For Two Reasons (Turkey)

For two reasons we were extremely disappointed by the Turkish government’s poor political choices prior to the liberation of Iraq. First because we believed and continue to believe Turkey’s future is in concert with the U.S. and the new democracies of Europe (France and Germany will never willingly allow Turkey a place in the EU), and second because we were concerned that the absence of a northern front would increase the likelihood of American and allied casualties in the war.

For two reasons we were extremely disappointed by the Turkish government’s poor political choices prior to the liberation of Iraq. First because we believed and continue to believe Turkey’s future is in concert with the U.S. and the new democracies of Europe (France and Germany will never willingly allow Turkey a place in the EU), and second because we were concerned that the absence of a northern front would increase the likelihood of American and allied casualties in the war.

For two reasons, we chose not to write about our concerns. First because Turkey is a democracy and it was clear that the government’s position was that of the people – although the people might have had a different position if the government hadn’t been leading from behind. And second because by location, size, disposition, educational achievement and form of government, Turkey remains important for the future of democratic advancement and the destruction of terrorist assets and ideology in the larger region.

We instead expressed our concerns privately and forcefully to members of the Turkish government and military, to the political opposition, and to the business and civic elite. They asked that we “have patience” with Turkey. And until now we did.

For two reasons.

First because the military victory in Iraq did not require heavy use of Turkish assistance and the loss of coalition lives was minimal (though each loss was a great one). Second because in the post-war reconstruction phase, we assumed that Turkey would find a way to take the initiative in expressing a desire to work with the U.S. once again as the friend and ally we had long considered it to be.

We were wrong on the second reason.

Since the war, Turkish political analysts increasingly suggest, “Turkey no longer fits in America’s thinking.” For two reasons, we are more concerned that America no longer fits in Ankara’s thinking. First, Turkey has made overtures to Iran and Syria (which is vying for the open slot in the Axis of Evil) rather than to Washington. Second, Turkey asked the U.S. to remove the forces that have been at Incirlik since the start of Operation Northern Watch in 1991.

JINSA remains a supporter of Turkey as a modern, secular, democratic state, the presence of which has made the Middle East and Central Asia more stable and has advanced American interests. It would be in the interest of both countries to find a way to maintain a security relationship as well as an economic and political one.

But for two reasons, its pre-war choices and its post-war choices, it will be hard, though not impossible for Turkey to regain its position as an unquestioned ally.