Nations and Post-Nations
With American soldiers in the middle of the fight, it is almost impossible to discuss national, sub national, tribal, ethnic and religious divisions in Iraq. Whatever one says about bringing Iraqis together or dividing them up plays against the backdrop of our troops and our politics. So, while it is tempting to relegate Somalia to the netherworld of our national memory, it is worth a look.
With American soldiers in the middle of the fight, it is almost impossible to discuss national, sub national, tribal, ethnic and religious divisions in Iraq. Whatever one says about bringing Iraqis together or dividing them up plays against the backdrop of our troops and our politics. So, while it is tempting to relegate Somalia to the netherworld of our national memory, it is worth a look.
After more than15 years of chaotic and brutal warfare, most Somalis were desperate for an end to anarchy. Enter the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a locally produced confederated court system, but with some leaders trained, connected and experienced in the Islamic netherworld – including Libya, Afghanistan, and the al-Qaeda-related al-Itihaad al-Islamiya. The courts imposed order, but the order they imposed was Sharia law, including lashes and amputations. This did not make them unpopular in largely secular Somalia – on the contrary, people appeared willing to accommodate the lifestyle for stability that looked like peace.
At some point, it appears the ICU went too far in military attacks on the secular (and ineffectual) government. Ethiopia entered Somalia in the fall on the side of the government. By January 1, the Islamists were retreating from their last stronghold – Kismayo in the south. Kenya closed its border and the U.S. Navy was patrolling the Indian Ocean along the Somali coast to keep the Islamists from filtering through.
Great, right? Pro-active non-Islamic countries toss an Islamic government and everything’s hunky dory. Not quite.
Even if the Islamists don’t engage in guerrilla warfare, a specialty of Somalis of many stripes and the obvious tactic for those ousted from power, the secular government restored to Mogadishu was previously incapable of providing security and is unlikely to be able to do it now. There are already reports of “private” militias taking over, guns back in the streets and people unsure which groups might protect them and which might brutalize them. This is the circumstance in which tribal loyalties become paramount and whatever “national” loyalties there were recede. The anarchy of post-national Somalia in 1991 is precisely what produced the ICU to begin with.
There is a lesson in “nation building” here for the U.S. There are nation-states who came together over years of shared experiences (including warfare), and some that have ethnic and tribal homogeneity. Some few come together over an agreed-upon set of principles. Most, however, are the results of lines badly drawn by outside powers, giving trans-national identities – religious, ethnic or tribal – strong influence among people for whom the national identity is either irrelevant or a source of brutality.
The results of America’s short military intervention in Somalia had far-reaching political and military implications – unwillingness to intervene in Rwanda and Darfur as well as heavy reliance on air power in Bosnia and Kosovo – but they would be dwarfed by the implications of failing to understand post-national warfare in Iraq.