Have they been reading JINSA Reports?

JINSA has always believed it is the responsibility of the Government of Israel to arrive at arrangements with its neighbors that safeguard the integrity of Israel and the security of its people. This is best done through direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs. In March 1998 we wrote:

Any plan that substitutes American – or any other – judgment about redeployment and defensible borders for that of the Government of Israelis a bad idea… And it is naive to think an American plan might be construed as a “suggestion” without pressure on Israel to accept it.

JINSA has always believed it is the responsibility of the Government of Israel to arrive at arrangements with its neighbors that safeguard the integrity of Israel and the security of its people. This is best done through direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs. In March 1998 we wrote:

Any plan that substitutes American – or any other – judgment about redeployment and defensible borders for that of the Government of Israelis a bad idea… And it is naive to think an American plan might be construed as a “suggestion” without pressure on Israel to accept it. Any plan bearing the prestige of the Government of the United States has enormous implicit pressure…. The U.S. must continue to be a facilitator in the peace process, but it cannot impose solutions on Israel.

We were pleased to see in The New York Times that Prime Minister Barak said before his trip to Washington, “He wants the Americans to scale back their role in the region. He described it as ‘overly involved’ – a result of the recent deterioration in Israel’s relationships with its neighbors. Mr. Barak said the Americans should be able to return to their ‘special role as facilitators’ and stop acting as ‘arbitrator, policemen and judge.'”

Better yet, when the Wye River Accords were signed in October 1998, we cited three concerns about using the CIA as security adjudicator between Israel and the PA. 1) The role is political: “The agreement asks of the CIA what should not be asked of it.” 2) “Three-way arbitration… means Israel is looking at ‘majority rules’ on the single issue that is the heart and soul of sovereign responsibility.” 3) “Rather than encouraging cooperation between (the) two sides… the CIA will likely end up like the MFO in the Sinai. After nearly 20 years, Israel and Egypt want it – rather than each other – to be responsible for maintaining the peace.”

Mr. Barak wants to change the CIA’s role. “I don’t think the CIA should be involved in counting the number of policemen in the Gaza Strip to check up on the Palestinians. I think the American role should be more special. This is the reason I’m going to Washington… I want to share ideas and build an overall strategy.”

The State Department appears to agree. “We would prefer a situation where the Palestinians and the Israelis could work these problems out directly without our extensively involved role,” said spokesman James P. Rubin in The Times.

This augurs well.

On the other hand, President Clinton was quoted as saying he was “eager as a kid with a new toy” to welcome Mr. Barak to Washington. We aren’t sure what toys Mr. Clinton plays with these days, but we find it demeaning that he addressed the elected head of a democratic government in such a manner, and worry about what it says about his intention to meddle in the process.