Knowing What We Know – It’s Your Problem Too

The lessons call for transparency by states that don’t want to be attacked by us, not Saddam-style obfuscation. States with long-range missile technology and WMD programs should note that IF we made a mistake about Saddam’s arsenal, we could make the same mistake again with the same effect.

Previously we discussed things that we knew were true. There are also things we thought were true but popular wisdom said we should have known were false.

The lessons call for transparency by states that don’t want to be attacked by us, not Saddam-style obfuscation. States with long-range missile technology and WMD programs should note that IF we made a mistake about Saddam’s arsenal, we could make the same mistake again with the same effect.

Previously we discussed things that we knew were true. There are also things we thought were true but popular wisdom said we should have known were false.

• We thought Saddam was seeking yellowcake uranium in Niger, but he wasn’t.
• And the corollary, we thought Saddam was trying to acquire a nuclear capability, but he wasn’t.
• And the other corollary, we thought the infamous “16 words” in the State of the Union address were true, but they weren’t.
• We thought Saddam was working on affixing chemical sprayers on MiGs, but he wasn’t.
• We thought Saddam had contacts with al-Qaeda operatives, but he didn’t. We thought President Bush and Prime Minister Blair were telling the truth about Iraq based on the collective wisdom of Western intelligence services, but they weren’t (i.e., “they lied”).

But wait! All those things we thought were true then knew were false, were, in fact, true!

Saddam was seeking yellowcake and a nuclear capability, and British intelligence knew it. Saddam buried the MiGs in the desert, and we’ve found them. There were contacts with al-Qaeda – and no one has proven the negative proposition about Saddam and plans for 9-11. And, most importantly, although the British and U.S. Senate reports on intelligence prior to the war are damning of American and British collection and analysis capabilities, both reports are adamant that President Bush and PM Blair did not apply pressure, manipulate or doctor information.

They did not lie. Joseph Wilson did.

The first lesson should be less for us than for those who would do us harm. If Western intelligence collection and analysis leave much to be desired (they do) but if after the attacks of September 11 Western governments are no longer willing to risk large scale attacks by state-supported terrorists (they aren’t), it is suddenly in the interest of rogue and potential rogue states NOT TO MAKE US WORRY ABOUT WHAT THEY HAVE OR TO WHOM THEY MIGHT GIVE IT.

It argues strongly for transparency by states that don’t want to be attacked by us, not Saddam-style obfuscation. Libya’s Khaddafi understood that what happened to Saddam could happen to him and turned over his nuclear and chemical arsenal. Nasty countries with long-range missile technology and chemical/biological programs – Syria, for example – should note that IF we made a mistake about Saddam’s arsenal, we could make the same mistake about Syria’s, with the same effect.

Rather than rending our Western garments, we should be reminding our adversaries that our mistakes could be their problem.