Pakistan and the Lawyers
America is based on its founding documents; one can “become American.” On the other hand, to be German is a racial identity. And, as second and third generation Turkish-German citizens have discovered, racial assimilation is not an option and cultural assimilation doesn’t always work too well either. The existence of Pakistan raises the question, “What if a country has neither a workable founding philosophy nor a single bloodline?”
America is based on its founding documents; one can “become American.” On the other hand, to be German is a racial identity. And, as second and third generation Turkish-German citizens have discovered, racial assimilation is not an option and cultural assimilation doesn’t always work too well either. The existence of Pakistan raises the question, “What if a country has neither a workable founding philosophy nor a single bloodline?”
Pakistan is ethnically, linguistically, culturally and tribally diverse, with no raison d’etre as a country other than to be “not India.” Unfortunately for the Pakistanis, according to Hussein Haqqani, an author and former advisor to three Pakistani Prime Ministers, “the country was created in a hurry and without giving detailed thought to various aspects of nation and state building.”
Instead, nationalist leaders chose the lowest common denominators: pan-Islamic ideology and the threat of India, giving enormous power to religious and military elites who over time became intertwined and linked by their desire for power.
Pervez Musharraf is the latest in the line of Pakistani leaders who rule with the active acquiescence of the military and religious leadership – both need to be paid off for the government to survive. Musharraf tried marginally and self-servingly to rein in the religious establishment after September 11th. The United States tried to separate him from his military position – to enhance the “civilian government,” but Musharraf cannot afford to cut his military ties. The military stands between the current tenuous situation and a Taliban-style government with nuclear weapons and between Musharraf and his own possible ouster. [There is a LOT of self-serving in Pakistan.]
There are calls for the United States to “do something” about Pakistan. Some are blaming America for what we have already one – whether supporting Musharraf too much or not supporting him enough. Musharraf himself seems to believe we will protect him to the bitter end – lest Pakistan go the way of Iran. Perhaps he sees himself as the Shah and believes that having once made the mistake of clearing out a secular ruler on behalf of the mullahs, the United States will not be inclined to do so again. He may have slightly misread the narrative.
President Bush has correctly called for Musharraf to resign his military position, for elections to be held, and for free movement by Benazir Bhutto, the primary opposition candidate. But the military, religious and civil structures in Pakistan are so completely intertwined and so completely corrupt, it is unlikely that anything we do will have much beneficial impact.
President Bush might usefully make one additional point to Musharraf: we could and did remove the Shah; but we may not have been able to save the Shah in the face of growing discontent from the Iranian middle class. We may not remove Musharraf; but when the lawyers are angry, we may not be able to save him from the Pakistani people.