Epigrams, Part I
The old saying goes, “The enemy of my enemy may be my potential ally on a single limited and strictly coincidental element of policy; but should not be confused with my, or anyone else’s, friend.”
The old saying goes, “The enemy of my enemy may be my potential ally on a single limited and strictly coincidental element of policy; but should not be confused with my, or anyone else’s, friend.”
Last month, JINSA co-sponsored a conference with the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University and the IDF Tactical Command College, and stayed in Israel for further discussions with both government and private offices. The threat posed by Iran, and mounting Sunni Arab concern about increasingly brazen Shiite Persian adventurism in the region, were at the top of everyone’s priority list. Saudi Arabia in particular, the Israelis told us, has been trying to blunt the financial influence of Iran both in Lebanon and in the Palestinian territories with its own infusion of cash.
In several instances Israelis suggested a combined front – America, Israel and the “moderate” Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf States) – including the thought that the U.S. could “recruit” the Saudis to use more of their money in support of moderation. One Ministry of Defense official went so far as to suggest the U.S. offer Saudi Arabia the cover of our nuclear umbrella to blunt concerns that they or Egypt would pursue an independent nuclear capability.
JINSA’s American delegation was less sanguine about the ability of Saudi Arabia or Egypt to play a constructive role, expressing some concern that at the end of the day Muslims of many stripes might prefer Muslim triumphalism to a deal with Israel and/or the infidel West. Or that they might stick with us long enough to shove Iran back in its box, but then turn on Israel. And the Americans were wary of aligning the U.S. too closely with countries in which many of the current policies are not consistent with ours, and in which the ultimate devolution of power was unclear.
One retired American general pointed out that the U.S. had extended its nuclear umbrella to Japan and Germany, “when we were heavily involved creating democracies and influencing their foreign policy… You are talking about an umbrella for human rights violators and terrorism supporters – that is something else. Our values are not consonant with Saudi Arabia.”
Another said, “Saudi Arabia is Sunni, not moderate. It supports Sunni terrorism to the disadvantage of both the U.S. and Israel.”
It is true that Saudi Arabia finds the prospect of a nuclear capable and increasingly belligerent Iran unsettling. Good. It should prompt the Saudis to ask what they can do to stop it. But only when they find the prospect of Sunni radicalism equally unsettling and stop funding and publicly promoting it, will we find the emergence of a coalition of reasonably like-minded countries with an interest in moderation and stability.
Until then, it appears to be a coincidence and nothing more that Saudi Arabia is the enemy of Israel’s enemy and Israel should be wary of trying to embrace it too closely or asking the U.S. to do so.