Negotiations That Aren’t
The Israeli government and military did what increasingly appears to be an extraordinary job of degrading the Hamas arsenal and leadership, reasserting deterrence not only against Gaza but against Hezbollah and Iran, and limiting civilian casualties. [It now appears that 12, not 41 people were killed outside the UNRWA school that Israel DID NOT HIT – nine adult males (some known Hamas members) and three civilians.]
But the Israeli government is giving Hamas leadership an opportunity to whine, moan, cry and make demands in Cairo – and be listened to.
The Israeli government and military did what increasingly appears to be an extraordinary job of degrading the Hamas arsenal and leadership, reasserting deterrence not only against Gaza but against Hezbollah and Iran, and limiting civilian casualties. [It now appears that 12, not 41 people were killed outside the UNRWA school that Israel DID NOT HIT – nine adult males (some known Hamas members) and three civilians.]
But the Israeli government is giving Hamas leadership an opportunity to whine, moan, cry and make demands in Cairo – and be listened to.
At some point in the Gaza War, JINSA suggested that Israel simply announce that it had completed the current phase of response to aggression and that it was ceasing fire until the time it was necessary to fire again. And then behave accordingly. (JINSA Report #843)
Ultimately, Israel did announce a sort of unilateral cease fire, but it was directly coupled with an Egyptian-negotiated unilateral Hamas cease fire. Then began the negotiation that wasn’t. Israel on one side, Hamas on the other and Egypt in the increasingly uncomfortable middle, non-negotiating the opening of border crossings, non-negotiating the release of Hamas terrorists and non-negotiating the release of Gilad Shalit.
All of these non-negotiations have the effect of giving Hamas a role where it deserves none and undermining Israel’s right to self-defense and right to have its illegally-held prisoner returned. And they have, not surprisingly, driven a wedge between Egypt and Israel – particularly after the Israeli government added the requirement that Shalit’s return is the key to opening the border, but engaging in a concurrent non-negotiation about the number of terrorists it would pay Hamas for the release.
Whoever doesn’t understand that Israel is negotiating with Hamas, please leave the room. Senator Kerry did a better job of avoiding Hamas while he was in Gaza than Israel has done using Egypt as a go-between.
One result is that international agencies, most of which are totally corrupted by their close financial and political relations with Hamas, have no incentive to be more cooperative with Israel and less with Hamas. Not to let them off the hook for their corruption or anti-Israel policies, it still has to be recognized that Hamas is the clear controlling government power in Gaza. President Obama dipped into an emergency fund for $20 million this week for extra aid to Gaza through international organizations including UNRWA. To whom will UNRWA answer?
Another result is pressure for a Hamas-Fatah “unity government.” For those who believe Fatah is an appropriate negotiating partner for Israel or a better steward of international largesse, the resurrection and legitimization of Hamas by Israel in Cairo makes it much harder to think Fatah will have the upper hand in any such government. The idea that Fatah, not Hamas, will control reconstruction funds flies in the face of Hamas control on the ground, and any “unity government” will have to take account of the Hamas demands that Israel is currently entertaining.
A third result is rising tension between Egypt and Israel. Egypt, for its own very good reasons, detests Hamas and was supportive of the Israeli action. Being forced into the role of arbiter, Egypt finds itself having to take a more pro-Hamas position in order to remain acceptable to Hamas in order to remain the arbiter, which it must in order to avoid being accused of being too pro-Israel. Not to let Egypt off the hook for its lax control of the Gaza border, it still has to be recognized that the Egyptian position would be stronger if it didn’t have to sit with Hamas and relay Israeli instructions.
None of the above – international aid organizations, Fatah or Egypt – are what we consider really good partners. All are less bad than Hamas; all are Israel’s interlocutors in various areas. The incoming Israeli government should consider reasserting a unilateral Israeli position on security, borders and international aid that requires interested parties to deal with it, cuts out Hamas, and stops undermining the neighbors.