The fragile, imperfect ceasefire in Lebanon has held. But it could become more tenuous after a recent change to a critical element in its success: high-level, on-the-ground U.S. military coordination and leadership.
For three months, Major General Jasper Jeffers interfaced in Beirut between the Israeli and Lebanese militaries. His presence and stature enabled the monitoring of Hezbollah’s compliance with the deal, deployment of Lebanese troops to the border, and withdrawal of Israeli forces. However, knowledgeable officials indicated that he left Lebanon earlier this year to focus on his primary responsibility as commander of Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) in Tampa, Florida but with no equally ranked replacement. Jeffers’s recent temporary visit to the region to help facilitate talks between Israel and Lebanon about their shared border underscored that the United States lacked a high-level military in the region responsible for this task. To ensure the ceasefire endures, it is critical that the Pentagon deploys another general officer to Beirut to take on this critical task.
For 18 years, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) failed to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, which required Hezbollah to disarm and withdraw north of the Litani River. Instead, LAF and UNIFIL stood idly by as the Iran-backed terrorist group amassed at least 150,000 rockets, missiles, and drones, as well as burrowed tunnels under civilian infrastructure and even UNIFIL outposts from which it planned to invade Israel. Through air and ground operations, Israeli forces eliminated much of Hezbollah’s infrastructure along the border as well as weapons and leadership throughout Lebanon.
Under the terms of the ensuing ceasefire, in exchange for Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, the LAF and UNIFIL must patrol southern Lebanon to remove Hezbollah and prevent it from returning to the area. Yet, if they were unable to enforce UNSCR 1701 before, there is little reason to believe LAF and UNIFIL could, on their own, prevent another Hezbollah buildup along the border now. That is why the deal established a U.S.-led International Monitoring and Implementation Mechanism that also includes Israel, Lebanon, France, and UNIFIL.
Through this mechanism, Israel can safely and indirectly share information about Hezbollah positions and activity with the LAF. U.S. leadership has pushed the LAF to respond to many of the hundreds of violations, while recognizing Israeli freedom to take action if the Lebanese military fails to do so. According to U.S. and Israeli officials we spoke with, this mechanism is instrumental in keeping the relative quiet.
A crucial factor in the monitoring mechanism’s success has been senior U.S. political and military representation. The civilian co-chair has been someone credibly speaking for the White House—at first, Deputy Assistant to President Biden Amos Hochstein and, now, Deputy Special Envoy for the Middle East Morgan Ortagus. The military co-chair has had stature and authority to represent the Pentagon and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Since the deal’s inception, that has been MG Jeffers.
While MG Jeffers nominally remains co-chair, more junior O-6 level officers, colonels, or captains, depending on the service, are now implementing the deal in Beirut. MG Jeffers’s return to Tampa is understandable—SOCCENT has larger responsibilities—but creates risks to the ceasefire’s sustainability.
Despite progress, Hezbollah remains a threat in southern Lebanon and could reignite fighting without enforcement of the ceasefire. Israel’s destruction of Hezbollah capabilities incentivized the LAF to assert itself, but it remains too soon to trust that the Lebanese military will counter the terrorist organization absent strong and high-level U.S. oversight. Preventing elements of the LAF from cooperating with Hezbollah requires close scrutiny.
To be effective, oversight must come from a U.S. general officer. The U.S. O-6 level officers who remain in the region will be at a disadvantage in meetings with the higher-ranking Israeli, Lebanese, and French brigadier generals participating in the mechanism. Similarly, these U.S. officers may not command the seniority to push the LAF toward greater efforts against Hezbollah, such as doubling its current deployment in the border area to meet its commitment to send 10,000 troops there. After establishing the co-chair as a U.S. general, leaving O-6 level officers in the region soon after its creation also sends a negative signal about U.S. commitment to fostering long-term calm.
With MG Jeffers needing to focus on SOCCENT, the Defense Department should appoint another general officer to co-chair the monitoring mechanism. That role should be based in the Middle East and have ceasefire implementation as the primary assignment. The United States similarly positioned a three-star as the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) for Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Since the USSC is part of the State Department, the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire co-chair should be a different officer who instead directly reports to the CENTCOM commander. To succeed at monitoring violations and mediating disputes, this officer should have familiarity with the region, particularly the IDF and LAF.
U.S. engagement remains critical to ensuring Hezbollah cannot again terrorize Israel and Lebanon alike. A dedicated U.S. general officer who has gravitas, experience, and credibility with all sides should lead that effort.
VADM Mark I. Fox, USN (ret.) served as deputy chief of U.S. Central Command and was a participant with the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s (JINSA) 2018 Generals and Admirals Program.
Ari Cicurel is the associate director of foreign policy at JINSA.
Originally published in RealClearDefense.