Last Best Chance: U.S. Policy for an Israeli Strike on Iran

Time has long been running out to prevent a nuclear Iran, and now that time is up. From day one of his new term, President Donald Trump inherited this dangerous and urgent problem—but also opportunity. Seizing this opportunity requires ensuring that there is no daylight between the United States and Israel, particularly when it comes to military action against Iran’s nuclear program, and just as critically, in managing the day after a strike to prevent Iranian retaliation and reconstitution of that program.

Iran’s nuclear program now has advanced so far that it could produce ten bombs’ worth of highly enriched uranium in one month. As the president recently admitted, this crisis is “down to the final moments.” Yet the Tehran regime is perhaps the most vulnerable it has been in decades. Israel has destroyed Iran’s advanced S-300 air defenses and severely weakened its second-strike threats against Israel, foremost Hezbollah. The Assad regime in Syria, Tehran’s closest Arab state ally, is no more and, thanks to Israel, Syria’s military capabilities have been laid waste. Iran is experiencing significant economic and energy problems at home, which will worsen as President Trump resumes tough oil sanctions, intensifying the regime’s unpopularity among the Iranian people.

Iran’s unprecedented vulnerability, even if it has not yet decided to take the final step of building a nuclear weapon, suggests the time is fast approaching to address this nuclear threat. The United States, and certainly Israel, cannot risk waiting until the last possible minute to try to catch Iran’s final turn of the screw on a nuclear weapon. Hamas’s October 7, 2023, invasion has taught at least Israel that it can no longer wait for an existential threat to emerge before addressing it.

President Trump prefers a diplomatic agreement to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program. As he said on February 10, 2025, “I’d much rather see a deal with Iran where we can do a deal — supervise, check it, inspect it and then blow it up or just make sure that there [are] no more nuclear facilities.”

Trump’s objective is correct, but the odds that it can be achieved through diplomacy are extremely low. The Tehran regime saw what happened to Moammar Qaddafi when he dismantled Libya’s nuclear program, and it has no intention of repeating that outcome. As indicated by its recent effort to ensnare the Trump administration in drawn-out indirect talks, Iran wants to slow-roll diplomacy and make its nuclear weapons infrastructure even more advanced, opaque, and invulnerable to threats. Maximum pressure from U.S. economic sanctions will not alter this calculation.

That leaves the military option, which Israel appears intent to execute. The United States has every interest to maximize the effectiveness of such an attack, deter Iran’s efforts to reconstitute its nuclear program, limit the risks of a wider war, and uphold the credibility of more than two decades of U.S. commitments to prevent an Iranian bomb. The United States ideally would be a full partner with Israel, or at a minimum provide it with essential support, in both the strike itself and in managing the aftermath. There should be no daylight between the two countries.

In addition to transferring critical capabilities to Israel, the Trump administration should offer aerial refueling, combat search and rescue (CSAR), intelligence, air defense, and preemptive action against Iranian ballistic missiles. Preferably, the countries also would collaborate on complex operations which are more challenging for Israel alone, such as targeting Iran’s deeply-buried Fordow facility.

The United States and Israel also share an interest that any military campaign against Iran’s nuclear facilities remain a contained military operation and not the start of a regional war. This means ensuring there are no severe reprisals against Israel, U.S. bases in the region, and U.S. Gulf partners. This will require Washington to warn Iran that any such retaliation will put at direct risk the regime itself, including its political, military, and economic centers of gravity. Tehran should understand that the existence of the 46-year-old Islamic Republic itself could be in jeopardy.

Washington, and Jerusalem, must also make clear they have prepared economic, diplomatic, military, and covert means to prevent Iran from trying to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program. This entails keeping a policy of maximum pressure in force as long as this Iranian regime persists. Also, any military operation against Iran’s ramified nuclear weapons infrastructure must be seen as a long-term campaign, and not a one-off strike.

There are certainly risks to military action, which should not be minimized. But the risk of inaction is greater. The United States cannot permit Iran to become a nuclear power, which would threaten the existence of Israel and other U.S. partners, trigger a regional proliferation cascade, push the United States out of the Middle East, and eventually threaten America’s eastern seaboard. Moreover, permitting Iran to cross the nuclear threshold, a core redline for decades for Republican and Democratic presidents alike, would severely damage U.S. credibility across the globe, undermining American allies and emboldening American foes, especially China.

Click here to read the report.