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Policy Options: Incoming?

- Monday, October 27, 2008 |

Dennis Ross, President Clinton’s Middle East envoy, is now speaking on behalf of Senator Obama on issues of Middle East security. In a recent interview, he addressed key issues of concern to JINSA readers.

In terms of the [Palestinian-Israeli] peace process, if you don’t engage, then by definition, Hamas becomes stronger… Senator Obama won’t deal with a non-state actor like Hamas unless Hamas changes its position, unless it’s prepared to recognize Israel, unless it makes it clear [that] it gives up on terror, unless it’s prepared to recognize previous agreements. So as for non-state actors, he’s not willing to deal with them… the U.S. should play a role, the U.S. should be involved, the U.S. should do what it can to promote the peace process and build bridges where it can… We cannot impose peace, because an imposed peace isn’t peace at all. He’s more than willing to invest in the process, but, then again, how he does it and in what ways will depend very much on the circumstances, and obviously there are many other issues out there.

It is an important statement and we very much appreciate the idea that an imposed peace is no peace at all.

Amb. Ross glosses over a crucial point, however, implying that American “engagement” will be between Israel and Fatah, because Sen. Obama will not “deal” with Hamas. But Israel and Fatah at best control only two of the three entities occupying space between the Jordan and the Mediterranean. “Not dealing with Hamas,” we assume, means not talking with or negotiating with Hamas – OK, but someone has to “deal” with Hamas, and someone has to “deal” with Gaza.” To ignore them is folly.

Through weapons imports and terrorist training – some of it in Iran with Hezbollah – Gaza is in danger of becoming an Iranian outpost next to Israel. The IDF already sees Hamas troops engaged in military training – not just terrorist capability, but fighting in formations. Saudi Arabia tried to restore some of its influence with Sunni Hamas, but for now, Iran has trumped Sunni solidarity. And while Fatah is confined to the West Bank, Hamas definitely is not confined to Gaza, meaning even where Israel and Fatah might find modus operandus, Hamas is there to play spoiler.

The U.S. military is arming and training Palestinian forces to try to control Hamas on the West Bank, but the IDF provides the only real security. Moreover, while Fatah forces are happy enough to thwart Hamas interests where they can, there is expressly no pledge from Abu Mazen to use those troops to protect Israeli citizens from Palestinian terrorists – including terrorists from Fatah’s own al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.

And Abu Mazen’s term as President of Palestine is ending, meaning that both the Americans and the Israelis face the possibility of Hamas being “elected” to run the whole “shooting match,” so to speak. And if the Palestinians don’t have an election, we are training the Fatah army to hold power by force against its own people. This should raise questions in the United States, even if the result is that we temporarily keep the dictator we like.

JINSA has been skeptical about “processes” that ask parties to give up deeply held beliefs and understandings in the name of “peace.” That was the nature of the Oslo process, and that process failed. We were, and remain, skeptical that Abu Mazen and Fatah have given up the idea that the creation of Israel was a mistake, and have decided that Jewish sovereignty is, in fact, legitimate. We believe that Fatah and Hamas are closer in political ideology, if not action plan, than Fatah and Israel.

The next president – whoever it is – will find three players, three governments and three physically separate entities. There will be no way not to “deal” with them all.