Part II: Negotiating with a Brick Wall
A negotiation requires the flexibility to concede something to gain something. If you concede nothing while your counterpart concedes something, you win and he loses. If the opposite occurs, the opposite results. If you both concede something and gain something, win-win. Yes, it’s simple. So why do so many people who call themselves “smart” want to talk to Iran? And why do other people call that “realpolitik”? And why is it that the Saudis and the Iraqi Prime Minister get it, while the Baker Boys don’t?
A negotiation requires the flexibility to concede something to gain something. If you concede nothing while your counterpart concedes something, you win and he loses. If the opposite occurs, the opposite results. If you both concede something and gain something, win-win. Yes, it’s simple. So why do so many people who call themselves “smart” want to talk to Iran? And why do other people call that “realpolitik”? And why is it that the Saudis and the Iraqi Prime Minister get it, while the Baker Boys don’t?
The Iranian government appears to have a set of deeply held, fully grounded beliefs about religion, governance and nuclear capability; none appear to be negotiable. And, in an important respect – which Kissinger and company appear to have missed – there is no comparison to the Cold War Soviets. By the 1950s, Lenin’s fanatical devotion to communist ideology had long since ceased to motivate the leadership. Its goal was the maintenance of power and the perks thereof. Deterrence, even MAD, was rational. Neither side could afford to tip the balance beyond a certain, sometimes-nasty zone of understanding – mucking around Central America, OK. Xerox machines for Solidarity, OK. Spying, OK. Shooting across the Fulda Gap, NOT OK. No direct retaliation.
Islamic radicals (Iranian, Syrian, Saudi and otherwise) are motivated by ideological or even apocalyptic fervor – making deterrence unsustainable and many of the normal “carrots” of international diplomacy irrelevant. So what will we talk to Iran and Syria about? What to pay them to let the U.S. retreat from Iraq in an orderly fashion?
Even if we talk to Iran – making a mockery of America’s Great Power status and shattering the hopes of millions in the Middle East who hope for something better than the 7th Century – stability in Iraq would be far from ensured. One thing we should have learned from the spiraling descent of Palestinian society is that violent rage, wrapped in religion and fueled by money and veneration, takes on a life of its own. The idea that the killers in Iraq (or the PA) are otherwise peaceful people who would return home to shepherd their flocks if only the U.S. (or Israel) left (or dropped dead), is naive in the extreme.
Why would Iran do anything for us after we leave? It would have achieved through the combination of violence and one-sided negotiation a U.S. exit from Iraq and hegemony there, and through it a border with Syria (and through that, Lebanon) Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Not to mention increased stature in the Shiite world. You can expect more of the same. The Saudis oppose American negotiations with Iran precisely because they believe Iran will emerge with its nuclear program intact and its reach further spread, particularly into the Shi’ite areas of Iraq bordering Saudi Arabia. Iraqi PM al-Maliki understands that his future depends on more on accommodation with the mullahs than with the U.S., hence his snub of the President and continuing support of al-Sadr’s militia.
They aren’t wrong and for America to throw Israel on the sacrificial altar for this is a waste of a good ally. The Saudis and al-Maliki don’t care about the Palestinians; the Israelis aren’t the problem. Iran is the problem and they seem to have decided that since we won’t do anything about it, they will protect themselves some other way. That’s “realpolitik” of the school the Baker Boys should understand.