Bombing Yugoslavia: An Appropriate Framework

As the NATO bombing campaign begins over Yugoslavia, JINSA begins with unreserved support for the American and allied forces that are under taking a dangerous mission. But the mission is ambiguous at best and futile at worst.

If the bombing is designed – as Supreme Commander of NATO forces U.S.General Wesley Clark has said – to inhibit the ability of the Serbian army to continue atrocities against the civilians of Kosovo, it is appropriate.

As the NATO bombing campaign begins over Yugoslavia, JINSA begins with unreserved support for the American and allied forces that are under taking a dangerous mission. But the mission is ambiguous at best and futile at worst.

If the bombing is designed – as Supreme Commander of NATO forces U.S.General Wesley Clark has said – to inhibit the ability of the Serbian army to continue atrocities against the civilians of Kosovo, it is appropriate. If it is presumed to have some larger purpose – such as to force Serbian strongman Milosovic to negotiate a settlement with the Kosovars – it is likely to prove a failure. And if the bombing is presumed to advance some American strategic interest, we fail to see what that interest would be.

Strategic interests have to do with America’s ability to defend its homeland and people, meet its treaty obligations, and preserve its way of life by engaging in commerce and political relations in places around the world. The building of national missile defenses clearly would be in America’s strategic interest.

It was in our strategic interest in 1949 to prevent the Soviet Union from moving the Iron Curtain westward. NATO was designed as a defensive alliance to serve that aim; and it has been spectacularly successful. Now, however, it is operating as an offensive force, and the implications of the change have not been appreciated. Furthermore, two of NATO’s members – Greece and Turkey – are on generally opposite sides of the Yugoslav problem, potentially causing a split within the alliance.

It is in America’s strategic interest to maintain our armed forces at a level of capability adequate to meet challenges to our national security. This includes meeting our treaty obligations to South Korea and NATO; preserving free passage on the seas – including the passage of oil from the Persian Gulf to the West; and defending our homeland from missile or other attack. “Holding” operations around Iraq, and in Bosnia, Haiti, Macedonia, and around Kosovo, plus temporary assignments in Asia, Africa and South America, and drug interdiction all degrade our war fighting capability.

A corollary is that America should refrain from involving itself in civil wars. If we demand autonomy for the Kosovars under the threat of NATO military action, why not threaten Turkey over autonomy for Kurds? The Kosovar Liberation Army demands full independence. So do many Kurds. Where do we stop? Shall we threaten Russia over independence for Chechnya or Ossetia? Threaten China over independence for Taiwan? How will we decide?

The United States is a society built on a moral foundation. When strong men use their military capabilities to slaughter civilians and create hundreds of thousands of refugees, it is moral and appropriate to use ours to stop them. But we cannot pretend that action in Yugoslavia is within some broad framework of American strategic interests that provides a blueprint for political, as well as military action.

It is not.

See JINSA Report #99 for more on the Crisis in Kosovo.