End States, Not End Dates: Defining Success for Operation Epic Fury

Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has been at war with the United States and Israel, killing directly or indirectly nearly one thousand American soldiers and maiming thousands more. It has developed strategic capabilities to dominate the Middle East and threaten American servicemembers, citizens, bases, partners, and eventually our homeland. Operation Epic Fury may not end Iran’s regime, which makes it all the more important to dramatically diminish Iran’s nuclear weapons program, missile and drone capabilities, and threats to freedom of navigation in the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.

These end states, rather than end dates, should set the standards for operational success. Pursuing such rigorous benchmarks will buy as much time as possible for the regime eventually to collapse at the hands of its own deeply-alienated population, before it can rebuild its military capabilities in any meaningful way. It also will reduce the barriers to action for future U.S. administrations that may be less likely to resort to force. Thus, to the extent the United States does not reach these benchmarks before the current conflict ends, it will need a clear and proactive postwar strategy, premised on credible military readiness, to stop Iran from reconstituting the threats that prompted Epic Fury in the first place. This strategy should proceed from the assumption that Iranian leadership will have strong incentives and urgency to revive its military and nuclear capabilities, and to redouble the defiance and escalation that endured the worst its most powerful enemies could throw at it.

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