It isn’t only Nukes

When last we wrote of North Korea (JINSA Report #610), we pointed out that our “allies” in the Six Party Talks had much more to fear either from North Korean nuclear capabilities or a North Korean collapse than did the U.S., although Washington had allowed itself to become the focus of Kim Jong Il’s obsession. We suggested that a U.S.-North Korea peace treaty might allow us to pay attention to other important northern Pacific regional problems. We may yet get our chance.

When last we wrote of North Korea (JINSA Report #610), we pointed out that our “allies” in the Six Party Talks had much more to fear either from North Korean nuclear capabilities or a North Korean collapse than did the U.S., although Washington had allowed itself to become the focus of Kim Jong Il’s obsession. We suggested that a U.S.-North Korea peace treaty might allow us to pay attention to other important northern Pacific regional problems. We may yet get our chance.

The apparent agreement of North Korea to freeze its nuclear program and to shut down and dismantle the Yongbyon facility can change America’s calculus. To be clear: we do NOT think North Korea will actually do it, and we are NOT happy that the IAEA is in charge – we prefer the Libyan model where U.S. and British agents took control of the nuclear material and shipped it to Oak Ridge, TN. But let’s focus here.

Two immediate issues beg renewed American attention – one military, one moral:

• North Korea has engaged in the proliferation of weapons and missile technology to Iran, Pakistan, Egypt and others. The U.S. should insist that the Proliferation Security Initiative be maintained and strengthened, along with other measures to ensure limits on the export of items which, in the hands others pose a threat to our interests and our forces abroad. The reinstitution of financial sanctions – which appear to have been enormously effective – should remain an open possibility.
• Desperate North Korean refugees who manage to cross the border into China have been forcibly repatriated by the Chinese government in violation of UN resolutions on the treatment of refugees. China calls them “illegal economic migrants,” but a U.S. government report stated: “A compelling case exists for recognizing North Koreans in China as refugees: (NK) regularly denies food to particular groups for political reasons, and refugees returned to North Korea face long prison terms, torture, or execution.” If we can talk about food and oil assistance to North Korea, we can push China to admit UNHCR to the camps where they hold people under appalling conditions before shipping them back.

And, if China has to deal with refugees, other countries, too, have to come to grips with non-nuclear problems in the region – as they should whether the nuclear agreement is a success or, as we suspect, not. Wealthy, democratic South Korea has spent years undermining the American position on the North while treating our soldiers as threat to their lifestyle. Now let South Korea contemplate the cost of a reunification that will dwarf what West Germany spent on the East, while the U.S. contemplates removing forces from the DMZ. Japan has already announced its intention to discuss the abduction of at least 17 of its citizens, presumably by North Korean agents, while China and Russia will have to take account of a Japan newly confident in its military capabilities and reconsidering the limitations on its Self-Defense Force.

The switch in the American position, whether it works or not, was possible because North Korea is of little direct threat to us and provides no leadership to other nasty forces in the region. The case is the opposite with Iran, and while non-nuclear issues have to be considered with regard to Iran as well, our negotiating posture should be different and our relation to our partners – the EU-3 and the Security Council – should be different as well.