On Arms Sales and Defense Budgets
A few weeks ago, we noted the impending $60 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia, plus $35 billion to $40 billion in contracts signed by the UAE, Oman’s expected $12 billion purchase and $7 billion in planned purchases by Kuwait. We were amused by State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley’s boilerplate disclaimer, that the United States “would do nothing that would upset the current balance in the region.”
A few weeks ago, we noted the impending $60 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia, plus $35 billion to $40 billion in contracts signed by the UAE, Oman’s expected $12 billion purchase and $7 billion in planned purchases by Kuwait. We were amused by State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley’s boilerplate disclaimer, that the United States “would do nothing that would upset the current balance in the region.”
We contend that adding $119 billion in weapons and other military equipment on the Arab side does indeed upset the balance, particularly when coupled with a potential slowdown in F-35 deliveries to Israel.
Israel recently signed an agreement that makes its purchase of 19 (they were hoping to squeeze out 20 at the price) Lockheed Martin F-35s one of the cornerstones of its future Qualitative Military Edge (a concept with which we have trouble, but that’s a different story). The Obama administration, and Israel, hailed the signing as evidence of a strong U.S.-Israel security relationship.
But the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense has cut the planned number of F-35 aircraft to be produced in FY11 from 42 to 32. This is likely to have the effect of increasing unit price and, since Israel will pay the same fly away cost per aircraft as the U.S. Government (plus certain costs related specifically to the Israeli version), anything that increases cost per copy to the U.S. Government will also affect the Israeli cost per plane. It may also slow delivery for Israel because of potential bottlenecks in future years as they work to ramp up production. As it is, the timeline is three aircraft delivered in 2015, eight in 2016 and eight in 2017.
That doesn’t seem like a lot compared to the $100+ billion the Saudis and the Gulf States are planning to spend. And it makes us worry about the delivery schedule for those 84 new F-15 fighter jets bound for Saudi Arabia, plus upgrades to 70 existing Saudi F-15s, 190 helicopters and a wide array of missiles, bombs and delivery systems, as well as accessories such as night-vision goggles and radar warning systems. Under that circumstance, will slowing the delivery and increasing the price of the Israeli F-35 buy “upset the current balance in the region”? If not, why not?
No one was “out to get Israel.” This has more to do with the belief that the F-35 is behind schedule and over budget. Maybe, but please explain how slowing it down, stretching it out and removing economies of scale for suppliers will help anyone – particularly Israel.
Israel faces a period in which not only are the Gulf States spending their grandchildren’s inheritance, but also in which Iran is moving closer to overt control of southern Lebanon. Israel faces Iranian-sponsored quasi-states on two of its borders, plus Syria, which will receive highly capable Russian P-800 Yakhont cruise missiles in 2011.
Israel recently completed the Ballistic Missile Defense exercise Juniper Falcon 11, conducted with U.S. European Command. The exercise included the testing of a range of Ballistic Missile Defense assets focused on command post simulation in response to a mock enemy missile attack by Iran and Syria. It was a great success according to all involved. But who thinks that after Israel defends itself from a ballistic missile attack, it won’t need aircraft to respond to the aggressors?
The F-35 is a key part of Israel’s future planning and since it is unlikely to impede the Gulf sales, Congress should ensure that the plane can be delivered in a timely fashion and at a cost Israel can handle – which argues for maintaining the original production schedule, not slowing and stretching.