Shielded by Fire: Middle East Air Defense During the June 2025 Israel-Iran War

Over the course of 12 days in June 2025, over a distance of some 2,000 km, Israel and Iran engaged in the first modern long-range missile and drone fire conflict between two countries that did not share a border. This unprecedented air war from June 13-24 demonstrated the effectiveness and tested the limits of modern missile defense capabilities. While the vast majority of the over 500 ballistic missiles fired by Iran did no damage to Israel, that success was due in large part to ad hoc U.S.-led air defense cooperation and achieved at the cost of significant drawdown of both U.S. and Israeli interceptor stockpiles. With Iran all but certain to rearm, the future security of both Israel and the United States will depend on formalizing and expanding the regional air defense network and investing in expanding the stockpiles and innovative capabilities of air defenses.

The United States and Israel demonstrated advanced integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) by coordinating intelligence and operations to intercept 273 of the 574 missiles Iran launched, with only 49 missiles impacting on Israeli populated areas, bases, and infrastructure. Meanwhile, limited assistance from Arab and European partners supported U.S. and Israeli efforts to defeat the 1,084 drones that Iran launched. Unlike during Iran’s previous attacks against Israel, the interplay between Israel’s offensive and defensive operations proved decisive during the conflict. Offensive operations targeting Iranian missile launchers and command sites, disrupted Iran’s ability to sustain attacks and reduced the volume and intensity of follow-on barrages.

However, the war revealed critical gaps in regional air defenses and technology. Israel’s initial surprise attack curbed Iran’s missile capacity, but Iran adapted with more sophisticated and frequent strikes, causing more damage in Israel, straining Israeli and U.S. interceptor stockpiles, and leaving Israel to heavily rely upon U.S. air defense support. Had Israel and the United States not coordinated and expanded air defense coverage ahead of the war, more of Iran’s missiles might have pierced Israel’s air defenses. And had Iran succeeded to expand its missile arsenal from 2,500 to 8,000 ballistic missiles by 2027, as it planned before Israel’s Operation Rising Lion, any conflict would likely have been longer and deadlier.

With Israeli interceptor stockpiles diminishing amid Iran’s unprecedented fire, Israel depended heavily on U.S. air defenses to intercept missiles. Absent this assistance, Israel may have needed to further diminish its own resources and face increased risk from deadly and destructive missile attacks in future conflicts. The United States launched over 150 THAAD “Talon” interceptors and 80 SM-3 interceptors—about 70 percent of all interceptors used during the war. Representing some 25 percent of the U.S. stockpile of THAAD interceptors, replenishing these could take 1.5 years.

It is vital, therefore, that Israel and the United States understand that they are in a rapidly paced arms race against Iran and the other global competitors—Russia, China, North Korea—who use its weapons or contribute to their development. The outcome of future conflicts will depend on how well countries improve their offensive and defensive capabilities. Both Israel and the United States face the urgent need to advance their air defense systems, increase interceptor stockpiles, and implement new strategies to address increasingly concentrated and unpredictable missile attacks, before Iran rebuilds its military capabilities. If new conflicts arise soon, any shortage will mark a massive vulnerability.

Although the IAMD effort proved successful during the conflict, its effectiveness depended heavily on U.S. leadership and the rapid but temporary deployment of U.S. assets. Arab nations only had limited involvement in the air defense coalition, and they lack sufficient air defenses to counter Iranian missile attacks. Improving regional security cooperation will require U.S. leadership to move IAMD past the current temporary coalition into a permanent, formal U.S.-led IAMD network that could respond to surprise attacks and aggression against less well-defended targets than Israel.

To strengthen regional security, the U.S. should transition IAMD from a temporary coalition to a formal, permanent network, focusing on real-time data sharing, integrated sensing, joint planning, and adequate resources for all partners. To facilitate these efforts and improve air defense capabilities, Congress should direct U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to assess IAMD effectiveness, address system gaps, and define joint protocols for regional missile defense. Ensuring preparedness for future conflicts also requires greater funding to replenish and expand the air defense interceptor stockpiles and production capabilities and co-development with Israel for innovative missile defense systems.

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Report Authors
Ari Cicurel
Associate Director of Foreign Policy