If the Mission is Political, Generals Shouldn’t Do It

What are three American generals doing in the middle of Israel’s security decision-making process? The fact that they are intimately involved in Palestinian affairs as well as with Israel bodes ill for the U.S.-Israel security relationship and Israel’s sovereign right to protect its citizens against a threat that respects no boundaries. The fact that Israel permits them to be in the middle bodes ill for the same things.

What are three American generals doing in the middle of Israel’s security decision-making process? The fact that they are intimately involved in Palestinian affairs as well as with Israel bodes ill for the U.S.-Israel security relationship and Israel’s sovereign right to protect its citizens against a threat that respects no boundaries. The fact that Israel permits them to be in the middle bodes ill for the same things.

One general is training the Palestinian army/police force/praetorian guard. Another was tasked after Annapolis with judging Israeli and Palestinian compliance with the Road Map. A third is charged with “coordinating security” between Israel and the Palestinians. Excellent, capable, respected American military officers – given an odd series of jobs to do.

We ask, as we always seem to, what is the mission, the American end game? What is it that the United States government wants to accomplish?

The Secretary of State and the President have been clear that the United States wants to arrange life in the area so the Palestinians will provide security for Israel and Israel will withdraw from the West Bank, paving the way for the Palestinian state in which the Administration is heavily invested. This is a political goal, not a military mission, and in order to try to achieve it, the United States has overridden Israel’s sovereign right to determine its own security parameters. Our government has engaged military officers to engage the Palestinians to “help” Israel decide that it is “safe enough” to leave. American military officers should not be asked to do that.

But not only that – or not even that. The Palestinian Authority has not accepted a mission to secure territory on behalf of Israel’s citizens. Abu Mazen has not agreed to “dismantle the terrorist infrastructure” which is his obligation to Israel under the Road Map. (And no, Israeli houses do not rise to the same level of importance and there is no comparison between Israel’s lapses on the Road Map and Palestinian lapses.) And even if they did, who judges whether and when they are capable? Who pays if the judge isn’t Israel and the judge is wrong?

Israel has traditionally asked the United States only for the tools to defend itself, not for military personnel. The successes the IDF has achieved in full-scale war, low intensity conflict and against terrorist attacks are the result of decisions made and carried out in Israel by Israelis – the Security Fence comes quickly to mind. The lack of success in some of those same areas, particularly in responding to an increasingly widespread war of attrition emanating from Gaza, is also the responsibility of the Israeli government.

U.S.-Israel security cooperation on tactics and training in low intensity conflict, urban warfare, intelligence, missile defense, homeland security and first response have made both countries safer without impinging on the sovereign obligations of either. It was a more than workable arrangement, respecting the capabilities and sovereignty of both. It should have been left that way.