It Wasn’t A Sale To An Ally

Congress did not fight the Administration over the Harpoon Block II anti-ship missiles for Egypt. No surprise there. It would have hard to enter open revolt against the President on an issue so closely related to the war. But neither did Congress roll over. According to sources, the Harpoon’s 500-pound warhead has been reduced and changes have been made in the software capability of the missile’s tracking system.

Congress did not fight the Administration over the Harpoon Block II anti-ship missiles for Egypt. No surprise there. It would have hard to enter open revolt against the President on an issue so closely related to the war. But neither did Congress roll over. According to sources, the Harpoon’s 500-pound warhead has been reduced and changes have been made in the software capability of the missile’s tracking system. Both are important to reducing the sea-land attack capability that was the greatest danger to Israel, and reducing the ability to threaten American ships should the missile find its way into unfriendly hands – Egyptian or otherwise.

All in all, the compromise looks interestingly like a proposal JINSA made last December. But before we tip our hat to ourselves, we pointed to three issues to be addressed in any discussion of modifications: “completeness, reversibility and the nature of the warhead.”

Completeness: The general description of the proposed modifications is insufficient. JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition) technology is not needed in a package without any land attack capability, but it is unclear whether that capability has in fact been removed.

Reversibility: It is essential to ensure that the system changes cannot be reversed easily by buying a few components or with some relatively easy software changes.

Warhead: The warhead size is very large for an anti-ship missile really suited for high value land targets or large ships or aircraft carriers (Can) the warhead easily be changed over to other types of munitions including chemical or biological-type weapons… With respect to the U.S. interest, (what is) the lethality of the warhead against a U.S. target should there be a change in the Egyptian government or should terrorists commandeer one of these fast missile boats?

Only on the last point are we now satisfied. On the others, to judge the risks and understand whether the reduction in capability precludes any threat to Israel (or the U.S. under certain circumstances), Congress should request establishment of a strict list of hard-to-reverse modifications.

One other point.

The Administration’s effort to build a coalition against Iraq worked in favor of the Harpoon sale. A congressional staff member told Middle East News Line (MENL), “The focus is on Iraq. (They) made the case that Egypt is important to any campaign against Saddam and nobody feels like arguing with that.”

We would argue with that.

It is unrealistic to assume that the sale of Harpoons will make Egypt an active participant in any future war against Iraq. More likely, the government-controlled media will spew its usual anti-American venom, the “street” will have a field day at our expense, and the government will desperately try to convince its people that it is NOT a participant. All in all, while it may be understandable that the Administration didn’t want to antagonize Egypt at this moment, and Congress acquiesced, it would be foolhardy to pretend that this was a sale to an ally in the war against terrorists and their supporters.