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Opening Signs and Opening Lines

The Clinton Administration invested heavily in Israeli-Palestinian negotiation sat least in part because, “The U.S. has long believed that the Palestinian issue represents the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict.” (U.S. Dept. of State 3/17/00) We disagree. The core of the conflict is Arab rejection of the legitimacy of Israel; Palestinian rejection is a subset of that.

The Clinton Administration invested heavily in Israeli-Palestinian negotiation sat least in part because, “The U.S. has long believed that the Palestinian issue represents the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict.” (U.S. Dept. of State 3/17/00) We disagree. The core of the conflict is Arab rejection of the legitimacy of Israel; Palestinian rejection is a subset of that. The security of Israel requires that both Palestinian aspirations and the threats posed by Arab armies be addressed but not with equal emphasis.

The Bush Administration appears to have its own Middle East priorities, and thus far at least, we like them. Mr. Bush declined to send an envoy to the last-minute Palestinian-Israeli talks. He also declined to name a permanent special Middle East envoy, effectively restoring the Secretary of State to his rightful place in the foreign policy hierarchy. In this regard, Gen. Colin Powell’s confirmation testimony bears noting: “I believe it is in the power of the Palestinian leadership and Mr. Arafat (to stop the violence)” and so we will call on him to do that and encourage him to do that and only then can we see what the next step in this process is going to be… It all begins with making absolutely sure that Israelis secure. The only democracy in the region, a nation we have supported for fifty years, it has to be secure and it has to feel that it is secure and that it can defend itself. And we cannot expect Israel to do much in conditions of violence, where their security is at risk.”

Shortly thereafter, he noted that the U.S. has broad interests in the region beyond Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, and he banished the term”peace process” from the diplomatic lexicon. (Has he been reading JINSA Reports? See #167and especially #166.)

The President was quick to call Ariel Sharon after the Israeli election and Secretary Powell was equally quick to announce publicly that the Arab states should avoid precipitous action and give Mr. Sharon a chance to form his government.

Mr. Arafat should note the attention being paid to Saddam his own chief rhetorical supporter and a threat to Israeli and American national security interests. Following a recent Iraqi-Syrian rapprochement, several Iraqi divisions moved to the area of the Syrian border. In response, the Administration, having called exorcising Saddam a priority, raised the alert status of U.S. forces in Europe, and sent two Patriot batteries to Israel from Germany. Other European-based Patriot batteries were sent to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. According to intelligence sources, a joint U.S.-Israeli military exercise called “Juniper Cobra,” including the Patriot brigade from Germany, took place this month.

While we believe that in the best case Israel should be able to defend itself against all threats, we can appreciate the signal that Iraqi or other Arab adventurism against Israel will meet with an American as well as Israeli response.

As Secretary Powell prepares for his regional fact-finding mission, we hope these early signs presage an American Middle East policy based on defending American interests in the company of like-minded regional allies. A strong and secure Israel would be well placed to be a partner.