Flight Risk: Turkey and the F-35

After Turkey’s decision to acquire the Russian S-400 air and missile defense system, despite repeated warnings from U.S. officials, the United States was forced in 2019 to block Turkey from procuring and producing the American F-35 fifth-generation fighter. Now, Turkey is asking to be let back into the F-35 program. The United States must carefully consider whether Turkey, a rising, and potentially threatening, regional power led by the authoritarian, pro-Hamas, neo-Ottoman President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, can be trusted with this advanced jet.

We fear that it cannot. Repeatedly, Turkish policy and U.S. interests have diverged. Too often has Ankara threatened to use force against U.S. partners—not to mention, on occasion, U.S. troops. Most recently, Erdoğan has called for Israel’s destruction while championing Hamas. Though we would prefer a genuine partnership with Turkey, providing Ankara with the most sophisticated fighter in the world while concerns abound about how, where, and against whom Turkey would use it, is not the way to achieve it. Turkey getting the F-35 should be the result of, not the means for, rebuilding trust.

Yet, it appears the Trump administration is favorably disposed to grant Turkey’s request. If it insists on doing so, we recommend that it only offer Turkey re-entry into the F-35 program under very strict conditions. To wit, Turkey must:

• meet U.S. legal requirements to get rid of the S-400;
• restore normal diplomatic and economic relations with Israel;
• end all forms of support for Hamas, including allowing Hamas to raise funds on Turkish territory;
• enter into a serious, preferably U.S.-led deconfliction mechanism with Israel over Syria; and
• respect Greek and Cypriot air and sea territorial boundaries as well as their exclusive economic zones (EEZ).

If Turkey cannot agree to these terms, it should not be granted access to this advanced American weapon.

Regardless of whether Turkey gets the F-35, however, we also recommend that Congress consider requiring that at least high-end U.S. weapons sales to Turkey be legally required to meet the standard of not adversely impacting Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME).

Click here to read the report.

Report Authors
Michael Makovsky, PhD
President & CEO
Blaise Misztal
Vice President for Policy
Amb. Eric Edelman
Distinguished Scholar; Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey
Svante Cornell
Gemunder Center Scholar 
Alan Makovsky
Member, Eastern Mediterranean Policy Project; Former Senior Professional Staff Member, U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee
Jonah Brody
Policy Analyst