Priorities in Lebanon and in Syria

The goal of the revolution is regime change; the goal of the dictator is regime preservation. While international focus has been on change in Lebanon, relatively little attention has been paid to Junior Assad’s priorities, and the rock and hard place between which he lies. It isn’t Lebanon’s regime he needs to preserve; it is his own and his priorities include:

The goal of the revolution is regime change; the goal of the dictator is regime preservation. While international focus has been on change in Lebanon, relatively little attention has been paid to Junior Assad’s priorities, and the rock and hard place between which he lies. It isn’t Lebanon’s regime he needs to preserve; it is his own and his priorities include:

• Syrian relations with Iran and Iranian support for Hizballah in Lebanon
• The drug and counterfeiting trades in the Bekka Valley
• The Syrian intelligence presence in Lebanon that makes everything else work
• The economic safety valve provided by Syrian workers in Lebanon.

To begin at the end, if the tens of thousands of Syrians working in Lebanon returned home, they would be a restive group – unemployed and repressed after being paid and being relatively free in Lebanon. There is no hope of employing them inside Syria, or of employing the drug lords and counterfeiters and their private armies who provide cash flow to the Damascus government while they make their own fortunes. The private militias have hardly been mentioned, but they, as much as Hizballah, comprise the real armed forces of Lebanon. They are unlikely to disband themselves and Junior has to believe that at least some of them will want revenge on his regime for destroying their cozy setup in the Bekka.

More important, the Syria/Iran “alliance” that was announced in the wake of the Hariri assassination actually began decades ago in support of Hizballah activities in Lebanon and worldwide. Since the late 1970s, Lebanon has been a haven for terrorists of all stripes – Israel found Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, Italian, German, Japanese, and Irish groups there in 1982, along with every Arab/Muslim variation. These relationships were instrumental in establishing al-Qaeda and Hizballah in Latin America, and are in part responsible for the nexus between terrorism and drug money.

For years, Iranian weapons have been flown into Damascus and trucked to Lebanon. Iran’s failures (and Israel’s successes) with the Santorini and the Karine-A weapons ships prove that a land link is essential. As is religious Iran’s agreement NOT to foment Islamic revolution in secular Syria. Junior is an Alawite, not only a minority sect in Syria, but one that is not even considered properly Muslim by some Islamic authorities. A fatwa from the mullahs, and the Alawites aren’t Muslims any more. This may account for Junior’s hastily arranged trip to Riyadh – checking on his status with the Wahabi clerics in case he falls out with the Iranians.

Regime change is, of course, our goal both in Lebanon and Syria. We wrote long ago that there are three ways to achieve it – the dictator chooses to change; he falls before his own unhappy people; or, if he poses a threat to the outside, the outside takes him out. Stage two appears underway, but concerted international action will be required to ensure that the dominoes continue to fall in the direction of freedom and government accountability to the people. There is still tremendous potential for backlash if Iran and Syria don’t reorder their priorities – and reduce their prerogatives – in someone else’s country.