Export Controls and China
The fact that there have been foreign spies in the United States during the administration of every president does not in the least reduce the extraordinary culpability of the Administration regarding Chinese nuclear spying. The opposite is true.
The single most important obligation of our government is to protect our national security. This of course includes deterring spies, but it also requires policies that would limit the ability of other countries to use information or equipment their spies might acquire for them.
The fact that there have been foreign spies in the United States during the administration of every president does not in the least reduce the extraordinary culpability of the Administration regarding Chinese nuclear spying. The opposite is true.
The single most important obligation of our government is to protect our national security. This of course includes deterring spies, but it also requires policies that would limit the ability of other countries to use information or equipment their spies might acquire for them. The Administration not only did not safeguard our important sites, it sold China the supercomputers that enabled them to use the unclassified software and classified data they stole from our nuclear labs, even after it was aware of the thefts.
Some history: In 1986, the U.S.-Japan Supercomputer Agreement set up a system whereby the two major producers of supercomputers agreed to carefully monitor and regulate sales to third countries – Japan had specific concerns about China. But in 1993, after disbanding COCOM (the multilateral body controlling the sale of sensitive commodities), the U.S. massively liberalized its controls on supercomputers without consulting Japan. JINSA urged a strict licensing system for supercomputers; an accounting of sales and an assessment of their impact on national security and weapons proliferation; a CIA/DIA assessment of who was seeking supercomputers and why; and restoration of a multilateral export licensing system. It didn’t happen.
Then in 1994, the administration moved to weaken the Export Administration Act (EAA) by largely eliminating national security professionals – DOD, NSC and CIA – from the review process that controlled the transfer of advanced technology to hostile or potentially hostile regimes. JINSA protested in a statement signed by 38 American Flag and General Officers who called for the restoration of DOD leadership in controlling exports and a restoration of COCOM. Some DOD influence was restored, but export controls have largely been eviscerated.
JINSA Advisory Board Member Ken Timmerman wrote recently, “With the help of U.S. technologies approved for export since 1993 by the Clinton administration, China has been able to improve its existing fleet of ICBMs and move forward deployment of its next generation DF-31 and DF-41 by at least five years… because China learned the secrets of reliable solid fuel rockets from American companies, and was able to design the musing U.S.-built supercomputers, licensed for sale by the Clinton administration. U.S. technology approved for export to China by the Clinton administration has helped the Chinese military build a new encrypted communications network… And by welcoming large Chinese military delegations to our military exercises in the Pacific, the U.S. has shown the Chinese how to exploit this technology to their advantage…”
The Administration had a deliberate policy to sell military-related technology and equipment to China, and a policy to treat China as a”strategic partner” even after we knew they were stealing from our nuclear labs. The bipartisan Cox Report – endorsed by major American newspapers including The New York Times, The Washington Times, The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal – makes it clear that our policy on exports to China is wrong. The policy needs to be changed now.