American Interests at the Summit
Shortly after his election, Ehud Barak made the point that the fewer interlocutors between Israel and its negotiating partners the better, and more secure the results of negotiations would be. So he wisely undid one of the most egregious mistakes of the Wye River Memorandum — removing the CIA as an arbiter of security problems between Israel and the PA. However tense things became, the IDF and the Palestinian “police” would have to work it out. In May, when the PA fomented violence against Israel, the IDF let Arafat know directly and in no uncertain terms what the consequences would be.
Shortly after his election, Ehud Barak made the point that the fewer interlocutors between Israel and its negotiating partners the better, and more secure the results of negotiations would be. So he wisely undid one of the most egregious mistakes of the Wye River Memorandum — removing the CIA as an arbiter of security problems between Israel and the PA. However tense things became, the IDF and the Palestinian “police” would have to work it out. In May, when the PA fomented violence against Israel, the IDF let Arafat know directly and in no uncertain terms what the consequences would be. No mediation. No negotiation. No “splitting the difference.” The violence stopped.
Unfortunately, President Clinton, the architect of Wye, is a true believer in American initiatives, proposals and personnel. Thus his insistence on convening this summit at this time despite the potential for increasing rather than narrowing the parties” differences.
Since Mr. Clinton is clearly prepared to lay American prestige on the line and, no doubt, billions of American tax dollars, Americans should ask a question. “What is the U.S. national interest in fostering a sixth Israeli-Palestinian “agreement” when the first five-and-a-half have not resulted in any tangible gains for the American position, and only arguable gains for Israel?” [Oslo I, Gaza-Jericho, the Interim Agreement counts as 1/2, Oslo II, the Hebron Accord, and the Wye River Memorandum, for those who can’t keep track.]
Leaving aside the obvious, it appears the President is motivated by fear. “If the parties do not seize this moment to make more progress, there will be more hostility and more bitterness – perhaps even more violence,” he wrote in Newsweek. “President Clinton believes that it’s essential to do it now, because we’re concerned about what happens if this descends into violence,” agreed Mrs. Albright. We assume they mean Palestinian violence since Arafat has already announced that as his option if he doesn’t get what he demands: an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital and the right of return of Palestinian refugees.
Will the President’s fear of violence induce him to “buy off” Arafat in hopes that he will not send his over sized “police force” into the street with their illegal weapons? For how long? At what cost to the United States? At what cost to Israel? What does it say about American foreign policy if we pay off someone who threatens our friends or us? Does this apply to policy elsewhere? OK, that’s more than one question, but we should ask them before we bow at the altar of “peace” when peace isn’t on the table.
America has real national security interests in the Middle East: removing Saddam; dealing with the multiple Iranian threats of terrorism, missiles and WMD; strengthening Turkey and Jordan; dealing with uncertain new leadership in Syria and increasingly unhelpful leadership in Egypt; watching Russian and Chinese inroads to our traditional partners, and more. A President who works to create an undemocratic, anti-American, irridentist Palestinian State under threats of violence to Israel, our only democratic ally in the region and the only country that truly shares our other concerns, would seem to be working counter to America’s national interest.