Linking autonomous platforms, manned assets, and human warfighters in a shared data mesh and command-and-control system would close those gaps. The U.S. military’s Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) aims to forge that very integration. Yet CJADC2 remains limited to “fragmented deployments,” according to the Pentagon. Fixing that is a critical next step.

Innovating in the unmanned domain will require the Pentagon to be more imaginative in how it acquires, tests, and links its manned and unmanned platforms. That requires thinking smaller, by acquiring more expendable unmanned systems, and thinking bigger, about operationalizing a joint-domain network. It also should involve Washington acquiring Israeli, Taiwanese, and Ukrainian unmanned technology, and expanding co-production with those U.S. partners at the cutting edge of warfare.

Successful adaptation also requires re-examining of how the Pentagon allocates resources. Currently, the Pentagon’s unmanned capabilities are constrained by cost overruns on large, manned surface combatants that are not well calibrated to today’s threat landscape. Studies indicate that guided-missile destroyers would be highly vulnerable in a Pacific war, and that reliably fixing and returning them to battle would be nearly impossible. Spending on these platforms, while important, represents a disproportionately large portion of the Navy’s budget — crowding out unmanned innovation and acquisition.

The Pentagon’s recent unmanned successes show it is not completely outpaced by warfare’s rapid evolution. Yet this race is a marathon, not a sprint.

Vice Admiral Michael Connor, USN (ret.) is former Commander of the U.S. Submarine Forces and a Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) Generals and Admirals Program participant. Vice Admiral Connor also previously served as director of the Pentagon’s Naval Warfare Integration Group.

Yoni Tobin is a senior policy analyst at JINSA.

Read the original piece in DefenseScoop.

The post Unmanned Warfare Has Now Expanded to the High Seas. Is the U.S. Ready? appeared first on JINSA.

PRESS RELEASE: 75+ U.S. Military Leaders Reject Gaza Genocide Claims

Yoni Tobin — Wed, 07 Oct 2026 11:00:47 +0000

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
October 7, 2026
Contact: Blake Johnson
bjohnson@jinsa.org

Retired U.S. Military Leaders and Legal Experts Reject Genocide Allegations Against Israel

Washington, DC – On the third anniversary of Hamas’s October 7, 2023, massacre, a group of over 75 senior retired U.S. military leaders and legal experts today issued an open letter, organized by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, rejecting allegations that Israel committed genocide in Gaza, concluding that the allegation is unsupported by the facts and does not meet the definition of genocide.

The signatories, including those who have commanded U.S. armed forces in combat, emphasize that the standards used to judge military conduct matter precisely because war is tragic and imperfect. Lowering the standard for what constitutes genocide, they warn, could create dangerous incentives for adversaries to embed themselves among civilians, exploit resulting casualties, and characterize lawful military operations as genocide.

The precedent established today will shape the conditions under which American forces fight tomorrow.

“Accusing Israel of genocide in Gaza is obscene,” said JINSA President and CEO Michael Makovsky. “It egregiously distorts the truth, the facts, and the law. These senior U.S. military commanders and lawyers, who understand the realities of war and the unprecedented steps Israel has taken to avoid civilian casualties, have stepped forward to correct the record. I hope those who are fair-minded will take heed.”

Genocide is an exceptionally grave crime requiring evidence of an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. Civilian casualties, however tragic, do not by themselves establish genocidal intent. Based on their professional experience and assessment of Israeli military operations, the signatories conclude that Israel has neither intended to destroy Palestinians as a group nor conducted its campaign in a manner consistent with such an intent.

The extensive measures taken by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to protect civilians while fighting Hamas, included advance warnings, evacuation instructions, protected corridors, tactical pauses, stringent legal review of targets, and repeated decisions to cancel strikes because of the presence of civilians. These precautions have at times required Israeli forces to surrender tactical advantages and expose their own personnel to greater risk.

The signatories do not minimize the suffering of civilians in Gaza. They draw instead on their own experience commanding American forces pointing out that, “There is no perfect attack; there are only those in which commanders use all available information to make hard decisions and their best judgement to comply with legal obligations and protect civilians.”

The letter also distinguishes inflammatory statements by Israeli political officials, which the signatories condemn, from the conduct of the IDF itself. Political rhetoric, they argue, cannot substitute for evidence of genocidal intent in the conduct of military operations.

The signatories call on those making allegations of genocide to apply the Genocide Convention faithfully and to distinguish between the tragic consequences of combat, potential violations of the laws of armed conflict, and the specific crime of genocide.

Misapplying that standard risks rewarding adversaries who deliberately endanger civilians and undermining the ability of the United States and its allies to defend themselves.

The letter concludes: “Protecting civilians and preserving the ability of our nation to defend itself requires us to defend the truth when the laws of war are being distorted to make false charges of genocide.”

Read the Open Letter

###

Jewish Institute for National Security of America

2021 L St NW, Suite 101-239

Washington, DC 20036

www.jinsa.org

The post PRESS RELEASE: 75+ U.S. Military Leaders Reject Gaza Genocide Claims appeared first on JINSA.

Open Letter From 75+ Military Professionals Rejecting Genocide Allegation Against Israel

Nolan Judd — Wed, 07 Oct 2026 09:00:42 +0000

For Immediate Release
October 7, 2026

Washington, DC – As retired senior military leaders and legal experts, on this, the third anniversary of Hamas’s October 7, 2023 brutal attack on Israel, we reject claims that Israel committed genocide in Gaza.

Genocide is a grave and exceptional violation of international law, defined and prohibited by the Genocide Convention of 1948 and enumerated as a crime in the Statute of the International Criminal Court and in the U.S. federal criminal code. The allegations that Israel committed this crime do not meet the established definition and standards of genocide, are unsupported by established facts, nor do they stand up to common sense scrutiny.

A finding of genocide requires evidence of acts that are intended to destroy a protected national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, in whole or in part. Israel has neither intended to, nor destroyed, Palestinians as a group in Gaza. All the evidence, in fact, points to the contrary conclusion: that, after suffering a barbaric, indiscriminate massacre by Hamas terrorists on October 7, 2023, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), acting in justified self-defense, went to extreme lengths to protect civilians in Gaza, including from Hamas.

Israel’s accusers allege genocide mostly because of the supposed number of civilians killed in Gaza. Such claims are rife with flaws. Genocide is not a quantitative crime; there is no number of civilian casualties that constitutes genocide. Nor are the claimed casualty numbers from Gaza credible. Issued by Hamas themselves and, at the very least, not distinguishing between civilians and combatants, they cannot be relied upon.

Further, established legal precedent makes clear that civilian deaths occurring during combat, however tragic, are insufficient, by themselves, to support a finding of genocidal intent. That is because of the unfortunate realities of war and the laws that govern it, both of which Israel’s accusers appear woefully ignorant.

Many of the signatories to this letter have commanded United States armed forces in combat against enemies who regularly hide behind civilians and put those civilians intentionally in harm’s way. Fighting under those complexities is especially difficult. We understand that the loss of civilian life in Gaza is tragic. But we also know that such tragic outcomes do not necessarily violate the law of armed conflict. There is no perfect attack; there are only those in which commanders use all available information to make hard decisions and their best judgement to comply with legal obligations and protect civilians. And that is exactly what we have witnessed from the IDF in Gaza.

Assessments of Israeli combat operations, undertaken by some of the signatories to this letter, describe a military taking an unprecedented combination of precautions to avoid civilian casualties; not one following orders to destroy Palestinians as a group. The IDF has provided civilians with numerous advance warnings—leaflets, phone calls, text messages, radio and TV broadcasts, and social media notices—evacuation instructions, protected corridors, and tactical pauses to help move them out of harm’s way, even when those precautionary measures ceded tactical advantage to enemy forces. IDF soldiers have even put themselves in harm’s way to protect Palestinians seeking to flee the fighting from attack by Hamas. Stringent legal review of targets is a standard part of IDF procedures. Repeatedly, Israel has called off strikes because of the presence of civilians.

Israel has also gone out of its way to provide aid and assistance to civilians in Gaza. More than 3.5 million tons of food, 48,000 tons of medical supplies, 5,000 tons of baby food, and up to 15,000 cubic meters per day of water desalinated by Israel have been sent into Gaza. Over half a million Gazan children were vaccinated during the war and some 5,000 Gazans evacuated for medical treatment abroad. These are not the actions of a genocidal state but of a professional military ethically and legally committed to the protection of civilian life.

This pattern of law-abiding IDF conduct in Gaza also contradicts accusers’ claims that some statements from Israeli political officials, seemingly encouraging unlawful harm to civilians, are evidence of genocidal intent. Such inflammatory statements are disgraceful. Yet, while it deserves unequivocal condemnation, rhetoric from politicians uninvolved in military decision-making is in no way reflective of actual IDF operations.

Israel has not committed genocide but rather set a high bar for how to conduct urban warfare against an enemy who will stop at nothing, including the death of its own civilians.

We call on those concerned with this issue to carefully assess the facts related to the Gaza campaign, insist on faithful application of the Genocide Convention, and reject factually and legally dubious accusations against Israel. Failure to do so incentivizes future adversaries to deliberately endanger civilians and then exploit civilian suffering to portray lawful operations as genocide, weaken public support, and divide our alliances.

The precedent established today regarding Israel will shape the conditions under which American forces fight tomorrow. Protecting civilians and preserving the ability of our nation to defend itself requires us to defend the truth when the laws of war are being distorted to make false charges of genocide.

Read the Open Letter

Letter Signees include:

Gen James F. Amos, USMC (ret.), 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps
GEN Frank J. Grass, USA (ret.), JINSA Generals and Admirals Program Participant
Gen W.L. ”Spider” Nyland, USMC (ret.), Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps
Gen Philip M. Breedlove, USAF (ret.), Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Commander US European Command
Gen Kevin P. Chilton, USAF (ret.), Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
Gen C.T. “Tony” Robertson, Jr., USAF (ret.), Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, and Commander, Air Mobility Command
GEN James D. Thurman, USA (ret.), Commander, United Nations Command, ROK-United States Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea
Gen Charles Wald, USAF (ret.), Deputy Commander of United States European Command (EUCOM)
LTG John M. Bednarek, USA (ret.), Senior Defense Official, Iraq; Chief, Office of Security Cooperation, Baghdad
Gen William Begert, USAF (ret.), Commander, Pacific Air Forces, and Air Component Commander for the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command
ADM Bruce Clingan, USN (ret.), Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe; U.S. Naval Forces Africa; Allied Joint Force Command, Naples
Gen Donald G. Cook, USAF (ret.), Commander, Air Education and Training Command
ADM Mark Fitzgerald, USN (ret.), Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe; U.S. Naval Forces Africa; Allied Joint Force Command, Naples
Gen Mike Hostage, USAF (ret.), Commander, Air Combat Command
Lt Gen Steven L. Basham, USAF (ret.), Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command
VADM John Bird, USN (ret.), Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet
Lt Gen Rod Bishop, USAF (ret.), Commander, 3rd Air Force
LTG H. Steven Blum, USA (ret.), Deputy Commander, U.S. Northern Command
LtGen Thomas Conant, USMC (ret.), Deputy Commander, United States Pacific Command
VADM Michael J. Connor, USN (ret.), Commander, United States Submarine Forces
Lt Gen David Deptula, USAF (ret.), Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Headquarters Air Force Lt Gen Eric Fiel, USAF (ret.), Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command
VADM Jeffrey Fowler, USN (ret.), 60th Superintendent, U.S. Naval Academy
VADM Mark I. Fox, USN (ret.), Deputy Commander, United States Central Command
LTG David Fridovich, USA (ret.), Deputy Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command-USSOCOM
LtGen Kenneth Glueck, Jr., USMC (ret.), Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration; Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Lt Gen Michael Gould, USAF (ret.), Superintendent, United States Air Force Academy
LtGen Mike Groen, USMC (ret.), Director, Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC)
Lt Gen Joseph Guastella, USAF (ret.), Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force
LtGen Earl Hailston, USMC (ret.), Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific/Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command
LtGen Karsten Heckl, USMC (ret.), Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration; Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command
LtGen John Jansen, USMC (ret.), Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources
LTG James Jarrard, USA (ret.), Deputy Commanding General of United States Army Pacific
VADM Dennis Jones, USN (ret.), Deputy Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command
LTG Raymond Mason, USA (ret.), Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, G4 Army Staff
Lt Gen Charles May, USAF (ret.), Assistant Vice Chief of Staff
LtGen Fred McCorkle, USMC (ret.), Deputy Commandant Marine Corps Aviation
Lt Gen Thomas G. McInerney, USAF (ret.), Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force
VADM John Miller, USN (ret.), Commander, US Naval Forces, US Central Command
LtGen Rich Mills, USMC (ret.), Commander, Marine Forces Reserve and Commander Marine Forces North
Lt Gen Charles Moore, USAF (ret.), Deputy Commander, U.S. Cyber Command
Lt Gen C.D. Moore II, USAF (ret.), Commander, Air Force Life Cycle Management Center
VADM Ross A. Myers, USN (ret.), Commander, Tenth Fleet/Fleet Cyber/Navy Space, and former Deputy Commander, USCYBERCOM LTG Raymond Palumbo, USA (ret.), Director for Defense Intelligence
Lt Gen Chris Nowland, USAF (ret.), Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force
VADM Carol Pottenger, USN (ret.), NATO Allied Command Transformation DCOS Capability Development
VADM Joe Rixey, USN (ret.), Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
VADM Herman A. Shelanski, USN (ret.), Naval Inspector General VADM Sandra Stosz, USCG (ret.), Deputy Commandant for Mission Support
LTG Guy Swan, USA (ret.), Commanding General, U.S. Army North/5th Army
Lt Gen Thomas J. Trask, USAF (ret.), Vice Commander, United States Special Operations Command
LtGen Mark Wise, USMC (ret.), Deputy Commandant for Aviation, USMC
RADM Fred L. Ames, USCG (ret.), Assistant Commandant for Human Resources
MajGen Joseph T. Anderson, USMC (ret.), CG 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
MG Joe Arbuckle, USA (ret.), Commander, Operations Support Command
RADM Paul Becker, USN (ret.), Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff (J2)
Maj Gen Jack J. Catton, Jr., USAF (ret.), Director of Requirements, Headquarters Air Combat Command
MajGen Mark Clark, USMC (ret.), Commanding General Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC)
MajGen Jon Gallinetti, USMC (ret.), Deputy Commander, Marine Corps Forces Command
RADM Brett Heimbigner, USN (ret.), Director Joint ISR Operations Center
MajGen Bob Hollingsworth, USMC (ret.), Vice Commander, Marine Forces Pacific
Maj Gen James P. Hunt, USAF (ret.), Deputy Commanding General, Multi-National Corps, Iraq
Maj Gen Kenneth Israel, USAF (ret.), Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Airborne Reconnaissance and Director of the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office
RADM Steven Kantrowitz, USN (ret.), Deputy Commander, Naval Legal Service Command
RADM Edward Masso, USNR (ret.), Commander Navy Personnel Command/Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel
RADM William F. Merlin, USCG (ret.), Commander, Eighth Coast Guard District
MG William Moore, USA (ret.), Director for Operations, Headquarters
Maj Gen Bentley B. Rayburn, USAF (ret.), Commander, USAF Doctrine Center
MajGen Dave Richwine, USMC (ret.), Chief Information Officer and Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, US Marine Corps
Maj Gen Lawrence Stutzriem, USAF (ret.), Director, Plans, Policy, and Strategy, North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command
MajGen Larry Taylor, USMCR (ret.), Commanding General, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing
MG Paul Vallely, USA (ret.), Deputy Commanding General US Army Pacific
RDML Terry McKnight, USN (ret.), Commander Task Force 151 – Anti-Piracy Task Force/Commander Expeditionary Group Two
RDML Mark Milliken, USN (ret.), Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy International Programs Office
BGen Michael Mulqueen, USMC (ret.), The United States Military Entrance Processing Command
Brig Gen Christopher Walker, USAF (ret.), Assistant Adjutant General and Commander of the West Virginia Air National Guard
BG Mitchell M. Zais, Ph.D., USA (ret.), Former Acting U.S. Secretary of Education
COL Marc Warren, USA (ret.), Former Special Assistant for Military Law and Operations to The Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army
MAJ John Spencer, USA (ret.), Executive Director, Urban Warfare Institute

The post Open Letter From 75+ Military Professionals Rejecting Genocide Allegation Against Israel appeared first on JINSA.

How to Keep the Houthis Out of the Red Sea

Yoni Tobin — Mon, 05 Oct 2026 08:41:02 +0000

The war for the world’s key maritime chokepoints now has a second front. Reportedly with Iranian assistance, Houthi forces staged a 48-hour offensive on September 10-11, seizing further stretches of Red Sea coastline and the Hanish and Perim islands. When the dust settled, the Iranian axis had gained effective control over another vital maritime chokepoint—the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, through which 25 percent of global container traffic passes in peacetime—without a clear U.S. response as yet.

Yet more is at stake than Yemen’s internal dynamics, regional tensions, or global energy prices. The Iranian regime’s ongoing efforts to hold hostage the Strait of Hormuz, and the Houthis’ seizure of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, are fundamental challenges to the global freedom of navigation that the United States has upheld for over two centuries.

In 1785, then-ambassador to France Thomas Jefferson argued that forceful U.S. action is necessary “if we wish our commerce to be free.” That is why, as president, he dispatched the U.S. Navy against the Barbary pirates in modern Libya.

Since that war, upholding freedom of navigation has been a core U.S. strategic pillar. The 2025 US National Security Strategy (NSS), like its predecessors, noted the continued American objective of “preserving freedom of navigation in all crucial sea lanes.” Ever since presidential administrations began issuing the strategy document in 1987, 16 of the 20 total NSS papers have reaffirmed this principle. Threats to international waterways have been one of the most common causes of US military action in recent decades, including against Libya in 1981 and 1986; Iran in 1988; and the Houthis themselves in 2025.

The Houthi threat to global shipping expanded dramatically overnight, threatening the credibility of that U.S. maritime security commitment. The Houthis no longer need drones or missiles, which they used in hundreds of attacks on ships between 2023 and 2025, to threaten Red Sea shipping credibly. Given the Houthi forces’ footholds along the narrow Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint, protecting shipping will be even harder, since the group can now attack with closer-range weaponry such as artillery, rockets, and heavy machine guns. Economic impacts were immediate, as crude prices spiked above $100 per barrel.

The implications of the Houthis’ newfound effective control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait stretch far beyond the Middle East. The Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance” is now cementing its grip on two of the world’s five most-trafficked energy trade chokepoints. Importantly, those two nearby chokepoints sit along critical intercontinental energy sea routes. Threats to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait force ships to reroute around Africa. For a container ship on an Asia-Europe route, this diversion would add 10–12 days to the voyage, and an estimated $1 million in fuel costs per round trip.

Moreover, left unchecked, this development could have cascading effects globally. Middle East chokepoints could be the first dominoes to fall as hostile actors test America’s open-seas commitment elsewhere. Days after the recent Houthi offensive, Chinese vessels were seen at the Bering Strait chokepoint linking the Arctic and Pacific oceans—where China and Russia have held joint drills and patrols. In addition, Russia’s ongoing Black Sea aggression underscores its threat to the nearby Danish and Turkish Straits chokepoints, and the South China Sea’s eight key chokepoints remain vulnerable to Chinese coercion.

While the United States is reportedly pursuing diplomacy with the Houthis, past diplomatic efforts did not deter the Houthis, and are even less likely to succeed now given the Houthis’ newly expanded territory. Houthi forces violated the 2018 Stockholm Agreement requiring their withdrawal from Hodeidah, which is still a key Houthi operations hub. Saudi-backed Yemeni forces reportedly recaptured the port of Mokha on October 5, which the Houthis had seized earlier this month.

The soundest approach is a U.S.-led coalition that protects global shipping and removes the Houthi threat. The United States has an unparalleled coalition-building ability, and dozens of U.S. partners—chiefly hydrocarbon exporters in the Middle East and importers in Europe and Asia—have strong interests in securing the two chokepoints. France recently sent troops, air defenses, and radars to protect Saudi Arabia from Houthi aggression, and the British government has agreed to conduct air-to-air refueling of Saudi jets. In a May summit, 40 nations signaled a desire to protect shipping, without detailing how.

A robust U.S.-led multilateral force would boost America’s credibility as a reliable security guarantor for its partners. Conversely, Washington staying on the sidelines would erode the confidence of friendly Arab countries, primarily an uneasy Saudi Arabia, the main target of Houthi attacks. It would also further embolden Iran and its proxies.

The United States has a narrow window to restore the credibility of its freedom-of-navigation commitment. Fortunately, its partners can help. Strength comes from numbers and concrete displays of U.S. leadership.

Lt Gen Thomas Bergeson, USAF (ret.), is the former deputy commander of U.S. Central Command. He oversaw military security cooperation and combat operations within the Arabian Peninsula, Northern Red Sea, Arabian Gulf, and Central and Southern Asian States. Before that assignment, Lt. Gen. Bergeson served as deputy commander, United Nations Command Korea. He has flown combat sorties in multiple operations.

LTG Karen Gibson, USA (ret.), is the former U.S. Deputy Director of National Intelligence for National Security Partnerships. Lt. Gen. Gibson has worked as a public servant for 37 years, first as an active-duty U.S. Army intelligence officer for 33 years, where she attained the rank of Lieutenant General, then as Sergeant at Arms of the U.S. Senate for an additional four years.

LtGen Sam Mundy, USMC (ret.), is the former commander of U.S. Marine Forces Central Command. He currently serves as President of Once a Marine LLC. He previously commanded Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command. From 2011 to 2013, he also served as the Executive Officer to the USCENTCOM Commander, traveling with him throughout the Gulf, Levant, and Central and South Asia.

MajGen Robert Sofge, USMC (ret.), is the former commander of United States Marine Corps Forces, Europe and Africa. As a general officer, he also served as director for strategy, plans, and policy (UCJ5), United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/US Forces Korea; deputy commander for Marine Forces Pacific in Hawaii; and director of the combined joint operations center in Baghdad, Iraq.

All authors participated in the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) Generals and Admirals Program.

Read the original piece in The National Interest.

The post How to Keep the Houthis Out of the Red Sea appeared first on JINSA.

U.S. Protection Revives Hormuz Oil Traffic as Debate Shifts to How Long It Can Last

jinsa-shavdala — Wed, 30 Sep 2026 15:18:48 +0000

U.S. efforts to protect commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz have helped revive Persian Gulf oil exports and weaken Iran’s grip on the waterway, experts now acknowledge, but a debate is brewing over how durable those gains are, and whether Washington is willing to sustain the costly naval commitment that underpins them.

…

Ari Cicurel, associate director of foreign policy at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, said the recent developments have challenged assumptions about how effectively Iran could use the strait to constrain international commerce.

“I think some in the foreign policy community underestimated the U.S. ability to break Iran’s effective hold over the strait, particularly the logistical capacity to sustain an alternative shipping route and protect commercial traffic,” Cicurel said. “Iran can impose costs on shipping, but the U.S. response has shown that the regime cannot translate those costs into a sustained blockade that preserves the same level of economic leverage as U.S. operations.”

The shift has reshaped Tehran’s relationship with the companies that depend on the waterway, Cicurel said, making it harder for Iran to dictate who can use the strait and on what terms. “The Navy’s blockade and protection of commercial shipping have shifted the cost of disrupting the strait onto Iran, which has lost most of its exports while its Gulf neighbors have increased their oil shipments,” he said. “Shippers now have a route through the strait that does not depend on Tehran’s permission” — eroding Iran’s leverage in negotiations.

But Cicurel said Iran can still attempt to influence decisions by creating enough uncertainty around the safety of the strait to deter companies from using it.

“Even with its leverage diminished, the Iranian regime has repeatedly withstood economic pressure by diverting money from the Iranian people to its military, and it will likely continue to do so to keep funding attacks as its revenue shrinks. Iran will likely keep launching calibrated attacks to extract as much of its remaining leverage as possible and to convince insurers and shipping companies the strait remains unsafe,” Cicurel said.

…

Meanwhile, Jonathan Ruhe, a fellow at JINSA, said the “real underestimation” was on the part of the Trump administration. He noted that while the oil is “flowing again,” Washington should have heeded presumptions that Tehran could potentially close the strait during the conflict.

“The real underestimation was the Trump administration’s failure to anticipate and preempt Iran’s initial efforts to threaten the strait. Extensive U.S. war plans built this exact scenario into their assumptions, but it was discounted,” Ruhe said. “The U.S. military, particularly the Navy, always had the ability to counter Iran’s unconventional maritime threats, but doing so became a lot harder once Iran dropped its first mines in the water and scared off commercial shipping with its opening drone strikes. Only recently have those mines, radars and other Iranian military assets been degraded, enabling the tough work of naval escorting to begin belatedly.”

Ruhe explained that while the flow of oil presents several diplomatic and economic benefits for the U.S. in its confrontation with Iran, he warned that Tehran’s leverage in talks may not shift.

“There are many diplomatic, economic, and operational benefits to getting oil flowing again. Yet it’s hard to imagine how any of this meaningfully changes Tehran’s negotiating posture,” Ruhe said. “Tellingly, Iran’s recent seven-day plan offered no concessions compared to the June MOU, when traffic through Hormuz was much lower. For all the military and economic pounding it has taken, the regime has been predictably stubborn in resisting Trump’s demands.”

“If the recent upsurge in Hormuz traffic proves sustainable, and if the U.S naval blockade on Iran remains effective, the regime could see diminishing downside in restarting attacks upstream from Hormuz, targeting the Arabian Gulf, commercial vessels, and energy sites with mines, drones, and missiles,” Ruhe continued. “Those strikes proved incredibly successful early in the war, and Iran currently has no reason to believe that’s no longer the case.”

…

Read the full piece in JNS.

The post U.S. Protection Revives Hormuz Oil Traffic as Debate Shifts to How Long It Can Last appeared first on JINSA.

To Stop Iran, America’s Partners Must Fight Together

Yoni Tobin — Mon, 28 Sep 2026 11:03:16 +0000

Iran appears to be exporting its Strait of Hormuz playbook to the Red Sea.

The Houthis’ sudden seizure of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has weaponized a strategic choke point to inflict economic pain, but Tehran is pursuing a more ambitious strategy: turning Israel’s playbook — developed after the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks — against America.

As Israel systematically dismantled Iran’s network of proxies across the Middle East, Iran has turned to targeting the Arab allies that underpin U.S. power in the region.

On Oct. 7, 2023, Israel found itself surrounded by an Iranian ring of fire — attacked by Hamas but facing Iranian-armed terrorist armies on seven fronts. Though it realized that it could be safe only if it dealt with the arsonist in chief — Iran itself — it first had to douse the closest flames.

It was the successful degradation, if not elimination, of Iran-backed proxies — Hamas, Hezbollah and the Assad regime — that cleared the way to Tehran. With those groups diminished, Israel no longer had to fear that they would unleash their fury in defense of their Iranian patron.

Tehran has clearly internalized the lessons from Israel’s dismantling of its ring of fire. It is now deploying them against the United States. The recent Houthi offensive represents a double reversal of the Israeli strategy.

First, the Houthi offensive demonstrates that Iran’s terrorist pawns have not been completely swept off the Middle East’s chessboard. After sitting out several weeks of intense regional fighting, the Houthis have rejoined Iran’s offensive. Worse, they have been acting in coordination with Iran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq, which have bombarded Kurdish groups and targeted Saudi oil infrastructure.

Both of these proxies have survived efforts to sideline them. The U.S. and Israel pummeled the Houthis. Iraq’s new government has demanded that the militias disarm and attempted to arrest a high-ranking official, but neither effort has succeeded.

The ring of fire might have shrunk, but it has not been extinguished.

More ominously, Iran has adopted Israel’s anti-proxy strategy. It is now fighting what it sees as an American ring of fire encircling Iran, not with terrorist groups, but with partner states. The closest to Tehran are the Arab states hosting U.S. forces.

Now, Tehran appears to be pursuing a calculated strategy to pressure those states to expel American troops and abandon their alignment with Washington. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Bahrain and even Egypt have all been targeted by Tehran and its proxies, even as they have avoided striking Israel.

By attacking America’s Arab partners and their infrastructure, Tehran seeks to punitively demonstrate that U.S. security guarantees endanger them. If this is Iran’s strategy, recent attacks are likely a prelude to a broader escalation.

The Houthis are on the march and could seek to control Yemen’s Red Sea coastline and establish a beachhead in the Horn of Africa. Iraq’s militias are growing bolder, perhaps portending a showdown with Baghdad or the Kurdish region, as soon as U.S. forces complete their withdrawal from the country.

This Iranian strategy seems to be working. Never has Tehran been closer to achieving its goal of expelling the U.S. from the Middle East politically and militarily.

In a drastic pivot from its recent pursuits of a U.S. defense treaty and normalization with Israel, Saudi Arabia has instead pursued an Islamic alliance with Pakistan and Turkey to hedge against exclusive reliance on America. Even this attempt at realignment failed.

Iranian proxies attacked the kingdom anyway, while the Saudis’ new allies offered limited initial support, underscoring the limits of the pact.

The Saudis are right that the region needs new security arrangements, but wrong to seek them beyond the United States. The answer is not less American security but more. The U.S. may not be able to commit the military resources needed to keep Bab el-Mandeb open, but it can bring together its partners to provide the security that the region needs.

This requires doubling down on the Israeli strategy of extinguishing Iran’s ring of fire. This time, however, there must be a coordinated approach, with all of America’s partners fighting the fires together, at once.

Mitigating the threats from Iran, Yemen and Iraq will require cooperation among the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United Arab Emirates. The UAE is the only state with a track record of success in ground operations against the Houthis in Yemen.

Israel has a record of successful strikes deep inside Yemen, intelligence penetration of Iranian networks, possible access to bases in Somaliland, across the Gulf of Aden from Yemen, and effective missile defense that it is ready to share with partners.

Iran is trying to reignite its ring of fire and direct it not against Israel this time, but against America’s Arab partners. Only a joint, coordinated response can secure the region’s critical waterways and infrastructure and perhaps finally stamp out the Iranian threat.

Hussein Aboubakr Mansour is a Gemunder Center fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America.

Blaise Misztal is vice president for policy at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America.

Read the original piece in The Washington Times.

The post To Stop Iran, America’s Partners Must Fight Together appeared first on JINSA.

‘MBS Will Not Forget’: Donald Trump’s Reluctance to Fight Houthis Rattles Saudi Arabia

Nolan Judd — Tue, 22 Sep 2026 18:41:55 +0000

Donald Trump’s reluctance to join Saudi Arabia’s conflict with Houthi rebels in Yemen has added new strain to Washington’s relationship with Riyadh, one already shaken by the US’s conduct of its war with Iran.

…

“MBS will not forget this,” said JINSA Generals and Admirals Program Participant LTG (ret.) Karen Gibson, former director of intelligence at US Central Command, adding that the administration’s hesitation demonstrates that the “United States will not necessarily fight when Saudi Arabia believes its vital interests are threatened”.

…

Read the full piece in the Financial Times.

The post ‘MBS Will Not Forget’: Donald Trump’s Reluctance to Fight Houthis Rattles Saudi Arabia appeared first on JINSA.

How Arab-Israeli Air Defense Coordination Is Developing into a Regional Security Shield

Nolan Judd — Tue, 22 Sep 2026 18:37:21 +0000

Operation Epic Fury helped increase coordination between US partners and allies in the region in terms of air defenses and other types of security coordination. A recent report by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to the United States Congress, which covered aspects of Operation Epic Fury from April to June, provided new details on the types of cooperation. Although the report was general, it shed light on an important trend in the Middle East.

…

In January 2022, the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) published a report titled “A Stronger and Wider Peace: A US Strategy for Advancing the Abraham Accords.”

This report “heralded the accords as an historic breakthrough and urged the US government to seize the opportunity to start building a new Middle East defense architecture premised on bringing America’s regional partners together in common cause to counter the growing menace from Iran.”

The goal was also for Congress to help support this cooperation, as well as a “region-wide air defense network to help deter and defeat the escalating missile and drone threat posed by Iran and its terrorist proxies.” The result was the Deterring Enemy Forces and Enabling National Defenses Act (DEFEND Act) of 2022.

JINSA noted in a May 2023 report called “Build it, and they will come: A US strategy for integrating Middle East air and missile defenses,” that there were opportunities to move toward a “region-wide integrated air and missile defense.” JINSA stated that “animosities among US partners have historically acted as a severe constraint on their willingness to engage in the levels of intelligence sharing and cooperation that meaningful air defense integration would require.”

…

Read the full piece in the Jerusalem Post.

The post How Arab-Israeli Air Defense Coordination Is Developing into a Regional Security Shield appeared first on JINSA.

Qatar’s Propaganda Machine Could Be ‘First Casualty’ of LNG Collapse

Nolan Judd — Tue, 22 Sep 2026 18:32:38 +0000

Qatar’s decades-long project of bankrolling pro-Islamist, anti-Israel and anti-Western causes could be the first casualty of the collapse of a critical energy income stream, a former U.S. national security adviser told JNS in recent days.

…

John Hannah, the Randi & Charles Wax Senior fellow at the Washington-based Jewish Institute for National Security of America and a former national security adviser to U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, said the devastating loss of Qatar’s LNG revenues could force Doha to reconsider its international investments.

“Hopefully, Qatar’s decades-long project to advance pro-Islamist, anti-American, anti-Israel causes will be one of the first casualties of the devastating loss of its LNG revenues,” Hannah said.

Hannah said the collapse of Qatar’s gas export income has left the ruling royal family facing an unfamiliar set of constraints.

“For the first time in a long time, Qatar’s leaders have to make hard choices on how they are going to keep their domestic economy afloat, their Western partners happy, and the ruling family in power without the LNG golden goose providing endless mountains of cash for massive welfare benefits, payoffs and strategic foreign investments,” he said.

According to Hannah, the fiscal reckoning facing Doha should extend beyond domestic austerity and into a fundamental reassessment of Qatar’s international posture.

“They are being forced into a major belt-tightening and part of that reckoning should be a decisive turn away from the two-faced foreign policy that had them playing all sides of the Middle East’s divide between pro-Western pragmatic modernists and anti-Western extremist Islamists,” he said.

Hannah argued that Doha’s long-running strategy of simultaneously courting Washington and accommodating Islamist actors across the region has now visibly failed.

“That’s the strategy that came crashing down on their heads when the same Iranian regime they’d spent years seeking to accommodate and appease didn’t think twice to devastate Qatar’s LNG lifeline in retaliation for an Israeli strike on Iran’s South Pars gas field that Qatar had nothing to do with,” he said.

He added that Western governments now have an opening to press Doha toward a genuine policy shift.

“Ensuring that reckoning happens and gets reflected in Qatari policy should be a priority for the U.S. and its allies in their engagements with Doha going forward,” he said.

…

Read the full piece in JNS.

The post Qatar’s Propaganda Machine Could Be ‘First Casualty’ of LNG Collapse appeared first on JINSA.