Defense Pact?

In 1979, JINSA published a “quick reference guide” to Israel as a security asset for the United States. It noted that Israel is stable, pro-Western and democratic; has a strong defense infrastructure and Western military orientation; an educated, technologically sophisticated population with language skills including not only our language, but also those of potential adversaries; and occupies a strategic location. All still true.

In 1979, JINSA published a “quick reference guide” to Israel as a security asset for the United States. It noted that Israel is stable, pro-Western and democratic; has a strong defense infrastructure and Western military orientation; an educated, technologically sophisticated population with language skills including not only our language, but also those of potential adversaries; and occupies a strategic location. All still true.

Today, the United States and Israel face threats that are being considered in tandem — the proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD being the most important. On a recent trip to Israel, a JINSA group was told intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and Israel regarding the threats posed by Iran and Iraq is so close that “there is no daylight between us.” Excellent.

But — and this is a HUGE “but” — trying to transform the strong and mutually beneficial U.S.-Israel security relationship into a formal alliance is a terrible idea. The U.S. floats it periodically when it is trying to tempt Israel to offer to do something that should only be done in response to concrete changes in Arab behavior. The idea this time is that a defense pact can give Israel the “confidence” to vacate the Golan Heights even if Syria remains a threat. It is the wrong premise. If Israel and Syria conclude a broad agreement that includes changes in Syria that turn Damascus into a good neighbor, an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan might be included as well. But right now the Syrians aren’t discussing anything with Israel, so continuing discussions of a defense pact amount to a bilateral negotiation about how the U.S. could protect Israel from the results of a unilateral Israeli decision to withdraw from the high ground. Why?

Then what about a “mutual defense pact” in which an attack on Israel would be responded to as an attack on the U.S.? Two mutual defense pacts in which the U.S. participates are NATO and U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK). Israel more closely resembles the latter; a small country protecting itself by using the threat of American retaliation to accomplish the deterrence that the threat of its own retaliation cannot. In exchange for its American troops, the ROK has given up the right to unilateral action, to preemption, to a piece of its independence. Will Israel?

And “mutual” means both ways. But Israel has already made it clear that it wants to be excluded from such American commitments as Yugoslavia, while it wants the benefits of technology cooperation at the level of Great Britain and an assured level of military aid.

The idea appears to have been shelved temporarily, as the State Department announced that it prefers to pursue mechanisms for strengthening Israel’s own capabilities. We always prefer an Israel able to defend itself. For 21 years the sine qua non of JINSA has been the belief that a strong and secure Israel is an asset to be relied upon by American military planners; and conversely, a weakened Israel, regardless of how it is weakened, is less of an asset. A formal defense alliance will take us in the wrong direction.