Epigrams, Part II

With apologies to Yogi Berra, it’s deja vu redux once more all over again.

We thought we were finished with the idea of the U.S. brokering another “peace agreement” between Israel and the Palestinian faction led by Abu Mazen. Apparently we were wrong. In one of those odd juxtapositions of political need, the U.S. and Israel separately, and for different reasons, have both been considering forging a deal with Abu Mazen despite his legal limitations since Hamas won the parliamentary elections, and despite his demonstrated inability to control events in the territories.

With apologies to Yogi Berra, it’s deja vu redux once more all over again.

We thought we were finished with the idea of the U.S. brokering another “peace agreement” between Israel and the Palestinian faction led by Abu Mazen. Apparently we were wrong. In one of those odd juxtapositions of political need, the U.S. and Israel separately, and for different reasons, have both been considering forging a deal with Abu Mazen despite his legal limitations since Hamas won the parliamentary elections, and despite his demonstrated inability to control events in the territories.

There are those in the U.S. and elsewhere who believe “solving the Palestinian problem” is key to progress in other parts of the region. In JINSA’s December meetings (see JINSA Report #635), our official and unofficial Israeli interlocutors unanimously rejected linkage between concessions to the Palestinians and the situation in Iraq. But the report simply says Israel could make it easier for the Arab states to help the U.S. solve the problem of Iraq if it would solve the Palestinian problem and get it out of the way.

This, in fact, squares (coincidentally we believe) with the desire of many Israelis to solve the problem for their own reasons – including regional politics, morality and “fatigue.” During JINSA’s 2006 Flag & General Officers Trip in June, and again at last month’s conference in Israel, we were told Israel has to “do what it takes” to “find a solution.” But whereas in June the Israelis generally were in favor of unilateral action to secure their borders, in December we were told, “There is an imperative to align with moderate Arab states. We may have to change long-held positions on Syria and the Palestinians,” said one. “We can’t solve the Iranian problem. We have to solve the Palestinian problem – I would look at the Saudi plan again,” said another.

A JINSA participant warned the Israelis, “Don’t do anything because you think the U.S. will then solve some larger problem. Only do it because you want to do it for yourselves and you are comfortable with the risk you assume. The U.S. would hard pressed to come to your aid if you give the Palestinians a state and make concessions that turn out to be dangerous for you. Any concessions should be made, in my view, with the understanding that Israel alone will be bearing the consequences.”

It has been and remains our view that Israel has no partner for peace – or even discussions of a practical modus vivendi – among Palestinian power brokers. Abu Mazen is more amenable to discussing day-to-day security for Israel and the Palestinians, but is facing increasingly violent unrest among his own people, fueled by money and political influence from Iran and elsewhere. He has proven unable to deliver on any security promises he makes, despite U.S. military training for his forces.

It remains unclear how Israel can “solve” the problem until the Palestinians agree to do it with them. The obvious analogy is America trying to stabilize Iraq while well-armed and well-motivated forces insist upon destabilizing it. There is no basis for believing either can succeed in the present circumstance.